Sapper - I wrote a number of articles for the BBc series some years ago and it covered much of what I experienced in my service in the UK - North Africa - Italy and finally in Austria but I rather doubt what I have to say now is of much importance - or even relevance to-day as the younger people appear - I could be wrong here - which would NOT be a first - to accept without question the Hollywood version of the war. Not too many of them sit down to think about what we actually went through in order that they can enjoy the so called freedom which we handed them - as it is this freedom again - appears - to be eroding away as thou shalt not place your wheelie bin at right angles to the street on the fifth sunday of each month - -your representative M.P. has every right to steal your money as he set up the rules for him - and her to do so - then have a platinum plated pension purloined possibly once more from the tax payer who is struggling to exist on his unemployment benefit - while the unemployed fatherr allows his 14 year old daughter to smoke at the dinner table - in front of her three children ! The world has come a long way towards decreasing the freedom we thought was worth fighting and suffering about - pretty soon we will be jumping through hoops at a command from the UN on our wall to wall TV's - and Ipods..... So Sapper Brian old mate - print you story ....... I am glad that you are catching up with me for this month of June only then I shall be ahead of you once more in July - and when I think of it - I am glad that I am of that age when I shall NOT see the wonders of the slavery which appears to be in store for our Children and their offspring - that is heartbreaking when I think of what you have suffered in the past 65 years - my wounds were peanuts compared to yours - so have a snappy birthday Brian - and keep out of those disco's ! Cheers
Antony Beevor is speaking at the National Army Museum on Thursday night about his new book National Army Museum : What's On : Celebrity Speakers
If you haven't already it, then I thoughrely recommend Carlo D'Este's seminal work on D Day and The Battle of Normandy "Desicion In Normandy", it is a very thoughrely researched book using sources from the US/UK/Commonwealth and German military and government archives as well as letters and excerpts from the main protagonist's biographies and personal correspondance with the author. I found it to be a very fair and balanced book, particularly when discussing contraversial topics such as the Villers Bocage debacle and Monty's severe manpower problems etc. D'este is very biased in relation to Monty. Later he gave a more balanced opinion but this book has a very poor view of the British performance in Normandy. The manpower claims made by D'Este (i.e Churchill was hoarding troops in England to help prop up the post-war Empire)was thoroughly debunked in 'Colossal Cracks' Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45 Stackpole Military History: Stephen Ashley Hart: Amazon.co.uk: Books Beavor's Normandy book has had a pretty thorough kicking by Simon Trew in the reviews section at Amazon Amazon.co.uk: Customer Reviews: D-Day: The Battle for Normandy
M Kenny - would agree with you on D'Este - I always thought he was a revisionist and pandering to Hollywood for the big bucks - his claim that Churchill was hoarding troops meant that he didn't know the difference of a Holding battalion to reinforce the losses of a fighting battalion...he was the same after Sicily ! Cheers
Current issue of BBC History magazine - A.Beevor has a good article / Interview with him on his views on the D-day / Normandy battle(s).
Recently I saw an article by Beevor where he claimed that Mony had said he would take Caen by the end of the first day.I have looked through a number of publications on the Battle for Normandy but cannot find a reference to it and that includes the planning map which shows Allied forces crossing the Seine on D Day + 90 as the final phase in the operation Can anybody validate Beevor's assertion?.
