August 3, 1943: Patton Famously Slaps a Soldier

Discussion in 'Italy' started by Phil Scearce, Aug 3, 2011.

  1. Phil Scearce

    Phil Scearce Finish Forty and Home

    Today's date in 1943, General George Patton slapped Private Charles H. Kuhl for malingering. The scene is famously recreated in the movie "Patton." In fact, Kuhl was actually suffering from malaria and was readmitted to the hospital. Kuhl survived the war and died in 1971.
     
  2. Truely one of Pattons greatest mistakes of the entire war. For striking that G.I. Patton was placed on probation thus he was left out of the planning of the Invasion of Europe.
     
  3. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Beaches of Anzio
    Patton was actually fired for that and the other slapping incident- and nearly blew it again at Knutsford when he said the wrong things - just as well he took no part is the invasion planning- as he was NO planner
    Cheers
     
  4. Jaeger

    Jaeger Senior Member

    Thank God Patton was in the doghouse during the planning of Overlord. Montys the chap for that sort of thing.
     
  5. Phil Scearce

    Phil Scearce Finish Forty and Home

    It played well into the preinvasion deception, though- the Germans were convinced Patton would be on the continent when the "real" invasion came.
     
  6. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Phil -
    the Germans were also convinced that the main strike would come through the Calais area - that's why they didn't release their Panzer reserve for sometime after D Day - so they weren't that smart- and it had nothing to do with Patton - he was forgiven after D Day by Ike - under dire threats to behave....
    Cheers
     
  7. Nevil

    Nevil WW2 Veteran/Royal Signals WW2 Veteran

    Thank God Patton was in the doghouse during the planning of Overlord. Montys the chap for that sort of thing.

    I think the impression that Patton was much in the doghouse with Eisenhower is a bit of an overstatement. They had a complex relationship as prior to Eisenhower’s appointment as SAC and for much of their service, Eisenhower had been junior to Patton in the US`Army so Ike tended to tread lightly even after Patton’s more blatant offences.

    He was also held back in the UK to lend credence to the well prepared fiction that the main allied landings would follow the Normandy ones and would be in the Pas de Calais and led by Patton, for whom the Germans had a very healthy respect. This kept much of the best German armour in that area until the very last minute.

    Certainly Patton’s leadership in the breakout in Normandy and later in the forced march of his 3d US`Army to relieve Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge were huge contributions to the allied success.

    As far as planning for the Normandy landings and the following campaign are concerned, almost all of this was done by British General Freddie Morgan and his staff. Morgan was Chief of Staff for the embryonic SHAEF at the time but was replaced in that role by US General Walter Bedell Smith (COSSAC) when Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) with Morgan becoming Deputy COSSAC. Freddie Morgan was a real gentleman, while Bedell Smith was a major SOB…….probably an essential quality for that position with such strong personalities (a delicate way of putting it!) reporting to Ike.

    I am not suggesting that Patton was a particularly likeable person, anything but I would say. However, his 3d Army troops were intensely loyal and willing to give their all for him. At the risk of sticking my neck out, I would also rate him as being amongst the very best armoured forces commanders in WW2, especially after he changed his whole philosophy after the Kasserine Pass disaster in North Africa.

    Nevil.
     
  8. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Nevil - well you did stick your neck out so - here we go - the main reason that the Germans had any respect for Patton was that they could not even think to guess which way he would jump next - that makes any professional wary...best armoured Commander-? I would put MacCreery a way ahead of him or even "Pip" Roberts of 11th Armoured -

    Patton had NO participation in the Kasserine debacle - that was Fredendal and Ike only - Patton was given command of II Corps- after Alexander had sorted out the mess.....then Marshall sent over Bradley to keep an eye on him as a deputy....they still made a mess at Gabes by letting three Panzer divs escape- so we had to do it all again at Medjez el Bab to Tunis

    As for Freddie Morgan planning the D Day invasion - it should be noted that when Monty first saw the plans with Churchill in Marrakesh - he complained and within 24 hours of landing in the uk - he had torn it apart and increased it to five Divisions- on five beaches -Bedel Smith or Ike had little to do with it.

