Arnhem,Would the Americans have been more effective?

I have just finished reading over the hol`s:

Brothers in Battle by Bill Guarnere and Babe Heffron.

And at the risk of worm/can opening i wonder what members opinions are,it easier to quote directly from the book as its self explanatory.This is Bill Guarnere.


" Now , we never fought with the British in the war. They are supposed to come up and meet us in Eindhoven. The British were good soldiers. They had a lot of time in combat. But their leaders had them stopping for frigging tea in every town. Maybe if they met their own troops in Eindhoven , not us , they would have fought better , instead of throwing two different armies together. That was a risk.

Strategy - wise , it should have been the opposite - the British should have jumped where we jumped and met their own armored division , and we should have been in Arnhem. If you watch the movie A bridge too far , that tells you what happened when the British were dropped in Arnhem. They jumped on top of a German armored division. And the dutch warmed them the German Armour was there! They told Montgomery; he knew all about it. And they still jumped right on top of them. The Germans were waiting.

If we were in Arnhem , we'd have gotten the shit beaten out of us too , but we fought differently , and we may have succeeded. If Patton was there , he'd have blown right through to Arnhem. He would have hit them like a brick. Instead , Montgomery wanted all the glory. He was an egotistical son of a bitch. No-one liked him. Montgomery lead this operation , so who was going to be the first one into Germany? Montgomery gets first pick , of course he wanted to be the first one in Germany , to be the hero. So that , to me , was failure because of a political move. First into Germany , the British?!

So yes , with Market Garden they left too many loose ends. Thats my own concept of the war. You read about this stuff after the war is over. And sixty years later you still analyse it. A lot of mistakes were made. ''


I thought it was worth a mention

 

Theobob

I know that you recently moved to Canada in the Peterborough area and trust that you have settled down to Canadian ways of doing things - a bit different to

that "over 'one" - one of the things that you appear about to learn is that to quote an ill informed American of how they would have fought a battle as opposed to the

way the Battle was fought…is a BIG No - No and not even worthy of the merest mention on this forum…just thought that was worth a mention...

Cheers
PS - the two authors (sic) actually fought at Ahrnem I take it …?

 

All our knowledge has its origins in our perceptions:

Leonardo da Vinci

 

Both Guarnere and Heffron served in the "Easy" Company of the US 101st Airborne and made the Market-Garden drop.

Over on ww2f.com there is a recently started thread on the hazards of taking the memoirs of senior German commanders too literally in their content due to some revisionist thinking on the part of the authors. There is also some hazard in taking comments of veterans as gospel as well.

A veteran can tell you a lot about how they fought, how the enemy fought, the value of their training and equipment, the officers that led them, the buddies they fought beside, the ground they fought over, their hopes and fears.

But, an understanding of larger strategy of how and why the war was fought is based upon the "foxhole' eye view that was their only perspective, that and the "scuttlebutt" that was "common knowledge" to come down to them through the "grapevine". In other words a mix of rumor, wishful thinking and tall tale that sustained the combat soldier in trying to make sense of the chaos they were a part of, but had precious little control over.

As to the specific points claimed by Guarnere and Heffron, there is a good deal of if this, then that to their thoughts that make it difficult not to wander off into the deep grass of 'what-if'. Sure there is a possibility that Patton would have ensured the armored spearhead had infantry right behind it so that there would be no need to await their closing up after the second drop zone, but he could have made the same mistakes that Horrock's made as well too.

There is a very slight chance that had a US division been given Arnhem drop its commander might have insisted on a closer drop point than that used and Urquhart had preferred, but ultimately did without due to the risk as perceived by the planners (who would not be making the actual jump). A closer drop point might have allowed more than a single battalion to reach the bridge and then permitted the capture of both sides.

The thing is, capture of the Arnhem bridge still does not ensure XXX Corps (or Patton at the head of his 4th Armored Division) will reach the bridge before the Airborne are overwhelmed.

 

The OP's quote from the 101st veterans raises the questions which have hung over Op Market Garden since 1944. Would operation Market Garden have been a success if the 101 had been at Arnhem? Would the war have ended if the 3rd US Army had been conducting the land operation with Patton at the helm rather than Dempsey's 2nd Army?

Implicit in that is the assumption that the American Airborne did their bit and the British screwed up.

This does not hold water as the US airborne divisions could have done more to expedite the success of Op market Garden. The statement by the veterans quoted in the OP was incorrect. the 101st were not supposed to sit tight until relieved by the XXX Corps. The 101st mission included the capture of Eindhoven from the North while XXX Corps attacked from the South. I don't think the 101st can be faulted in failing to prevent the Son bridge from being blown. They could still have sent a patrol or two towards Eindhoven. The 82 Ab Division drop ignored the Nijmegan bridges entirely,. which had to be captured by a set piece attack by the Guards Division. It was purely German incompetence which allowed the Guards to sieze the road bridge.

