Barbarossa

Discussion in 'The Eastern Front' started by Gerard, Dec 13, 2006.

  1. L J

    L J Senior Member

    I never positioned myself as analitic....;)

    As for comparison between Eastern and Western Fronts each of them had own specific.
    For example I cannot avoid paying respect for allied forces for naval operations.
    And also how to forget that allied air forces did a large portion of strategic bombing of Germany when Soviet aviation had no such a facilities.
    I also think scales of lend-lease help are also underestimated by those members, who tries to diminish them. (Not only tanks, guns, airplanes, small arms and other "shooting equipment" must be counted)
    I'm staying for weighted analysis of contribution of all sides to our mutual Victory over Nazism

    Regards,
    Alex
    Amvas,do you know of any good book (in English please,my Russian is like my Chinese :D )that is giving a survey of why the Sovjet Union survived 1941 ans why it was capable eventually to plant the Red Flag on the Reichstag . Please not "Before Stalingrad" from Glantz .I will not digress on my disillusionment on this book,having recieved a lot of criticism for it on another forum .
     
  2. AMVAS

    AMVAS Senior Member

    Amvas,do you know of any good book (in English please,my Russian is like my Chinese :D )that is giving a survey of why the Sovjet Union survived 1941 ans why it was capable eventually to plant the Red Flag on the Reichstag . Please not "Before Stalingrad" from Glantz .I will not digress on my disillusionment on this book,having recieved a lot of criticism for it on another forum .

    I'm not too good in English-language books considering them less informative for the Soviet troops than the Russian ones. Why not to use some other Glantz's books? Even been under some critisizm they are enough good for overall opinion. Some days ago I visited my friend in Budapest and he showed me some English books, transalted from Russian military scientific books. but I guess they are very rare sort of staff there...They were mostly tactical, but not strategical...

    Regards
    Alex
     
  3. L J

    L J Senior Member

    Amvas,thank you for your quick reply
     
  4. Tiger AusFe

    Tiger AusFe Junior Member

    One of the Most amazing facts missed out by the german Command was the impossible logistic requirements of invading Soviet Russia. Not only did the Supply lines lengthen to extraordinary levels, but also the front widened the further into russia you got, meaning the further you advanced, the less men you had to cover ground, and the less supplies they would get!
     
  5. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    missed out?
     
  6. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Ah, yes, everyone knows the OKW and OKH simply had nobody to think of this small detail.
     
  7. Tiger AusFe

    Tiger AusFe Junior Member

    They did not work out the logistical reality of the situation. That is the truth of the matter. It was woeful planning on the part of the German command. The supply was totally inadequate for the planned operations. Anyone who has read the accounts of the soldiers and the german front line reports would be aware of this.
     
  8. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    Enlighten me, what exactly did the OKW plan then?

    (And keep in mind that reality resp. actual situations don't always reflect the planning - same with orders and their execution).
     
  9. Smudger Jnr

    Smudger Jnr Our Man in Berlin

  10. Tiger AusFe

    Tiger AusFe Junior Member

    Enlighten me, what exactly did the OKW plan then?

    (And keep in mind that reality resp. actual situations don't always reflect the planning - same with orders and their execution).

    Its not what they planned, it's what they did not plan for. The amount of supplies needed, the difficulty in bottlenecks at rail heads, the speed of delivery of goods, the repair of rails and the destruction of locomotives by the Soviets to prevent them falling into German hands, further the difference in guages of Russian and german railways. Evacuation of wounded, the amount of time it takes to unload trains, and laod with the repairable flotsam and jetsom of war,You may have the ability to transport 50 tons of supplies to a certain point, but as the front broadened and the supply lines got longer it became almost an impossible task to supply troops. The Germans were simply not prepared for the Herculian task that confronted them, nor did they have the ability to supply the units at the pace they needed supplying.

    Add to this mechanical reliabilty, the Panjee wagons and such still being massively used to supply front line troops, the mechanical breakdowns, the worrying wear and tear of parts, you have to supply spare parts and food and ammunition and reinforcements with very limited rail facilities.

    This is what they failed to plan for. Much the same as Goerring said he could supply the 6th army at Stalingrad, the supply chain was not capeable to supply as the german command had envisaged it would or how it needed to be supplied.
     
  11. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    I think you misunderstood my question (which wasn't a rethorical one).