    Patton's men thought highly of him ? possibly as much as 8th army thought of Monty ? men discharging themselves from hospitals to keep up with the battles ..?

    Pattons leadership at the breakout in Normandy - they were a month late for goodness sake and the Brits and Canadians and Poles were hung out to dry - and his leadership at Bastogne -wow - he turned left and the German 7th Infantry Army took no notice of his charge .... against that one should look at the actions of Brian Horrocks with XXX corps- he was on the coast with the Canadians when Monty phoned for him to prepare to move to the Meuse ON THE DAY THE GERMANS BROKE through - 16th December 1944 - Horrocks then had the difficult task of crossing the admin tails of at least five divisions - pick up two more divisions and two armoured bdes - and was on the Muese by the 21st December - THAT was profesionalism.

    Cheers
     
  9. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

    Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the general, the more he contributes in manoeuvre, the less he demands in slaughter.
    Winston Churchill


    Patton tended to outrun his supply column. Montgomery said on at least one occasion, that the battle was won in the Quartermasters stores.
     
  10. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Deleted - posted twice!
     
  11. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Today's date in 1943, General George Patton slapped Private Charles H. Kuhl for malingering. The scene is famously recreated in the movie "Patton." In fact, Kuhl was actually suffering from malaria and was readmitted to the hospital. Kuhl survived the war and died in 1971.

    Certainly Patton’s leadership in the breakout in Normandy and... huge contributions to the allied success. Nevil.

    Pattons leadership at the breakout in Normandy - they were a month late for goodness sake and the Brits and Canadians and Poles were hung out to dry Cheers

    Tom has covered most of what I would have contributed and more. Always knowledgable and here is 100% right (in my opinion).

    Phil - Why do you use the word "famously", I believe "infamously" would have been more appropriate.

    Nevil,

    Patton's US 3rd Army was only activated and released the day after the initial breakout in Normandy, albeit some of his Divisions had been pushed into the battle shortly before.

    His leadership thereafter is questionable, for example, when he went hell for leather grabbing real estate in Brittany, without any flank protection and therefore practically invited the Germans to sever his precarious and narrow line of communications, which they attempted; and were eventually stopped at Mortain.

    He also paid lip service to a direct order from Monty to only use what forces were needed to secure what he already had in Brittany and do a left hook to head for the Seine, the idea being to trap the German 7th Army there or earlier e.g. the Falaise Pocket. But Patton continued with the pusuit in Brittany and sent such a small force towards the Seine that it was unable to influence matters - essentially a spent force when it arrived; Bradley's words - although not verbatim - not mine. One of Patton's own Divisional Commanders said it was one of the most stupid decisions of the war.

    Monty should take some of the blame for not being very specific with his orders and firm in their execution. He should have known better after Patton went walk about in Sicily, where he was supposed to protect the British and Canadian left flank but didn't bother, causing a delay in securing the Island.

    Tom has highlighted the repercusion for Patton's Allies and this repercusion adversely affected the rest of the US Army around the Falaise Pocket.

    Patton had a lot of fine qualities and every Army needs Generals with his drive and ability, but the fact is that he was a loose cannon. His legend is greater than his deeds. And that is why Bradley leapfrogged frogged him in the pecking order, to command US ground troops in Normandy & NW Europe. Bradley deserves more credit than he gets.

    NB. I will provide exact quotes by/about Bradley and Patton's Divisional Commander if requested (but with a circa 10 hour delay - work...).

    I realise that what I am saying may be seen as controversial and will possibly upset some of our US members, but that is not my intention... Long live the Allies!