Whether Patton would have done a better job is a moot point. If a single commander of the allied land forces had a free hand to assign troops to task then Patton would be the man of choice to lead the US Cavalry to the rescue. But Patton could, and never would be in a posiiton to support an Op market Garden.

The deployment of the 1st Airborne Army in 1944 in Op market Garden was going to be in 21 Army group rather than 12 Army Group. In the imaginations of some counter factual historians the 1st AB Army dropped across the Rhine in the 12 AG area might have allowed Patton and the 3rd Army to win the war in '44. Except that Bradley did not want to use the First Airborne Army at all in support of the advance of his army group. He did believe in the "strategic role" of AB forces. When offered the opportunity to use them he is claimed to have asked for the transport aircraft instead to support his ground troops.

The idea that Op market garden could have won the war in September 44 is only plausible if the Germans were at the point of collapse - which they weren't, as their response demonstrated. Patton might have relieved the troops at the bridge art Arnhem - but then what? The purpose of the operation was not to relieve the paratroops but to break through into the North German Plain with a sizable force, with a possible secondary objective of isolating the Western Netherlands (Holland) and preventing the Germans from firing V2 rockets at London. . That was not going to happen in the face of II SS Corps, fgiven the dipersion of the allied effort in the "broad front" strategy..

There are other questions which have not really been asked about Op market Garden - or the Allied operations in NW Europe in Aug/Sep 1944.

1. What was the real reason why Op market Garden was launched? What were the allies trying to do, and why did they think this might have ended the war?

2. Why were the objectives focused on seizing ground rather than on destroying the sizable German armies withdrawing largely pon foot. 15th Army along the Belgian Coast could have been ciut off by an attack North from Antwerp. If Patton had headed for the Swiss Border raher than the Moselle and Rhine the German 19th Army withdrawing up the Rhone might have been rounded up

3. How much use were the few elite airborne formations? These were extremely expensive to train and maintain, diverted manpower and aircraft from other tasks, an too valuable to be wasted. 1940 showed how effective airborne forces might be to make a surprise attack on an un suspecting neighbour. But when used against a mobilised enemy the effect of deploying airborne troops behind the lines was to create a set of hostages who needed to be "rescued" regardless of the overall operational priorities. Here is a classic example
.

Surely the ideal way to prevent the paras from being overrun, and incur far fewer casualties would be to not drop them in the first place Bradley had a point.


Arnhem and Bastogne are obvious examples. Less well known is the impact of the decision to drop the 6th British AB Division East of Caen on 5/6th June. The decision was undoubtedly a good one as it secured the east flank of the beachhead. However it did mean that the 3rd British Division tasked with capturing Caen on D Day had a series of additional tasks to support 6 AB division and link up with it which in practice took precedence over capturing Caen.

 

Was stopping for frigging tea so much more time-consuming than coffee and do-nuts ?

 

NO.

Not if they had been forced to work the same plan, anyway. RAF (Leigh-Mallory, I believe) did not want to land troops too close to the bridge for fear of AA fire. Gavin and Taylor were more experienced in airborne ops than Urquhart and might have protested at this, but there is no certainty that they could have over-ridden the RAF. Restrictions on the initial lift would have remained the same.

As far as I can tell, there was absolutely no difference in quality and performance between the British and American airborne; both were the cream of their armies and had excellent leadership. One thing that comes through strongly in Band of Brothers is the great respect that the two airborne forces had for each other, so I have no idea why stay-at-homes today want to stir up rivalry by making silly comparisons. The real problem at Arnhem was the plan, not the men who were chosen to carry it out.

 

Clearly Bill Guarnere was a great soldier, but not a great historian.

"If you watch the movie A bridge too far " - need I say more!

Regards

Tom

 

Once more I would disagree with Belaser on his statement that many tales by Veterans should be discounted as being of a fox hole nature only and they are not

aware of the overall strategy etc etc…. SOME Veterans after the war were incredulous of the many errors which had taken place and wanted to know what actually

had happened ….thus - in my case about 25 years of study mainly of the Desert - Tunisia -Sicily and Italy campaigns as well as a limited study of some of the NWE

campaign and very little of the Burmese campaign.

It became very clear early on that Marshall's plan to load a few divisions on the Eastern Seaboard - sail across the Atlantic to land at say Cherbourg - then drive

through to Berlin and the war would be over in nine months - and in telling this to Alanbrooke of all people made me aware of the American ignorance of what the

war was all about..and how they would conduct themselves in their efforts to gain territory as opposed to weakening the enemy…..which was maintained throughout

with their dragging their feet in North Africa - Sicily and Italy…..which Belaser has now finally admitted….ignoring the fact that Monty was within three weeks of

entering Berlin when the goal posts were moved allowing the Russians to rape and pillage middle Europe for 40 years…..now we have this nonsense from this book

by two who should know better…..proving no end to the stupidity of some…this will be my last posting on this thread.