    You explained very detailed where they failed or were ignorant of the facts and state that they apparently weren't aware of various factors (or simply ignored them).

    But my question is: What did they really plan? How did they plan to feed their troops? How did they plan to transport supplies? You say they didn't mention these aspects in their plannings? (Or do I misinterpret the part 'what they did not plan for'?)

    ...if that is so, I can't see how that bunch of incompetent and dilettante officers managed to conquer half Europe in the first place.
     
  12. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    I do not agree, there were quite a lot of VERY competent officers in the German supply chain, or the landsers would be eating grass. I have to agree with most of Tiger E says in his post above. Problem is that this is still a reflection of what Clausewitz had said with his well known aphorism that I shall misquote: war is the continuation of politics.

    Picking up on Tiger E's last paragraph, one thing is political decisions (Goering's promise in this case) another is providing the capacity to deliver them. There was no failure of the logistical system in supplying Stalingrad, the failure was on the decisions taken by the superior organs of the state who ignored the logisticians warnings that it would be an impossible requirement.

    That, the decision on not to prepare for Winter, the decision to demobilise troops when things seemed to go well, the decision to pretend Malta didn't exist, etc, etc.

    I pity the poor supply men of all ranks who were faced with impossible tasks and were ordered to perform or else!
     
  13. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    I do think there was an element of overconfidence on the part of the OKW/OKH in 1940-41. To be fair, they had just beaten the largest army in Western Europe (France), chased another rival off the continent (Britain) and conquered Western Europe in the process (with the exception of the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula). And they were facing an enemy supposedly weakened by a vicious purge in which 7 of 9 Marshals were executed (Budenny and Vorisholov) and countless other General Staff Officers disappeared. The Red Army was seen as cumbersome, outdated and disorganised. Perfect fodder for such an efficient weapon as the Wehrmacht. At least thats how the Germans saw it. As Hitler said " We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down" and he wasnt the only one who believed that sentiment. The German plan was to destroy the Soviet Armies as near to the border as possible thus preventing them using the traditional ally of the Soviets, space. I dont think the Germans were incompetant, look how the campaign went. If they were guilty of anything it was complacency. There was no long-term plan for supplying the troops, how else to explain how inadequately they were prepared for winter? They never intended to campaign that long. I dont have the book at the moment but in Robert Kershaw's book "War without Garlands" it makes reference to the supply problems faced by the Army Groups at the time of the Kiev Pocket and especially of Von Bock's worries about lack of fuel and ammunition. Tiger and Tom both make excellent points about the German railway system being useless in Russia. This meant that trucks had to make up the deficit. and the Russian road system was completely inadequate. Most of the trucks were from the conquered territories (German factories not being able to turn out enough) and these would not have been built for military operations. Kershaw's book makes reference to the problems suffered by the trucks and support services in keeping the Armies supplied. Think of the headaches this caused, especially if you are a mechanic in one of the Wehrmacht's support workshops. Lord knows how many different types of trucks with any of a myriad of technical issues making it impossible to adequately stock replacement parts. Many of the trucks had to be abandoned because there were no parts to fix them.

    The Wehrmacht in 1941 had to be hastily expanded to accommodate Hitler's vision of a Germanic East - the Panzer divisions had to be expanded but there were no more tanks to go around. The solution? Decrease the number of tanks in each division thus rendering them less effective.

    My point about all of this, The OKH/OKW were planning for a short campaign and had to do so with no long term strategy in place to ensure that the Wehrmacht could complete the task. Hitler only received the plans in December 1940 and expected the invasion force to be ready by the Spring. Doesnt give them much time to plan everything does it? Its true that there were some outstanding Military minds in the German High Command but they had a hard taskmaster and this may have lead them to ignore certain factors.
     
  14. Heimbrent

    Heimbrent Well-Known Member

    ("Incompetent and dilettante officers" was sarcasticly meant really)
    I'm well aware of the fact that in the Wehrmacht Ia was prestigious, not Ib or Ic. So able officers usually weren't placed with supply or intelligence - that doesn't imply however that supply and intelligence were in the hands of morons.

    Of course there were plans to supply the troops invading the Soviet Union - partly based on criminal intentions, like the Ernährung aus dem Lande, feeding off the land. Millions of people dying of hunger wasn't only accepted but planned.

