After reading the second volume of "The Crucible of War" (up to the retreat from Matruh, for the time being), you come to feel sorry for the hundreds, even thousands, of lives wasted needlessly in the fight for infantry "boxes" which long after the battle stood smoking, its defenses shattered, criss-crossed with panzer tracks, as mute testimony to the effectiveness of the war of movement, epitomized by Rommel's steel spearheads in their race for the Delta. Were "box" tactics a good idea gone sour? A need out of lack of resources? Or the deadly brainchild of armchair brass?
After reading the second volume of "The Crucible of War" (up to the retreat from Matruh, for the time being), you come to feel sorry for the hundreds, even thousands, of lives wasted needlessly in the fight for infantry "boxes" which long after the battle stood smoking, its defenses shattered, criss-crossed with panzer tracks, as mute testimony to the effectiveness of the war of movement, epitomized by Rommel's steel spearheads in their race for the Delta. Were "box" tactics a good idea gone sour? A need out of lack of resources? Or the deadly brainchild of armchair brass? Warlord, Box tactics were absolutely 'brainless', as a defensive measue to stop highly armoured/mechanised forces. The debacles at Gazala (Boxes) and the Cauldron are proof of this. The British (one Divsion), South African (two Divisions, one in Tobruk) and 1st Free French Division were at Gazala/Tobruk. The 8th Army had circa 100,000 troops compared to the Axis' 90,000 and more tanks, but still ended up defeated at Gazala and the Cauldron, and amongst other matters, lost Tobruk and then retreated all the way to the Alemein line. The Brigade boxes relied on mutual support, but the reality was that faced with Panzers, anti-tank guns and Artillery it was impossible to provide the required support. At Gazala, both the 1st Free French Div at Bir Hackeim and 150th Brigade, 50th (Northumbrian) Div, were in the southern most boxes, very islolated and took the brunt of the Axis attacks. The 1st Free French held out for 16 days, but had to retreat eventually. The 150th Brigade received the brunt of the Axis attack and was overrun, its CO KIA and the whole Brigade either KIA or taken prisoner. The Brigade was struck off the nominal roll i.e. it ceased to exist for the duration. The 50 Div also lost two Divisional support regiments; 72nd Field Regiment, RA - same fate as 150th Brigade - and 50th Recce Regiment in the Cauldron - never reformed. The 50th Recce was actually attached to the 22nd Armoured Brigade at the time. The 150th Brigade, 72nd Field Regiment RA and 50th Recce Regiment (the latter then being 4th Bn Royal Northumberland Fusiliers) had all served with 50 Div in France as part of the BEF. NB. For the sake of accuracy, the 4th Bn Royal Northumberland Fusiliers was reformed as an Independent Machine Gun Battalion. The 8th Army lost circa 33,000 men as POW at Tobruk and its surrounds, with about a third being South African; indeed the 2nd SA Div ceased to exist, with what remained of the Division i.e. the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and the 1st Field Regiment of the Cape Field Artillery becoming part of the 1st SA Div. Box tactics was an 'experiment' that went dreadfully wrong. That said, just because Box tactics didn't work, doesn't by default mean that it gives "testimony to the effectiveness of the war of movement, epitomized by Rommel's steel spearheads". General Leslie Morshead, CO 9th Australian Div, who held Tobruk for 8 months in 1941 despite Rommel and his Panzers, believed 'Blitzkrieg' (as it became known) to be a limited tactical manouvre. This belief was also held by Monty, who gave Rommel's Panzers a bloody nose at Alam Halfa and Medenine, and whose tactics proved far superior to those of Rommel i.e. the Afrika Korps and their Italian allies were defeated. And don't forget what the British and Canadian's under Monty did to the German Panzers and a very large chunk of the German 7th Army in Normandy - destroyed them. Best, Steve.
Warlord, That said, just because Box tactics didn't work, doesn't by default mean that it gives "testimony to the effectiveness of the war of movement, epitomized by Rommel's steel spearheads". General Leslie Morshead, CO 9th Australian Div, who held Tobruk for 8 months in 1941 despite Rommel and his Panzers, believed 'Blitzkrieg' (as it became known) to be a limited tactical manouvre. This belief was also held by Monty, who gave Rommel's Panzers a bloody nose at Alam Halfa and Medenine, and whose tactics proved far superior to those of Rommel i.e. the Afrika Korps and their Italian allies were defeated. And don't forget what the British and Canadian's under Monty did to the German Panzers and a very large chunk of the German 7th Army in Normandy - destroyed them. Best, Steve. Well, effectiveness doesn't equal perfection, and every tactic has its counter-tactic somewhere, specially when you push your resources (including luck) beyond the breaking point. First Alamein happened because Blitkrieg at any cost faced too few panzers and dog-tired infantry against rather well dug-in defences, with their backs against the wall; at Alam-Halfa and Medenine the breakthrough was all that mattered, and in the meat-grinder the butcher's bill was just too big for Rommel's supply train. Which, of course, doesn't deny the benefits of saving lives through sacrificing hardware, and, above all, of well balanced formations, capable of hitting hard at the enemy's weak points, no matter where and of what kind they are.
