Against all odds – Saint-Valery-en-Caux (June 1940)

I think we have now exhaustively covered the advance of Rommel’s 7.Pz.Div. on June 10th 1940. I propose we let him be for the time being at Veulettes-sur-Mer. I shall discuss his advance on Saint-Valery on June 11th at a later date.

I would now like to direct the spotlights on the far less hyped 5.Pz.Div., commanded by Generalleutnant Joachim Lemelsen and his role in the Saint-Valery-en-Caux disaster.




You may remember from an earlier post that, on June 10th 1940, from Rouen, Rommel headed straight towards the north-west, in the direction of Yvetot, Ourville and the coast which he reached at Les Petites Dales that same evening. Meanwhile, his counterpart of the 5.Pz.Div., had been ordered north-east.

In his XV. Armeekorps (mot.) Korpsbefehl dated June 10th 1940, General Hermann Hoth is issuing the 5.Pz.Div. (and the M.G. Batl. 8 who had been subordinated to it) following orders: “Prevent the enemy from breaking through to Rouen in the Neufbose (sic – Neufbosc), Saint Martin (probably Saint-Martin-l’Hostier), Totes line and stand ready to attack on Dieppe on the orders of the corps if necessary.” Lemelsen is, in essence, given a purely defensive mission – quite strange indeed for a Panzerdivsion in the given context.

Personally, I find those orders quite puzzling.
Surely, by the time these orders had been issued, Hoth must have known the remaining Allied forces in Upper-Normandy were in no shape to launch any kind of counterattack in the direction of Rouen. Aerial reconnaissance reports must also have brought to his attention that most British and French units were trying to make a run for Le Havre or Fécamp. As it happens, the only serious threat in that region would have been several battalions of French infantry and light armour north of Totes – no match for a Panzerdivision. Finally, as for Dieppe, the German 57th Infantry Division was already heading straight towards the city (which they captured the next day).

Another strange element of Hoth’s Korpsbefehl: “The 5th Panzer Div. has, during the passage of the 2nd (mot) Div., to refrain from any south-north movement” If I understand this correctly, this at least suggest that priority is clearly given to the objectives of the 2.(mot) Div. Finally, Hoth’s Korpsbefehl also dictates that both available Aufklärungsstaffeln, the 2.(H)/31 and the 1.(H)/11, were mainly to conduct their reconnaissance flights in the north-west of Yvetot, i.e. in the region were Rommel’s 7.Pz.Div. was to operate.

Someone with a devious mind (like myself) would perhaps be inclined to conclude that the 5.Pz.Div. was merely granted an obscure sideshow role, whereas Rommel’s 7.Pz.Div. would be guaranteed a place in military history books. One may also suspect that Hoth, motivated by personal sympathies, obeying political guidelines or in order to serve propaganda purposes (or all of the above) willfully gave Rommel every opportunity to grab the laurels of victory. It might also be that Hoth may not have been confident in the newly appointed Lemelsen’s capabilities.



I can easily imagine that Hoth’s Korpsbefehl must have been hard to swallow for Lemelsen: he was effectively reduced to the role of Rommel’s minion. Fortunately for Lemelsen, his orders left ample room for interpretation. Instead of securing the area of Totes (as he could have done had he chosen to follow his orders to the letter), he pushed further north, conveniently staying out of the way of the 2.(mot) Div. area of operations. I surmise his intention was to proceed further north than Hoth had intended, eventually leave the road to Dieppe at Belmesnil and then head straight to the coast via Bacqueville-en-Caux and Luneray (which is grosso modo what he did the following day). Things, however, did not go as smoothly as planned though.

Whereas Rommel encountered only sporadic resistance, Lemelsen’s journey north-east, however, was certainly no plain sailing though. On their path, his 5.Pz.Div. severely clashed with a number of French rearguard units in the area of Totes and Biville-la-Baignarde (on the D927).

Today, when reviewing the ‘big picture’ surrounding the Saint-Valery-en-Caux drama, the fierce combats that took place near Biville often remain under the radar. British historians tend to forget that, without the gallant resistance of the French at Biville, many of the 51st (Highland) Division would not have even been able to reach Saint-Valery, let alone establishing a defensive perimeter.

In the afternoon, on the outskirts of Totes (the momument on the side of the road marks the place where the engagement took place), Lemelsen’s Panzers first stumbled on a handful of Panhard AMD-35 and two Hotchkiss H35 light tanks (unit as yet undetermined) which were swiftly dealt with (cfr. uploaded pictures).