I have never read a book by Beevor to comment, but from what I have heard those who don't know a lot on the subject think he writes a good book, and those who do know a lot on the subject think he's inaccurate and just regurgitating what's already come before. I did find this review on Amazon very interesting though...both positives and negatives, though hasn't sent me any closer to deciding whether it's worth buying though :p I'm leaning on probably not. Published to coincide with the 65th anniversary of the D-Day landings, Antony Beevor's latest blockbuster comes with a press release claiming it as the "most vivid and well-researched account yet" of the Normandy campaign and, presumably, a marketing budget to match. Given the author's reputation as the leading British author of military history, and the popularity of his chosen topic, the book is already assured of its place among 2009's best-sellers. But does this mean it is actually any good? At 523 pages of text and another 40 of source notes - altogether, probably a quarter of a million words - 'D-Day' is a book with dimensions to match its subject. Sensibly enough, Beevor rejects any temptation to over-complicate his structure, and his chronological progression from the eve of invasion to the fall of Paris, coupled with a pacy and accessible writing style, make the book a straightforward and (in some ways) undemanding read. The 30 chapters are of roughly equivalent length (which makes the book easy to digest), and the text is supported by 19 maps and several dozen photographs. No significant operation or battle is wholly ignored, and attention is paid not only to the major belligerents, but also to those whose role is sometimes under-represented in English-language histories of the campaign, for example the Polish Armoured Division and Free French forces. To some extent, therefore, the author can claim to have provided a balanced account of the momentous events of summer 1944. For this reason his book should appeal to a wide audience, including readers already familiar with the campaign, as well as those seeking an engaging introduction to the subject. Beevor's greatest talent lies in his ability to use personal accounts to illustrate and cast light on the broader experience of conflict, and 'D-Day' provides ample (and admirable) evidence of the author's humanitarianism. In particular, Beevor makes extensive use of French sources to help his readers understand what life was really like for those civilians unfortunate enough to be caught under the hammer of war in 1944. His descriptions of the conditions endured by the citizens of Caen - a city almost flattened by Allied bombardment - are both vivid and empathetic; a reference on page 201 to molten lead falling from blazing roofs like rain, under a clear blue sky, is almost poetic in its intensity. Similarly, Beevor is at his very best in describing scenes of liberation, notably in the final chapters, which deal with the fall of Paris. This reviewer found these among the most powerful and evocative sections of the book, written with an energy and passion which - combined with genuine understanding of the political and military dynamics of the period - make for narrative history of the most compelling kind. Obviously enough, however, 'D-Day' is primarily concerned with the activities of armies and air forces (and, to a lesser extent, navies). Here too, Beevor's work has much to recommend it. As with his use of previously-unrevealed civilian accounts, his research enhances our understanding of how the campaign was perceived by soldiers, airmen and sailors at the `sharp end'. Furthermore, although the author's basic inclination is to produce a narrative history, rather than an analytical one, there are interesting insights into issues such as the effectiveness of air power, the treatment of psychological wounds and the integration of casualty replacements. Beevor is especially good at articulating the intensity with which the fighting in Normandy was conducted; although there is relatively little in his account that will surprise readers who already know the campaign well, for those whose attention has focused on the events of 6 June, the extent of the ordeal experienced by thousands of young men in the summer of 1944 may yet come as a shock. So may the author's frequent references to the killing or mistreatment of prisoners - by both sides - throughout the Normandy campaign. In this case, Beevor's descriptions of acts of casual murder imply a struggle waged with ferocity and hatred, and challenge existing perceptions of a gentlemanly contest between enemies who respected one another and the rules of war. Again, here the author has made a real contribution to our understanding of the campaign in North-west Europe, for which future researchers will be grateful. So far, so good; purely in terms of its readability, 'D-Day' is a very good book. Unfortunately, it is also marred by a number of weaknesses, some of them arguably quite serious, which cast doubt on the claims made in the book's publicity. Unfortunately, lack of space (Amazon's 1000-word limit) precludes proper attention being given to them here. If you are interested in another perspective on Beevor's work, however, please read my alternative review on this site, titled 'On the negative side...' `D-Day' is in many ways a very good book. However, its publicity and blurb make very big claims regarding the research that underpins it, and these deserve scrutiny. In particular, although significant sources in Caen and New Orleans have been intensively mined, close examination of Beevor's endnotes reveals a much more restricted research base than might be inferred from the book's publicity and a casual glance at the list of archives used. For example, although