Alanbrooke. The British Commander most neglected by History?

Discussion in 'Searching for Someone & Military Genealogy' started by von Poop, Oct 16, 2010.

  1. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    Tom. Actually.
    I had hoped you would add a little more detail on how Alanbrooke influenced the prosecution of the war. I know little about him, and concentrate most of my reading (dare I say study) on the men with mud on their boots, who sent most their time in slit trenches or taking the ground and killing the enemy.
    I few days ago I came upon a book written by Samuel W. Mitcham entitled The Battle of Sicily; 'How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory'. Indeed a very lofty tilte. In case I was in about 5 pages on the Google link below when I realized His thesis was indeed very thin and there wasn't going to be much to learn here except that the Author had left out some rather important facts regarding the preparedness of the western allies to mount a full scale operation agianst Europe. http://books.google.ca/books?id=-pfHDCuYzfIC&pg=PA225&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false
    Cheers
    Matt
     
  2. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Matt

    I can appreciate your dilemma in understanding Alanbrookes role in the Victory - so cast your mind back to the beginning…

    Churchill was doing everything - but not everything was going as well as the Battle of Britain especially for the Army with

    the debacle at Dunkirk - another one at Greece and Crete with no one having a really good idea on what to do…. meanwhile

    Alanbrooke had lived through Dunkirk - and was sent back to France and so had a first class idea on what was needed - the CIGS

    couldn't handle Churchill….and therein lay the main problem Churchill had to be stopped with his strategy….and it took until

    Christmas '41 before Alanbrooke became CIGS - and the changes to the army began with the General Service Corps to TRAIN soldiers

    and Officers to learn how to fight a war - the first indication of the success of this new strategy was Monty's appointment to

    8th Army in August '42 and his success against Rommell in the September at Wadi El Halfa- and El Alamein in the October '42

    History show that we never lost another Battle…meanwhile Alanbrooke was spending a great deal of time in persuading the Americans

    to adopt HIS strategy as they didn't seem to have one - they reluctantly did and thus we won the war etc etc etc….

    Study 'Alanbroke' by General Fraser to gain a better view of what Alanbrooke actually did for that Victory…

    Cheers
     
  3. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    Just found this on You Tube, it's bloody ace, never seen it before.
    Never heard him speak before.
    Horrocks introduces the prog.

     
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  4. bexley84

    bexley84 Well-Known Member

    I spotted it in the New year and put it up on one of the Churchill threads.. The understatement is fantastic. Might also still be on the BBC website..
     
  5. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    D told me it was already on forum, I missed it. :(
     
  6. dbf

    dbf Moderatrix MOD

    Deserves another airing, doesn't it.
     
  7. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Excellent post at No. 43, Owen. Enjoyed that imensely.

    Tom Canning recommended I read 'Alanbrooke' (Fraser) a couple or so years ago. Thoroughly enjoyed the book; and understood far more about the reasons why the war was conducted the way it was.

    Besides Alanbrooke, I don't believe that history has been as kind as it should have been to Lord Gort or Sir John Dill.

    In adversity, Gort made the momentous decision to evacuate the BEF from the continent before total disaster befell it. At that time and since, it appears that his decision/action in doing so was seen as a weakness in the man. I believe it to have been to the contrary. Without that decision we would all probably be speaking German now.

    Dill was a subtle man and not up to handling Churchill. It needed someone as the CIGS who was just as forceful as Churchill - enter Alanbrooke. What may not be widely known is the influence Dill subsequently had on the course of the war as as the CIGS man in Washington DC, or in what esteem the Americans and the CIGS held him.

    Fraser wrote that Dill was Alanbrooke's "dearest friend and most valued colleague".

    When Dill died on 4 November 1944, Alanbrooke had lost someone who was:

    "...quite irreparable... irreplaceable in Washington...", and

    Alanbrooke "...loved him, and valued his counsel as a pearl beyond price...".

    Of his handling of the Americans:

    "...the emollient diplomacy of Dill who could express an idea by inducing his companion to advance it as his own, and who could without humbug express disagreement as if it were a compliment..." and

    "Dill they already admired and loved."

    The Americans paid Dill the honour of laying him to rest at Arlington National Cemetery and erecting a statue there in his honour. http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jgdill.htm

    NB. Orde C. Wingate is also buried there.
     
  8. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    Blimey excellent
     
  9. canuck

    canuck Closed Account

    "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."


    Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps)
     
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  10. Owen

    Owen -- --- -.. MOD

    Finally visited his grave today.