Cheers

 

Now Tom, be charitable. I did not say the thoughts of veterans should be discounted, on the contrary I listed several areas where their opinions have special insights that conventional histories lack. What I did say was that some care should be given when they stray from those areas where they have real first person knowledge.

It is inevitable that our memories are subjective to the time and place where they occur. This has advantages and disadvantages when one attempts to reconcile history as it was and as you remember it.

 

The most effective allied airborne division was the British 6th airborne. Every other division had flaws in its traiing/leadership. Despite Hollywood might say, the 101st did not have a great record, particularly in Normandy. the 82nd airborne was a far more effective American division, although it had the advantage of being more experienced.

 

Belesar,

Agreed. Like all sources, veterans' memories and memoirs (and especially general's memoirs!) should be treated by historians as one would any other Historical source - it is not disrespectful, it is just being professional.

The best example of the professional historian demonstrating his skill in my opinion is Rory Muir's 'Salamanca', at the end of each chapter he includes a comment section which describes how he has used the conflicting sources available and why he has given some greater credence than others. If (when!) I begin to write, that will be my model.

Regards

Tom

 

As an American I have to weigh in. I have been amused at this thread mainly because, regardless, as others have mentioned, Operation Market Garden was a disaster from the jump off. The 101st would have faired no better due to the same conditions that doomed the British in Arnhem. Unfortunately us yanks have a propensity to use hindsight to build the size of our egos. Tough as the 101st was , Guarnere included, the forces were stretched too thin from Eindhoven to Arnhem . Personally , I believe the operation was brilliant, cooler heads did no prevail and the warning signs should have been heeded .

 

After every battle / war / military operation people involved or armchair strategists love to ask "What If". Especially after failure. Sure folks what if Germans had initiated Operation Barbarossa six weeks earlier ? What if OKW sent a few extra division to Rommel in 1942 ? What if Germans won Battle of Kursk (as Manstein mistakenly claimed they were about to) etc. Countless examples like this exist. Actually Hitler being a veteran in trenches of Great War did that a lot too and at the end claimed Germany would win the war if it was not backstabbed at home front by Socialists , Communists , Jew etc.

In this case though we need a hindsight. Market-Garden was a flawed concept from beginning. It would never be war winning stroke although it was painted that it would be before and after the operation. The concept was September 1944 war could be ended victoriously (no as long as Nazi Party and leadership stayed as state authority Reich would continue to fight to end) , one more push and it would be over after sudden victorios dash of Allied armies in Western Europe ( no something mundane and as unromantic like supply problems came into view ) This mistake later accepted as history born out of hope and wish of ending war before Christmas. UK was at war since 1939 and it was tired , out of manpower , everyone was just wishing to end this business as quickly as possible. V-2 attacks from Netherlands on Britain also trying everyone's nerves at this stage. Same at American side who were planning to take their troops away from Europe after an early victory and send them to Pacific already.

Unfortunetely facts on the ground were not competible with wishes. What arouse in September 1944 was a false hope a symptom of victory disease as Japanese later called it. Fact is in September 1944 German Army already stopped and began rallying instead of retreating as Market Garden envisioned. Fact is even if Allied could grab a bridgehead on Rhine as intended Germans would fight as ferociously as possible to block Allied advance towards Ruhr and drive it back. The fact is 15th German Army remained more of less intact entering Netherlands from Scheldt would be a huge problem on the flanks of airborne corridor already extended. The fact is there was a great pressure on Eisenhower from Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington (Marshall particularly) to use those elite and expensive airborne divisions somewhere. The fact is airborne commanders (especially Browning ) were over enthustiastic at last being allowed to battle. So tactical planning was also faulty and conditions on ground were ignored. The fact is Bastogne and Arnhem can never be viewed at same perspective. In Battle of Bulge four months later Patton and 3rd US Army reached besieged paratroopers in Bastogne in five days because weight of German attack was away from them towards north at Meuse approaches. In Arnhem 1st Airborne just landed in midst of 2nd SS Panzer Corps and SS Corps Commander Bittrich took necessary local precautions prematurely without interfarence from Berlin and all reinforcements from CiC West came to Netherlands first. 30th Corps advancing from a single road under fire was at the other hand getting all its logistics and supplies from Cherbourg (Antwerp was still closed) It was destined that Allied advance be stalled at some point.

Changing British airborne with Americans would not alter anything except number of casaulties on nationalities involved. "A Bridge Too Far" could never be taken account as a historic reality. It is as historic as possible say "Patton" (1970) as an reenectmant.