the author lists almost 300 separate U.S. National Archives references, over half of these originate in just five boxes of documents, from thousands that might have been consulted. Work in several other important foreign archives produced very limited results, and there is little evidence of systematic research even in archives closer to home. Beevor's bibliography of secondary sources, memoirs and unit histories omits numerous important works, among them (and this is a real surprise) some of the best personal accounts of the Normandy fighting. His awareness of academic research on related matters also appears thin. Some readers, for example, may feel that reference to recent books by David French (`Raising Churchill's Army'), John Buckley (`British Armour in the Normandy Campaign'), and Timothy Harrison Place (`Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944') would have enhanced Beevor's portrayal of British combat performance in Normandy. Similarly, Beevor's judgement on Allied deception plans ("more effective than the Allies had ever dared imagine" [p.157]) might have been more cautiously expressed had he read Mary Barbier's published work on the topic. Sadly, on these subjects - as in several other areas of enquiry - Beevor's comments appear somewhat out of date. The consequences of Beevor's reluctance to engage with a broader range of reference material, or (perhaps) of his publisher's failure to employ a competent fact-checker, are felt throughout `D-Day'. Although the Normandy campaign is big and complicated, and honest mistakes are unavoidable in any study on this scale, the number of factual errors contained in Beevor's book is disconcertingly high. Admittedly, many of these are of a relatively minor kind that will probably not much concern the general reader (e.g. a `General Helmlich' [sic, p.214] did not die on 10 June, although General Hellmich WAS killed seven days later). Nevertheless, there are lots of them, and cumulatively they call into question the bold assertion that this is the most well-researched account of the Normandy campaign yet to appear. More to the point, there are places where insufficient familiarity with key sources contributes to narrative or analytical confusion (for example, when the author makes mistakes about the sequence of events on the Martinville Ridge in mid-July); for an author who is concerned above all with describing and explaining real human experiences of war, this is a problem. Similarly, although the book's accompanying publicity disparages "interviews conducted too long after the event" as a unreliable historical source, this did not absolve Beevor of responsibility to check the written (but still personal) accounts on which he so relies so heavily. Had he done so, he might have avoided errors such as those found on page 211, where he describes numerous Allied aircraft being hit by `friendly fire' off Utah Beach on 9 June (a day on which bad weather grounded almost all British and American planes), or on page 247, where a more careful reading of his source would have revealed that the author was referring to a battle that occurred on 29 June, not one taking place over a week later. Nor are the maps contained in `D-Day' of as much assistance to the reader as their number (19) might imply; none appears to be entirely free of errors, and that on pp.244-5 - to be blunt - is a complete shocker. Arguably, `D-Day' also lacks balance in its treatment of Allied and German experiences of the campaign. Whereas most of Beevor's German sources originate with accounts written (mostly from memory) by senior commanders held in British or American captivity after the war, the vast majority of Allied accounts come from soldiers of junior rank. Although General Patton (whose published diaries are much quoted by Beevor) provides something of an exception, this means that the campaign is seen mainly from one perspective for the Allies, but from an entirely different one for their enemy. Perhaps the greatest victim of this approach is Bernard Montgomery, 21st Army Group's commander throughout the campaign. Beevor seems to have little time for Montgomery, whose personality and behaviour could admittedly be distinctly unappealing. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Allies eventually won a crushing victory in Normandy, and perhaps Monty deserves just a little more credit for this, and understanding, than he gets from Beevor. Certainly, at the very least it would have been nice to see the author take account of arguments presented in Nigel Hamilton's multi-volume biography of Montgomery. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is among the sources absent from Beevor's bibliography. `D-Day' offers considerable rewards to its readers, not least in terms of its value in re-invigorating unsettled debates on the planning and conduct of the Normandy campaign, as well as the light that it casts on how best-selling works of popular history are researched, written and marketed. But although it is full of the vivid colour and detail that we have come to expect from this most talented and readable of authors, this reviewer remains unconvinced by many of the claims made in its accompanying publicity. Indeed, it could be argued that despite the signs of age shown by both books, Max Hastings' 'Overlord'and Carlo D'Este's 'Decision in Normandy' remain distinctly superior works, both in their ability to balance narrative and analysis, and in some of their conclusions about the campaign. Still, at the risk of contradicting almost every response to Beevor's latest work that seems likely to appear in the next few months, this reviewer feels compelled to state his final position unambiguously. A great read D-Day certainly is; great history, however, it is not.