    [sharedmedia=gallery:albums:938]

    [​IMG]
     
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  11. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    The Forgotten Field Marshal: Viscount Alanbrooke

    The Forgotten Field Marshal: Viscount Alanbrooke
    In the shadows of Montgomery, Alexander and Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alan Brooke’s extraordinary contributions as a strategist and leader have been largely forgotten over time. His experiences stretching across the First and Second World War, he held an incredible list of accolades and was one of Churchill’s key advisors leading Britain to victory over the Nazis. In this episode, former paratrooper and Second World War expert Bill Duff takes us through the incredible life of Alan Brooke.
     
  12. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    There was an episode of Angus Wallace's WW2 Podcast recently also about Alan Brooke - it was an interview with Andrew Sangster, who I didn't agree with about a bunch of things to do with Monty, but still - he is the author of a new book, Alan Brooke: Churchill's Right-Hand Critic. Apparently the author's original idea for the title was more like "The Forgotten Field Marshal" but ... publishers are publishers.

    among other places to listen
     
  13. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    I am an unabashed Alanbrooke fan, I mave have a bias as a former Eagle. Brooke and Adam both served in N Battery the Eagle Troop before the First World War.

    There are several reasons why Brooke deserves wider recognition.

    1. During the First World War he made several significant contributions to British tactics. While Brooke did not invent the creeping barrage, he did introduce the kind of barrage map that wpuld enable the CRA to see exactly which battery was not firign on the correct line. The first barrage map I found was one hand drawn by Brooke for the sucessful breakthrough of the 18ht Division on the first day of the Somme. Brooke was the senior professional artillery staff officer in the Canadian Corps and responsible for the excellent staffwork and logistics which helped the Canadian Corps deserve its reputation as the allied storm troops.

    2. Brooke did a good job rebuilding the army after Dunkirk. He reversed the static defence strategy, spotted the significance of Heavy AA as an anti tank weapon and organised large scale exercises to learn to manouvre armour..

    3. During WW2 he shaped the successful Allied strategy. He understood the significance and value of the Mediterranean as a side-show and diversion. He managed to curb Churchill's impulses for ill thouhgt through and under resourced operations in Norway, Siumatra etc.

    4. He was abut the only person who Montgomery respected as an immediate superior. No Brooke. No monty
     
    Last edited: Jul 16, 2021
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  14. Tolbooth

    Tolbooth Patron Patron

    Afraid I was very disappointed with Sangster's book. Very short on any analysis or depth. Felt it was cobbled together from the diaries and few general WW2 histories. Alanbrooke deserves better.
     
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  15. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Hello Sheldrake,

    Brooke was the right person for the CIGS hot seat and the country, if not Europe as a whole, should be immensely grateful of his selection.

    Recognition of that, and his efforts and qualities in general, are indeed historically lacking relative to others. Others deliberately sought the limelight, the newspaper inches and and the historical texts and attention, all to satisfy their own egos. You mention the worst of the lot: Montgomery. Historical recognition is often a zero-sum equation with only a finite and limited quantity available. Some went out of the way to steal from others.

    On the subject of exercises, armour and AA/ATk, I feel you have over-egged his achievements and skills.

    There can be no doubt the leadership of the British Army was in desperate need of more training and practise in the handling of formations above divisional level. Brooke certainly recognised that and lead their implementation as C-in-C Home Forces and then CIGS. However, I suspect they were an inevitability whoever was in the hot seat post-Dunkirk. And it is just as difficult to quantify the helpfulness of his guidance and advice on the events and outcomes. Take Exercise Bumper as an example: he was repeatedly critical of Alexander's approach and tactics. As the Exercise Director, his words were the DS solution. But were they truely the 'right' or 'best' solution?

    Staying with Bumper, there was indeed an experiment with using an HAA regiment reroled in an ATk role. Was it an experiment that was so successful that it became widely adopted? If not, why not?

    And finally, and yes Bumper even has relevance here too, Brooke's fingerprints are all over armoured/tank tactical doctrine from 1937 onwards (if not earlier): the role of an armoured division, its establishment, its training and so on and on... The early war struggles of armoured warfare were probably more related to his input than those of Hobart or the unnamed "tank gurus" you have previously mentionned.

    Brooke was a class act. The perfect foil to Churchill in Britain's time of need. I, for one, rate his contribution to the war outcome far greater than that of Montgomery who - as you rightly point out - only got to perform as hedid because of Brooke.
     
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  16. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Brooke was probably not a great commander. He was not as good a communicator as Montgomery or Patton, who marshalled media to project themselves and their ideas.

