9th Infantry Brigade and Brigadier Arthur Orr/22nd Armoured Brigade and Brigadier Harry Jackson

Good day everyone,

I'm currently researching why Anglo-Canadian brigade commanders in 21st Army Group were relieved of command and I've stumbled across a couple of puzzles.

The first is Brigadier Arthur Orr. He took over command of 9th Infantry Brigade after Cunningham was wounded on D-Day. Orr was relieved of command in early August 1944 as Maj. Gen. Whistler's was not happy with him (at least according to his biographer).

The second is Brigadier Harry Mackeson. Mackeson took over from Hinde in early August but only lasted a month before he was fired and replaced by Brigadier Hugh Cracroft (according to then Colonel A.D.R. Wingfield who would later replace Cracroft).

So apart from Whistler's biographer and Wingfield's autobiography, I can't find anything that would suggest a reason why these two men were fired. Both seemed to have won most or all of the battles they fought (I'm happy to be corrected if this is wrong).

Anyone have an insight (i.e., evidence that can be used in a PhD dissertation) into why these two men were fired?

 

Better late than never.... hope it's not too late.

From what I have seen/heard, Brigadier Orr was relieved of his command following (not the first) error of tactics/leadership on the 7th August 1944 which resulted in significant casualties being incurred by 2 Lincolnshire Regiment at Vaudry when they were outflanked.

Copies of 2 Lincs War Diary and 9 Brigade HQ War Diary encloseed for reference together with an article written by a person who lives in the Vaudry area and who has researched the battle.

I have a hard copy of the 2 Lincs Official History so can take a look at that to see if any subtle references if info is still required.

Cheers.

Quis Seaprabit

2 Lincs War Diary












A fatal mistake is made
At 1000 on 7 August, and in contradiction of even the most basic of accepted infantry tactics, the Commander of 9 Infantry Brigade ordered 2 LINCOLN to advance alone to the railway line, which was around 600m away from the foremost Battalion position and then to push forward to the top of the hill. No orders were given to KOSB to ad-vance on their left and they remained astride the Vire Estry road. In support of 2 LINCOLN were a Squadron of 44 RTR and 101 Anti-Tank Battery RA, a heavy machine gun platoon of 2 Bn Middlesex Regt and one Battery 33 Field Regiment RA with self-propelled 105mm guns. The advance began with C and D Companies of the Lincolns to the left (East) of the D55a (Vaudry) road and A and B companies to the right. A platoon of 253 Fd Coy RE were in sup-port to provide mine clearance.
Almost as soon as A Coy moved out they were mortared heavily, immediately killing a signaller, destroying the wireless set and temporarily blinding the platoon commander. Heavy machine gun fire from well dug in weapon pits in the hedgerows and on the South side of the railway line. Two tanks from 44RTR moved in on the right flank to assist but were rapidly knocked out. The first by a Panzerfaust (German Bazooka equivalent) and the second by a mine. After supporting fire by the artillery, A company eventually reached the railway line, but by now all the Com-pany officers had been injured. Two German machine guns, sited in the railway crossing keeper’s cottage took a particularly heavy toll. The remaining RTR tanks attempted to reach the railway crossing, but the two leading tanks were disabled by mines, which effectively blocked the
(sunken) road about 100m short of the crossing. The RE Section attempting to clear the mines also suffered casu-alties.
On the left of the advance, D company had initially made good progress to La Lande, however, they were unsup-ported on their left flank as a result of the fact that the KOSB had been ordered to remain astride the Vire-Estry road and they were rapidly outflanked by German troops, who were now firing at them both from ahead and be-hind and to the left. Two sections (20 men) of the foremost platoon had managed to cross the railway line and were effectively surrounded.
At this point of the attack, it was decided that the attack was getting nowhere on either flank and could not con-tinue without further heavy losses. Consequently the Companies on both of the sides of the Vaudry road were extricated back to the start point under a smokescreen laid by the artillery. Unfortunately, it did not prove possi-ble to contact one of the Sections of D Company which had crossed the railway line and these were initially post-ed missing. All 11 men were later found dead. Which was in addition to the other three ORs killed and two offic-ers and 25 ORs wounded. One of these soldiers was Private Arthur Papworth, who is the Soldier buried in Vaudry churchyard.
As a result of this failed attack and because the Brigade Commander had failed to provide support on either flank , and also because this was not the first time that the Brigade Commander had erred, he was sacked at 2200 that evening and replaced.

9 British Infantry Brigade War Diary

 

Quis Seaprabit,

Sadly Nick_43's last logging in was his post here 13/11/2023. I've looked through his other thread on a wider theme, but there are no clues to his research and location, except he is a Canadian. You could try a PM to him. asking him to check in.

