Biggest Mistake of WWII

Strategic: Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union was rather small.

Surely the Russians received aid that given to them; it wasn't purchased in cash or kind, was it?

That raises the second question: did the Americans give aid to the Russians, or did we buy/borrow or lease it off the US and give it to the USSR ourselves?

 

Damn! And I who thought that Bagration had been an offensive initiated by the Red Army in June '44, not a German mistake!

The mistake on the german part was to take the bait and allocate 17 panzer divisions to Army Group South in June while there were only 3 panzer divisions in Army Group center. The Russians counted on that to the amazing sucess of the offensive.

The attack worked in part because the panzer divisions, with have a vital strategic role to play: to counter attack breakthroughs, weren't allocated correctly.

In June 1944 Army Group center had only 39 divisions (3 panzer) while Army Group South had 56 (of with 17 panzer). The result was the destruction of 30 divisions, and the permanent crippling of the wehrmacht. The greatest allied victory in the war.

Source: Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945.

 

Surely the Russians received aid that given to them; it wasn't purchased in cash or kind, was it?

That raises the second question: did the Americans give aid to the Russians, or did we buy/borrow or lease it off the US and give it to the USSR ourselves?

They gave material goods to the USSR. Simple as that. I don't know if they repayed, but I read that Britain finished paying the lend-lease bill in 2005 or something.

 

Source: B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945

As you can see, attacking the USSR wasn't a good idea.

 

Source: B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945

As you can see, attacking the USSR wasn't a good idea.
And not counting MIA is also not a good idea:p

 

The mistake on the german part was to take the bait and allocate 17 panzer divisions to Army Group South in June while there were only 3 panzer divisions in Army Group center. The Russians counted on that to the amazing sucess of the offensive.

The attack worked in part because the panzer divisions, with have a vital strategic role to play: to counter attack breakthroughs, weren't allocated correctly.

In June 1944 Army Group center had only 39 divisions (3 panzer) while Army Group South had 56 (of with 17 panzer). The result was the destruction of 30 divisions, and the permanent crippling of the wehrmacht. The greatest allied victory in the war.

Source: Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945.
Maybe consulting a serious source ,not something about the Luftwaffe
From The Dupuy Institute Forum:German OOB in june 1944 in the east:
17 PD in the east:AG N :1 AGC :2 AGNU :9 AGSU :5
Btw :AGS did NOT exist

 

Reading parts of "Hitler and Churchill - Secrets of Leadership" By Andrew Roberts , it is hardly surprising that in summarising Hitler's errors he quotes "The Big Three" , The Halt order at Dunkirk , Barbarossa and Declaring War on America all of which came directly from Hitler - AR also quoted a comment from Churchill who following the July Bomb Plot felt that it would have been tragic had the Allies been robbed of the genius of Corporal Hitler who had done so much to help secure Germans defeat.

 

Second to my copy of The Economics of WW2, lend lease to the USSR totaled 5% of the USSR's GNP in 1942 and 10% for 1943 and 1944.

I think that 20% of GNP would have helped a lot more the poor Soviets, with had to face the totality of the fighting power of the wehrmacht alone for 3 years, particularly 1942, the most critical year of the 20th century.

We seem to have a couple of threads that have strayed into one however I will respond here with both answers.

With respect to the biggest mistake, if Hitler had not declared war on the US, Roosevelt would have only been allowed to deal militarily with the Pacific war against the Japanese. Hitlers declaration took that problem out of Roosevelts hands.

There is no doubt that Barbarossa turned out to be the beginning of the downfall of Germany and tied up millions of troops that could have been used elsewhere. Many more mistakes were made by Hitler during Barbarossa which cemented their defeat.

Second to my copy of The Economics of WW2, lend lease to the USSR totaled 5% of the USSR's GNP in 1942 and 10% for 1943 and 1944.

With respect, the quoting of bare GNP percentage figures is ridiculous and somewhat insulting. Without screwing those figures down into what was sent and how it enabled Russia to pull up stumps, survive the crucial process of moving east and then being able to concentrate their production more fully into certain crucial areas makes your argument ambiguous to say the least. Russia's scorched earth policy denied Germany resources however it affected Russian manufacturing as well in the short term.

The comprehensive supply of food products and "finished" materials allowed Russia to commence production immediately in many areas by taking out one level of the manufacturing processes at those crucial times.

The allied nations were not fully geared up for war in September 1939. We hear from many Russian supporters that the Allies (predominantly the US) could have, should have, why didn't they and the list goes on. They deny it had any effect which irks me every time I hear it.

I think that 20% of GNP would have helped a lot more the poor Soviets, with had to face the totality of the fighting power of the wehrmacht alone for 3 years, particularly 1942, the most critical year of the 20th century.

This is clearly another shooting from the hip comment that was not possible to achieve. Shipping, the elements and scourge of distance are just a few of the prohibitive factors that would never have seen this level of volume achievable.

 

Reading parts of "Hitler and Churchill - Secrets of Leadership" By Andrew Roberts , it is hardly surprising that in summarising Hitler's errors he quotes "The Big Three" , The Halt order at Dunkirk , Barbarossa and Declaring War on America all of which came directly from Hitler - AR also quoted a comment from Churchill who following the July Bomb Plot felt that it would have been tragic had the Allies been robbed of the genius of Corporal Hitler who had done so much to help secure Germans defeat.
Not wanting to restart those threads,but
1The Dunkirk order was not given by Hitler,but by von Rundstedt ,and it has never been proved that the Germans could capture Dunkirk,and that the fall of Dunkirk would mean that Britain was out
2 Barbarossa :Hitler had no other alternative or waste his oil in the desert of North Africa
3America :no declaration of war would only mean a delay of the US entrey in the war

 

Von Rundstedt did agree with the halt order and he was not a lone voice amongest the Generals , Hitler was a prime mover in it.
Hitler did not have to attack Russia , Stalin had no intention of attacking him and a move a serious move in North Africa might have taken Britain out of the war , through Churchill being forced from office.
A German clear up of the Middle east would have increased pressure on Turkey to join the Axis and would have opened the door to a German Naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the cutting of of India from GB.
Gibraltar , Malta and Cyprus would also have fallen , military and political isolation would have been extreme and potentially all of this before a Japanese attack on Pearl harbour.
America might have been more focused on the Pacific , it is note worthy that America didn't declare war on the Axis until Germany declared war on her.

