50th Infantry Division

Discussion in 'Higher Formations' started by merdiolu, Dec 6, 2013.

  1. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Steve,

    Broadly I agree with you. 50 Div seems to have been a good formation and, as Williams' research has shown did well in Normandy. I also agree with you that the criticism of the British v German fighting methods is to an extend a criticism of style rather than effect. The British did rely on concentrated artillery firepower, but that was a tactic to which the Gwermans had no answer. Its like complaining that a rugby team which has a dominant pack doesn't try to play running rugby.

    I am not sure if anyone has looked at the performance of the artillery in the formations which under performed in Normandy. If the artillery was as important to British army success or failure ought to depend on the quality of the artillery. If the artillery fire is on time on target then its good. If it is late or inaccurate and causes undue friendly fire its bad. If the supported arm, principally the infantry loses confidence in the artillery that should protect them in the assault, then it is likely to be reflected in their willingness to press on. I do have some questions about how artillery was used in some formations, but not the 50th.

    I don't believe in the spite theory. Generals may dislike individual commanders, but units and formations are the boxes of toys in the toy cupboard. The decision as to which formations top be disbanded may have more to do with PR and organisational politics than anything else.

    Here is a hypothesis about why 50 Div.

    Two divisions needed to be disbanded in autumn 1944. 59 Div had already been disbanded. Disbanding a second Home forces Division while retaining all three of the ex 8th army Divisions would reinforce the perception that the majority of the fighting would be done by those who had endured the longest separation without respite - as well as a bit of a slight on the Home Force raised formations.

    I think they picked 50 Div because it was the least worst option
    AD were THE Desert Rats. Disbanding them would not be a good message.
    51 HD was a Scottish symbol. When the formation was captured at St Valery, the 9th scots Division was renumbered as the 51 HD. Breaking it up wasn't a good media message either.

    So that left 50 Div. The negative response to the news that 50 div had been chosen as an assault division provided evidence that some thought that they had "done their bit". After all they were the only formation which had already undertaken two D Days as assault division. .
     
  2. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Sheldrake

    Excellent hypothesis with which I would totally agree - least worst option plus fighting for so long along with 7th AD...

    Cheers
     
  3. markdeml

    markdeml Member

    IIRC Montgomery said that the territorial divisions performed best in Normandy, the 43rd led the British advance all the way across the rhine. He listed eight ‘most reliable’ of the 21st army group, all never served in 8th army except the 50th. And only the 11th armoured and 6th airborne were regulars
     
    Steve Mac likes this.
  4. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    When did Montgomery write or say that?

    The Guards Armoured Div were all Regular, as there were no TA Guards, though its field and AA artillery were all Yeomanry and TA..
    The 11th Armoured Div was pretty much a TA formation. Its armour and artillery were Yeomanry.
    The 6th AB Division was made up of parachute battalions converted from TA battalions supported by the Worcester Yeomanry The para battalions in 1 AB Div ended up as regulars, but in 1944 paras were no more regular than any other wartime raised special unit.

    Probably the only "Regular" formations serving in 21 AG were the Guards formations, 3 & 5 Inf Divs and .56 and 231 Bde
    .
    I am not convinced that by 1944 there was any real difference at a divisional level between the TA and Regular units.
     
  5. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Hello Sheldrake,

    I really like your ‘rugby’ analogy and agree with a lot of your hypothesis. My hypothesis differs mainly in the following two respects:
    1. The 49th (West Riding) Division should have been in pole position for being broken-up; and
    2. I believe that Monty had already decided to break up 50 Div as early as February 1944.
    Dealing with the second of these points first and based on the recollections of Mel Snr – who was a 50 Div veteran who served with it right through from 3 September 1939 until circa 1 December 1944 – we have these two snippets posted on this very forum by Mel Jnr.

    and

    The underlining, highlighting and additional text in square brackets are mine…

    Now, there are those that would say, well these words are just the ramblings of a 92 year old or so, who doesn’t recollect what was said clearly. That would be doing a great disservice to Mel Snr, who’s faculties are all intact. In one of the final exchanges I had with Mel Jnr he mentioned that Mel Snr had been helping him lift some old paving, and had been ribbing him mercilessly and acerbically about his efforts and showing him how it should be done.

