As if the consultants were nuts...

I feel it fair to warn you before I post this that I have my Jug/Air Power soapbox out.

I was watching a Bridge Too Far last night and in the opening battle of XXX Corps I noticed something that the consultants had added to the battle that was conspicuous by its graphic relativity. For those of you who have it on DVD you can go to the first part and see exactly what I am talking about. Now, I know it is a reproduction and subject to a little <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hollywood</st1:place></st1:City> license but I am sure the battle consultants were used to fit the order of battle. <o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>
The first scene starts when the leader (not Horrocks but the other British dude that told the concerned Reece pilot that he was an idiot) gets into his armored vehicle and begins to move. Now the British Arty boys open up with what looked to be a crap load of “105s” (25 pdrs?) on the German anti-tank positions as the tanks moved forward and kept pacing the artillery ahead of their movement. (That’s pretty accurate tactically right?). So the German anti-tank gunners get holy hell rained down on them and those that didn’t die dove into their foxholes. Then the <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Shermans</st1:place></st1:City> rolled up to that position and the Arty had to cease and the gunners ran out of their holes and started opening up (those whose guns were not destroyed by the British Arty). Now artillery is pretty spotty and can do a lot of damage but is somewhat limited because of trees, visibility and spread probability. So the German anti-tank guns and armor started the Shermanicide, that we have all come to know happens when a Sherman is moving and it was pretty much a field day as you would expect. On of the lead groups pops the purple smoke and “here come the Jugs” (we have a funny saying in the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> from Laugh-in that went “He’ come da Judge”). Of course they are using simulated bombs but the breath of the explosions takes out entire sections leaving nothing alive or usable from that point on. A secession of these attacks and it left an entire enemy defense of the road open. As a matter of fact the Brits get out and survey the situation before moving ahead to make sure there is nothing moving. It reminds me of the scene in “Apocalypse Now” where they call in the napalm because of the enemy along the tree line and in one pass, there is no enemy left alive, just crispy critters. <o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>
The question is this. Why not call the Jugs first, let them take out the entire German defenses, save your artillery, men, and tanks and move on in an orderly manner? Why get men killed before you call in the air? This was how Patton moved so fast. His XIX TAC dedicated tactical air force always worked an area about 30 miles in front of him, sending back recon and bombing any heavy stuff before he gets there. That’s when the <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Shermans</st1:place></st1:City> fast engine and man-killing 75mms can do their best when anti-tank and German armor is not blowing holes in them. You see, according to Weyland, the reason Patton could move fast is because he didn’t have to wait for the arty to position itself because the artillery is too slow and could prevent the enemy from digging in. So the enemy’s only hope is to stay ahead far enough to dig in and when they were doing this the air would find them. He only used artillery when he got to an area of numerous strong points. Since air is far more destructive than artillery (in both coverage and intensity) why not use it and go flying across <st1:country-region w:st="on">France</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Germany</st1:place></st1:country-region>? Why use Jugs to mop up? You let the Jugs to “wipe out”, not “mop up”. Then if there is some mopping needed, let the ground forces and mobile arty take care of it. <o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>
Maybe I am over-simplifying the problem but I believe <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hollywood</st1:place></st1:City> at least got the order of battle from qualified consultants. With air coming in at about 200 feet you get about 20 seconds to shoot down as many as you can see and that is IF you are willing to forgo the relative safety of your foxhole for an almost sure death if they are marked on your position. If they are not on your position they are too low to get an AA shot at them being blocked by the trees and moving too fast. There is to this day, never been a sufficient counter for tactical air other than defense air. <o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>
Was air an ancillary weapon to the British ground forces as it seems to be? <o:p></o:p>

 

The question is this. Why not call the Jugs first, let them take out the entire German defenses, save your artillery, men, and tanks and move on in an orderly manner? Why get men killed before you call in the air?

