BBC2 tonight Clarkson on Convoy PQ17

Discussion in 'Books, Films, TV, Radio' started by Owen, Jan 2, 2014.

  1. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    I think this is the point.
    TV's a expensive and complex medium, with a complex and varying audience, so compromise is inevitable.
    I don't sit down to watch a primetime documentary and expect all that much, but this delivered a nicely put together story, and I imagine delivered it to a much wider audience than is often easily achieved.
    (Though I hear Mr Reed's recent programmes achieved excellent figures, so there's still hope for a little more depth.)
     
    hutchie likes this.
  2. Roxy

    Roxy Senior Member

    I've just watched the repeat on BBC2. I thought that it was bloody good!

    Roxy
     
  3. hutchie

    hutchie Dont tell him Pike!!

    I would like to know where he got the resources such as ships cargo list? I'm looking for then for my grandfathers convoys in the med
     
  4. Peccavi

    Peccavi Senior Member

    Was impressed by Clarkson but was the implied (sorry explicit) criticism of Dudley Pound fair?
     
    Roxy likes this.
  5. Bart150

    Bart150 Member

    Yes
     
    Roxy likes this.
  6. Blutto

    Blutto Banned

    Many thanks to those that put in up on YouTube, I enjoyed watching it this morning before work. Based on what I have read in the past, there is little doubt that Pound was ultimately responsible, but a shame that it may well have been that he was somewhat 'short of a quid' due to his brain tumour.

    Presented very well indeed and close to perfection when compared to the utter crap that the 'History Channel' so often peddles.
     
    Roxy likes this.
  7. toki2

    toki2 Junior Member

    Excellent documentary but so sad - all brave men.
     
  8. Andreas

    Andreas Working on two books

    Very good programme, thanks for the heads-up.

    All the best

    Andreas
     
  9. Hesmond

    Hesmond Well-Known Member

    Many thanks watched utube and very impressed , i knew a lad who was merchant service he would talk for hours about his experinces in the 1930s and 1950s when some one mentioned WW2 he lowerd his head and walked off.
     
  10. Recce_Mitch

    Recce_Mitch Very Senior Member

    I found the programme interesting.

    Cheers
    Paul
     
  11. von Poop

    von Poop Adaministrator Admin

    Alanbrooke refers to Pound as 'Poor Old Dudley' (when not indulging in stronger criticism).
    I don't particularly see any errors on his part as necessarily his 'fault'; maybe more the fault of circumstance, precedence & tradition which put him in such theoretically high position.
     
  12. Roxy

    Roxy Senior Member

    Commanders expect to take the credit for successes; they have to be prepared to take the blame when it goes wrong.

    Roxy
     
  13. Harry Ree

    Harry Ree Very Senior Member

    I do not think that the Clarkson documentary fulfilled the strategic background to the Russian convoys.His opening scene was a reference to Stalin's shopping list of military aid while the thrust of his communication should have been to emphaise the opportunity that Churchill saw to keep Russia in the war...a godsend if ever there was of ensuring that Hitler was committed to fight his war of expansion on two fronts.Indeed the biggest fear that Churchill had was that Russia would cave in and sue for peace.Hence the strategy of the British Government and later, the US Government to supply war materiel and support the Russian war economy by sea and by land.(While one would expect Stalin to regard the provision and of military aid and its protection,from the west as important,his utmost priority was to ensure that his resources were directed to the area of the Russian mainland where at this stage of the war,the Germans held the upper hand and the Wehrmacht had yet to be defeated in the field.)

    However supplying the Russians by the Russian Arctic ports posed problems for the Allies in that convoys were under continual threat from well armed German forces based in occupied Norwegian bases.From when the first convoy sailed in August 1941,it became obvious that convoy air and sea cover was inadequate.The Russian Northern Air Fleet was known to be small and obsolescent and the only minesweepers in the area were two supplied by the British in 1913. The British Military Mission in Moscow,unimpressed by Russian naval and air performance, continually urged the Russians to reinforce convoy cover but despite promises,these assurances fell short of what was required.Further Pound made clear to the Russian Ambassador that air cover was inadequate. The British had already sent two squadrons of Hurricanes in September 1941 and then after the PQ17 incident,the Hampdens of Nos 144 and 455 Squadrons were despatched to North Russia as torpedo bombers in addition to 4 PRU Spitfires.As it was, No 210 Squadron Catalinas were already based there from the experience of convoy attacks prior to PQ17.

    The lack of convoy protection for PQ17 is reflected by the statistics returned on its losses.36 merchants ships plus 3 rescue ships set out but two of the former returned to Iceland.Of these 13 merchant ships and one rescue ship was sunk by aircraft and 10 merchant ships sunk by U Boats.Experience so far gained by the Admiralty had shown that German raiders were reluctant to engage a convoy closely, except when it had scattered or was completely unescorted.

    SW Roskill in his official record of The War at Sea 1939-1945 made the following points.(The reference to Churchill clearly indicates an example that political leaders do not wish to be associated with failure.)