    In respect of the first point, 50 Div landed on Gold Beach on D-Day as a Division with four Infantry brigades, with 56th Infantry Brigade being added to the normal strength; in seniority:

    151st – 6th, 8th and 9th Bns Durham Light Infantry;
    69th – 6th and 7th Bns Green Howards, and 5th Bn East Yorkshire Regiment;
    231st – 1st Bn Hampshire Regiment, 1st Bn Dorsetshire Regiment and 2nd Bn Devonshire Regiment; and
    56th – 2nd Bn Essex Regiment, 2nd Bn Gloucestershire Regiment and 2nd Bn South Wales Borderers.

    In addition, 47 Commando was under command for the landing behind the 1st Hampshires, who they assisted before setting off to capture Port-en Bessin.

    NB. The 2nd Bn Essex Regiment were old friends that had served with 50 Div, as part of the 25th Infantry Brigade, in the BEF in May/June 1940.

    The 49 Div had encountered problems in Normandy. Not only had Monty bumped them because of concerns as the assault Division for Gold Beach, he had also dismissed the CO of the 6th Bn Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, who thought it not battle worthy and broken up the battalion; replacing it with the 1st Bn Leicestershire Regiment. In addition, the 70th Infantry Brigade was broken up and its troops dispersed as replacements.

    The 70th Infantry Brigade orbat was – 10th and 11th Bn Durham Light Infantry, and 1st Bn Tyneside Scottish; the latter had formerly been the 12 Bn Durham Light Infantry. These three battalions were the duplicates, or second line, of the 6th, 8th and 9th Bn Durham Light Infantry, 151st Infantry Brigade, 50 Div.

    Now, to me 50 Div looks in good shape albeit it I needs replacements as the fighting progresses, but 49 Div has problems. To me it would have made sense to:

    1. Cannibalise 49 Div and send 70th Infantry Brigade troops to replace losses in 50 Div, as they are originally from the same Regiment and in a lot of cases family members of 151st Infantry Brigade troops;
    2. Cannibalise 56th Infantry Brigade to replace losses in 50 Div, as it was an extra brigade anyway and they are familiar with the Division and its command; and if necessary
    3. As Churchill suggested, bring a Commando Brigade or its troops into 50 Div.

    Long serving 50 Div members could then have been sent home to a well deserved rest, without taking the Division out of the line.

    This could have been done. For example, remember that 151st Infantry Brigade fought with 50 Div throughout its WWII and of that Brigade, the 9th Bn Durham Light Infantry remained in NW Europe after 1 December 1944 as a battalion of 131st Infantry Brigade, 7th Armoured Division.

    Instead, 70th Infantry Brigade troops are dispersed widely, the 56th Infantry Brigade was moved from 50 Div to 49 Div on circa 20 August 1944, Monty apparently dismisses the use of a Commando Brigade or its troops to make up the shortfall in 50 Div and effectively breaks up 50 Div. Why?

    Well, a lot of the reasons you have outlined in your hypothesis come into play, but more so I believe that Monty was fulfilling a promise he made to the troops of 50 Div in circa February 1944: “Get me a foothold [in NW Europe] and then you’re finished”.

    I still think it was a shabby ending for a Division that had done so much to secure final victory, but at least the 9th Bn Durham Light Infantry (and 2nd Bn Devonshire Regiment) were there at the end; albeit as part of 7th Armoured Division.

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  6. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Steve:

    With all due respect to Mel Snr., I still do not think that Montgomery made the promise you describe. If I could see some documentary proof of it, I would credit it but otherwise not. Tony Charles, the GSO 1 of 50th Div, had never heard of any such promise and was very surprised when he learned partway through the campaign that the troops were expecting to be withdrawn. (This from 50th Div war diary.) If an early withdrawal or an impending breakup of the 50th had been promised or planned, then surely Charles would have known of it. I have encountered the story before in the recollections and diaries of other veterans, but I have never seen any official document about it.

    I also doubt it because it doesn't sound like Montgomery to me. He knew very well that you can't promise troops one thing and then do another without damaging their morale. He was also looking at a serious manpower shortage, and it isn't common sense to believe that he would make a promise like that to one of the few divisions he had available to him.

