50th Infantry Division

Discussion in 'Higher Formations' started by merdiolu, Dec 6, 2013.

  1. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    I don't think Morgan was any happier with a three division invasion but as COSSAC lacked the political clout to demand the additional shipping needed to support five rather than three assault divisions. It is not easy to get something done. The result may have had as much to do with Ike's authority and diplomatic skills as Montgomery thumping the table.
     
  2. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Sheldrake

    You may be quite correct in stating that Ike had a contribution in the expansion of Overlord..but not according to Nigel Hamilton in Vol 2 of "Monty- Master of the Battlefield " Part 5 - Chapter 1 particularly pages 489 - 494 when Ike at

    a meeting with Monty in Marrakesh gave Monty the authority to "study" the Cossac plans - which he did and Monty being Monty changed them - from his experience of the Sicilian landings - and took off before Ike arrived

    Cheers
     
  3. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    I wrote a book about the 50th, and I spent some time trying to find out why it was broken up. Manpower was the root of the problem. By 1944, Britain's limited manpower pool could no longer sustain the burden of a first-class air force, the second largest navy in the world, war industry, and a large army as well. The army was last on the list of priorites. In my view this was a mistake, but by 1944 it was too late to chage. Montgomery knew from an early stage that some of his formations would have to be disbanded in order to sustain the others, and this was a general problem throughout the British Army. The 59th (Staffordshire) Division was disbanded in August-September 1944 and I think an armored brigade went as well. So the 50th was a victim of circumstances, as were quite a few other formations and units.

    The battle performance of the 50th is a bit controversial. The 50th did very well on D-Day, a fact Montgomery acknowledged. The 50th had serious problems in the bocage fighting, like so many other formations, and some observers (notably the NZ brigadier William Hargest) found the 50th sloppy and over-cautious. Tiredness among veteran personnel was a problem, and some COs and brigadiers proved disappointing. Officer casualties were very high, especially among battalion commanders. The battalions were heavily diluted with new men from outside the regimental recruting areas. Psychological casualties in early June were heavy. More ominously, the 50th encountered serious disciplnary problems for the first time in its history and wound up leading the 21 AG in courts martial.

    Yet the 50th revived strongly in the late stages of the Normandy campaign and surmounted most of its problems. Improved tactics were a big part of this, and the GOC, Douglas Graham, gave strong leadership throughout.

    I don't have time to finsh this now, will return to it.
     
  4. Swiper

    Swiper Resident Sospan

    Could you fire me a link to that or give me the details on who/where? That is very, very useful material.
     
  5. markdeml

    markdeml Member

    IIRC the problem with the 51st was their GOC, once he had been sacked in July their performance turned on its head
     
  6. Bluebell Minor

    Bluebell Minor Junior Member

    I have followed this topic with considerable personal interest.

    My late Father in Law was a very proud member of 8 DLI from its inception, one of the three TA Durham Light Infantry Battalions forming 151 Infantry Brigade who remained with the Division throughout its operational existence . 150 Infantry Brigade, comprising three Yorkshire Battalions, was virtually anihilated at the Battle of Gazala in May 1942.

    Mobilised in late Summer 1939 the Division first experience of battle was at Arras in late Spring 1940 (morale in 151 Brigade was not improved by the sight of a number of WW1 DLI War Graves during the advance to contact). As others have commented the Division (and especially 151 Brigade) was ultimately one of the most experienced and battle hardened in the British Army North Africa and European theatres of war and highly regarded by FM Montgomery.

    There is also no doubt that the veterans were exhausted by their experiences and justly deserved the UK postings to form training cadres in December 1944 (my father in law had been wounded twice, recieved two MID and a CinC's Commendation signed by FM Montgomery personally)) Younger members of the Division were posted as reinforcements to other units including 9 DLI who thus maintained the fighting traditions of the "Faithful Durhams" till the very end of the War in NW Europe.
     
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  7. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    That is indeed what Hamilton says. However, "changing the plans" was well outside the scope of something that Montgomery could do on his own. At the time Montgomery was merely the GOC 21 AG designate with no command authority to force the US or UK navies and shipbuilding industry to re-arrange their priorities. (and the USN never fully subscribed to "Germany First") Monty's insistence on expanding the assault width to five divisions was necessary, but not sufficient on its own. It needed the full support from the Op Overlord team and Eisenhower to persuade the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make that change happen in the face against the competing demands of the U Boat war and China, Burma India and Pacific theatres. The US Navy never bought into "Germany First" .. This required the kind of political skills, leverage and goodwill which are rightly associated with Eisenhower.