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  12. 17thDYRCH

    17thDYRCH Senior Member Patron

    From Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's War Diaries, page 360:

    The whole process was made all the more difficult by the fact that amongst Marshall's very high qualities he did not possess those of a strategist. It was almost impossible to make him grasp the true concepts of a strategic situation. He was unable to argue out a strategic situation and preferred to hedge and defer decisions until such time as he had to consult his assistants. Unfortunately his assistants were not of the required calibre, and Cooke( Naval Planner ) was of a very low category.
    My meeting with Patton had been of great interest. I had already heard of him but must confess that his swash-buckling personality exceeded by expectation. I did not form any high opinion of him, nor had I any reason to alter this view at a later date. A dashing, courageous, wild and unbalanced leader, good for operations requiring thrust and push but a a loss in any operation requiring skill and judgement.
     
  13. Nevil

    Nevil WW2 Veteran/Royal Signals WW2 Veteran

    Nevil - well you did stick your neck out so - here we go - the main reason that the Germans had any respect for Patton was that they could not even think to guess which way he would jump next - that makes any professional wary...best armoured Commander-? I would put MacCreery a way ahead of him or even "Pip" Roberts of 11th Armoured -

    Patton had NO participation in the Kasserine debacle - that was Fredendal and Ike only - Patton was given command of II Corps- after Alexander had sorted out the mess.....then Marshall sent over Bradley to keep an eye on him as a deputy....they still made a mess at Gabes by letting three Panzer divs escape- so we had to do it all again at Medjez el Bab to Tunis

    As for Freddie Morgan planning the D Day invasion - it should be noted that when Monty first saw the plans with Churchill in Marrakesh - he complained and within 24 hours of landing in the uk - he had torn it apart and increased it to five Divisions- on five beaches -Bedel Smith or Ike had little to do with it.

    Patton's men thought highly of him ? possibly as much as 8th army thought of Monty ? men discharging themselves from hospitals to keep up with the battles ..?

    Pattons leadership at the breakout in Normandy - they were a month late for goodness sake and the Brits and Canadians and Poles were hung out to dry - and his leadership at Bastogne -wow - he turned left and the German 7th Infantry Army took no notice of his charge .... against that one should look at the actions of Brian Horrocks with XXX corps- he was on the coast with the Canadians when Monty phoned for him to prepare to move to the Meuse ON THE DAY THE GERMANS BROKE through - 16th December 1944 - Horrocks then had the difficult task of crossing the admin tails of at least five divisions - pick up two more divisions and two armoured bdes - and was on the Muese by the 21st December - THAT was profesionalism.

    Cheers

    Well, Tom................

    In the first place you have misquoted me. I did not say that Patton was “the best Armoured Commander.” I said he was “amongst the very best armoured forces commanders in WW2.” That is a pretty generalized statement and allows you to add in almost anyone you think merits it, although as Patton was an Army commander, I had that rank in mind when I wrote it.

    Although not an Army Commander, General Horrocks would certainly qualify. In fact, Eisenhower has been quoted as describing him as “the outstanding British General under Montgomery.” (Brian Horrocks - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia )
    .

    Also I did not say that Patton was involved in the Kasserine Pass battles, I said he learned from them……….from the British and Germans. Thus:

    Battle of the Kasserine Pass - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


    New leadership
    On March 6, Major General George S. Patton was placed in command of II Corps, with the explicit task of improving performance……………………….. Unlike Fredendall, Patton was a 'hands-on' general not known for hesitancy, and did not bother to request permission when taking action to support his own command or that of other units requesting assistance.[nb 5]
    …………………………. Commanders were given greater latitude to use their own initiative, to keep their forces concentrated, and to make on-the-spot decisions without first requesting permission by higher command. They were also urged to lead their units from the front, and to keep command posts well forward,
    and so on…………………………………………….