I havent read the book yet, but it does get a ringing endorsement from Max Hasting on the Times Website: D-Day: The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor review | Non-fiction book reviews - Times Online
Sapper wrote, "The trouble with Authors is that they repeat others sources. Thus; repeating the mistakes Errors, and just plain prejudices! I have to say that many of the Veterans are absolutely aghast at what is written at times.For truth must never be allowed to get in the way of prejudice... or sales! So I am looking to publish my version later..If it is not too expensive. That would be unusual. A first hand account. Has Tom or any of our other Vet mates written their stories?" sapper A couple of points One of the German vets I know helped in the research of a DVD about the Waffen SS " Hitlers elite Fighting Force" . When he saw the finished product he said it wasn't true,mostly. The publisher said he couldn't use the truth or it wouldn't sell. So that is an insight into the mind of publishers, they want profit more than truth. That is why the best books are mega expensive, because they know they won't sell many. Another point is, two people could be stood next to each other at the same event ( battle, football match, witness to a robbery etc.) and they will both give different accounts of the same action. Also another German Waffen SS Vet I know wrote his own memoirs and published them with a 500 run. He had to sell the book at £20 to make any money which he split between the German war graves commision and the Royal British Legion, as he also served in the British army after the war. So, it is not too cheap, but as previously said you would get a lot of takers on here, add me as being interested. There is always the option of doing a CD rom "book", I don't know if they work out cheaper though.
Books that are more expensive usually reflect the amount of research that went into it in my opinion.
It must be disappointing for authors to see their works discounted. Mind you I have seen a few errors such as mistaking two people by the name of Trevor -Roper and then giving the wrong account of their involvement in the Second World War. A case of not properly researching their subject.The other point is that an author can acquire a brand which leads to publishers seeing their works as a good business.
Harry - On Beevor's assertion that Monty "thought" he could take Caen on the first day - he may be right as I have faint memory of that coming up at one point early on in his presentations at St Pauls - where he made two or three of them ' At that time Tedder - Harris - Coningham and others thought they could win the war without any interference from the Army and were badgering Monty to get the Airfields at Caen early in order that they could win the war from there... Now Monty had had enough of Tedder and Coningham by this time after their exploits in the desert - until they departed for Eisenhowers HQ at Algiers - when both Monty and Broadhurst came up with the "cab rank" project which was very successful - then Sicily came up - and Tedder and Coningham failed to even hinder the German "Dunkirk" from Messina.. So here we have the same Air Force pressure for Caen - and I would not be surprised if a weary Monty said - OK we will get them on the first day - Monty failed and Tedder spent a great deal of time all through July to have Monty removed- he failed in that but did get Leigh Trafford removed.... Main thing was that Monty's plans for 90 day was successful.....notwithstanding Tedders' nonsense ! Cheers
What I can never understand is how a specific work is often slated even before it's been read. A review like that from a personage like Simon Trew is a pretty significant piece of condemnation, and I find Beevor dull, so I shant be reading it. But I can't comment on it's specific content based purely on what the Daily Mail or similar chooses to stir up. I suppose to some extent these 'block-busting' authors live by the sword though, Beevor, Hastings (who I enjoy much more) etc. always seem to have a little media 'stir' on release of a new title. Seems to be part of the marketing and apparently does their sales no harm. (As an aside, it seems mildly unfair to dismiss D'estes too harshly. I agree that 'Decision in Normandy' can be rather grating to the British reader, and that some of his interpretations are off-beam, & perhaps even dated now, but it's still overall a good piece of military History & an essentially useful book. Trouble is Normandy's such a big subject that to rely on any one title without balancing it against others is probably folly. Swings & roundabouts.) ~A
It must be disappointing for authors to see their works discounted. For most authors it doesn't really matter much as their royalties are based on the trade price, not the cover price. Thus an author on 10% of a £20 book doesn't get £2 a copy, he gets 10% of the price the retailer buys the book at from the publisher. You normally only get 10% (or whatever %) if the book buyer purchases it direct from the publisher.