The earlier thread in April 2022 was:Anglo-Canadian Infantry/Armoured brigade commanders 21st Army Group

 

I believe he's Nick Wheeler an is/was at RMC. @43Wheeler on X.

 

I didn't realize it was that long ago...I finished up my dissertation and started teaching so my time to post has been very limited. I'd be very interested in looking at that war diary. Is the narrative about the battle your own?

 

Nick,

Is your dissertation available online via your university / RMC? I expect many here would be interested to read it.

 

Not currently. I'm turning it into a book this summer. Once published, it will be available online through the RMC library. If anyone has any questions, I'd be happy to answer them, however.

 

That would be me. Although I no longer post on the toxic cesspool that is X. Far too many people are camping out on the peak of the Dunning Kruger curve.

 

9 Brigade War Diary can be found at 9th British Infantry Brigade During World War 2

Narrative above not mine but that of a UK expat and former military person who now lives in the Vaudry area and who researched the action there, don't know if is based on facts or opinions based on military experience...

Can ask them to contact you via email if you want to PM me details.

Quis Separabit

 

It is quite tricky to find out why some officer was removed from command. In particular whether they deserved to be removed from command.

The British Army culture was more forgiving than the American or Soviet. The British high command was aware of long it took to train people at different ranks. It takes six months to train a private soldier, but a lot longer to train, company battalion, Brigade or divisional commanders. There is a much quoted diary entry by Brooke as GOC Home Forces who despairs that half of his corps and divisional commanders are not up to the job, but he cant find anyone better. This was an institution that was aware that half of its commanders were below average.. (No statistical pun intended) Montgomery counselled Leese, his successor as GOC 8th Army, not to sack McCreery one of his corps commanders. His advice was that McCreery was teachable and reminded Lesce that when he first commanded a corps, Montgomery held his hand and showed him what he should do.

Having said that, various senior officers were removed from their posts for non-performance. There was usually a discussion up the command chain - as with the exchange of correspondence between Montgomery and Leese.

Hinde was removed along with his divisional commander and corps commander after Dempsey and Montgomery had become very dissatisfied with the performance of 30 Corps and 7th Armoured Division. Similarly, dissatisfaction with the performance of 51st Highland division led to the replacement of McMillan with Rennie. GOCs 3rd Canadian Infantry (Keller) and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions (Kitching) were also replaced As can be seen on open internet sources on the Canadian officers the decision to replace officers was a subjective decision by officers with partial information where internal politics played a big part. Was there a need for a scape goat? Does this man have any friends?

Montgomery's words and deeds provide an insight into some of the issues. He was a very capricious man who could take an instant and irrevocable dislike of an officer. Early in his command of 8th Army, he was ruthless in sacking those who bellyached or ignored his orders, even if they had a point. Those he liked would be given his support and coaching. There is a saying in the British Army - no bad soldiers; only bad officers.

There was the issue of battle stress. There is very little written about battle stress (PTSD) in officers. It is not a topic that the army is happy to share with its soldiers or the public. It was a big part of the dismissal of "Yella Keller". who had asked to be replaced, and in the discrete replacement of several other senior officers. Added to the corrosive effects of combat on the mind, officers had the stress of constantly making decisions that would kill or maim people they loved as members of their regimental family. In 1984 I heard Lord Carver talk about commanding 4th armoured brigade. One of the first things he did as a 26 year old captain acting Brigadier taking over Commander 4th Armoured Brigade in June1944 was to fire all three of the COs of his armoured Regiments. He said that each of these had been there for too long and were "tired". Carver tried to fire the CO of his Gunner Regiment, but could not because they were only in support of his brigade. However, a memoir of an officer in his regiment (4 RHA) mentioned that this CO was drinking a bottle of whisky a day and when his regiment moved, he was left in his tent to move in his own time. That might be one manifestation of "too tired".

Harry Mackenson was a Scots Dragoon Guards officer who joined 7 Armd Div after commanding 28 Armd Bde of 9 "Panda" Division. Maybe his face did not fit. 7th Armoured Division tended to do thins their own way. Verney a Guards Officer had taken over in August,

 

That would be great. Can't seem to figure out how to PM you however.