    In regard to the slapping incident and Patton’s supposed dismissal, see”

    George S. Patton - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


    he apologized to the soldier "and to all those present at the time,"[33] The news reporters who had sent their report to Bedell Smith demanded that Patton be fired in exchange for killing the story, a demand which Eisenhower refused.[34] Contrary to popular impression, Eisenhower never seriously considered removing Patton from duty in the ETO: "If this thing ever gets out, they'll be howling for Patton's scalp, and that will be the end of Georgie's service in this war. I simply cannot let that happen. Patton is indispensable to the war effort – one of the guarantors of our victory."[34]

    and

    After consulting Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Assistant Secretary of WarJohn J. McCloy,[46] Eisenhower retained Patton in the European theater, though without a major command. Marshall and Stimson not only supported Eisenhower's decision, but defended it. In a letter to the Senate, Stimson stated that Patton must be retained because of the need for his "aggressive, winning leadership in the bitter battles which are to come before final victory."[47]

    Pre-invasion Planning:

    With regard to pre-invasion planning, Morgan’s original plan provided for invasion by two Army Groups, 21st AG on the left and 1st US AG on the right, the former comprising the British and Canadian forces and the latter US forces under Bradley. I don’t know what Montgomery “tore up” but certainly he, as Allied Ground Commander, was given the opportunity to comment and suggest changes and one of these was the change to five divisions on five beaches. It would have been strange if he had not been given that opportunity

    The biggest question was the allocation of Omaha as one of the US beaches. With the allocation of three beaches to the British and Canadians this left only two useable beaches, Omaha and Utah, for a roughly equal number of American troops. It was known from British submarine surveillance that Omaha would be a formidable obstacle and result in heavy casualties. However, as it was the only feasible beach between the British/Canadian ones and Utah, Bradley reluctantly accepted it.

    General Morgan was the planner for D-Day and the initial campaign in Normandy. The fact that a portion of the hugely detailed plan was changed by the Ground Commander would not in my opinion be a reason to denigrate Morgan’s competence.



    Regarding the month delay in starting the breakout of Operation Cobra, this was caused by the failure, however justified, of the British and Canadian armies to meet Montgomery’s own pre-invasion battle plan regarding the taking of Caen. see:

    Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    During the hard fought two and a half month Battle of Normandy that followed, the impact of a series of unfavourable autumnal weather conditions disrupted the Normandy landing areas and seriously hampered the tactical delivery of planned transportation of personnel and supplies which were being carried across the English Channel. Consequently, Montgomery argues in his literary account that he was unable to follow his pre-battle plan precisely to the timescales planned outside of battle. It should be noted that the extension of the battle plan by one month was the cause of significant retrospective criticisms of Montgomery by some of his American peers, including the much respected Bradley and equally controversial Patton.[citation needed]
    Montgomery's initial plan was, most likely, for an immediate breakout toward Caen. Unable to do so, as the British did not get enough forces ashore to exploit the successful landing, Montgomery's advance was checked. When it appeared unlikely that the British Second Army would break out, Montgomery's contingency was designed to attract German forces to the British sector to ease the passing of United States Army through German defences to the west, during Operation Cobra. This series of battle plans by the British, Canadian and American armies trapped and defeated the German forces in Normandy in the Falaise pocket. The campaign that Montgomery fought was essentially attritional until the middle of July with the occupation of the Cotentin Peninsula and a series of offensives in the east, which secured Caen and attracted the bulk of German armour there. An American breakout was achieved with Operation Cobra and the encirclement of German forces in the Falaise pocket at the cost of British sacrifice with the diversionary Operation Goodwood.[66]

    According to British historian Anthony Beevor, “D-Day: The Battle of Normandy,” (ebook edition) p43: Although 3d Army was not scheduled to be operational until Aug 1,
    On July 27 Bradley made Patton temporary commander of V111 Corps and assigned two armoured divisions to his command. With these as his spearhead, Patton started the breakout.