The main engagement, however, took place several kilometres north of Totes, at the hamlet of Biville-la-Baignarde, where a number of French units were ordered to halt the Germans at all cost. These units, i.e. the 5e Demi-brigade de Chasseurs Alpins (encompassing the 13e, 53e, 67e B.C.A. and the 69e B.C.P.) and elements of the 5e Régiment de Cuirassiers, clashed head-on with the Panzers.



I would like to emphasize, in order to highlight the intensity of these combats, that the Chasseurs Alpins were no raw recruits. Those French mountain infantry units were disciplined, adequately equipped, well-trained and led by experienced officers. Need I remind that all three Batallions de Chasseurs Alpins involved here took active part in the Namsos expedition just a couple of weeks earlier? At Biville, however, on open ground, they were no match for the Panzer onslaught. An account relating to another light infantery unit, the 69e Batallion de Chasseurs à Pied, even reports man-to-man bayonet combats. Fighting was ferocious and French casualties were high.

The 5e Régiment de Cuirassiers, belonging to general Berniquet’s 2e DLC (Division Légère de Cavalery) also gave the Germans a hard time. This regiment, with traditions dating back to the Ancien Régime and which also saw action at Waterloo, did not fail its reputation. The combats near the Somme a couple of days earlier, however, had severely weakened its combat capabilities. They were soon outnumbered and outgunned. Another fine unit that was swept away by the Panzers was the 23e GRDI (Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie).

After the war, many of the fallen were posthumously awarded the Légion d’Honneur for their gallantry during the Biville combats. On the German side, the engagement at Biville - though successful - was granted only marginal attention. As to the British, although this significant engagement had enabled units of the 51st (Highand) Division to effectively reach Saint-Valery-en-Caux unhindered, I failed to find any references… Establishing the makeshift defence perimeter around Saint-Valery would not have been possible without the courageous resistance at Biville on June 10th 1940, where the French managed to frustrate Lemelsen’s plans.

As far as I know, no pictures ever emerged of the Biville onslaught. I was also unable to ascertain to which extent the Luftwaffe had taken part in the onslaught (anyone?).

After the Biville clash, Lemelsen’s men had to mark a pause for the night and lick their wounds. They would not advance further until the next day. As to the French, some surviving scattered elements eventually retreated towards Veulles-les-Roses and regrouped. They made a last gallant stand the following day whilst providing cover to the evacuation operations until being ordered to surrender. Many died, the rest were captured.

From what precious little information I was able to assemble, the main cause for this disastrous encounter seems to have been the French lack of adequate anti-tank guns combined with the Panzer’s superior mobility, numerical superiority and outstanding co-ordination. Also, the terrain was uniquely suited for Panzer operations.

Enjoy your weekend,
Christian

 

During these last couple of weeks, I have done my utmost best to draw a comprehensive picture of the events that took place on June 10th 1940. As it happens, they led to six Allied divisions, including the 51st (Highland) Division, to be trapped inside a makeshift perimeter.

Unfortunately, I have to confess my task in this respect is as yet incomplete! Though I (successfully?) tried to describe the roles played by Rommel's 7.PzDiv. and Lemelsen's 5.Pz.Div. I failed to find trustworthy sources in order to adequately highlight the activities deployed by Generalleutnant Paul Bader's 2.ID (mot). I would want to emphasize that this third division, though not as hyped as other two, was instrumental in sealing the faith of the Allied troops caught in the German's net. Any historian or researcher failing to take their contribution into proper consideration, would make an error in judgement..

As from now, for the time being, I shall now focus on the combats that took place on June 11th 1940.
Around midday , the Allied were effectively trapped in an area of.approximately 60 sq.km, approximately stretching form Saint-Valery to Cany-Barville (West flank) to Octeville, Houdetot and Saint-Pierre-le-Viger (South flank), eventually running back towards the coast near Sotteville-sur-Mer.

A logical first step, in order to gain proper situational awareness, would be to find a map or sketch depicting the ongoing Ops..
Personally, I feel this necessary for allowing to place all accounts or events into proper context.

To my amazement, except for the excellent website of the 51st HD, I found no such comprehensive map in any historical website or reference work I could lay my hands on. Whereas sketches provided by the 51st HD website focus on the own units, they fail to include any reference as to the positions of neighbouring French troops. I am fully aware that this is a British forum, but must I remind that the French were also present with no less than four divisions? Also, in sheer numbers, compared to the (approximately) 6000 British, there were roughly 40000 French stuck in the same area. I would argue that makes their presence far from trivial (to say the least!) and, as such, cannot be disregarded.

