AMBUSH AT JEFNA STATION

Discussion in 'North Africa & the Med' started by Instructor6, Nov 27, 2022.

  1. Instructor6

    Instructor6 Member

    At about 3.30 on the afternoon of the 28th of November the leading platoon of A Company of the 8th Battalion the Argylls and Sutherland Highlanders were moving up a pass west of Jefna station on highway 7. The battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel McKellar had just marched 15 miles along a muddy road. As McKellar later recalled it had been on the go for 17 days with little rest, living in the open - wet and cold. [1] There was also nothing sunny about Tunisia for most of the last few days as it had been raining. A Company was the advance guard and had just stopped below the pass for brief late lunch everybody was tied and a little footsore. [2]

    A Company had resumed the advance moving across open fields to the north of the road which had two large hills on either side of the road while Y Company which was to the south rear also advanced. Two sections of the battalions Bren gun platoon also started moving along the road with anti-tank gun hauled by its own truck. At this point German machine guns and mortars opened up from concealed positions on the ridge at the head of the pass. Out in the open fields with very little cover Captain Malcolm’s A Company suffered heavy losses. His leading platoon lost all its soldiers killed wounded and captured. The rear platoon took cover in a ditch and tried to return fire. The Bren Gun Carriers in the road came under heavy fire from machine guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons and several caught fire, their crews wounded or killed. McKellar, who was with the advance guard sent Y Company to occupy a spur and support A Company while he also ordered B Company to take the high ground on the left (north) of the road and X Company to attack south of the road.

    Over the next 2 hours Mackellar and his battalion fought to try and dislodge the German soldiers occupying the two hills the one to left (north) Djebel Azzag, Mckellar christened Green Hill as it was and still is forested the one on the right (south) Djebel El Ajred he called Bald Hill for obvious reasons. As darkness fell it became apparent that although some success had been made in seizing Green Hill the Germans were in danger of flanking the battalion from Bald Hill and Mckellar ordered a withdrawal. The remaining drivers and crew of the Bren Gun Carriers spent a harrowing afternoon pinned down before just 2 managed to drive their carriers back down the road.

    When Jock Mckellar eventually re assembled his battered battalion down the road he discovered that he had lost almost all of A Company, and its company commander was missing believed killed. Furthermore, his remaining 3 companies had also taken losses. In total the ambush cost the battalion 150 casualties including 3 officers wounded, 6 officers missing in action while 5 soldiers were killed 22 wounded and 113 missing in action. Later Mckellar would learn that 15 of the missing had been killed.

    Just after the withdrawal, the anti- tank officer of the battalion, Captain Campbell Preston took a gun portee (the towing vehicle) and with its driver moved bravely down the road into no man’s land to search and recover for missing personnel. He was able to find and rescue the missing wounded Captain Malcolm [3]and seven other wounded. One of the carrier drivers Private Murray was found in the Carriers both his feet smashed by a high explosive bullet. Though in great pain, he is reputed to have said to Preston “if I had only one foot working I could drive this damned thing out myself”. Sadly Private Murray died of his wounds soon afterwards.

    The Other Side of the Hill

    The author of Jock Mckellar’s misfortunes was none other than Major Rudolf Witzig who may have taken some small pleasure in having done to the Argylls battalion what had previously been done to the Kampfgruppe he had commanded at Djebel Aboid a week ago. Witzig was the commander of the 11th Parachute Engineer Battalion and had gained much fame and a Knights Cross for his part leading a company to capture Fort Eben Emael in Belgium.

    After Witzig had withdrawn his Kampfgruppe from Djebel Aboid a week earlier, he and his engineers had devoted time to placing mines and booby traps along the route to Jefna to delay any Allied advance. He had then set his men to work establishing a very strong defensive position in the pass between Green and Bald Hills. The paratrooper engineers used their considerable skills to create concealed and strong defensive positions in depth some of them blasted out of the actual rock. Witzig and his men also laid anti-personnel mines and booby traps to protect their flanks and carefully sited their machine guns and mortars. The result was that not only did Witzig inflict serious damage on the Argylls, but he later rebuffed attempts by the 36th Brigade to capture the position and inflicted over 230 casualties on the 6th West Kents and No 1 Commando.[4] The losses on this day were not however just one-sided, for Witzig’s engineers suffered casualties on that day and the next. By the time his battalion was relieved and moved to the rear it had incurred almost 40% casualties out of unit of 600 men.