    I don't know how the story originated. If Mel Snr. could give a date, a place, or some other particulars, then we might be able to track it down. I used to be in touch with Ian Hamilton, Monty's biographer, and I would be happy to try and track him down again and ask him what he know or thinks. He didn't mention any such promise when I interviewed him some years ago.

    As to the 6th Duke's incident...that's all that it was, an incident, which historians have made too much of. Turner, the CO in question, was not Stellenbosched but given another command: 1st Hamps of 231st Bde in 50th Division, which Turner led quite effectively in subsequent actions. If Bowersock's Breaking the Panzers is to be trusted, the rest of 49th Div fought well enough and played a major part in the repulse of the big German armored counterattack in MARTLET-EPSOM.
     
  7. markdeml

    markdeml Member

    May not have said that specifically, but I know I have seen something similar in the book Colossal cracks, Montgomery list eight divisions he thought performed best, and they were nearly all inexperienced ones
     
  8. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    *
    TTH,

    I did explain that it was a 'hypothesis', thus:

    *
    I also explained in an earlier Message in this thread that:

    *
    Just because a contemporaneous document detailing a matter has not yet surfaced, or someone you believe should know does not know, doesn't make it untrue.

    By way of example, were the only acts of courage for which a Victoria Cross should have been awarded the ones that were recorded? I doubt it, but I can't prove there were because they were not recorded. But I can make that assumption.

    What Montgomery said at his small gatherings were probably unscripted and no such official document may exist. But one day, probably when I retire from the day job, I will investigate this thoroughly.

    My comments on the 49 Div were only meant to show why I thought it should have been cannibalised rather than 50 Div, not to denigrate it. The fact remains that 6th Bn DoW were broken up and its CO dismissed; he thought them not battle worthy. It was probably because of the very heavy casualties suffered in Operation Martlet, especially at Rauray, that the 70th Infantry Brigade was chosen for breaking up on 19 August 1944. The 49 Div had problems at this time; it had lost completely four of its nine Infantry battalions in addition to battle casualties in the other five. These are facts supporting my hypothesis, not a comment on 49 Div's fighting ability.

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  9. markdeml

    markdeml Member

    Some historians have pointed out the 49ths operations around the Oden as one of the few examples of effective all arms cooperation by a British infantry division in Normandy, particularly the battle for Tessel Wood in which the 1/4 btn Koyli made a 4km wide penetration in 12th Panzer which had them flailing helplessly for reinforcements from elsewhere
     
  10. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Some historians have pointed out the 49ths operations around the Oden as one of the few examples of effective all arms cooperation by a British infantry division in Normandy, particularly the battle for Tessel Wood in which the 1/4 btn Koyli made a 4km wide penetration in 12th Panzer which had them flailing helplessly for reinforcements from elsewhere

    If some historians think there were only a 'few examples' of such inter-arms cooperation in Normandy then they haven't looked hard enough. The 6 June assault was another such example, by three British and Canadian divisions. The 50th Division conducted a very good attack on the first and second days of BLUECOAT, and armor and infantry worked together superbly in the 9th DLI's famous fight for Lingevres.
     
  11. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    If you mean "were there people who were nominated for the VC but did not awarded one" then there may be some citations for lesser awards which record that the recipient had originally be put forwards for a VC. However, the award of the VC is not the only measure of courage or even the best. Sometimes the grade of a gallantry award may be more to do with the circumstance under which the award was written up and the skill of the person drafting the citation than in the actions of the recipient.

    In the C21st we have an obsession with celebrity and the focus on "VCs" can destract from the deeds of the many others who may have been just as brave, but were not favoured by having the right people witness the action or the skill to write it up well.

    Was Lt Bramald, of 102 (Northumberland Hussars) Atk Regt RA (50 Div) awarded .the DSO for running around on foot in a tank battle at st Pierre and directing the fire of tanks from the outside any more or less brave than Stanley Hollis?
     

    Attached Files:

  12. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

    A matter of terminology - The Guards battalions were most certainly not all 'regular battalions'. It is true to say none of them were on the Territorial Army Establishment. However, apart from 1st and 2nd Bns and the odd 3rd battalion in pre war 'suspended animation' most were raised as war establishment units. Not on the permanent army list or the TA list. Some 4th and 5th Bns had been on the war establishment 1914-1919.
     