    George S. Patton - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    In regard to comments about Patton habitually running ahead of his supply chain:

    Patton expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. However, Eisenhower favored a "broad front" approach to the ground-war effort, believing that a single thrust would have to drop off flank protection, and would quickly lose its punch. Still, within the constraints of a very large effort overall, Eisenhower gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden.[62] The combination of Montgomery being given priority for supplies, and diversion of resources to moving the Communications Zone, resulted in the Third Army running out of gas in Alsace-Lorraine while exploiting German weakness.[63] In late September, a large German panzer counter attack sent expressly to stop the advance of Patton's Third Army was defeated by the 4th Armored Division at the Battle of Arracourt. Despite the victory, the Third Army stayed in place as a result of Eisenhower's order. Ironically, the Germans believed this was because their counterattack had been successful.[64]

    and
    Result of Eisenhower’s decision to support Montgomery’s drive to the Ruhr vs US 3d Army advance: See:
    Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Montgomery was able to persuade Eisenhower to adopt his strategy of a single thrust to the Ruhr with Operation Market Garden in September 1944. It was uncharacteristic of Montgomery's battles: the offensive was strategically bold, but poorly planned. Montgomery either didn't receive or ignored ULTRA intelligence which warned of the presence of German armoured units near the site of the attack.[68] As a result, the operation failed with the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division at the Battle of Arnhem and the loss of any hopes of invading Germany by the end of 1944.
    Montgomery's preoccupation with the push to the Ruhr had also distracted him from the essential task of clearing the Scheldt during the capture of Antwerp;[citation needed] and so, after Arnhem, Montgomery's group was instructed to concentrate on doing this so that the port of Antwerp could be opened.


    Regarding the comment about Patton’s “failure” to relieve Bastogne, see:

    George S. Patton - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    Battle of the Bulge
    Main article: Battle of the Bulge

    In late 1944, the German army launched a last-ditch offensive across Belgium, Luxembourg, and northeastern France, popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge, nominally led by German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. On December 16, 1944, the German army massed 29 divisions (totaling some 250,000 men) at a weak point in the Allied lines and made massive headway towards the Meuse River during one of the worst winters Europe had seen in years. General Eisenhower called a meeting of all senior Allied commanders on the Western Front to a headquarters near Verdun, France, on the morning of December 19 to plan strategy and a response to the German assault.
    At the time, Patton's Third Army was engaged in heavy fighting near Saarbrücken. Guessing the intent of the Allied command meeting, Patton ordered his staff to make three separate operational contingency orders to disengage elements of the Third Army from its present position and begin offensive operations towards several objectives in the area of the Bulge occupied by German forces.[67] At the Supreme Command conference, General Eisenhower led the meeting, which was attended by General Patton, General Bradley, General Jacob Devers, Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, Deputy Supreme Commander Arthur Tedder, and a large number of staff officers.[68] Eisenhower commenced the meeting by announcing that the German offensive was to be viewed as an opportunity, not as a disaster, and that he wanted to see only "cheerful faces."[69]
    When Eisenhower asked Patton how long it would take him to disengage six divisions of his Third Army and commence a counterattack north to relieve the 101st Airborne, Patton replied, "As soon as you're through with me."[70] Patton then clarified that he had already worked up an operational order for a counterattack by three full divisions on December 21, then only 48 hours away.[70][71] Eisenhower was incredulous: "Don't be fatuous, George. If you try to go that early you won't have all three divisions ready and you'll go piecemeal." Patton replied that his staff already had a contingency operations order ready to go. Still unconvinced, Eisenhower ordered Patton to attack the morning of December 22, using at least three divisions. Patton strode from the conference room, located a field telephone, and upon reaching his commmand, uttered two words: "Play ball".[72] This code phrase initiated a prearranged operational order with Patton's staff, mobilizing three divisions–the U.S. 4th Armored Division, theU.S. 80th Infantry Division, and the U.S. 26th Infantry Division–from the Third Army and moving them north towards Bastogne.[73]The operations order included order of battle, road deployment order, fuel, resupply, security, and clearance of the road net.[72] In all, Patton would reposition six full divisions (including his 3rd and 12th Army Corps) from their positions on the Saar front along a line stretching from Bastogne to Diekirch to Echternach.[74] Within a few days, more than 133,000 Third Army vehicles were re-routed into an offensive that covered a combined distance of 1.5 million miles, followed by supply echelons carrying some 62,000 tons of supplies.[75]
    On December 21 Patton met with General Bradley to go over the impending advance: "Brad, this time the Kraut's stuck his head in the meatgrinder, and I've got hold of the handle."[73] Patton then argued that his Third Army should attack towards Koblenz, cutting off the Bulge at the base and trapping the entirety of the German armies involved in the offensive.[72] After briefly considering this, Bradley vetoed this proposal, as he was less concerned about killing large numbers of Germans than he was in arranging for the relief of Bastogne before it was overrun.[72][76]
    During the advance, Patton led his divisions from the front, frequently leapfrogging ahead in his command car, then stopping to urge the men on. As one tank destroyer sergeant related: "On the way to Bastogne, we would see Patton along the side of the road waving us on. I don't know how he got ahead of us all the time, but he did. Patton was right there breaking it up and getting things moving again. He was a relentless man...and a great general. Patton had a theory that the Germans didn't shoot as well on the run. That's why he never wanted to stop. The only time he stopped in the field was when he ran out of gas."[17]
    On December 26, 1944, the first spearhead units of the Third Army's U.S. 4th Armored Division reached Bastogne, opening a corridor for relief and resupply of the besieged forces. Patton's ability to disengage six divisions from frontline combat during the middle of winter, then wheel north to relieve besieged Bastogne was one of his most remarkable achievements during the war. Author John MacDonald cites it as one of the greatest extant examples of the mastery of military logistics, stating, "probably his greatest military achievement, unsurpassed at the time, was the logistic repositioning, within twenty-four hours, of a whole army corps at the Battle of the Bulge."





