Normandy as a campaign is a very difficult one to write about, I would imagine. for a start so much happened over the 80 or so days of the campaign. How do you fit so much into a one volume work? People will notice that certain events have been missed, or brushed over. And this is before we start about each Allied Nation putting forward their case as to why their nation's army did more than others to ensure victory. The brief of a writer of the Normandy campaign is not easy and I have yet to see a book about it that has pleased all the Allied side!! I like Hastings too, I must say and although I do find D'Este quite critical of the British (He particularly emphasises the disappointing performances of some British formations such as 7th Armored) "Decision in Normandy" the book is not a bad read and gives a good oversight of the campaign as a whole. He certainly is not as critical of the British as Cornelius Ryan has been.
GH- BUT - Cornelius Ryan was Southern Irish/American and so the 300 year old Battle of the Boyne kicked in with the ongoing hatred of all things British - even to his widow who was a consultant for the "Bridge too Far" I believe - that reflected a great hatred of all things British... as did D'Estes' lack of understanding of the British at Sicily when Monty had the weight of much of the German strength against him to none for Patton...Patton deliberately avoided battle in Sicily in order to feed his ego by liberating Palermo - which no one needed - then his fictional "race" to Messina... Truth has been relative for some time with too many authors - and others as we see with the present ongoing expenses in Parliament - Truth is replaced by entitlement....even the last Cardinal Achbishop of Westminster replaced Truth for "Unity" ,,,and he should have known better ! Cheers
Harry – Thought I hadn’t dreamt it – here are some of the arguments of “caen on the first day” – Monty – Master of the Battlefield “– Nigel Hamilton Preparations for D Day – Chapter One Various pages from # 485….. The first meeting was convened at St Paul’s School – 9.0’clock 3rd January ’44…..in which the Cossac plan had been presented by General West and Brigadier Mclean, the senior officers of Cossac’s planning section- At great length they enumerated the reason why Normandy was chosen…landing craft ….transport aircraft …and the consequent decision that rather than landing in weakness on a broad front, the assault should concentrate on a single primary objective – Caen. We couild make sure of Caen ,or try for Caen and the Cotentin penisul (Cherbourg peninsula) General West later recalled …I told Monty he couldn’t take Caen the first day. HE ( MONTY) was very optimistic. After all it is 12 miles from the beaches. It would take all day for the troops to move that far. Only large Airborne troops could have taken Caen. A footnote on page 494 4 – “ In fact Morgan’s plan did not even guarantee Caen, which could only be attacked some three days after landing…… So with 20-20 hindsight as always – Caen MIGHT have been taken on the first day ……had the Armour carried the Infantry on board to make an assault Cheers Tom, Thanks for your reference.I am aware of Hamilton's publication.I will get the book, seems ideal for my half hour read in bed each night. Many years ago I worked with two chaps who as teenagers landed in Normandy.One had witnessed death before call up when a sub station failed and the casualty was badly burnt.He said that it put him off the smell of bacon for a long time and then he had to fight for his life in Normandy. Getting back to your point about Monty,it is incredible that he uttered that Caen could be taken by the end of the first day.I suppose it is associated with confidence and like all "managers",confidence is preferred to pessimism as it is essential to motivate those below.And then yet he was criticised by the Americans when he was accused of faltering before Caen. Your point about armour cannot be disputed, as an infantrymen,it must have created fear in the minds of those who had nothing to counter the tank when they heard those squealing wheels.I can only relate the experience of my New Zealand cousin's husband who as an infantryman in the 22nd Wellington Battalion,fought in Greece,(our first battle ,very severe) was evacuated to Crete and fought the German paratroopers on Crete.(They landed among us and things got very hectic and in the finish we were well out numbered and the navy took us off to return to Egypt) He was taken off from Crete on the withdrawal and then fought in the Western Desert (We were at Sidi ? when attacked by 40 plus German tanks.Rifles are no match for tanks.We were placed in a oven,a terrible place called Bardia in a small cramped yard in the open,horrible conditions,little food for 5 weeks when we were relieved by South African troops.We then went to Alamein) He finished the North African campaign and was later declared unfit,he always said the problem came from his time as a POW,albeit only five weeks but enough for him to fail a medical in 1944. He was first brought to England after sailing for Egypt and was diverted to England (Maidstone to face the Germans who never came so we were sent back to Egypt,lots of training, then to Mount Olympus in Greece) One infantryman who fought hard and survived.Battle technology may change but an army will always require the foot slogger. Thanks for your insight into to the role of a foot slogger
Well said TOM my old mate. Ir was not only those authors ..There were a hell of a lot of others that talked the British Down...ALL EXCEPT ONE GROUP. The American service men were very aware of the fighting quality of the British. Sapper