    "The whole matter was, of course, fully investigated in the Admiralty, and on the 1st of August the First Sea Lord gave to the Cabinet an account of the events which led up to the crucial order being sent. The only new knowledge to be derived from that report is Admiral Pound's statement that on the night of the 3rd-4th July the Admiralty became possessed of intelligence indicating that the Tirpitz had eluded our patrolling submarines, and could be in a position to attack the convoy on the morning of the 5th. The existence of such precise intelligence has not been confirmed by postwar research. According to the record of the meeting, Admiral Pound told the Cabinet that the Admiralty had given the orders to disperse, then to scatter the convoy. Mr. Churchill's statement that he 'never discussed the matter with him [Admiral Pound]', and that 'so strictly was the secret of these orders being sent on the First Sea Lord's authority guarded by the Admiralty that it was not until after the war that I learned the facts'42, seems therefore to show a lapse in the Prime Minister's memory.43"

    "As we look back on this unhappy episode today, it is plain that the enemy was never likely to risk the Tirpitz in close attack on a convoy protected by an escort which was heavily armed with torpedoes. That, as was pointed out earlier, had always been Admiral Tovey's opinion; but the Admiralty had never accepted it. The latter could not, of course, know of the restrictions imposed by Hitler and Raeder on the employment of the battleship. Yet all experience of German warship raiders so far gained had shown how reluctant they were to engage a convoy closely, except when it had scattered or was completely unescorted. The Scheer's attack on HX 8444, the Hipper's on WS 5A and SLS 6445, the wariness of the Scharnhorst andGneisenau when they approached, but did not attack, the escorted convoys HX 106 and SL 6746, all indicated the same unwillingness to accept action except where an escort was very weak, or totally lacking. Furthermore the earlier experiences of German heavy ships had been such as might well make them chary of approaching our destroyers' smoke screens.47 It may therefore be felt that evidence derived from recent experience was available in London to suggest that, if faced with a similar problem, the Tirpitz's actions would probably follow on the same lines as the other raiders. If that be accepted, then the real nature of her threat could have been reassessed, and it might well have been realised that to scatter was to court far greater perils than to stand on and show fight".

    As regards the appearance of Tirpitz,Its deployment followed the expectations of Admiral Tovey,C in C Home Fleet in that it would show in the vicinity of a convoy when there would be no risk of it being lost.

    The Russian submarine K21,on station as an action for the PQ17 convoy,intercepted the Tirpitz who had sailed after the convoy had received instructions to scatter .K21 fired a salvo of 4 torpedoes which claim 2 hits which later were discounted but the engagement forced the Tirpitz to return to base.The fact that PQ17 had scattered and the K21 had faced Tirpitz gave rise to an observation from Kuznetsov of the Russian Northern Fleet "The British dodged an encounter with the Nazi squadron,abandoned the convoy and doomed it to destruction, whereas the Soviet sailors did the opposite.They went out to meet the Nazi squadron,attacked and damaged its heaviest unit,Tirpitz by K21 and forced the enemy to retire".( Golovko. "With the Red Fleet")

    Following the savaging of PQ 17,Churchill notified Moscow on 17 July that subsequent convoys would be postponed. The psychological impact of the convey cancellation far outreached their material effect and no assurance could alter Stalin's suspicions that Britain might consider securing a separate peace with Germany.

    As for the cost of materiel lost on PQ17,S W Roskill gives the following statistics:

    Delivered Vehicles 896 Vehicles lost 3350
    Delivered Tanks 164 Tanks lost 430
    Delivered Aircraft 87 Aircraft lost 210
    Delivered Cargo 57176 tons Cargo lost 99316 tons

    Luftwaffe 202 aircraft put up for the loss of 5 aircraft.

    I found it strange that Clarkson failed to mention the principal players at sea,namely Captain J E Broome RN,Commander of the PQ17 Escort.

    Commodore J C K Dowding RNR Commander of the PQ 17 Convoy.

    E S Roskill in his official The War at Sea 1939-1945 plays tribute to the performance of Dowding and the individual effort of Lt L J A Gradwell to muster the surviving merchant ships and guide them to port. Dowding lost 2 of his mini convoy of 6 ships by bombing before to could make port at Archangel,he himself being a survivor fro the Oiler Afton.

    Overall, the aid supplied by the western Allies has been regarded as small compared to Russian war economy output.They claim that of guns available to them, 7500 guns...artillery pieces, 1.5% .were supplied by the western Allies.8.9% of tanks were supplied by the western Allies of a total of 9100 tanks available.By the last year of the war,the Russians claim to have received aid which amounted to less than 3% of their war production output.Stalin did have the good sense to place his main war production,east of the Urals.

    Cannot say I have seen the account of the incident from a ATB publication...I would think they would cover it well from where the historical account is now.
     
  14. hutchie

    hutchie Dont tell him Pike!!

    harry you know as well as we do that it would be a fine balance to get it right, if clarkson put too much information people would loose interest and it would be a documentary aimed at amateur historians, if he put too little information in people would loose interest again and find it boring. i personally feel he got the balance right as to capture a wider audience, its like a sample or a tester within the stores, its enough for you to see, smell & taste and if you want to buy or learn more thats up to you.

    and how many people do we know that only watched it cause it was a top gear presenter? i know a few!
     
  15. KevinC

    KevinC Slightly wierd

    Meanwhile in deepest darkest Africa the program eventually reached our shores

    I actually enjoyed it. Nice hearing from the veterans who actually took part in the debacle.
     
  16. arnhem44

    arnhem44 Member

    I'd like to see the percentage figures of only the years 1941-1942 . Those were the crucial years, and I am sure west allied aid percentages are much higher.
    Starting 1943 maybe more convoys came through (and thus more material) , but the soviet production would have been much much more also.

    Also are the figures including aid going through Persia ?
     
  17. SteveDee

    SteveDee Well-Known Member

    I'm late to the party once again, but I stayed up last night (way beyond my normal bedtime) to watch this;
    BBC iPlayer - PQ17: An Arctic Convoy Disaster

    I normally avoid anything involving Clarkson, but he had 'wound his neck in' just far enough to do an 'OK job' on this one.

    I thought it was an excellent program and plan to watch it again this evening, as the details don't soak into my dull brain as easily as they use to.
     
    Owen likes this.

Share This Page