    and
    George S. Patton - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    However, probably the key to Patton's success compared to all of the other U.S. and British forces, which had similar advantages, was his intensive use of close air support; the Third Army had by far more G-2 officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army.[65] Third Army's attached close air support group was XIX Tactical Air Command, commanded by Gen.Otto P. Weyland. Developed originally by Gen. Elwood Quesada of IX TAC for the First Army at Operation Cobra the technique of "armored column cover" whereby close air support was directed by an air traffic controller in one of the attacking tanks was used extensively by the Third Army.[66] In addition, because Patton's rapid drive resulted in a salient that was vulnerable to flanking attacks and getting trapped by the Germans, Weyland and Patton developed the concept of using intensive aerial armed reconnaissance to protect the flanks of this salient. Microwave Early Warning (MEW) radar, another technique pioneered by Quesada, was also used by XIX TAC to both cover against Luftwaffe attacks and to vector flights already in the air to new sites as an air traffic control radar. As a result of the close cooperation between Patton and Weyland, XIX TAC would end up providing far more air sorties for ground support for the Third Army than the other attached Tactical Air Commands would for the First and Ninth Armies. Despite their success, however, Eisenhower had faith only in the traditional method of advancing across a broad front to avoid the problem of flanking attacks, which most accounts for the decision to halt the Third Army.
    The halt of the Third Army during the month of September was enough to allow the Germans to further fortify the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans, with heavy casualties on both sides. By November 23, however, Metz had finally fallen to the Americans, the first time the city had been taken since the Franco-Prussian War.


    Since becoming operational in Normandy on August 1, 1944 until May 9, 1945, the Third Army was in continuous combat for 281 days.[3] It had advanced farther and faster than any army in military history, crossing 24 major rivers and capturing 81,500 square miles of territory, including more than 12,000 cities and towns.[3] With a normal strength of around 250,000–300,000 men, the Third had killed, wounded, or captured some 1,811,388 enemy soldiers, six times its strength in personnel.[3][86][87] By comparison, the Third Army suffered 16,596 killed, 96,241 wounded, and 26,809 missing in action for a total of 139,646 men, a ratio of enemy to U.S. losses of nearly thirteen to one.[88]


    So yes, Patton was a bit of a loose cannon and often outspoken to the point of embarrassment. He was also a very successful commander, by any standards.