I get the feeling that I'm the only one so far to have bought the book. I'm half way through and a lot of what's been written has already been covered elsewhere, so no surprises there. A number of criticisms have been made about various personalities (Monty, Ike, etc), units (Canadians at Carpiquet, 11th Armoured, 50th British Division, 51st Highland Division, 90th Infantry Division (American)) and strategies that have mostly been covered over time. He crams a lot of information into each sentence, paragraph and chapter and I have found it a little stodgy to wade through. That's from someone who enjoys reading difficult and complex material. I've read his Stalingrad and Berlin books and enjoyed them. Maybe it's because the information was new to me and the Normandy campaign is not. Just over £11 for a £25 book maybe indicates it might not sell as well as they hope. My first partial book review. Cheers - Robert
Interesting feedback - thanks for that. I did wonder what he would have to say about the Brits; nothing new, it seems.
Robert & Paul Notwithstanding Beevors criticism of the Brits at Normandy -he is right in many aspects as from what I have read so far of that part of the campaign neither 51st - 7th Armoured and V111 Armoured bde fought as well as they did even in Tunisia and Sicily - 11th Armoured under Pip Roberts did not perform too well in co operating with the Infantry as was second nature in North Africa - Pip being one of our shining stars in the desert - the 51st and 7th did much better under less tired leaders but XXX corps didn't really come alive until Horrocks took over in August after his wounding more than the year before in Bizerta. I do think that while the criticism is justified in many cases - the main point is that the returning Desert rats did not have enough time to train the rookies in battle and therefore when they fought in the convined bogage as opposed to the hills of Tunisia and Sicily - or the open plains of the desert -the whole thing was on the point of falling apart - fortunately the Armour and Infantry started to work to-gether as seen with Canadian "Star" Guy Symonds' adaptation of taking the Infantry into battle in Kangaroos to keep up with the Tanks at the Falaise area - against a great deal of resistence from British Commanders - then we started to really win........and I wasn't even there ! Cheers
The big problem is that not too many who did their part on the battlefield did not, or could not record their experiences.Publishing,I suppose is more accessible now to all, not as it was post war. However,I'm afraid that we have lost a great deal of military history because those taking part in deciding if the British Empire and all it stood for,would survive,were not able to give and account of their era. We are therefore depend on "historians" such as Beevor to record events which in many cases are regurgitation of official history or of other relative works.Its as if there is a continual process of proving the pythagorous theorem. Tom,thanks for your comment,I will follow it up but I can't see Monty stating this as his aim on the first day.I suppose talking about it to the first troops would reflect confidence.
Harry – Thought I hadn’t dreamt it – here are some of the arguments of “caen on the first day” – Monty – Master of the Battlefield “– Nigel Hamilton Preparations for D Day – Chapter One Various pages from # 485….. The first meeting was convened at St Paul’s School – 9.0’clock 3rd January ’44…..in which the Cossac plan had been presented by General West and Brigadier Mclean, the senior officers of Cossac’s planning section- At great length they enumerated the reason why Normandy was chosen…landing craft ….transport aircraft …and the consequent decision that rather than landing in weakness on a broad front, the assault should concentrate on a single primary objective – Caen. We couild make sure of Caen ,or try for Caen and the Cotentin penisul (Cherbourg peninsula) General West later recalled …I told Monty he couldn’t take Caen the first day. HE ( MONTY) was very optimistic. After all it is 12 miles from the beaches. It would take all day for the troops to move that far. Only large Airborne troops could have taken Caen. A footnote on page 494 4 – “ In fact Morgan’s plan did not even guarantee Caen, which could only be attacked some three days after landing…… So with 20-20 hindsight as always – Caen MIGHT have been taken on the first day ……had the Armour carried the Infantry on board to make an assault Cheers