Battle For France 1940.

Discussion in '1940' started by milnut, Oct 13, 2005.

  1. milnut

    milnut Junior Member

    hi, every one. newby here.
    i thought that id post up my dissertation topic up her for these reasons: a) so as to give me a way of developing my thinking about the topic. images/smilies/default/cool.gif to assure that i am not missing something, that is staring me in the face. c) and, most importantly, to gain your valuable and knowledgeable opinions.

    the questions which i will be trying to answer is, as follows:
    why did the german army achieve such a rapid victory in france in 1940?

    please tell me what you think. also, if you have any good books which you could recommend then post the titles up, and i can see if i have checked them off. so far, i have got 35 books which iv got down as needing to be read. i thought theres more but that swhat iv got at the minute.

    cheers, and i hope that some interesting discussion will come from this.

    phil.
     
  2. Gnomey

    Gnomey World Travelling Doctor

    Simply put the French fought very poorly. Having spend billions of Francs on the (worthless) Maginot Line the Germans just went around it and attacked from behind (or flew over it) to which the French had nothing they could do. The building of the Maginot line also made the French a static army with a lot of her men in the line and few were the German attack was made. Although undoubtly pockets of French fought well and the British put in a good display. The blitzkreig that proved so effective in Poland was effective again as the French airforce was obslolete, though some weren't there were not a lot of them. Another problem for the French is that their Generals had no (or very little) concept of how to use their superior armour against the Germans. The German tactics were so much superior than that of the Allies - especially with regards to armour tactics. The Panzer armies where very effective against the line as much of the allied armour was spread around the line, while the Germans concentrated theirs in one place to force a breakthrough, which happened at the Meuse. From there on in just like what happened at Falaise the almost encircled army started to flee and men just left the battlefield, the whole right flank of the allies was rolled up by the Panzers. On the left however the British (with some French) managed to fight and fighting retreat to the coast where they managed to be evacuated from in and around Dunkirk, thanks mainly to Hitler for stopping his Panzers to wait for infantry and poor weather that hampered the Luftwaffe attacks on the encircled troops.

    All in all it was a poor display by the French who could have done much better with their superior equipment.
     
  3. milnut

    milnut Junior Member

    hi, Gnomey. well mate thats about the long and short of it. good reply.
    but, what would you say was the most vital, and crucial, element of the campaign? very interested to know this, so i can compare them with my own thoughts on the subject.

    cheers.
    phil.
     
  4. Gnomey

    Gnomey World Travelling Doctor

    In my opinion probably the most important factors in the German victory were: Superior tactics (Air force/army cooperation + armour/infantry cooperation), surprise (Allies thought the Ardennes inpertrable to armour - were caught again in 1944 with the launching of Operation Wacht am Rhein) and to a lesser extent the poor showing of the French army.
     
  5. milnut

    milnut Junior Member

    when you say poor showing of the french army what do you mean exactly?
    the french forces which were located on the meuse were poor value reserve formations. however, even Guderian later said that the meuse crossing was razor thin close.
     
  6. Gnomey

    Gnomey World Travelling Doctor

    I mean that they where slow to react and then did not react with a decisiveness that would of stopped the German advance. If they had launched a concentrated counterattack with large numbers of tanks and infantry they could have held the Germans at the Meuse and maybe of send them back towards Germany who knows as they never really tried. The French army was for the most part (correct me if I am wrong but this is my opinion) was disorganised in retreat and never fought a concentrated counterattack similar to that of the British at Arras.

    I will admit my knowledge of what exactly happened is not as good as it could be, so if I do say anything which is totally wrong just correct me.
     
  7. milnut

    milnut Junior Member

    well as you say organisation is going to be one of my main themes, and where the fault lays. but thats for later. im abit thuzzy on all the details aswel. so much reading to do o_O .

    does anyone know of any good map web sites, as id like a couple as the campaign progressed. this would eb a great help.

    cheers
    phil
     
  8. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    Hi Minut,

    <strike>A copy of one of my responses from last month. </strike>

    In hindsight, France would never have "stood" as they were out-played and out-manoevered from day one by an underestimated foe which was not lead by museum exhibits with a WW1 mentality.

    They didn't study their foe or read their books (General Guderian's "Achtung Panzer"), they didn't understand the effect of aircraft in warfare, modern communications nor were they strategic planners even though they had Poland as an example.

    It would never have stood up to Blitzgrieg warfare.

    They had one of the largest armies in the world and it crumbled due to lack of planning, leadership and modern training methods.
     
  9. Gnomey

    Gnomey World Travelling Doctor

  10. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    This site gives a good insight with an example below.