Anyway, please find, hereunder, my first attempt. If anything, it provides a fairly good impression of the sticky predicament both British and French troops were in.



Laying this jigsaw proved to be quite a challenge though - it took me quite some time to give birth to a first draft. While the respective positions of 51st HD and German troops were relatively easily pieced together, the same exercise proved much more challenging when it came to the French. Though I am fairly confident in the result of my research, at this time, however, I can not claim it to be bulletproof. On some occasions, I had no choice but to extrapolate or approximate and, as a result, I may have to correct some faulty assumptions in the future (so, please don't shoot the pianist... not yet anyway!)

As always, in order to fine-tune this initial draft, I would welcome all your inputs, comments or feedback.
I would love to lay my hands on a similar map in order to compare.

Usually, I would now wish all of you an enjoyable weekend.
Instead, on this occasion, I wish all the best and lots of courage to.anyone that may have been impacted by Storm Babet.

KR,
Christian

 

An observant forum member notified me that my first draft was somewhat incomplete.
Indeed, I failed to include the position of the 7th Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers - my sincere apologies for this omission.

In order to correct this oversight, I would need to have an approximate idea of their position on June 11th 1940. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to find any account, sketch or any document that could help determine their whereabouts at the time. If I am not mistaken, the 7th NRF was the 51st HD's dedicated MG battalion. I would therefor surmise they would surely have been entrenched nearby a position of some tactical importance.

For now, the only clue I have is an input for a rather old thread (started in 2010): 'Captured at Saint-Valery'.
"On the afternoon of June 11th the 7th RNF received orders to destroy all vehicles and machine guns and march to St Valery arriving at around 0300hrs on the 12th June. On arrival the commanding officer was told there would be no ships to take them home and promptly marched the battalion to the area of a sunken road lined with trees leaving only B Company at St Valery on dock duties.At 0800hrs news was received that the French had surrendered at 0940hrs acting on orders from 51st Div Hq 7th RNF also surrendered.". This short account (source?), however, fails to mention the 7th NRF's position prior to receiving the order to withdraw towards Saint-Valery.

Could anyone help me figuring out this one?

KR,
Christian

 

The Machine Gun battalion of 1940 didn't fight as a unit. To quote Mike "Trux" old BEF pages...

"The infantry battalion lost its machine guns in the late 1930’s and they were then concentrated in machine gun battalions. These were infantry battalions converted to the new role. In action it was usual for each division to have a machine gun battalion and to assign a company to each brigade. Brigade generally assigned a platoon to each battalion so that in fact each battalion once more had a machine gun platoon, although the responsibility for administration and maintenance rested with the machine gun battalion".

M.G. Battalion HQ would normally have been alongside Div. HQ with the platoons spread out to add firepower to each Infantry Battalion. They were not responsible for the defence of a particular area as they were integrated into the 51st (HD) battalions that you have shown.

 

ACK Rich - Thanks!
This explains why I was unable to find anything.

 

Over these last couple of weeks, I have been reviewing numerous accounts describing the intense rearguard combats that took place in the vicinity of Saint-Valery-en-Caux on June 11th 1940. By now, most (if not all) of those stories must already be familiar to most forum members. I therefor see no added value whatsoever in quoting them as you can easily find them by consulting dedicated websites (e.g. https://51hd.co.uk/).

On the other hand, if one cares to approach things form a somewhat different (i.e. non-British) perspective, one may still find some hidden gems that sometimes unlock surprisingly fresh insights.

I recently received the kind permission of Mr Thiébaut Jourdain, webmaster of www.valleeducousin.fr, to translate and share with you a stunning but, above all, dramatic account. To me it was, in many respects, a true eye-opener.

As I explained in a previous post, the 5th Panzer Division, after the Biville onslaught on June 10th, immediately pushed straight towards the coast. The following day, near Veules-les-Roses, they clashed violently with rearguard elements of the 2e DLC (Division Légère de Cavalerie). This French division was operating in roughly the same area as the 1st Seaforth, the 5th Gordons and the 2/7th Duke of Wellington (cfr. sketch posted earlier).