Harry - I only quoted what Monty THOUGHT in the frist conference at St.Pauls -he went on to trash the whole Cossac plan and told them to go away and rewrite the three division into a five division attack - or if they couldn't do it - to get someone else to lead ..... I shall have to read further to find Tedder's bitching... SAPPER - same in Italy - the Americans ALWAYS had a Britsh Corps in the US 5th army -they started off with 46th - 56th -7th armoured and Commandos at Salerno and Garigliano - added 1st & 5th for Anzio - then after Rome they had 6th Armoured - 4th Div - 9th Armoured bde and 6th Sth African- then at the Gothic they had also 78th Div when they got back from Egypt - so no matter what Gen Clark thought of McCreery - he couldn't do anything without the Brits alongside BY THE WAY -in the ongoing controversay as to who should get soaking wet on the beaches of France on Saturday - has any one noticed that 65 years ago TO -DAY- the first Capital in Europe - ROME was libertated by a joint US - Canadian Special services commando - strange I haven't seen anything on that event ..... Cheers
Beevor was interviewed on Radio 5 Live today on the Simon Mayo program. I didn't hear it all as I was in and out of the car but I thought I heard him do a u-turn on his opinion of the Caen bombing. He also answers a few punters questions at the end; quite diplomatically in some instances. i.e the Brazillian forces one. You can probably hear it again via here. BBC - Podcasts - Daily Mayo
RJL - tough to get BBC radio 5 - or any other number as my antenna is not long enough to stretch the 5000 mile distance - but thanks all the same.. Cheers
LOL. That's too bad Tom. They've probably got a stupid "only UK internet listeners" can hear the podcast rule too.
Don't know how I missed this thread. There are a lot of 51HD Vets who are/were a bit miffed about his claims of them not performing well, which to some extent is true. Unfortunately he does not mention, maybe does not realise, that the 51st did not actually have divisional strength until the first week of July. I can only assume that other divs/Brigades were the same. For Instance 5th Camerons were not at full strength until 1st July. D+7 party arrived 24th June and D+14 party arrived 1st July. So the first major attack that the Camerons put in on 13th June, they would have been at only1/3rd strength.
I have not read this book, though years ago I did read his book 'Stalingrad' and then 'Berlin'. Both of which I enjoyed. Twitter delivers a devastating critique via: https://twitter.com/_gabriel_U/status/1401509882109612032/photo/1 (two photos). They are from: Taken from a review that was published in 2016 entitled 'Blitzkrieg manqué or a new kind of war? Interpreting the Allied Victory in the Normandy campaign' by an Adam Tooze, Columbia University; someone I've never heard of: https://mk0adamtoozept2ql1eh.kinsta...2017/08/Tooze-D-Day-A-New-Kind-of-War-1-2.pdf His personal website is: ADAM TOOZE – Historian – Author – Critic – Blogger I will endeavour to read this review later.
I would recommend Tooze's "The Wages of Destruction — The making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy" (Penguin, 2007) which explains a great dela about the limitations of Germany's war effort.
PIcking up one of the points from Tooze's excellent paper. Beevoir and the other historians have largely ignored the artillery experience. James Holland's book on Normandy includes lots of errors. Peter Caddick Adams's sand and steel has a chapter on the weather forecast but no chapter on the D Day fireplan That is the story that Will and I have attempted to tell for the Royal Artillery in nGunners in Normandy.
Having read Adam Tooze's paper / review one question of many could be answered or reflected upon here. As the NW Europe campaign went on I recall anti-aircraft units were re-rolled as infantry. Did these units welcome this potentially very bloody, frontline role? Were they effect in the new role? On a more contemporary note. There have been commentaries on the British Army 'heavy' divisions being "light" in artillery (rockets and tubes) compared to their potential peer opponents in the Russian Army, even if their divisions are smaller in personnel. Apparently much attention has been given to the Ukrainian experience of Russian artillery. I digress.
A lot of the HAA, especially 3.7", were in the process of being converted for the indirect fire ground role from early 1945 - the REME workshops were earmarked for the conversion of 3.7" gunsights so that they could be used against ground targets. On another note, I'm a bit dubious about Tooze's assertion that the Royal Artillery had more personnel than the Royal Navy by the end of the war. The Royal Navy was absolutely enormous in 1945.
Re 1. During Q3-4 1944 about 5,000 Light AA Gunners were transferred to the infantry as individual reinforcements. Many Light AA units had been converted from infantry battalions, e.g. 92nd (Loyals) Light AA Regiment. However, the command structure was gunner and oriented towards air defence. Furthermore the air threat had been transformed by the German introduction of cruise missiles and jet aircraft, AA Brigades did undertake infantry roles in areas where a lack of infantry training or support weapons would not be a risk. One AA Brigade manned the front lines on a quiet sector of the Italian front and another was part of the force blockading the Germans in Dunkerque. Heavy AA Units also performed as coastal artillery and the defences for captured ports. Aa UNits also acted as lines of communication troops protecting liberated areas from brigands.
