Anglo-Canadian Infantry/Armoured brigade commanders 21st Army Group

Yes, that's Stanier all right.

 

This sounds like a great dissertation idea. I went to IWM and LHMA when I was researching my own book, but either I missed Cooke-Collis' stuff or they didn't have it then. I spent more time on battalion commanders than on brigadiers, I'm afraid; you can't put in everything you want if you ever want to finish what you're working on. I wish you lots of luck, can't wait to read it.

 

Thanks for this. What is the title of your book? I'd be curious to know your thoughts on British Bn command as it would likely tie into some of what I'm writing on bde comd.

 

I'd like to know too!

 

Armies of Empire. It is a comparative study of the 50th (TT) Division and the 9th Australian Division. I don't feel I quite did the subject justice, didn't know half as much when I wrote it as I do now. As to battalion commanders, I found a strong prejudice in appointments against TA officers and in favor of regulars. This was most evident in 39-40, when many TA COs were kicked out on mobilization or soon after. I don't think this made a lot of sense. The regulars who came in to replace the TA COs may have been better trained, but only somewhat so. The general standard of training in many regular units then was not that great, and I don't think the British Army then did a lot to prepare 2 i.c.s and company grade officers to step up one or two levels to battalion command. Anyway, some of the regular captains and majors had been long in grade and were middle aged when they got battalions and I think they were past their best. The preference for regulars continued throughout the war, though. Even as late as 1944 you see regulars with little or no battle experience being shifted into TA battalions ahead of very experienced TA captains and majors. By then, of course, the standard of officer training was far better than it had been in 1939, so that no doubt helped. Also, officers of middle and senior grades were significantly younger. Regulars who had been only second lieutenants in 1939 were getting battalions by 1944. As I recall, Montgomery set 35 as the upper limit for infantry COs in 21 AG. Another very noticeable trend in the early war years was to keep appointments within regiments. You can see the WO running right down the list of regular majors and captains in the DLI, Green Howards, and East Yorks to fill vacancies in 50th Div. By late 42 or so, though, the supply of such men had about run out. Still, instead of taking eligible TA officers from within the 50th Div battalions, the WO turned to other infantry regiments. Rifle regiments and the Queen's Royal Regiment seem to have been favorite sources of supply, though I am not sure why.

 

Oh, yes, and one Australian and one Canadian led 50th Div units. Curiously it was the same unit, the 9th Battalion Durham Light Infantry. The Australian was J.O.S. Percy and the Canadian was John Mogg, later Field Marshal Sir John Mogg.

 

I'm glad you brought up the question of Regular/TA officers. I've noticed the same thing with British brigade commanders - there was only 1 TA officer who reached brigade command. To an extent that makes sense to me - if you have sufficient professional soldiers, why use "part-time amateurs" when you have a known quantity in your Regulars. That said, I think an argument can certainly be made that it meant capable TA officers were replaced by potentially less-capable Regular officers. On the Canadian side about 2/3 of brigade commanders were Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM ie part-time soldiers). Now it was absolutely necessary because the Canadian Permanent Force (Regulars) only had 450 officers in 1939 about 50% of which were unfit for overseas command. So expanding to First Canadian Army with two corps, five divisions and two independent armoured brigades meant NPAM officers were absolutely required to fill out all of the command and staff positions. Using NPAM officers in command positions, while necessary, came with a massive training bill - everything basic inf and armd courses to war staff courses. To be fair the PF wasn't much better though...certainly a lesson we learned in the post-SWW period the Primary Reserves shifted from primary importance for mobilization to augmenting the Regular Force (which continues to this day).

 

That kind of seems to "go" with something I've read about, about regular officers being (too?) concerned about their postwar military careers vs temporary officers who "just wanted to get the job done and go home". I could really not, unfortunately, tell you where I was reading about that. I'm sure it was more a comment about a particular officer rather than a widespread observation.

(The snarky side comment I want to make is, "why use part-time amateurs when you have full-time amateurs available?")

 

The Australian regular establishment was also quite small, smaller than the Canadian I think, so for most battalion commands it was Militiamen or nothing. The Australian Staff Corps, however, furnished a high percentage of regulars for higher commands and key staff positions. There was a lot of rivalry and tension between senior Militiamen and the Staff Corps, and this had adverse effects on the Australian Army. The disgusting Gordon Bennett, a Militiaman, was rabid against the Staff Corps, and this attitude definitely harmed the performance of 8th Australian Div in Malaya. Though he did very well in division command in Syria John Lavarack of the Staff Corps felt that Thomas Blamey (a Militiaman) sidetracked him afterwards.

 

Most of the 9th Australian Div COs early in the war were veterans of WWI. They were I think nearly all Militiamen as well, but the static conditions of Tobruk suited their experience and abilities well enough. By the time 9th Div went back into action at Alamein some younger men who had gained experience were in place. One 50th Div CO had a nervous breakdown in 1940 and another nearly lost his grip on his unit, but a majority of them seem to have done OK in 1940. Given the general lack of both experience and proper training this is more than could have reasonably been expected. Of course the same could be said for the BEF as a whole.

 

One thing that struck me was that even allowing for casualties battalion command turnover in 50th Division was excessive. Much of the time I couldn't even guess why a man was replaced and someone else brought in, but I did get an uneasy sense that the WO was playing "Buggins' Turn." "Oh, he hasn't had much of a war so far but he's always been a good chap, give him an extra pip and one of those Terry battalions."