The following breathtaking account is the testimony of Mr André Consigny, at the time NCO in the 3e RDP (3e Régiment de Dragons Portées). His unit, together with the 73e RA Lunéville (73e Régiment d’Artillerie – Lunéville being the unit’s patron city) confronted spearhead elements of Generalleutnant Joachim Lemelsen’s forces on June 11th 1940.

As you may be aware, the French language is ideally suited for expressing strong emotions. However, translating those into plain English can be most challenging and may often call for some creative liberties. Though not a professional translator, I nonetheless hope I successfully managed to capture most of the essence of Mr Consigny’s original text.

Here goes…

“We are given six MGs and, with our chest belts still full of ammunition, immediately take positions. It would seem the enemy waited for us to show up because, around 10 a.m., shells start pouring down. In a distance, we can see tanks advancing – still few in number though, but approaching from three sides simultaneously.

We, as infantrymen of the 3rd RDP, have no adequate means of defense (against armour). Fortunately, our brave comrades of the 73rd RA Lunéville are still at our side. Their batteries now act as anti-tank guns, aiming straight at the Panzers, firing at zero-angle. Four tanks are soon crippled. The others instantly take evasive action, but three more are hit - there must not be many more left. We can see only one remaining, speeding straight at us like a meteor.

At a hundred meters, we open fire with our MGs, but without noticing any result. This last Panzer eventually breaks through our lines, ends up in the MT-park behind us and starts firing at point blank range. All around, vehicles start burning or instantly explode. All those who took cover under or around them turn into living torches. The assassin in command of the tank opens his turret and slaughters everyone still alive with his SMG.



Our weapons are now silent. All around this godforsaken area one can now only hear cries of agony, desperate pleading moans and the crackling of fires. Three more trucks are set alight. Now it's my turn. I'm buried alongside an artillery tractor in six inches of pine needles, playing dead. Minutes seem like hours. Suddenly I don't hear anything except for the fading noise of caterpillar tracks.

I can hardly believe it! Why did he suddenly stop shooting and leave the remaining cars, weapons and guns intact? A true mystery! I jump on my feet and run to seek out Chenal and Rousseaux, my two corporals. Both appear to be seriously wounded. Rousseaux, however, is still conscious. A guy helps me carry him into a broken down ambulance around which many soldiers are screaming in pain.

While tending to Chenal‘s wounds, a captain of the 73rd grabs me by the arm and, along with six men of various other units, orders us to immediately put two remaining guns in battery. Not being artillerymen, we understand next to nothing of his instructions. Fortunately, two gunners of the 73rd pop up and firing is soon resumed. The enemy is now emerging about a kilometer in front of us. The captain, in rather discourteous terms, orders us to back to our MGs. Ten minutes later, we fire at will. We’re back in hell!

I have become a completely different man: I, the fervent 1939-pacifist, no longer fires above enemy heads. Eager for bloody revenge, I now shoot to kill. Only anger and hatred drive me now. Just like my mates, I have now turned into a mad dog fighting cruel beasts.

Mankind no longer exists – all the good ones are dead, the others have turned mad. We frantically, continue firing though the barrels of our MG barrels are now red-hot, causing numerous skin burns while reloading. We nonetheless obsessively continue non-stop firing without even caring to aim. Somehow we must have been proficient, because we hear an officer shouting orders: 'lengthen'. Has he gone crazy? No, it is true! Yet, though the enemy is retreating, more and more of them are coming into sight.

Suddenly, two new MGs we hadn’t noticed before take position beside us and open fire. Incredible! Where did they come from? Our madman officer now orders to aim even further ahead. We can see him clearly as he is perched on something very tall. His towering silhouette, like a wildly gesticulating demon, stands out against the burning sky. This sight truly galvanizes us; no longer do we fear tracers, shots or shells.

We climb the embankments in order to peek as we can no longer hear anything - by now, we are all nearly deaf. True enough, the bastards are in full retreat! We can now enjoy a short respite.

On this Tuesday, June 11th 1940, 11:30 p.m. the 73rd and 3rd have prevailed. Men emotionally shake hands or hug, others cry. Then, all remaining equipment is set ablaze. In spite of everything, we have the feeling of having won a great battle today – we forced the barbarians to pull back!”

This local success shall, however, be short-lived.
After this engagement, André and the survivors of his unit retreat towards the coastline.
His ordeal is not over yet...

To be continued.
Christian

 

Great thread, thanks for your hard work. Attached pages from 4th battalion Queens Own Cameron Highlanders Historical records which may or may not help you with dispositions of 51st HD.