"What if" is on the table but without these three decisions the course of the war would have been radically different for a fraction of what went to Russia properly supplied would have been enough to have taken the British out of the Middle East

 

The mistake on the german part was to take the bait and allocate 17 panzer divisions to Army Group South in June while there were only 3 panzer divisions in Army Group center. The Russians counted on that to the amazing sucess of the offensive.

The attack worked in part because the panzer divisions, with have a vital strategic role to play: to counter attack breakthroughs, weren't allocated correctly.

In June 1944 Army Group center had only 39 divisions (3 panzer) while Army Group South had 56 (of with 17 panzer). The result was the destruction of 30 divisions, and the permanent crippling of the wehrmacht. The greatest allied victory in the war.

Source: Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945.
I think that to count only PD is giving a wrong picture
From the Dupuy Institute Forum(by Rich Anderson,a well known expert )
Tank Status of the Ostheer 31 may 1944 (#operational/in repair /assigned or en route)
AGSU Pz186/87/138 StuG 194/62/278
AGNU Pz 830/133/229 StuG 480/70 /185
AGM Pz 85/14/37 StuG 404/76/68
AGN Pz 91/53/30 StuG 241/53 69
Toal Pz 1192/287/434 StuG1319 /261 /68O
A comment of R.Anderson :Overall there is little to indicate that the strength assigned to AG-NU on 31 may was unreasonable .The possible alternative was to make AG-Mitte stronger,but one must ask if the situation warranted such a move,especially considering the events AG NU and AG SU had just been trough

 

Second to my copy of The Economics of WW2, lend lease to the USSR totaled 5% of the USSR's GNP in 1942 and 10% for 1943 and 1944


The point was....in early 1942 it was a VITAL 5%....10-15% of the tanks used in the counterattack outside Moscow were British, British aircraft were arriving with the Russians in large numbers when the Russians didn't yet have any LW-competitive designs etc.

Von Rundstedt did agree with the halt order and he was not a lone voice amongest the Generals , Hitler was a prime mover in it.


It's important to note that that was for the THIRD Halt Order :mellow: Von Runstedt had actually ordered the PREVIOUS two during the campaign!

 

The point was....in early 1942 it was a VITAL 5%....10-15% of the tanks used in the counterattack outside Moscow were British, British aircraft were arriving with the Russians in large numbers when the Russians didn't yet have any LW-competitive designs etc.

With more than 5% it would be even better. :p

 

I think that to count only PD is giving a wrong picture
From the Dupuy Institute Forum(by Rich Anderson,a well known expert )
Tank Status of the Ostheer 31 may 1944 (#operational/in repair /assigned or en route)
AGSU Pz186/87/138 StuG 194/62/278
AGNU Pz 830/133/229 StuG 480/70 /185
AGM Pz 85/14/37 StuG 404/76/68
AGN Pz 91/53/30 StuG 241/53 69
Toal Pz 1192/287/434 StuG1319 /261 /68O


Well, so, in Bagration the russians put the majority of their tanks agaisn't AGM, with had less than 700 AFVs (that data doesn't include the SS divisions), of the 4200 available.

Also, AGM had less personel too. They needed at least few hundred thousand extra troops.

 

AG M had more personell than the other AG's
AG N:434749
AGM:644396
AG NU:532738
AGSU:476889
Source :Panzerarchiv :Starke der divisionen imSommer 1944

 

About the SS divisions ne 5(3th )belonged to AG SU
two (9th and 10th ) were reserves of AG SU,but were earmarked for the West
I think that they are included in the figures I have given
An other point are the independent tank bataillons (470 Tigers and 5 Konigtigers),I do'nt know if they are included neither to which AG they belonged .

 

AG M had more personell than the other AG's
AG N:434749
AGM:644396
AG NU:532738
AGSU:476889
Source :Panzerarchiv :Starke der divisionen imSommer 1944

1- That includes only the heer personnel? Because the total is 2.1 million, were are the other 400.000?

2- Not more than the 2 army group souths . They needed 1 million men.

 

1- That includes only the heer personnel? Because the total is 2.1 million, were are the other 400.000?

2- Not more than the 2 army group souths . They needed 1 million men.
the total is 2.1 million,because that is the ist-starke

 

And not counting MIA is also not a good idea:p

1- Ever heard of the concept of operational casualty? I think that MIA is not a very good statistic because it counts prisoners, and prisoners are soldiers that surrender themselves because they lost a battle/engagement, and what makes then surrender themselves are the combat casualties.

2- I don't have good data on MIA.

3- The purpose of these graphs is to illustrate the relative importance of each front. I think casualties directly related to combat are a better indicator than total casualties. I read the argument for the utilization of operational casualties in this site: Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Statistical Collation and Military Simulation, by Nigel Askey

this page on the site explains why you should not consider missing as an important casualty in the determination of the defeat of an armed forces.

 

the total is 2.1 million,because that is the ist-starke