    REASONS IN WRITING

    This part of the story is for those who want to know why the Argylls managed to be ambushed so easily. During the last 2 weeks of November the Allied and Axis forces were engaged in a race to secure northern Tunisia. Unfortunately, the German and Italians seem to hold most of the cards. First, they were able to quickly move troops, supplies, tanks and guns to Bizerte and Tunis from Italy and Sicily by both sea and air. In contrast the British in the form of a single understrength division - the 78th had supply lines that extended first 500 miles back to Algiers and then by sea some 1000 miles to the UK or 3000 miles to the USA. One advantage the Allies had when they landed was strategic surprise but that had now rapidly disappeared, and even tactical surprise was becoming more difficult.

    After the first clash between British and German forces at Djebel Aboid, these challenges especially, the logistic ones, had delayed the advance of the 36th Brigade Group. The advance was renewed on the 27th of November 1942 by the Scottish contingent in a Kent Brigade - the 8th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The battalion's CO, Lieutenant Colonel McKellar who had been in command since 1940. The absence of many decent roads in this part of Tunisia dictated that the route east would be along Highway 7 first to Sedjenane and then towards the town of Mateur. Moreover, the brigade commander, Brigadier Kent Lemon was under pressure from the chain of command to advance quickly and he undoubtedly advised McKellar accordingly. Mckellar, a capable officer with experience on the North- West frontier was rightly concerned of the danger of ambush from the hills.

    At Djebel Aboid the Queens own West Kents had already executed an ambush on the Germans so it could be assumed that they were fully alert and likely to respond accordingly. Mackellar sensibly expected that the Germans would soon return the favour if he did not proceed with justifiable caution. Mckellar wanted to recce any significant hills and ridges that might conceal an ambush but unfortunately Kent Lemon overruled him. On the 28th Brigadier Kent Lemon unwisely ordered Mckellar to move his tired battalion some 26 miles from Sedjenane to a road junction just 10 miles of Mateur in one day and without any transport. This order was supposedly to ensure the brigade advanced in coordination with its sister brigade the 11th Infantry then advancing towards Medjez El Bab.

    A further problem was that McKellar was not assigned any troops or vehicles from the division’s 56th Reconnaissance Regiment. This regiment was especially organised and trained to probe ahead of brigade, detect and report on enemy forces. Unfortunately, due to shipping constraints the regiment had landed with only 2 of its squadrons - B and C. One of the squadrons (C) had briefly sent a small patrol to recce towards Mateur but then it had been diverted south to support the advance of the 11th Infantry Brigade.

    The division headquarters also issued a recent operational instruction with challenging objectives but also based on out of date and inaccurate intelligence. It stated that the only troops near Mateur were Italian and were only supported by a few armoured cars. This information was obviously wrong as Howlett and his battalion had already encountered Witzig’s Kampfgruppe which had Panzer IV tanks, his own paratroopers in addition to the Italians. Mackellar was well within his rights to highlight this to Kent-Lemon and ask for more reasonable objectives and also more time but was probably overruled by Lemon and an over optimistic divisional staff.

    Nonetheless it is arguable that Mackellar could and should have led every stage of his advance with his Bren Gun Platoon but did not do so on this day. Given recent events he should also have quickly identified in advance from the map that the pass between the two Djebels was an obvious place for an ambush or a delaying action. That noted the pressure to get moving at 3pm to achieve his objective as assigned at brigade some 11 miles further on by nightfall placed him in what was probably an impossible position. Mackellar was also probably tired after 17 days on the move, had not eaten at all that day and not thinking clearly. It is arguable that during the brief meal break the battalion took just short of the pass McKellar should have ordered patrols to explore the locality.

    In any case, Mckellar and his battalion suffered significantly that day and the brigade advance was stopped well short of Mateur so none of the aspirations of the British commanders were met. The strength of the German position at Green and Bald Hills established initially by Witzig was such that it did remained in German hands until late April 1943 and repelled all attempts to take it. The Argylls paid dearly for the unjustified optimism and absence of hard-headed thinking by staff of the 36th Brigade and especially the 78th Infantry Division under Major General Vyvyan Everlegh. The division and brigade staff would however become more experienced and skilled as the Tunisian campaign wore on. Brigadier Kent Lemon however would not long remain in command of the brigade as he would soon be relieved, but that as they say is another story. Jock Mckellar commanded his battalion until early April with distinction and earned a DSO but did not see the end of the campaign as he was sent home to rest and then command an Officer training unit.