 

I made some inquiries as to pinpoint the location where the 3 RDP and the 73e RA halted the advance of the 5.Pz.Div.
For once, I didn't have to look very far:as there is a street named after the 3e Rgt de Dragons Portés and a discreet monument on the site where the battle was fought. As it happens, I didn't even notice it the last time I was there.

The inscription on the monument (somewhat hidden behind one of the garden workers vans on the Streetview caption) states:
"Here, on this site, on June 11th 1940, the last elements of the 3rd Motorised Dragoon Regiment resisted the invader. On June 12th, surrounded in Veules-les-Roses, they sacrificed themselves around their commander, Lieutenant Colonel de Reboul, earning the enemy's admiration. Remember them."



▲ This photo, sold on €Bay two years ago, may have been taken at the Veules-les-Roses battle site. The topography and the destroyed equipment are certainly consistent with Mr Consigny's account. Note the French 75 mm guns in the foreground.

I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if the galvanizing officer described in Mr Consigny's account were to be no other than Lt Col de Reboul himself.

I must admit I somewhat feel uneasy about this though. There is no question that the gallantry displayed by men of the 3e RDP commands everyone's respect. However, the men of the 73rd Lunéville Artillery Regiment seem to have been altogether forgotten... According to Mr Consigny's testimony, however, they knocked down no less than seven Panzers during that same engagement! In my book, this kind of prowess, at the very least, deserves some credit.

Cheers,
Christian

 

Hi Christian
In this context, the "schnelle Brigade von Senger" might be interesting for you.
(Due to my current lack of spare time, unfortunately, only the links. But thanks to your language skills, that should not be a problem.)

about the person:
General der Panzertruppe Ritter und Edler von Senger und Etterlin - Lexikon der Wehrmacht

brief outline in English:
Brigade Senger June 1940 - Axis History Forum

contemporary original documents:
Russisch-deutsches Projekt zur Digitalisierung deutscher Dokumente in den Archiven der Russischen Föderation | Akte 4. Unterlagen der Ia-Abteilung der Gemischten schnellen Brigade Senger: Anlagensammlung zum KTB Nr. 1 der Gemischten schnellen Brigade Senger.

 

Hi Ollie,

What a coincidence! I was just investigating the role of the Senger Brigade, though via another document form the same source:
Russisch-deutsches Projekt zur Digitalisierung deutscher Dokumente in den Archiven der Russischen Föderation | 32. Unterlagen der Ia-Abteilung der 5. Schützenbrigade der 5. Panzerdivision: KTB der 5. Schützenbrigade der 5. Panzerdivision zum Westfeldzug, 10.5.-26.6.1940
By piecing together information from British, French and German sources, I hope I to synthesize an overall overview of the situation of Saint-Valery-en-Caux' eastern defence perimeter. It would appear that this sector of the front has been quite neglected by researchers. I shall try to somewhat correct this oversight.

MfG,
Christian

 

Dear all,

After having reviewed several additional accounts published on the official 51st Highland Division’s website, some French testimonies and a number of German archive documents, I came to the conclusion that some corrections to my initial sketch (cfr. post #62) were required.

My first draft was not so far off mark though, but the DTG should have been 110900JUN1940. For the Allies, things were swiftly taking a turn for the worst, and by 111700JUN1940, the size of the perimeter had already significantly shrunken, especially on the eastern part.



The most significant maneuver in this sector was indubitably the major rush to the coast performed by elements belonging to the 5.Pz.Div. (probably Panzer-Regiment 31 backed by Schützen-Regiment 13 - TBC).

While doing so, the Germans literally bypassed the British who had established a line of defence along the D142. Indeed, on June 11th, 17:00 hrs, Capt Mcrae, Adjutant of the 4th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders noted in his War Diary: "No offensive action was directed against our front or that of the 1/Gordons."

One doesn’t need to be a master strategist in order to guess Generalleutnant Lemelsen’s intent: the capture of Veules-les-Roses. Fortunately, this plan was foiled by the French (cfr. account provided by Mr Consigny- posts #66 and #68). It had been a close call though!

IF the Germans had succeeded in capturing Veules-les-Roses as early as the afternoon of June 11th, they would have been able to proceed directly towards Saint-Valery (via the D925), effectively cutting off the main routes of retreat of the British battalions, thus preventing them to reach Saint-Valery altogether. Also, embarkations from the beaches at Veules would not have been possible anymore, hence drastically reducing the number of evacuated soldiers.