If you remember the scence as Gen Horrocks, thats the chap you are talking about, is climbing up to the tower, he asks one of his staff bods, if there were any updates. The reply was "if we get into difficulties, then we are to call in the Air Force using purple smoke"!

The TaC fighters were operating a taxi rank system with ground controllers. the tanks were to proceed down the road under their own steam as it were. Intelligence failed to locate any active enemy in the area and so the need for ground support was only on a stanby nature.

 

If you remember the scence as Gen Horrocks, thats the chap you are talking about, is climbing up to the tower, he asks one of his staff bods, if there were any updates. The reply was "if we get into difficulties, then we are to call in the Air Force using purple smoke"!

The TaC fighters were operating a taxi rank system with ground controllers. the tanks were to proceed down the road under their own steam as it were. Intelligence failed to locate any active enemy in the area and so the need for ground support was only on a stanby nature.
But isn't your biggest threat going to be the initial front that holds your forces back? After that you can break out with the air patrols trying to spot enemy movement where the reloaded and rearmed fighter/bombers would be ready to strike again. Isn't that cheaper than losing tanks as you roll into the enemy kill zone? The enemy is not going to hit your lead tank, he is going to wait until you are in position to lose a lot of equipment and can't retreat and then open up on you. You send recon patrols ahead to spot any movement and move like the wind in your main force. By then you could be too close to use air power for fear of frendly fire accidents. Doesn't that seem logical?

BTW: What is a taxi-rank system?

 

And then talking absolute crap while doing the job (typical pilots).
As to sending in air power first, it does sound the logical thing to do. But as the British were going in most of our aircraft were elsewhere doing other things (like bombing the bejeezus out of towns and trains). It does make sense to use them first, but if you haven't got enough you don't waste them. Maybe the bombline was also being enforced, so air power was used only as a last resort. I'm not sure, I'll sit back and watch this thread.
Kitty
^_^

 

And then talking absolute crap while doing the job (typical pilots).
As to sending in air power first, it does sound the logical thing to do. But as the British were going in most of our aircraft were elsewhere doing other things (like bombing the bejeezus out of towns and trains). It does make sense to use them first, but if you haven't got enough you don't waste them. Maybe the bombline was also being enforced, so air power was used only as a last resort. I'm not sure, I'll sit back and watch this thread.
Kitty
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You may have hit on the differences between the American tactics and British tactics. It would be subject to the number of available aircraft. I have stated before that I believe the British produced too many fighters and not enough tactical air, just like the Germans did. Though from experiences in the BofB where fighter/bombers would have been useless, I can see why they would be valued. To me, after “Big Week”, the value of fighters dropped significantly. The <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> had sufficient numbers of fighters to deal with what was left of the Luftwaffe so the British should have switched their aircraft industry to tactical air only and convert the fighter pilots into strike pilots. This would have given them great numbers and hurt the Germans much worse. If the British had more tactical air, they would have faced much less of a static front and would have raced across <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region> as well. The idea of a “quick end” would not be necessary as the progress would dictate that the Siegfried Line was just another “bump in the road”. <o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>