    I picked out Brooke's intervention in anti tank gunnery as he repeatedly mentioned it in his diary in 1941. I have alrerady posted the detailand the dates in other threads about the Desert war. He was underwhelmed by a demonstratiuon of anti tank guns in May 1941. Demanded to see somehting better including 3 inch and 3.7 inch and then did battle with Beaverbrook to obtain a supply of 3.7inch anti tank ammunition. He does not mention any other military technology in any detail. 103 HAA were tasked with a secondary role as an anti tank regiment in July 1941 they are released from that role at the end of 1942 when they become a field force unit preparing to provide HAA for an expeditionary force. By then all HAA in a field force role are expected to undertake anto tank and ground shoots.
     
  17. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    We will never know the 'truth' about his command skills in the field. Perhaps his own hesitancy and rapid self-removal from the list of potential 8th Army commander is as a good a yardstick as any.

    I think the three issues: ATk, armour tactics and higher command competency all stand out in equal measure as being real bug bears of his post-BEF thru '42 thoughts and concerns. Each crop up regularly in his diary. They were indeed serious issues which needed desperate attention.

    Whilst we can measure his outputs with some degree of accuracy, measuring the outcomes of his efforts is far more problematic. Superficially, it seems rather limited.

    For all his effort, did armour tactics really improve because of his input, or inspite of it? I've read quite a bit on the wider subject recently and a lot of pointers suggest he was part of the problem rather than the solution.

    Your thoughts on the HAA to ATk matter are documented, they are in effect a summary of his outputs. But can we quantify the outcomes? To what extent did his efforts improve capability on the battlefield? If at all.

    And then there is the question of higher command and the candidates. He had no problem scoring his generals good or bad and was quick to have those he felt a problem removed. But his judgements were often based on very brief observations and/or gossip. Did Brooke have a devine insight because I don't see that he really turned the promotion and appointments system into one of merit. It still seemed to be based upon personal opinion. Did all the 'big' exercises really filter out good from bad, competent from incompetent, when the DS solution and critique was a personal opinion?

    I too am a big admirer of his efforts. The war would have taken a far different direction had he not been sitting on Churchill's shoulder and a direction probably far less rosy. At the strategic level, it's very difficult to truely fault him. He had a canny knack of identifying and understanding problems. At the strategic level, that was gold dust. He had it too at the lower level, but his solutions did not have the same degree of brilliance.
     
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  18. Rich Payne

    Rich Payne Rivet Counter Patron 1940 Obsessive

    As a BEF obsessive, I can't fail to be impressed with how Brooke managed to get 2 Corps out more or less intact and Montgomery's command of 3rd Infantry Division was superb and took full advantage of the training that he had focussed on during the phoney war.

    However, I can't see that either of them took responsibility for or owned up to the failures which lead to 3 Div's Divisional Cavalry, 15/19 Hussars being ambushed in Asse when the Belgians on their left flank withdrew early. Surely either Corps or Divisional commanders should have been co-ordinating that ? As far as I can tell, neither regarded it as significant enough to discuss in their memoirs.

    To my mind, it should have been a black mark on both their records as field commanders in 1940.
     
  19. MarkN

    MarkN Banned

    Again, I feel credit to certain individuals is being over-egged with the benefit of the knowing later outcomes and the need to spin some form of success in a time of failure.

    The evacuation of the BEF was a success wholly creditable to the matelots: the RN, the MN and all the weekend sailors who took their little boats across the Channel. And a special mention to the French troops left behind holding the perimeter.

    Gort, Brooke et al succeeded in getting their troops to Dunkirk, they didn't succeed in getting them away from Dunkirk. The relevance of this is highlighted by what happened to the 51st Division: they were pushed against the sea but ended up as POWs not back in Blighty. The most optimistic Admiralty prediction was they could get a maximum of 45,000 away. Had that prediction proven accurate, it would have left 180,000 BEF troops in and around Dunkirk being captured or killed. Would we then consider Gort's decision wise and Brooke's efforts successful?

    With the knowledge that hindsight brings, that the matelots surpassed themselves and the sacrifice of the remnants of the French 1st Army holding the perimeter, the decisions and actions of BEF commanders are viewed through somewhat rose tinted optics.
     
  20. idler

    idler GeneralList

    How could the RN and the little ships have earned everlasting glory if there'd been no-one to pick up? 1st Army would have been just another entry in the French list of lost battles without all the rosbifs to save. Who (aside from the French and Belgians, obviously) would have been blamed had the BEF been cut off and carved up by the Germans before it got to Dunkirk?

    The BEF did an awful lot to save itself. It and its commanders deserve a share of the credit for their efforts to prevent the worst from happening.


    .
     
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