  13. Peccavi

    Peccavi Senior Member

    Does the act need to be observed and reported by an Officer in order to qualify?

    Seem to remember a Fijian lad in Iraq, who got nothing (since no officer present) but the others in his platoon said he deserved two VCs that day.
     
  14. markdeml

    markdeml Member

    In my opinion the success and failure of infantry divisions depended on their GOC, and his tactical approach. Montgomery claimed the 51st division was not battle worthy and had failed in every task it had been given in the early part of the Normandy campaign, but once it had been given a new commander, its reputation was later salvaged and went on to be relatively effective for the rest of the war. The 43rd infantry division was arguably the most successful infantry division of 21st army group in the NW theatre, but its troops derisively referred to their own GOC as ‘the butcher’ and it suffered horrendous casualties in Normandy and Holland for the aggressive approach of Gwilym Thomas, who favoured mass frontal assaults with infantry, akin to the first world war
     
  15. markdeml

    markdeml Member

    Well critical historians like Max hastings and D’Este have insisted the 21st army group never became highly proficient in combined arms even after Normandy. In one of his books John Buckley counters this by singling out the operations of the 49th division around Cristot, and Tessel wood, in which it was working effectively alongside the tanks of the 24th lancers.
     
  16. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Absolutely. Mike Watson in his excellent talk on Le Cateau, which included the comments made by veterans he had met on the 50th anniversary poited out that the reason that pone reason why Reynolds, Luke and Drain were awarded the VC was because they rescued F Sub in front of the CRA.
     
  17. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  18. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    *
    Apologies for not responding to your question earlier, Kyle... I decided not to add to this thread for a while, as it appeared to be going well off theme i.e. 50 Div, and discussing Victoria Crosses (VC), etc., generically. Probably my fault for introducing the subject of VC's in an analogy to explain something else!

    Regarding your comment, this is absolutely right. Not even all of the few men remaining that had been with 6th and 8th DLI, and other 50 Div units, from the start returned home with the cadre. A lot fought on until the end with other units.

    I pick up on certain names that appear in more than one 50 Div battalion history. For example:

    At page 59 of 'Three Assault Landings - The Story of the 1st Bn Dorsetshire Regiment in Sicily, Italy and NW Europe' (Lt-Col AEC Bredin, DSO, MC.) a comment pertaining to the 9 June 1944 states: "Lieut. HD Foster joined us from the Canadian Army during the night- he was our first 'Canloan' officer, and quite one of the best." The history later refers to him as 'Hal'.

    The 1st Bn Dorsetsire Regiment, 231st Infantry Brigade, 50 Div, returned to the UK as a cadre shortly after the 1 December 1944. However, the 9th Bn Durham Light Infantry, 151st Infantry Brigade, 50 Div, remained in NW Europe, as motorised infantry in 131st Infantry Brigade, 7th Armoured Division (The Desert rats).

    At page 350 of 'The Gateshead Gurkhas - The History Of The 9th Battalion The Durham Light Infantry 1859 - 1967' (Moses) a comment pertaining to 30 March 1945 states: "...and Capt. HD Foster the command of 'A' Company. Captain Foster was one of three Canadians serving with the battalion under the Canloan scheme." At page 353, the same officer is referred to as Capt. Hal Foster.

    Again, at page 323 it also states Lieutenant Brewer recalled: "Before we left Lt-Col. Mogg was given a free hand reorganising our Battalion with the cream of the Brigade - he could throw out anyone, Officers and men alike, that he did not consider to be up to scratch and replace them with the pick from the other battalions..."

    Best,

    Steve.
     
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  19. DavidW

    DavidW Well-Known Member

    What did the 50th do for air defence prior to the arrival of 34th Lt AA Reg in October 1942?
     
  20. idler

    idler GeneralList

    'Duck!' was my first thought...

    25 LAA Regt were attached to the Division in September 1942 before they joined it in November; 34 LAA were only with 50 Div for about three weeks.

    There may have been a longer affiliation as The Path of the 50th records 25 LAA using a Bofors in an anti-tank role in the 4 E Yorks locality on 31 May 1942.
     

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