I think the comments that “Coyningham” made to Patton about using air power as an excuse is fallacious conceptually. I am not talking about insulting or demean or even uncalled for, but rather to me it means he didn’t understand the incredible leverage that air power gives whichever army has it. In this event, it was helping the Germans because they were attacking Patton with it at El Guettar, so that issue was about Allied defense air needed to thwart these attacks. But it is also a transitive thing. In math there is a transitive principle of equality that if: a = b and b = c then a = c. So we can apply that here in that if the role of defense air is to prevent damage to one’s own army from the enemies tactical air, then transitively one’s own tactical air would create the same damage to the enemy’s army. Therefore if Coyningham didn’t realize the gravity of the damage that German tactical air was capable of, he wouldn’t have realized the gravity of damage that Allied tactical air could do to the Germans either. If he was not being a smart-a** but actually believed that armies didn’t really need defense from tactical air strikes on them, then I would think he would not appreciate tactical air himself. An air force general would never intimate something like that today but yet the issue of a tank’s vulnerability to air was just as relevant back them as it is today. Perhaps the combination of BofB experience and the short-sightedness of Coyningham concerning the efficacy of TAC was what drove the British aircraft industry to produce the ratios they did. To me, tactical air is not a support of ground forces but ground forces are support of tactical air, because it is the weapon of choice. It takes a long time to do with artillery to do what tactical can do in thirty seconds, and using artillery gives the enemy time to get cover and move equipment out of the line of fire.<o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>
But, like Rumsfeld said, "you go to war with the army you have". I can buy the differences in tactics being along those lines. In MG, they were given priority and the US TACs were assigned to them (hence using Jugs instead of Tiffies/Mossies for tactical air). Maybe this was the only way the British ground had developed to coordinate air/ground combat. It does take a pretty developed system between air and ground to optimize air use in close support. Just using colored smoke is pretty fundamental and though it seems so hard to imagine it knowing modern warfare, coordination between air and ground was a relatively new thing even in the 1940s.
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I don’t think it is the ratio of fighters to tactical aircraft (of all kinds) that is as important as the ratio of the number of tactical aircraft to the width of your front. Other factors are involved like how fast you rearm/refuel and how efficiently you can move your forward tactical air bases up with your moving army so they don’t have to fly so far. You can optimize these to make up for numbers short falls. But all this is contingent on having air superiority which fighters certainly have a significant impact on. In my opinion, this was what made the Jug more important to the USAAF than the Mustang, that it could perform both roles so well. All fighter/bombers can be used as fighters or they wouldn’t have the name. But, they have to be effective at both roles. They can’t just be good at one and ok at the other. Mustangs and Spitfires were excellent fighters but just ok at ground attack (due to ordinance limitations and aircraft vulnerability in low level attack). Hawker should have just focused on the Tempest and dropped any other aircraft resources working out the kinks, and get it into mass production as soon as possible. Supermarine should have been working on creating a fighter/bomber as well rather than simply improving the Spitfire. <o:p></o:p>
<o:p> </o:p>