    Nevil.
     
    Slipdigit likes this.
  14. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Nevil
    I can see where you have given a great deal of thought to this debate and I would apologise if have taken any of your original statement out of context by mis quoting
    you.
    However I note that you base your arguement on the articles by Wiki - I am sorry but I cannot agree with most as it is not always correct and tends to lean on the revisionist attitudes of many American writers , with one eye ever on Hollywood- and example of this is to be found near the end of your submission that the commander of the US Air forces Quesada originated the "Air Cover' for Pattons army - I would ask you to refer to the 2nd Volume of Nigel Hamilton's trilogy - "Monty - Master of the battlefield" - Chapter 6 - El Hamma pp 196 - you will read of the FIRST Cab rank by any Allied Airforce under Harry Broadhurst of the DAF - after Tedder - Conningham and the US Brereton had gone over to Algiers with Ike .

    Further into that same volume we find in Part V Chapter one pp 485- this gem ..."For Morgan's Overlord plan,the result of one and a half years of research and discussion, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan's planners themselves confessed ....."Eisenhower on seeing the plans for the first time in Algiers on 27/28 October 1943 was appalled .....
    THAT was why Monty tore it up and came up with the five division - five beaches plan - Ike and Smith might have been appalled - but they did nothing to change it ....Monty had already fought for one landing at Sicily and knew what could go wrong - while it is true that he was very slow in Southern Italy to relieve Clark at Salerno - would agree that it is faster to drive a jeep 300 miles on an undisturbed road thanit is to repair blown up bridges collapsed mountains on roads - mined dirt tracks for your four divisions etc -NO Scotty to beam you over 300 mies in thosedays

    This is why I do not go along with Wiki - it doesn't deal in objective truth- close but half truths don't count...
    Cheers
     
  15. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    with one eye ever on Hollywood-

    Goodness Tom, you must be slipping. It took you four whole posts to throw your usual straw-man into the discussion. B)

    Nevil, have fun with him. Anything you post contrary to the orthodoxy will be termed "revisionist" and "Hollywood".
     
    Dave55 and Za Rodinu like this.
  16. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Jeff
    I can see that you have never really forgiven me for pointing out the truth of many events in WW2 - and even now you cannot distinguish between subjective and objective truth- and in some wild moments you have often agreed with me on my thoughts on some US commanders such as Mark Clark - to your buddy Patton and worst of all my condemnation of your favoured Lightening Joe Collins - who disobeyed not quite as many orders as the other two but equally reprehensible inasmuch as they cost lives unnecessarily - face it he did disobey Monty at the Bulge- you should now have a look at Nigel Hamilton's Volume 3 - Chapter 7 on how Monty issued orders for Collins to make up a four division reserve ready for the counter- attack -but he carried on with the battle - and got a bloody nose- and Monty had to start again....

    The main problem here is that both Nevil and I are mature adults and thus able to have sensible arguements predicated on facts - which is much more fun than any manufactured idiocies by people who write what other people want to read or rather watch while chewing pop corn
    Cheers
     
  17. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

  18. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Contunuing the theme, 'Patton continues his advance through Brittany.'

    [​IMG]

    I couldn't resist this, Jeff.

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  19. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Contunuing the theme, 'Patton continues his advance through Brittany.'

    [​IMG]

    I couldn't resist this, Jeff.

    Best,

    Steve.

    By all means, Steve, please do. Discuss the man and his faults based on his merits, or the lack thereof, not xenophobia. :)
     
  20. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Steve & Jeff -
    just got the red cross as opposed to photo's so cannot comment - but the yawns say it all..
    cheers
     

Share This Page