 

As ever

I think you are both right. However, one lesson from Op market Garden is that warfare is a risky and costly business. Rather than making the same statements ad nauseaum I think it raises a different question. If you were the allied commanders, how risky would an operation need to be, and what would the benefits need to be before you sanctioned the operation?

It is true that the German heartland would not fall to a coup de main attack in 1944. But the only way anyone could have found this out was by making the attempt. In war decisions must be taken despite incomplete information and information sometimes needs to be fought for. Donald Rumsfeld was pilloried rather unfairly for making that point. It was not unreasonable for teh Allies to hypothesize that the Germans might be at the point of collapse in September 1944. The Kaiser's second Reich had sued for peace and disintegrated from within long before the German border had been crossed. The speed of the German collapse on the West and the East in Summer 1944 and the 20th July plot were indicators that there was a possibility that the same might have been true of Hitler's Germany. Had there been no attempt to force the Rhine in 1944 the Op Market Garden debate would not have been over, merely a different set of critic ms of the why oh why did the allies train up this airborne army and never use it.

There was another set of known unknowns facing the allies. In the week before Op market Garden was launched, the first of the German V2 strategic ballistic missiles struck London. These were weapons against which there was no defence. No one could have known how effective this campaign might have been or whether the British public could have survived an attack by weapons of mass destruction, had the Germans chosen to use their stockpile of sarin in this way. In the event the V2 bombardment caused "only" half a 9/11 in terms of casualties, but it might have been much worse. This was not a matter which could have been revealed to the media or the public at the time, but the allied leaders would not have been forgiven had no one made the effort to deny the launch sites in the Netherlands to the Germans.

The casualties of Operation market Garden were heavy but in the long run quite small compared to the cost of nine months further fighting, whioch cost the western allies over 200k casualties and the Russians over a million. The conventional crtiticism of British military leaders was their caution and unwillingness to take risks. (e.g. reluctance to launch a second frnt until certain of success, preference for deliberate operations with pauses, reluctance to take risks in pursuit etc. Op Market Garden is an example of the allied leaders, led by the British willing to take risks when it mattered.

On thise figures Operation Market Garden would have been worth laucnhing iof the odds had been anything up to 1:10. If the risk was 20,000 casualties, what odds would you accept if it saved a million?

 

I agree that they couldn't know that Reich would fight to last though they should have guessed since Unconditional Surrender principle was still be writ of Allies until the end of war and Nazis would continue to oppose that. The comparisions with Great War and Germany's seek for Armistace was faulty. Hitler would never do that. He emphasized that "There would be no November 1918" (German Armistace Date). Nazi totalitarian dictatorship and regimes dominion over state and army was total especially after 20th July plot. In Kaiser's Germany there were political parties , trends and unions which started German Revolution. In Hitler's Germany there was none of that.

Montgomery in his Memoirs said he considered Market Garden %90 sucessful and he would be the sole defender of operation. That is over exagerration of course. Without Arnhem bridge rest of operational objectives were pointless. Still if we look the outcome it was not a total loss. At the end of Market Garden and subsequent operations in Holland in 1944 Allies liberated a 85 km long corridor and secured the approaches to Scheldt / Antwerp from east. Capturing Groesbeek Heights provided a valuable bridgehead for drive to Rhine later. Eindhoven airfields were captured also and V-2 launchers were driven a further 90 km north. Yes 1st British Airborne was almost annhilirated but still these gains above are still better than nothing

 

Cup of Tea

 

"Montgomery in his Memoirs said he considered Market Garden %90 sucessful and he would be the sole defender of operation. That is over exagerration of course. Without Arnhem bridge rest of operational objectives were pointless. Still if we look the outcome it was not a total loss. At the end of Market Garden and subsequent operations in Holland in 1944 Allies liberated a 85 km long corridor and secured the approaches to Scheldt / Antwerp from east. Capturing Groesbeek Heights provided a valuable bridgehead for drive to Rhine later. Eindhoven airfields were captured also and V-2 launchers were driven a further 90 km north. Yes 1st British Airborne was almost annhilirated but still these gains above are still better than nothing"

And of course we should ask how many casualties the British and Canadians would have taken in clearing Southern Holland up to the level of the Maas, which was essential in making Antwerp relatively secure.

I don't understand your remark about the operational objectives being "pointless" without the Arnhem bridge, especially as the rest of your paragraph tells us how useful the gains made by MG actually were to subsequent operations. How many military operations are ever more than 90% successful?

Regards

Tom

 

"I don't understand your remark about the operational objectives being "pointless" without the Arnhem bridge"

Once Nijmegen Bridge has been captured and crossed you are on an "Island" surrounded by water so the capture of another bridge is essential to advance any further. The Arnhem bridges were thus the most suitable targets for the operation. The fact that they were not captured meant that the "Island" became very much a no man's land during the winter of 1944, especially after the Germans flooded a large part of it.

John