Does anybody know the MO of the British Army/2nd TAC coordination? I have a 2nd TAC book but I haven't gotten to it yet (it is about three down in the reading order). Anyone ever studied this? Also, just how many tactical aircraft (light/med bombers, and fighter/bombers) did the RAF have and what where they?

 

I honestly don't know the answers. I have a great load of books yet to read, two of which are fighter and bomber command.
As to US using tactical air, i've been thinking about it and i think the Allies were using US TAC air, whilst the Commonwealth fighters were used to defend the heavy bombers that were moving deeper into Reich territory. I know that long ranger fighters nursed the heavy bombers in, stayed high with them whilst they bombed, and then dove afterward and shot up everything that moved.
And after several nasty experiences of close air support, i think the allies were very nerovus about it, and so enforced the bombing line.
Probably all wrong, but I've just set my mind to thinking about it and that was what came back.
Kitty
PS. Jimbo, can you please shorten your posts a bit? I have a usage limit, you know.^_^

 

I honestly don't know the answers. I have a great load of books yet to read, two of which are fighter and bomber command.
As to US using tactical air, i've been thinking about it and i think the Allies were using US TAC air, whilst the Commonwealth fighters were used to defend the heavy bombers that were moving deeper into Reich territory. I know that long ranger fighters nursed the heavy bombers in, stayed high with them whilst they bombed, and then dove afterward and shot up everything that moved.
And after several nasty experiences of close air support, i think the allies were very nerovus about it, and so enforced the bombing line.
Probably all wrong, but I've just set my mind to thinking about it and that was what came back.
Kitty
PS. Jimbo, can you please shorten your posts a bit? I have a usage limit, you know.<!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id="_x0000_t75" coordsize="21600,21600" o:spt="75" o:preferrelative="t" path="m@4@5l@4@11@9@11@9@5xe" filled="f" stroked="f"> <v:stroke joinstyle="miter"/> <v:formulas> <v:f eqn="if lineDrawn pixelLineWidth 0"/> <v:f eqn="sum @0 1 0"/> <v:f eqn="sum 0 0 @1"/> <v:f eqn="prod @2 1 2"/> <v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelWidth"/> <v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelHeight"/> <v:f eqn="sum @0 0 1"/> <v:f eqn="prod @6 1 2"/> <v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelWidth"/> <v:f eqn="sum @8 21600 0"/> <v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelHeight"/> <v:f eqn="sum @10 21600 0"/> </v:formulas> <v:path o:extrusionok="f" gradientshapeok="t" o:connecttype="rect"/> <o:lock v:ext="edit" aspectratio="t"/> </v:shapetype><v:shape id="_x0000_i1025" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="" style='width:15pt; height:15pt'> <v:imagedata src="file:///C:\DOCUME~1\rittjc\LOCALS~1\Temp\msohtml1\01\clip_image001.gif" o:href="http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/images/smilies/happy.gif"/> </v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]-->^_^<!--[endif]-->
Sorry kitty. Not trying to take up space, just a habit of mine to detail an opinion to explain how I come about it. Ironically, I am sometimes accused of making outrageous claims without backing it up and even though often it is an original idea. Such criticism is usually in the vain of you have to explain your ideas in the context of a historian as if that's the only way people are allowed to arrive at ideas as their brains are no good, not being certified and sanctioned with the WHF (World Historian Foundation). I sometimes think that people believe that if it is not revealed by the correct historians, it was not meant to be known by us mortals.

BTW: What is a usage limit?

 

The thing about tactical air support is that it is a valuable tactical asset. If you use it for the small insignificant opposition it's not there when you actually do need the heavy support to get you out of the mire.

To use it to hit any area you think might have heavy opposition is a waste. Sending the aircraft over the suspected enemy lines before the advance isn’t going to provide too many targets as they will be camouflaged and dug in and very difficult to see from a low, fast moving aircraft. Hence using a rolling barrage in front of the advance, as protection for your troops and to soften up the enemy as you advance, artillery being an integral asset for your own close support and can be used more freely. Losing troops in an advance was all part of the reality of war and expected, the question was just how many. Wasting a valuable asset can just as easily cause more losses later than prevent losses now.

<o =""></o>Once an enemy strong point has been found, they can be marked and engaged by air support with less chance of the asset being wasted.
<o =""></o>
Not only did the Americans have much more aircraft available they were much less shy of destroying everything just in case the enemy was there. The policy was supposedly to prevent losses for their own troops and probably did, but did nothing to prevent unnecessary losses to civilians and collateral damage to property. Both of which are actually illegal under the Geneva Conventions. However, as large scale bombing of civilians was practiced by all sides I’m sure that can be over looked as in war loss is inevitable.

 

The thing about tactical air support is that it is a valuable tactical asset. If you use it for the small insignificant opposition it's not there when you actually do need the heavy support to get you out of the mire.

Tac Air should be available to all users, regardless of teh tactical situation, that is why the Taxi Rank, system was used, the air assests over the batlefield could be called in as and when required by ground forces.

In Both korea and vietnam, CAS was used to attack even small groups of men, as it meant friendly forces did not need to go forward under fire.

In Vietnam in particular, there were many examples of massive amounts of CAS being used to support platoon sized formation against enemy fire. think of the 7th cav at id Drang, where they used the codeword "Broken Arrow" to obtain priority usage of the available CAS. There was also the incident where a Chinnok crewman left his aircraft to provide covering fire while a downed pilot was rescued. he came under attack and there was 1500 sorties flown in support of that one man!

<O =""></O>Once an enemy strong point has been found, they can be marked and engaged by air support with less chance of the asset being wasted.


That is where the FAC and TACPs come into use, marking and guiding CAS assests into the target. By this means the CAS have a chance of effectively destroying the target by mean of accurate placement of weapons rather than a general "Chuck the bomb and hope it hits" type attitude.