    However, the plannings were based on assumptions that eventually proved to be wrong: Having brought the campaign to an end before winter is just one of them.
    The reason for this is (among others, I guess) the experience of the war with France (which had been a feared enemy, hence the swift victory was partly overrated) and the (mis)conception of Russia as Koloss auf tönernen Füssen which really is a contradiction in itself. The fear of the Soviet Union because of its vasteness, but also the political system as diametrically opposed to NS wasn't to be neglected, yet at the same time "the Germans" were sure that it would easily collaps - mostly based on the experience from WWI.
    *edit* Really the German Army didn't have a clue what the (military) situation in the Soviet Union was. They had very few advisors who really knew (or had known) Russia and besides their views were heavily influenced by the NS-ideology, so it was quite impossible for them to have a balanced and objective view of their future adversary.

    Apart from that it's clear that any army will come to a (temporary) halt after a certain distance (It's of little importance here, but K.-H. Frieser talks about some 300km if I'm not mistaken). I'm on rather thin ice here and can't back that information up, but I would say that Hitler had a very strong influence on the plannings and in the end always the last word - and it must be rather difficult to plan campaigns on such terms. It must have seemed a bad idea even then to invade the Soviet Union, but for the above reasons the generals in command were apparently confident enough. They didn't really have another option anyway.

    Sorry again that I hid my point of view behind sarcasm in the posts above.
     
  15. Za Rodinu

    Za Rodinu Hot air manufacturer

    Apart from that it's clear that any army will come to a (temporary) halt after a certain distance (It's of little importance here, but K.-H. Frieser talks about some 300km if I'm not mistaken). I'm on rather thin ice here and can't back that information up, but I would say that Hitler had a very strong influence on the plannings and in the end always the last word - and it must be rather difficult to plan campaigns on such terms. It must have seemed a bad idea even then to invade the Soviet Union, but for the above reasons the generals in command were apparently confident enough. They didn't really have another option anyway.

    Sarcasm? You're selling ice to the penguins :lol:

    Not only Hitler, Barbarossa itself was logistics hell with Guderian et al. going his every way, switching plans, making a mess of operating zones, murdering unit borderlines in that crazy 1941 summer, etc, etc, etc. Not much better with the Soviets until summer 43, which was when they started learning to curb their instincts (or rather Stalin) and set down realistical objectives and not going further from there - running like mad to a phase line, stopping there and waiting for the supply lines to catch up. Before that Soviet logistics operated more or less on the Socialist Hope principle (my copyright from now on, if you don't mind :) )

    Sorry for the rant, but as a former logistics guy I'm rather sensitive on this subject :)
     
  16. Tiger AusFe

    Tiger AusFe Junior Member

    The Germans had not planned for the scorched earth policy, they had not planned for the road systems, what were down on many German maps as major roads were nothing more than dirt tracks. the germans did not plan for the wear and tear on supply vehicles, nor for the wear and tear on tanks. (Many vehicles had not been overhauled since france or yugoslavia or greece)

    The Germans had obviously planned to supply the armies in the filed and miscalculated their abilities to do so. they planned that army groups would need a certain amount of supplies a day, but this could not be met. Due to the horrendous supply problems that reared up, including sabotage from partisan groups.

    It was not helped by the switching of objectives either, forcing panzer armies to swing away from Moscow and go off in a different direction. trying to keep all this supplied, and also a ferocious pace of advance proved to be impossible. The Germans simply had planned to keep the armies going in the filed, but had underplanned, and under calculated.
     
  17. L J

    L J Senior Member

    The Germans had not planned for the scorched earth policy, they had not planned for the road systems, what were down on many German maps as major roads were nothing more than dirt tracks. the germans did not plan for the wear and tear on supply vehicles, nor for the wear and tear on tanks. (Many vehicles had not been overhauled since france or yugoslavia or greece)

    The Germans had obviously planned to supply the armies in the filed and miscalculated their abilities to do so. they planned that army groups would need a certain amount of supplies a day, but this could not be met. Due to the horrendous supply problems that reared up, including sabotage from partisan groups.

    It was not helped by the switching of objectives either, forcing panzer armies to swing away from Moscow and go off in a different direction. trying to keep all this supplied, and also a ferocious pace of advance proved to be impossible. The Germans simply had planned to keep the armies going in the filed, but had underplanned, and under calculated.
    I don't think they had underplanned:they knew that after september,due to the problems mentioned in the posts before,they would have big problems,thus they stake everything to win the war before september (probably wishfull thinking )
     

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