Warlord / Steve - it's wonderful to sit here and win all the battles of yester years BUT -fact is that this small mindeness of brigade boxes came about in the very early days when a troop of 11th Hussars or KDG's could rout an Italian garrison by scaring the hell out of them ......as it was about all Wavell had in those days - and he made excellent use of it with Popskies Private army - LRDG - we musn't forget that the five day raid turned into much longer raid by wiping out a complete Italian Army at Beda Fomm with just a euphemistically named XIII corps under O'Conner. T'was neither Wavell's nor O'Connors decision to send the Australian and KIWI forces to Greece andCrete- that was apolitical decisionby Churchill aided and abetted by Eden- and we know how that ended - Wavell was fired - then Auckinlek took over and had the same little bde box mentality - Then upon the scene strides Rommel who fought in divisional strength -and was still repulsed by Moreshead at Tobruk.... 8th Army grew until they could take Rommel on and at Crusader they nearly did it when he crawledback to El Agehlia - to be reinfored when 8th Army was very week and thus we had the mess from Gazala - then Auchinlek was fired and upon the scene strides Monty who said 8th Army will now fight in Divisional strength also and we will not run after their small panzrs onto his BIG 88mm. guns- and lo and behold Alam el Halfa was won on points .....but the armour was still not good enough until after Medenine - when Rommel was fired - and lo and behold we won the war..... Cheers
Well, effectiveness doesn't equal perfection, and every tactic has its counter-tactic somewhere, specially when you push your resources (including luck) beyond the breaking point. First Alamein happened because Blitkrieg at any cost faced too few panzers and dog-tired infantry against rather well dug-in defences, with their backs against the wall; at Alam-Halfa and Medenine the breakthrough was all that mattered, and in the meat-grinder the butcher's bill was just too big for Rommel's supply train. Which, of course, doesn't deny the benefits of saving lives through sacrificing hardware, and, above all, of well balanced formations, capable of hitting hard at the enemy's weak points, no matter where and of what kind they are. No disagreement here Warlord! Warlord / Steve - it's wonderful to sit here and win all the battles of yester years BUT -fact is that this small mindeness of brigade boxes came about in the very early days when a troop of 11th Hussars or KDG's could rout an Italian garrison by scaring the hell out of them ......as it was about all Wavell had in those days - and he made excellent use of it with Popskies Private army - LRDG - we musn't forget that the five day raid turned into much longer raid by wiping out a complete Italian Army at Beda Fomm with just a euphemistically named XIII corps under O'Conner. T'was neither Wavell's nor O'Connors decision to send the Australian and KIWI forces to Greece andCrete- that was apolitical decisionby Churchill aided and abetted by Eden- and we know how that ended - Wavell was fired - then Auckinlek took over and had the same little bde box mentality - Then upon the scene strides Rommel who fought in divisional strength -and was still repulsed by Moreshead at Tobruk.... 8th Army grew until they could take Rommel on and at Crusader they nearly did it when he crawledback to El Agehlia - to be reinfored when 8th Army was very week and thus we had the mess from Gazala - then Auchinlek was fired and upon the scene strides Monty who said 8th Army will now fight in Divisional strength also and we will not run after their small panzrs onto his BIG 88mm. guns- and lo and behold Alam el Halfa was won on points .....but the armour was still not good enough until after Medenine - when Rommel was fired - and lo and behold we won the war..... Cheers Well balanced note Tom, thank you. It is sometimes easy to forget the difference pre-Rommel and the DAK. However, Rommel and his methods were not unknown to the British, given his rapier thrust through France to Abbeville at the mouth of the Somme in 1940. It should not have taken a genious to work out that different tactics to 'defensive Boxes' would be needed to counter him/DAK. Accepting that a good many experienced N Africa hands were sent to Greece/Crete, the 'British' still had superority in numbers of men and tanks. Whilst accepting that a lot of these Troops were new to N Africa, the same is also true of the DAK. What the British surely lacked at this time was visionary, capable leadership and better equipment. Monty arrived with the vision and capability, and conveniently for him at the time when better equipment was starting to filter through. I know it is easy to sit here and be an armchair critic...so I'll sit in my 'Box' and ask a question: Do you think Monty would have fought at Gazala and in the Cauldron, and if so would he have fought the same way tactically as Ritchie (and Auckinleck)? Best, Steve.