Even using smoke canisters to mark the target is a very effective method and ensures that the CAS assessts are used to their full potential. hence it a essential part of battlefield tactics to ensure the smooth co-operation between ground and air.

Sending the aircraft over the suspected enemy lines before the advance isn’t going to provide too many targets as they will be camouflaged and dug in and very difficult to see from a low, fast moving aircraft.

if you are facing well disciplined troops then they will avoid detection before the attack but to the rest, the possibility of hitting the low flying aircraft is difficult to overcome.


Both of which are actually illegal under the Geneva Conventions. However, as large scale bombing of civilians was practiced by all sides I’m sure that can be over looked as in war loss is inevitable

remember it is the right of the victor to write the history of the war.

 

I pay the equivalent of 25 GBP for unlimited. Slows to 56 after that but still unlimited.

What do you pay USD Jimbo?

Time to revert back to the original topic of the thread! if you want to compare ISP/OSP pprices then please wait until you are back in the barracks!!

 

[FONT=&quot]Tac Air should be available to all users, regardless of teh tactical situation, that is why the Taxi Rank, system was used, the air assests over the batlefield could be called in as and when required by ground forces.
The <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> applied its air support differently in WWII.
FM 100-20 set that air and land forces are co-equal and neither is an auxiliary of the other.

Within the USAAF was the priority system (FM 100-23).

1) Air superiority
2) Interdiction
3) Ground Support

In <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:country-region></st1:place> in particular, there were many examples of massive amounts of CAS being used to support platoon sized formation against enemy fire. think of the 7th cav at id Drang, where they used the codeword "<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Broken Arrow</st1:place></st1:city>" to obtain priority usage of the available CAS. There was also the incident where a Chinnok crewman left his aircraft to provide covering fire while a downed pilot was rescued. he came under attack and there was 1500 sorties flown in support of that one man!
"<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Broken Arrow</st1:place></st1:city>" was actually the code phrase for indicating to all friendly forces that the enemy has overrun your lines. It did assign top priority of all assets (air, artillery, supply, etc) to your group. But, it is not specific to air. You couldn't use it just to get desired support. It's like declaring an emergency at an airport. You are immediately assigned all priority and deference to resolve the situation and allowed to bust any regulation to resolve the situation, but if you declare an emergency, you better really have one or you will get your ticket pulled and fined out the ying-yang.

remember it is the right of the victor to write the history of the war.
But that does not mean the victor has fabricated it. Losing does not necessarily indicate integrity and introspect, anymore than winning indicates a guaranteed bias.[/FONT]

 

[FONT=&quot] The <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 /><st1:country-region w:st="on"><ST1:place w:st="on">US</ST1:place></st1:country-region> applied its air support differently in WWII.
FM 100-20 set that air and land forces are co-equal and neither is an auxiliary of the other.

Within the USAAF was the priority system (FM 100-23).

1) Air superiority
2) Interdiction
3) Ground Support

"<st1:city w:st="on"><ST1:place w:st="on">Broken Arrow</ST1:place></st1:city>" was actually the code phrase for indicating to all friendly forces that the enemy has overrun your lines. It did assign top priority of all assets (air, artillery, supply, etc) to your group. But, it is not specific to air. You couldn't use it just to get desired support. It's like declaring an emergency at an airport. You are immediately assigned all priority and deference to resolve the situation and allowed to bust any regulation to resolve the situation, but if you declare an emergency, you better really have one or you will get your ticket pulled and fined out the ying-yang.

But that does not mean the victor has fabricated it. Losing does not necessarily indicate integrity and introspect, anymore than winning indicates a guaranteed bias.[/FONT]

Thanks for the info on "Broken Arrow", Now I remember the scene from the film about it! But in real live it was issued by the FAC on the ground to his HQ in Saigon.

Thanks also for the info from the FM 100-20. Its very interesting