    Of Course, Monty being Monty then claimed the entire credit!
     
  8. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    *
    Welcome to the forum merdiolu,

    I haven't been on the forum since 5 December 2013, so have only just stumbled upon this thread. The 50th (Northumbrian) Division, or 'Fifty Div', is a hobby of mine; which started through family connections in the two world wars.

    1. Up until mid-1938, Fifty Div had been a standard British Infantry Division, albeit made up of 'Territorial' (or part-time) rather than Regular soldiers. It therefore has three Infantry Brigades (IB's), with supporting arms: 149th - all Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (3 battalions), 150th - Green Howards (2 battalions) and East Yorkshire Regiment (1 battalion) and 151st - Durham Light Infantry (3 battalions). However, it was then converted to a Motorised Division of two IB's, with the 149th IB being split up and converted to other uses; albeit the 4th Bn Royal Northumberland Fusiliers remained as Fifty Div's recce battalion.

    Fifty Div embarked for duty with the BEF as a Motorised Division, but deprived of its transport which had been requisitioned for use elsewhere found itself fighting as an Infantry Division, but with only two brigades rather than three. Latterly, the 25th Independent IB was temporarily attached to Fifty Div to bring it up to the normal strength of a standard Infantry Division.

    It was evacuated back to the UK in early June 1940 and converted back to a standard Infantry Division effective 1 July 1940 with the addition of a new IB, with supporting arms: 69th - Green Howards (2 battalions) and East Yorkshire Regiment (1 battalion); this was originally the 150th IB's second line/duplicate brigade.

    Fifty Div remained a standard British Infantry Division thereafter until it was returned to the UK as a training cadre in December 1944.

    Ergo, Fifty Div was a standard Infantry Division - which involved no special training in itself, albeit the roles it was required to undertake during WWII would involve it in specialist training.

    2. It was only experienced because it fought for so long on so many fronts, so the 'experienced' label becomes self fulfilling.

    3. I believe the previous contributors to this thread have provided a lot of information that contributes to answering your question, but I believe the reason it fought so long on so many fronts was initially - 1940 to mid-1942 - because it was trained and available, and later because it was steady in battle, reliable, tough and ultimately successful. It wasn't perfect, but it fought whatever was in front of it, including much vaunted German Paras and Panzer Divisions and won (with few exceptions).

    4. What has not been commented on but was nevertheless true, is that it was 'famous' here in the UK; held in very high regard by Churchill and the British people, and indeed by the Germans.

    5. I have partly explored the reason for Fifty Div being converted to a training cadre and have never been satisfied with the 'official' answer. However, I do commend to you reading the views expressed in the linked thread at Messages # 26, and 34 to 42 inclusive; link: http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/24746-python-lilop-leave/

    What no commentator has ever mentioned, as I recall, is that before D-Day Monty told Fifty Div that if they got him a foothold in Normandy they were finished; meaning he would send them home. In other words, he believed they had already done enough. The fact that he kept them in NW Europe for nearly 7 months, including involving them in the low countries, for example, in securing the Gheel Bridgehead, Operation Market Garden and the expansion of the bridgehead on The Island, shows the esteem in which they were held.

    The fact that Fifty Div was not there for the Rhine Crossing and the advance into Germany, was not a fitting finale for a Division that had done so much to secure victory. The same fate befell the Division in WWI, in that the original 'Northumbrian' brigades/battalions had reverted to a cadre and largely been replaced.

    I will add comments from other sources to this thread in due course.

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  9. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Alan Moorehead, the Australian born Daily Express War Correspondent, won an international reputation for his coverage of campaigns in the Middle East and Asia, the Mediterranean and NW Europe. He was twice mentioned in dispatches and was awarded the OBE in his role as a War Correspondent. He is the author of the renowned trilogy 'The Desert War', about the North African Campaign 1940 - 1943.

    He followed the Western Desert Force, which morphed into the 8th Army, before switching just prior to the 2nd El Alamein to cover the exploits of the 1st Army.

    He believed that the 2nd New Zealand Division was the outstanding British & Empire division in North Africa, closely followed by the 9th Australian Division. He also had high regard for the 6th and 7th Armoured Divisions. However, at page 239 of 'Armies of Empire' (Allan Converse), it states:

    "Moorehead also knew the 50th well, and followed it from Gazala all the way to Holland. He admitted 'a warm bias' towards the Northumbrians..."