    It was apparent to French and British leaders that once the Germans attacked, the Allies had to move into Belgium. To provide time for this movement the Allied leaders depended on a delaying action by the Belgian Army, reinforced by the barrier of the Ardennes and the Meuse River, the large forts at Liege, the deep cut of the Albert Canal north of that city, and Fort Eben-Emael near the Dutch-Belgian border. (This fort was said to be the strongest single fortress in the world.) The major problem was the lack of consultation and coordination with the Belgians and the Dutch. Although the Low Countries realized that Nazi Germany would include them in any pattern of conquest against the West, they continued to hope that a policy of abject neutrality would forestall the inevitable.

    http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_4.html
     
  11. milnut

    milnut Junior Member

    hi, spidge.
    in regards to your comment about the allies not reading their books. is it not true that most of the books about armoured warfare were british and french? although the germans did do alot of innovation themselves. however, the political issues were also a major playing in the adoption of armoured warfare, and not just the old fashion british regimental system. plus, the germans were originally going to press on through belgium (schlieffen etc). plus the plan for the armoured advance was only conditional in relation to the succes of the panzers. with most of the roads in the operation being reserved for regular forces. so the germans were far far more old fashioned in relation to 'blitzkrieg' than most people would have thought. it was an uphill stuggle to get the plan that was eventually put into action allowed by okh, okw.


    in regards to the air power and comms, i have to unconditionally agree with you. the comms were rubbish. the whole c3i system was to pot.and thats what the main jist of my arguement will be. allied combined air and land forces were just non existant.

    like you say belgium really was not helping themwelves there were they. i wonder though if the allies would have been allowed into belgium erlier then would the ardennes attack been even more rapid. just a quick thought. i dont really know, but just come to me.

    cheers for the help guys.

    phil
     
  12. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    Guderian and his book were proved correct in Poland. Even with this fresh information, no changes were made.

    Guderian tried to gain every material available about motorized warfare and translated the works of Captain B.H. Liddel Hart and Major-General J.F.C. Fuller. In Britain these theorists had only limited success in seeing their ideas realised. Guderian also read a short book by a French officer, Charles de Gaulle. He contributed articles of his own to the Militär-Wochenblatt which were generally well received. 'Since nobody else busied himself with this material,' he commented, 'I was soon by way of being an expert!'

    In 1930 he took command of the 3rd Prussian Motor Transport Battalion, which was equipped with some real armored cars, dummy tanks and anti-tank guns. One area in which Guderian's influence proved to be of considerable importance was communications; the key to command and control. By the outbreak of the war every German tank had at least a radio receiver and every command tank had a transmitter, which gave the German armored formations an extremely high degree of tactical flexibility.

    Adolf Hitler, who had exclaimed, on witnessing one of Guderian's demonstrations involving a motor-cycle platoon, two armored car platoons, a platoon of experimental PzKpfw Is and an anti-tank platoon: 'That is what I need! That is what I'm going to have!'

    After the invasion of the Sudetenland Guderian became Chef der Schnellen Truppen, being responsible for recruiting, training, tactics and technique of all the Wehrmacht's motorized and armored units. In 1938 he published his highly influential book on armored warfare, Achtung-Panzer!. The book explained his logic ideas on how German armored units should be built up. One thing Guderian was worried about was the raising of tank brigades for close co-operation with infantry divisions, as employment of tanks merely in support of unmechanized infantry was a reversion to the practice of 1916-18. Tanks in this role might have some limited tactical utility but could have no operational impact. One of his conclusions was that the greatest results could be achieved when massed tanks are used with the benefit of surprise.

    He had by then been promoted to General der Panzertruppen and on the outbreak of war was given commend of the Nineteenth Corps, which he led in the Polish Campaign. For the battle of France he was given a Panzer group, and his brilliant handling was a perfect demonstration of the concept of blitzkrieg -rapid armored breakthrough, supported by air power, on a narrow front- which he had propagated in his writings. Every German tank had a wireless communication system and were set in action as whole and independent units and were not attached to the Infantry units, with Guderian driving relentlessly as far as his men and tanks could go, wrecking havoc far beyond the expected front-line. It were his tanks which were first across the Meusse, at Sedan (14 May 1940), and first to reach the Channel coast (20 May). Guderian always believed in being at the front so that he could take personal control whenever necessary.

    Guderian played a decisive part in the victory over France in 1940, although he was forced by an overcautious High Command into making unnecessary stops. Hitler suddenly ordered a halt to Guderians panzers, allowing the Allies to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force back to England from 28 May until 4 June.
     