 

I agree in many respects. I devoted a chapter to why some brigade commanders were sacked but I could not nail down an explanation for each one - largely because the primary source documentation isn't there. Commanders talked a lot about officers lacking character (e.g. D.C. Cunningham of 9th CIB). Sometimes, they meant an officer lacked loyalty up, drive/determination, or self-control, and in other cases, it was a catch all so they did not have to explain their reasons. Officers understood what a lack of character meant (e.g. Brigade Sandie of the 159th Brigade). Criticising tactics was more difficult because Anglo-Canadian officers were encouraged to interpret doctrine to a certain degree. That said, it was pretty clear that Brigadier Leslie of the 130th Brigade did not have a good grip on brigade operations nor command (good staff officer however.) Battle exhaustion was certainly one factor they understood and discussed at higher command. The problem was that they did not have a mechanism to relieve a commander with anything but an adverse report. As an example, there was a lot of talk about Brigade Cass and their concern that, despite being an excellent brigade commander, they feared he was close to "cracking up" and they had no way to relieve him with his reputation intact. This is what happened to Brigade Sprague (8th CIB) during Veritable.

 

PM called Conversations on here.
Go to Quis Separabit profile & Start A Conversation.
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Fascinating discussion. Makes it interesting to see what happened to sacked officers afterwards, as many of them seem to then have been posted to backwater assignments, never to come back to frontline command, but not in any other way reprimanded or permanently retired (e.g. Davy of 7 Armd Bde after CRUSADER, who then did staff work, and then shifted about in various positions that never came close to a combat command in the field).

CRUSADER as a career-defining event: Post-operation fate of Empire commanding officers

All the best

Andreas

 

I am aware - from a talk long ago by a British military historian Peter Caddick-Adams - that post-Dunkirk there was a "thinning out" of no longer suitable officers for a "long war" or the modern blitzkrieg having collapsed from exhaustion and nerves.

I raised this subject on this thread: After Dunkirk over 50% senior commanders were removed?

I added Jim Storr has written on the theme in 'The Human Face of War', published 2009 and in simple terms, of the divisional and higher-level commanders 1/3 went on, 1/3 went nowhere and 1/3 disappeared from sight. The 'third who went on' were people such as Montgomery, Alexander, Brooke and one or two more.

Some of his data can be seen using Google Books, searching with sacked. Via: https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Human_Face_of_War/8Zwt8AslGKIC?hl=en&gbpv=1

Staffs Yeoman added:

 

I am currently researching the US Army between D Day and St Lo. Lots of officers were removed from command appointments.

Some could not cope with the stress of combat.
Colonel Ordway commander of the 115th Infantry Regiment was not in evidence when the deputy divisional commander "Dutch Cota visited the HQ 16 July (?) to find it run by the S3 and the Co of the artillery battalion. "Where is the Co - and found him hiding in a slit trench unwilling to emerge. Ordway had been appointed in place of Colonel Slappey on 13 June when the GOC 29 div,

"Gerhardt wanted an aggressive commander for the 115th, one who could "put a fire under his men," as he liked to say. Slappey was not that kind of dynamic namic leader. Actually, Gerhardt liked Slappey, and his removal was an uncomfortable comfortable task. Gerhardt telephoned Gen. William Kean, Bradley's chief of staff at 1st Army. "Have you room for Slappey? He is a splendid fellow and I hope you have a spot for him. Please let me know. . . . I have placed Colonel Ordway [formerly division chief of staff] in command of the 1 15th in place of Slappey." Ordway, a brilliant staff officer who had been clamoring for a field command in lieu of his rear-echelon job, now got his chance.
Joseph Balkoski. Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy (Kindle Locations 2782-2783). Kindle Edition."
Ordway had his go in command in Combat and a chance to see the elephant. He did pass the test of combat, coping with fear. Keller GOC 3rd Division knew he had reached the limits of his physical courage.

Some demonstrated that they could not do the job or at least deliver the results required in the time allotted. The US Army's 90th Infantry Division went through four GOCs in three months. Not doing as well as your peer group or screwing up spectacularly, put the commander in primed ejector seat. Of course this may be unfair on someone unlucky enough to face particular difficulties. And the enemy got a say.

Some did not project the right impression. Colonel Slappey obviously left Uncle Charlie Gerhardt unimpressed. In suspect not looking the part and not delivering

Some dismissed commanders disappeared from military history. Others did not, even those found wanting as combat leaders. Both Ordway and Keller went on to serve in senior staff appointments. Keller as BGS 1st Canadian Corps. Ordway was decorated for his post war work in the War Department General Staff. George Erskine recovered from his dismissal from 7th Armoured Division.

Neil Ritchie failed in 1942 as commander 8th Army. Brooke who knew him as a staff officer thought he had been given senior command too early. He considered that with experience as a divisional and corps commander he would develop. He ended the war as a corps commander.