I still am struggling with several unsolved issues though. Perhaps someone can help me out (WD?).

1) There is one British battalion, which also must have been located somewhere around Veules-les-Roses on June 11th, but that I was as yet unable to pinpoint: the 1 Bn Princess Louise's Kensington Regt. There is a thread regarding this unit on the forum, but the posts contained nothing that could help me defining their (approximate) position.

2) The location where the French 3e RDP and the 73e RA successfully repelled the Germans must have been nearby positions held by the 2/7 Bn Duke of Wellington. I suspect they were somehow involved in these combats as two of soldiers of the unit rest in the local communal cemetery. Again, according to Capt. Mcrae's WD: "Heavy German tank attack was launched against the D.W.R.'s on our left".

3) I am fairly sure that on June 11th, the 153rd Brigade’s HQ was located at Blosseville. Would anyone have a clue as to where it was established?

As a result, the sketch I uploaded here above is still to be considered as being 'under construction'
A third iteration shall no doubt be required in order to fine tune some details.
Please feel free to comment anytime!

Have a nice weekend,
Christian

 

"Weekend" ? Has Belgium introduced a four-day week without telling me ?

The Kensingtons were another Machine Gun Battalion. I believe that they were a 3 Corps fixture on the Saar who remained there when other battalions were rotated in and out. The "permanent" garrisoning of the Saar Front and to what degree 3 Corps divided their resources to support Saar Force is something that I keep meaning to look at, but have never got around to.

Some British troops, principally Lines of Communication from the Maginot positions headed south and were interned in Switzerland. Presumably all fighting troops moved with 51 HD

 

Good Morning

Thanks for continuing this thread Christian, very interesting to see events from a French point of view as most British sources tend to concentrate on the 51st's point of view. In answer to your questions:

1. As Rich has just posted above the Kensingtons were, like 7 RNF, a machine gun battalion.

2. 2/7 DoW were involved with the 5th Panzer tank attack, it being noted that they "just hung on" in the face of the attack as the tanks lacked infantry support and so couldn't consolidate the ground they gained, eventually withdrawing back to their start line.

3. According to Saul David's book, which I have already mentioned, 153 Brigade HQ was indeed in Blosseville on the 11th June 1940 - "At 5:30pm a conference was held at 153 Brigade headquarters in an orchard on the east side of the village of Blosseville".

As for the location of the French 3e RDP and the 73e RA have you looked at the link to the map that I posted at the beginning of this thread? French dispositions at St Valery En Caux 10 - 11 June 1940

Hope that may be of some assistance to you.

 

Hmmm.....my mistake. I took a day off tomorrow, so I'm already somewhat operating in weekend mode
Also Rich, as you've been living in Belgium for quite a while, you should know we practically invented surrealism.
This is where the Twilight Zone meets the X-Files - ANYTHING is possible here!

Thank you for elucidating this little mystery

KR
Christian

 

I've decided not to go to work next Wednesday

I'll never quite get the hang of public holidays in the middle of the week !

 

I’ve been doing some digging in the War Diary (or Kriegstagebuch / KTB) of the 5.Schützenbrigade (5th motorized infantery brigade). This brigade, commanded by Oberst Joachim Degener, was subordonned to Generalleutnant Lemelsen’s 5.Pz.Div. and comprised Schützenregiment 13 and Schützenregiment 14.

On June 11th, this German brigade saw intensive action on Saint-Valery-en Caux’ eastern flank, in particular in the area covered by the British 153rd Brigade (comprising the 2/7 Bn Duke of Wellignton, 4th Bn Seaforth, 5th Gordons and 1st Bn Black Watch) and the French 2e DLC.

Though the page containing the entries related to the events that took place on June 11th 1940 was burned on the edges, I managed to extract and translate the following:

18:53

"Received a radio messages testifying to the stubborn resistance put up by enemy forces near Veules (Attachment 632). Schützen Regiment 14 also reported by radio message (Attachment 636) at XXX that Veules was finally cleared at 6.45 p.m. and that 500 prisoners have been captured."

"Meanwhile, a divisional order was received (Attachment 637) by the commander of the 5th Schützen Brigade, who at 4:50 p.m. gave the following order through the liaison officer of Schützen Regiment 14: “Secure the seafront with a skeleton force on both sides of Veules. XXX is to proceed in strength towards Blosseville.”