  13. mahross

    mahross Senior Member

    Phil,

    There are numerous reasons to this. If you want some input, email your idea and i'll have a look over if for you. I may be able to help you with a few bits. Have you got a working bibliography?

    Ross
     
  14. milnut

    milnut Junior Member

    thanks for the offer ross.

    yes, i have a working bibliography.
    when iv started to get a little more into it all, in time, i shall email you. thanks. just wanted to see people opinions, as ever one on here seems very knowledgeable.

    regards,
    phil
     
  15. Gnomey

    Gnomey World Travelling Doctor

    Here is site with some maps of the campaign showing both the German and the French plans. They are not animated but still informative.

    http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/blitz/

    Welcome to the forum phil, I look forward to more posts from you.
     
  16. Rich Payne

    Rich Payne Rivet Counter Patron 1940 Obsessive

    Did the Allies' "Dyle plan" increase or reduce the likelihood of eventual defeat? It puzzles me slightly that a winter was spent building fixed defences which were so rapidly abandoned in order to advance into Belgium.

    The River Dyle hardly looks like an ideal defensive position and the forces must have been more thinly spread by advancing on to a wider front.

    That said, the German breakthrough did not come at that point and I wonder if the British would have been more comprehensively outflanked if they had stayed in fixed positions in Northern France rather than being compelled to begin a fighting withdrawl by the collapse of the French at Sedan.

    Incidentally, the difference in mentality between those planning the Blitzkreig and the Belgian defenders is perhaps highlighted by the fact that the responsibility for ordering the demolition of the Albert canal bridges fell to the "Grenswielrijders" or "Border Cyclists" If it were not so serious, the idea of these lightly armed troops "pedalling furiously" in the face of advancing german armour would be almost comical.

    Rik.
     
  17. mahross

    mahross Senior Member

    Phil - Argueably the main reason for the loss in france was the failure of the western armies to adapt in the inter-war period, and to assimilate the ideas of the great war properley. This is especially evident in Frances' building of the Maginot Line.

    Ross
     
  18. laufer

    laufer Senior Member

    (Gnomey @ Oct 13 2005, 04:54 PM) [post=39982]I mean that they where slow to react and then did not react with a decisiveness that would of stopped the German advance. If they had launched a concentrated counterattack with large numbers of tanks and infantry they could have held the Germans at the Meuse and maybe of send them back towards Germany who knows as they never really tried. The French army was for the most part (correct me if I am wrong but this is my opinion) was disorganised in retreat and never fought a concentrated counterattack similar to that of the British at Arras.

    I will admit my knowledge of what exactly happened is not as good as it could be, so if I do say anything which is totally wrong just correct me.
    [/b]

    Colonel de Gaul was one of the allied commanders who understood the importance of armoured forces and, as a commander of the 4th Armoured Division (4th DCR), tried to fight more aggressively.
    On 15 May, he was ordered to delay the enemy in the Laon region in order to gain time to bring up the 6th Army to block the road to Paris. Having received only part of the units intended for his division, Colonel de Gaulle launched an initial attack with 80 tanks to try and cut the lines of communication of the German armoured divisions. After reaching its objectives the 4th DCR was forced through lack of support to retreat in the face of enemy reinforcements.
    Once the division was joined by its other units, a second attack was launched with 150 tanks : after achieving its initial objectives, the attack was halted by German air and artillery attacks.
     
  19. laufer

    laufer Senior Member

    (mahross @ Oct 14 2005, 10:49 AM) [post=40028]Phil - Argueably the main reason for the loss in france was the failure of the western armies to adapt in the inter-war period, and to assimilate the ideas of the great war properley. This is especially evident in Frances' building of the Maginot Line.

    Ross
    [/b]

    As a second reason I would add the mental condition of majority of French society causing by some "peacemakers".
     
  20. smc66

    smc66 Member

    I'd also like to expand on Laufer's point vis-a-vis mentality. You cannot ignore the political side. French politics was in a permanent state of disarray throughout the 1930s often chopping from left to right in short spaces of time which ultimately led to a lack of long term decision making and a mentality of defending what you have. The Maginot line itself only went as far as the Belgian-German border through a mixture of politics (Belgians were not the enemy) and economics (the French ran out of money). Furthermore, getting defensive agreements with the Belgians proved very difficult because Brussels wished to remain neutral to avoid antagonizing the Germans, therefore no great defensive works were prepared on the Belgian-German border until very late in the day. This made it easier for Hitler because he could gamble on the unwillingness of a number of nations to work together because too many individual interests were at stake. A viewpoint he kept right to the end of 1945.
     

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