    [1] In an unpublished memoir “Notes on the North African Campaign * Nov 42 to 1 Apr 42” held at Stirling Castle in the Regimental Archives.

    [2] This story is largely based on McKellar’s account, the War Diary of the 8th Argylls for November 1942 and Malcom A.D “History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 8th Battalion 1939 -1947, London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1949 and Gilberto Villahermosa Hitler’s Paratrooper - The Life and Battles of Rudolf Witzig. Frontline books 2010.

    [3] Malcolm recovered and is the author of the Regimental History cited above.

    [4] The 6th Royal Queens Own West Kents lost 150 men and No 6 Commando 80.
     
  2. Takrouna

    Takrouna Active Member

    This is the Argyll monument beside the road, Green Hill in the background. I took this picture in June this year. Thank you for your post, very informative. I took a video from the top of Bald Hill, I'll try and post it later. #Tunisia80
     

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  3. Instructor6

    Instructor6 Member

    Takrouna

    Many thanks for the photo. Look forward to seeing the video.
     
  4. Andreas

    Andreas Working on two books

    Here are the 5. Panzerarmee Ic war diary entries for the last days of November 1942.

    0042.jpg 0043.jpg 0044.jpg

    All the best

    Andreas
     
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  5. Takrouna

    Takrouna Active Member

    I used Google translate 'Lens' AI for this translation, hence some words are scrabbled but nevertheless it gives you a rough understanding:

    belong: 11 Infantry Brig. 36. Brig. Blade Force " The following units are temporarily subordinated to: 1 mid. american Panzer Rgt. Art. units 1 Rumen Boost Component - and the recon sti. 35 The 78th Division appears to belong to V. Korpa mu. The intentions of the enemy were, after this order, Tebourba and Mateur to approach. From booty commanded it appears that the French. Troops north of the Le Kef - Zaghouan line are fighting under British command, with the British and American troops south of this line being under the command of General Juin. In joint attack of the two combat groups from Djedeida after north-west rem. from Mateur southeast into the Berggalinde, mur- de reached the Rav around 175-250. Enemy tank attack, hior- bei also mitti for the first time. Art. on Djedeida, murde abri oson. Active reconnaissance activities about the Pont du Fahs line itself fell into the hands of the enemy - Modjem el Bab to the northeast. Only a few findings due to aerial reconnaissance, which suggests that the enemy was using the further advance Riokon in front performed near night. Assessment: After the previous forces have been reinforced, more attacks can be expected in the previous area and now also new attacks from the south-west. Achievements: 8 tanks and 10 carrettes shot down, 42 prisoners. Through Arab interrogations, a large part of the previously known information about the command posts of the individual units of the Div. Barre confirmed. The Luftwaffe war correspondents who were in command until sun Bintreffen of war correspondents of the Hoeras das Hoor nit to look after were divided between the combat groups Tunda and Biserta. Arabian holden from the Boitla and Gafsa area clusters. A discussion was held with the envoy Rahn and his staff on the value of the Arabs for Binsatgichitoites in Poind areas and on the possibility and use of the Arabs by the SD. 5 Arabs are taken to the west at the entrance to the Pont du Fahs bet at

    29. November 1942: During the night from November 28th to 29th, 1942 there were no special incidents. Gegon 9.00 thr beginning enemy attack with panthers from Tebourba, especially durah strong Stuka effect was demolished. Min panther supported enemy attack on group' Witsig murde also rejected. At the same time, aerial reconnaissance revealed a larger concentration of tanks in areas north-west of Tebourba Station Hair. (135 tanks). The Luftwaffe fought this tank attack all day long, so that an attack was not reported. Another tank column from Medjes el Bab on Tebourba. From the west continued active reconnaissance activities in the direction of on Tunis. Upon the report of the advance of another tank and emergency column on the Pont du Fahe road to La Mohanedia, Hpta. Kirsten mur Div. "Superga" and sent su the foremost backup at the bridge 4 km south of La Mohamedia. En it was found that these enemy claims that A-raber had made were completely exaggerated. According to reports from Arabs, a stronger enemy group with fm. gather in Raune us Sbeitia. Further interrogations brought no new results. From combat group Broich 15 offs. and 186 men as prisoners from 28.11. registered later, so that the successes for 29.11. 3 panners, 3 armored scouts shot down, and 21 offs. and 204 Uffe. and crews of prisoners. Attachment 14: Air reconnaissance notification from 29.11.1942 15: Daily report of November 29, 1942 30. November 1942: On the night of November 29-30, 1942, around 4:00 a.m., 150 enemy paratroopers each landed near Zaghouan and near Depienne. Widespread attack broken off at Gruppe Titsig. Battle reconnaissance pushed south from Matour inflicted heavier casualties on the enemy mi. In the course of the morning pressure from strong enemy panther forces in the Chouigui area, against which the Luftwaffe was successfully deployed