"The 5th Schützen Brigade shall establish its command post in Château Chapelle-sur-Dun."

19:00

"The commander of Schützen Regiment 13 was also ordered by the commander of the 5. Schützen Brigade to leave only a skeleton rearguard forces on the coast. XXX should largely be given the opportunity to rest and repair XXX vehicles."

"Regimental HQ of Schützen Regiment 14 was established at the Blosseville church; Regimental HQ of Schützen Regiment 13 at Château Saint-Aubin, 600 m east of the church. Brigade HQ is established at Château Chapelle-sur-Dun."

This information is slightly conflicting with Mr Consigny’s testimony and some other accounts relating to the combats near Veules. Though Allied troops trapped in Veules ceased to pose any further threat to the Germans, the town in itself was not ‘cleared’ (‘gesäubert’) until the following day. The subsequent order to secure both sides of Veules (on the cliffs overlooking the town) seems to confirm this.

Also, I seem to have been correct in my assumption that it was indeed Schützen Regiment 13 that had been involved in the combat related by Mr Consigny, as they were given the opportunity to lick their wounds after this engagement.

As to me, by the next time I visit of Upper-Normandy, I shall have some additional places of interest to visit







Cheers,
Christian

 

In an attempt to clarify the situation of the battalions attached to the 153th Brigade on the evening of June 11th, I synthesized all available information on the sketch uploaded hereunder - please feel free to comment.



In order to pinpoint the British positions, I relied on the accounts published on the official 51st HD website. As far as I could determine they are consistent with French and Germans accounts. Only the timing of events is sometimes open to debate. That isn't surprising though, as events developed very fast indeed - the situation evolved in a matter of mere hours! Also, some accounts were written weeks if not months after the events took place.

Allow me to share my conclusions and assumptions with you. Please note the timeline is uncertain as some discrepancies exist between different accounts as to the time some events took place. This is, however, quite common in such a situations.

This is how I surmise the course of events in the evening of June 11th 1940 on Saint-Valery-en-Caux' eastern defence perimeter:

After securing the outskirts at Veules (somewhere around 07:00 p.m.), German forces proceeded towards Blosseville. That would have led them smack into the sector occupied by the 2/7 Bn DWR. Around midnight (or 02:00 a.m ? TBC)., Brigade issued orders to withdraw towards Saint-Valery-en Caux. The 2/7 Bn DWR would have had to withdraw with the Germans in close pursuit - not an easy predicament! They would have no doubt used the main road (D925) in order to reach Saint-Valery straight via Ectot. Fortunately for the 2/7 Bn DWR, as we could learn form the 5.Schützenbrigade's KTB, the objective assigned to Schützen-Regiment 14 was not Ectot, but Blosseville.

As for the 2nd Seaforths and 5th Gordons, their route of escape was through Blosseville. The village was a 'passage obligé' and must have been quite a bottleneck. It would seem, however, that both units managed to leave Blosseville (in the direction of Manneville) before the German's arrival. By a strange coincidence, the pursuant Germans, just as the British 153rd Brigade, also established their HQ at Blosseville (maybe even in the same location near the church? - to be established)

Finally, the 1 Bn Black Watch, would have been the less fortunate unit, as they would have had to cover the greatest distance to reach Saint-Valery. Moreover, they would have had to use small country roads - far from ideal, especially by night and in full blackout... If you want to see for yourselves, use Google to follow their path from Angiens to Guetteville and from there to Saint-Valery (follow the D468 to the northwest).

One word of advice to those who shoud want to double-check: in Captain Mcrae's account, he often refers to 'YELON'. Don't get an headache whilst trying to sort this out as there is no such place. In fact Captain Mcrae must have meant 'ICLON'. This is (or rather was) a small village. Recently, the place was administratively degraded to a mere hamlet. Again, according to Captain Mcrae's, account: "Bde. HQ. was established in a small farm house in YELON (sic) to the rear of Bn. HQ. Enemy were very active in the air all afternoon but did not attack our positions." Both HQ's remained there only for as very short time; Bde. HQ. moved to Blosseville by the end of the day.

A funny twist of a local name is to be found in the account of Lieutenant Colonel GEB Honeyman, 1st Battalion The Black Watch, where he refers to 'Gueutteville' as 'Gutterville' (...) I can assure you though that Gueutteville-les-Grès is a very charming village and would, as it happens, serve as an ideal base of operations should you want to explore the 'Pays de Caux' for yourselves - everything is within striking distance (no pun intended).