    He highly rated their break-out from the Gazala line on the night of 14/15 June 1942. The last soldiers of the retreating 8th Army to leave these defences, Fifty Div, rather than retreat via the coast road or eastwards, chose to attack the Axis forces to the west before swinging south east around Bir Hacheim and east to the Egyptian border. Moorehead states at page 368 of his trilogy:

    "The 50th burst clean through the enemy defences leaving a trail of burning vehicles, panic-stricken men, bemused commanders and confusion everywhere. Had they been on an organised and supported offensive they might have scattered the enemy in this sector in a single night and cleared the road to Bomba and Derna. As it was, they were alone and with many extraordinary adventures they came around Bir Hacheim and reached the British lines almost intact."

    They did in fact capture and deliver to British forces in Egypt an Italian General.

    Remember also that Fifty Div had lost the 150th Infantry Brigade in its entirety two weeks earlier, when it was overrun by the DAK on 1 June 1942. The aforementioned extraordinary aggressive 'retirement', was achieved by only two Infantry Brigades and supporting arms.
     
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  10. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Following the loss of the 150th Infantry Brigade at Gazala, various units were attached to Fifty Div as their third brigade. At the time of the 2nd El Alamein (23 October 1942) this consisted of both the 1st Greek Brigade and the 2nd Free French Brigade. At the time of Enfidaville (16/17 April 1943) this was the 201st Guards Brigade. However, because the 201st Guards Brigade had suffered heavy casualties in previous fighting they were left behind in North Africa with the 168th Infantry Brigade, of the 56th (London) Division, taking their place for the Sicilian campaign.

    Fifty Div was an assault division during Operation Husky, with the 151st Infantry Brigade being in the first wave landing at Avola. The 168th Infantry Brigade were the last of the three brigades to land on D+3. The Division spent all 39 days of the campaign at the forefront of the battle.

    At the end of the Sicilian campaign in August 1943, the Special Correspondent of The Times Weekly Edition wrote:

    "...But I always had the feeling that the sheet anchor of the army was the veteran 50th Division. They had the hard, dirty work at Lentini and Primosole, and the long slog up-coast from Catania, past Etna.... They got less public mention than some other divisions because theirs was the unspectacular flank of the front. They plugged on, learning new warfare the hard way, taking their punishment and coming on for more. Tyne and Tees may well be proud of them, for they are a grand division."

    On the 19 August GOC Fifty Div received a letter from Monty in which he wrote:

    "...One somehow never imagines that 50 Div can do otherwise than well, and in this short campaign it has lived up to its best traditions..."

    I will be back!
     
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  11. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Steve, what is your source for Montgomery's 'promise?' I have read and heard a lot about it, but no one cites a specific date or document.

    I strongly suspect that the promise was a myth generated by rumor. Montgomery was so short of troops in 1944 that I can't believe that he would have made a prior promise of short service and prompt relief to one of his most experienced divisions.

    Also I know I need to write more on this thread, as I promised to do earlier.
     
  12. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    *
    Hello TTH,

    Like you I had heard a lot about it and believed it to be a myth. However, I got the chance to ask a Fifty Div veteran, indirectly, via this very forum.

    Mel Snr, 50 Div Signals, confirmed that the promise was made at a 'Monty' talk/gathering and that's good enough for me; see link Messages 102 to 105 inclusive refer: http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/24926-a-brief-history-to-50th-divisional-signals-in-ww2/page-4 The last paragraph of Message 105 specifically refers.

    The 'quick' references I have found just now to such Fifty Div Monty talk/gatherings appear to have them taking place circa mid to late February 1944, when they were based in East Anglia. I will look into this further though!

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  13. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    I don’t know where the trend to attach the oft quoted criticisms of certain veteran British Divisions fighting in Normandy (numbering two) to ‘all’ veteran British Divisions fighting in Normandy (numbering three) started, but it was probably with Carlo D’Este in his book ‘Decision In Normandy’.

    The 51st (Highland) Division and/or the 7th Armoured Division (the two) may have under-performed and deserved the criticism levelled at them in Normandy. I have read the criticism but have never investigated whether these two noble British Divisions deserve it. But what does this have to do with the performance of 50 Div?