    Ha-chaittag's report of a stronger paratrooper column in action against La Mohamedia. On the other hand, more stealthy air krifte (hunters) are used. 43 prisoners were brought into this section according to previous statements. Completion of enemy overview. Result: Originally reported 56th Engl. div. not appeared in section, but only the 36th reconnaissance division, which had already been divided into 70 su. The individual units of the opposing 78.engl.Inf.D are beginning with subordinate U.S.A. units of herds the following: 1.) 35th Inf. Brigade with reinforced 138th Fold-Art.Rgt. (360 359th and 502nd Division), Matour Section. 2.) Purchase group "Blade Forge" with 64. Panzerjger-Abt. (254th, 255th and 256th companies), 17th Fold-art.-Rgt. (10th, 13th and 26th Division), 13th U.S.A.-Pannor-Rgt., 1 Parachute Btl. Section Mateur - Tebourbo 3.) 11 Inf.Brig. with 3 Inf.811., 132. Feld-Art.Rgt., 1 mitt US.-Tank-Bt1., 701.U.B...-Panserxerator-Kp, 175.0.3. Fold Art. Dept. and 9.(13.Mid.Abt. of the 4th art.Rgt. Section Tebourba - Medjen el Bab. 4.) In the Tunis-Sud section (Dapienne - Goubellat) regular map, 56th Reconnaissance Dept., 1 English. Fallschirmjager-Et and according to unconfirmed reports en frans. Kav., (4th Arrik. Jiger Ret. 7) and attack against Tunis from 3dan. Marriage of paratroopers and members of the 56th Aufkl tion dept. Link to Major Hani, liaison offs. Super Command Libya Preparation of a location map for the Libyan Eringa Schauplate. Captain Kirsten at Itál. div. to determine and explore the position commanded by Gen.Edo. Appendix 15: Air reconnaissance report from November 30, 1942 17: Daily report from November 30, 1942
     
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  6. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    From "Algiers to Austria" by Cyril Ray.
     

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  7. Takrouna

    Takrouna Active Member

    This is what remains of Djefna station. It's the water tower, covered in war damage. The tracks are also still there. That's Green Hill across the road.
     

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  8. Andreas

    Andreas Working on two books

    And here is the aerial recce flown in the morning of 28 November and the daily report for the evening.

    All the best

    Andreas 0125.jpg Screenshot 2022-11-28 at 5.05.40 PM.jpg
     
  9. Takrouna

    Takrouna Active Member

    Here's the rough translation (great reports Andreas!):
    Generalkonnando XC. AK telex 0. B. 5. I c. days after Vos 28.1 1.194. Hach Beuteb for attack n 2.11, structure of the 78th engl. 11. Inf. etc. Blade Force doing a Fallachim-Bt1. 36 Infantry Brig. 56. Aufkirung-Bt1. (apparently assumed only temporarily) 1 average Meric. tank tl. and archaic Art. Units (also only occasionally assumed). Enemy reconnaissance activity between Medjez el Bab and Pont du Fahs. Enemy tank attack from Tebourba to Djedeida (including medium artillery) rejected. Strong enemy accumulations were reported by Arabs in the Sbeitla Gafsa area. Assessment: Since air reconnaissance 28.11. only slight movement reported, there is an assumption that the opponent is executing ??? at night. Expect further strengthening of the previous forces and intensified attacks in previous sections, as well as attacks now also from the southwest 1st due to the brisk reconnaissance activity. Achievements: shot down 8 tanks, 1o carettas, prisoners. 8,696 108 A Lrc
     
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