Cheers,
Christian

 

Addendum: after reviewing the extract from "Escape from Saint Valery-en-Caux - Recounting the Adventures of Captain B C Bradford", published on the 51st Highland Division's official website, I slightly altered my initial sketch. It now includes a reference to the German's offensive on the front held by the 1 Bn Black Watch.



I must, however, confess I didn't find any reference allowing me to identify the attacking German force. Since no armour seems to have been involved, I can't ascertain the 5.Pz.Div. was indeed involved. Other than that, the sketch seems to fit all accounts quite nicely.

I would also be very grateful if someone could help me identify the French unit that, according to Captain Bardford's account "were excellent". At this stage of the war, such high praise was not very common! I can't be certain of anything, but my best guess would be either the 13e Bataillion de Chasseurs Alpins (13e BCA) or the 69e Bataillion de Chasseurs à Pied (69e BCP).

KR,
Christian

 

Dear all,

Sorry for the interruption, but I had other fish to fry...

I think that, now that the combats that took place during June 11th 1940 on Saint-Valery’s eastern flank have been quite exhaustively covered, we can now redirect attention back towards the western flank.

After his spectacular dash towards the cost, on late evening of June 10th, most elements of Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division (except for some detachments securing the vicinity of Fécamp) were positioned west of the Durent river (roughly between Cany-Barville and Veulettes-sur-Mer) where they had secured all crossings.

After spending the morning of June 11th refueling and resupplying, all units were ready for the next leap ahead towards Saint-Valery-en-Caux by midday.

The Durent river valley is a marshy flatland flanked on both sides by chalk cliffs. In order to proceed eastwards towards Saint-Valery, Rommel’s men had first to reach to top of the 90 meter-high cliffs. In order to achieve this, only two avenues of advance were possible.

First, starting from Veulettes-sur-Mer, take the route leading to Conteville and then proceed further towards Le Tôt and Saint-Léger (nowadays the D79). The short distance from Veulettes to Conteville makes this option appealing since, once in Conteville, you have reached the top of the cliffs. At the time, however, this road was very steep, narrow and winding – the perfect spot for enemy forces to make a stand and block advancing columns of armoured vehicles. As it happens, the Germans build a number of impressive bunkers along that very same road as part of the Atlantikwall defences. Also, on the very same spot Rommel’s panzers started their advance towards Saint-Valery, the French erected a monument after the war to commemorate the gallant crew of a B-17 which was shot down there in 1943.

If you fancy yourself a Panzerkampfwagen 38(t) ’s tank commander, you can explore this option starting at Pont-Rouge (where the Durent meets the sea) and follow the D79 in the easterly direction. Please note though that in 1940, that same road was nothing more than a path by today’s standards. The uploaded photo hereunder was unmistakably taken at Veulletes-sur-Mer (the distinctive cliff is a giveaway), nearby the present-day casino.



In their brochure '10th-12th June 1940 - The Fierce Battle', the Association Pays de Caux published a astonishing photo of a column of Pkfw 38(t) en route to the top of the cliffs with Veulettes-sur-Mer in the background. I have no idea where they got hold of it, but I shall contact them and ask permission to post it on this thread.

The second option is to proceed from Auberville-la-Manuel (Rommel’s HQ) in direction of the village of Paluel towards Saint-Sylvain and Ingouville (following the D68). If you care exploring this route, you shall experience it to be somewhat longer, but much less steep.

At about two o’clock in the afternoon of June 11th, German forces comprising Pz.Regt.25 and Schützen –Regiment 6 (S.R.6) started their advance on both these axes. Initially, they encountered no resistance and reached the plateau on top of the cliffs unchallenged.

Their path would soon bring them on a direct collision course with the 2nd Seafort, the 1st Gordons and the 4th Camerons…

Kind Regards,
Christian

 

Hello,
A retired Gendarmerie officer, for several years I have devoted part of my free time to carrying out research on the fighting of June 1940 in Seine-Maritime. Living in the near Saint-Valery/Veules les Roses area, I write articles in the local weekly "Courrier cauchois" and organize ceremonies as I did on June 11, 2023 in Sotteville-sur-mer in l honor of the thirty men of the 2/th Duke of Wellington regiment who fell on June 11, 1940, in the presence of a large delegation, or in Angiens where 17 British soldiers are buried. I have the pleasure of sending you some of these texts
Remaining at your disposal
Hervé