Box tactics was an 'experiment' that went dreadfully wrong. That said, just because Box tactics didn't work, doesn't by default mean that it gives "testimony to the effectiveness of the war of movement, epitomized by Rommel's steel spearheads". . If you didn't have boxes, where would you put your infantry? It was an extension of standard British infantry practice, which stressed solid defensive positions and defensive fields of fire. In the desert, instead of a infantry defending in one direction, they used "boxes" so that enemy Panzer formations couldn't swing round and attack from the rear. At Gazala the boxes held out, there were several attacks against Bir Hachim that were repulsed with heavy casualties to the attackers. The problem was that the "Boxes" needed a strong mobile force to counter envelopment attacks, and neither the British equipment nor doctrine were up to the task. Almost all the British armour (Crusader, Valentine, Matilda, Cruiser III,) was armed with the 2 pdr, without any HE shell it was almost useless against German defensive positions or AT guns. They only had a single brigades worth of Grants. The British AT was almost exclusively 2 pdr, with only a dozen or so 6 pdrs. The whole position fell apart on "Black Saturday" When the 4th & 22nd armoured brigades were badly defeated. At Gazala it wasn't the boxes that were the problem, it was a poorly equipped armoured force using poor tactics. IMO
If you didn't have boxes, where would you put your infantry? It was an extension of standard British infantry practice, which stressed solid defensive positions and defensive fields of fire. In the desert, instead of a infantry defending in one direction, they used "boxes" so that enemy Panzer formations couldn't swing round and attack from the rear. At Gazala the boxes held out, there were several attacks against Bir Hachim that were repulsed with heavy casualties to the attackers. The problem was that the "Boxes" needed a strong mobile force to counter envelopment attacks, and neither the British equipment nor doctrine were up to the task. Almost all the British armour (Crusader, Valentine, Matilda, Cruiser III,) was armed with the 2 pdr, without any HE shell it was almost useless against German defensive positions or AT guns. They only had a single brigades worth of Grants. The British AT was almost exclusively 2 pdr, with only a dozen or so 6 pdrs. The whole position fell apart on "Black Saturday" When the 4th & 22nd armoured brigades were badly defeated. At Gazala it wasn't the boxes that were the problem, it was a poorly equipped armoured force using poor tactics. IMO Hello freebird, I understand that, but isn't it just another way of saying our Box tactics could never have worked, were doomed to failure and therefore should possibly not have been used? The question is then - and I have just put a similar question on a note 4 minutes before yours - what could the British have done instead? What would Monty have done faced with the same issues? Best, Steve.
Steve - in my view Monty would have fought those battles differently as he had studied his enemy - which was a foreign concept among British Generals at that time - if we take good look at what we had at that time - the Auk - Cunningham/ Ritchie - Godwen Austin / Norrie / Gott / Lumsden - The Auk was inexperienced with British Officers although having served as Corp Commander in the Uk for a time - he knew his Indian Officers but not the British thus he selected Cunningham for his work in Ethiopia - Ritchie had the talent but not the experience - making Godwen -Austen resign - Norrie was past it - Gott was tired out - Lumsden fought the Balaclava battle every day .....charging the enemy guns. As said Monty had studied and by the time he got off the plane - he knew what he was going to do - and by the time he had quizzed Freddie de Guinand he knew what he had to work with - and it was NOT good - he had already asked Harding to come up with a corps of Armoured for the chase after the main battle - but he only had Lumsden - whom he couldn't get rid of until Medenine then the armour improved at El Hamma. In his first days in the desert he asked for three men - Leese - Horrocks and Kirkman and fired lots of Colonels - Leese to XXX corps - Horrocks to XIII corps and Lumsden to X corps with Kirkman to sort out the Artillery - which we saw at El Alamein. His first Battle at Alum al Halfa sorted out the Armour who stayed put making Rommel to swear to Kesselring that "The swine didn't come out" Rommels methods had been rumbled by this little man with the white knees....the only Battle Rommel won after that was at Kasserine in Tunisia against the green Americans - then he committed his biggest folly by taking on Monty again at Medenine - then he was fired ! Significantly Monty had O'Conner and Ritchie as Corps Commanders at NWE - we lost many good Generals in the beginning in the desert - Carton de Waite/O'Conner /Neame.V.C. /Combe and a few others - Gott was killed as was Jock Campbell V.C. tragically after being appointed Commander 7th Armoured. Trust this will answer your question of how Monty would have fared - it was not all about his superiority of supplies but rather morale - men and machines - the sick list under his command was less than 1% - people were sneaking out of hospitals not to be left behind- that says it all.... Cheers
His first Battle at Alum al Halfa sorted out the Armour who stayed put making Rommel to swear to Kesselring that "The swine didn't come out" In fact, short after Matruh, when the remains of 8th Army were fighting for their lives around the Alamein box, panzer commanders were complaining all over about "heavy resistance by Grants not charging, but firing from the maximum effective range of their 75mm's". Instructions by Auchinleck and his "8th Army's Chief of Staff" were finally producing good results.