    In his book, D’Este highlights a comment made by Brig. James Hargest, the New Zealand Army observer to XXX Corps, in his official report (CAB 106/1060). The comment concerns Hargest reporting that he was able to identify all officers of the 8th Bn Durham Light Infantry at a distance of 600-800 yards due to the reflection of the sun off map boards and D’Este uses it as evidence of a lack of tactical skill within 50 Div. Eh? Really?

    Let us be discriminating about the comment and D’Este’s use of it, by the use of three key questions:
    • Were all the 8th Bn’s officers present?
    • Were the ‘offenders’ green junior officer replacements fresh out from the UK or experienced officers that had fought in the Western Desert and Sicily?
    • Did Hargest or D’Este in any way qualify the comment?

    Do either of these men expect any reasonable person to believe veteran officers would have ‘all’ made this mistake and at the same time? It’s just 'not' a credible comment or in D'Este's case not a credible conclusion!

    Now, D’Este. I have read ‘Decision In Normandy’ a couple of times and it forms part of my book collection. What I discerned from the book about D’Este the person is that he is anti-British, and his book a ‘hatchet-job’ on Monty and the British Army.

    Hargest’s report appears to be the source of the vast majority of criticisms of 50 Div in Normandy. However, it isn’t often mentioned that his report (CAB 106/1060) begins with the words “50 Div fights well…”. Williams in his thesis (see Message # 5) at page 68 states:

    “Late on June 9, the column reached St. Pierre, a small village on the high ground just northeast of Tilly-sur-Seulles. Described by Brigadier James Hargest as an “excellent” combined arms attack, the mobile column took St. Pierre and dug in for the night. Determined to re-take the village, the Germans launched a counter-attack early on June 10. Hargest recounts that some members of the 8th Battalion, The Durham Light Infantry, panicked while receiving German mortar fire and retreated to the previous day’s start line. The result of this retreat, according to Hargest, was heavy casualties and the requirement to re-take the village.

    Other accounts of the battle however, do not concur with Hargest’s criticism of the 8th Battalion. While a regimental history may omit or gloss over a time of poor performance or weakness, the performance of the 8th Battalion on June 10 is, on the contrary, rather impressive.”

    -He then goes on to mention why.

    What isn’t mentioned is that Hargest recorded the attack on St. Pierre as taking place on 11 June 1944, not the 9 June as was in fact the case. So, given the other positive accounts of what happened on the 9 June, is Hargest’s recollection of panic and retreat recorded as the 11 June reliable?

    At Message # 23, TTH states that Hargest found 50 Div “sloppy and over-cautious”. Hargest reported that he saw men of 50 Div sheltering from enemy Artillery, Mortar and MG fire, and rather than fire their own weapons called in their own heavy weapons support in response. The ‘over-cautious’ comment appears facile given the circumstances of Hargest’s own death on 12 August 1944. On his last visit to 50 Div before moving to his new appointment he was killed in a German Artillery stonk. He should have sheltered, been more cautious…

    I also wonder what Hargest’s agenda was, if indeed he had one, or if he was qualified to comment on 50 Div's performance? I ask because his own record in Crete and North Africa has been brought into question.

    Whereas there were question marks over the performance of some battalion commanders, there was no general ‘Higher Command’ criticism of 50 Div’s performance in Normandy that I have heard of or read about and it suffered no notable sackings.

    I leave the last words of this Message to L/Cdr Ethan Rawls Williams, USN. In his thesis at page 10 he states:

    “Through an investigation of its adherence to doctrine, combined arms integration, and an understanding of the constraints placed on the division by higher headquarters, this thesis will support that the 50th Division performed well in the Normandy Campaign. While the 50th Division was not perfect in its execution of the battle and did have setbacks, this thesis argues that the criticism directed towards its performance is a by-product of the disapproval of Montgomery’s operational technique and, to a lesser extent, the highly publicized failures of fellow North Africa veterans 7th Armored and 51st (Highland) Divisions.”
     
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  14. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Steve:

    It has been a while since I read "Decision in Normandy." I think it is a good book, admittedly with some flaws. I don't think d'Este is anti-British, nor do I think that he had it in for Montgomery. His main point, as I recall, was that the Normandy campaign did not go according to Montgomery's original plan, and I think d'Este was right about that. It is to Monty's credit that he adjusted quickly and effectively once he got stuck in the bocage, and pulled a victory out anyway.

    As to the performace of 50th Division:
    I have also read L/Cdr Williams' thesis, and it agrees with my own. I don't think Hargest's criticisms are entirely invalid, because some of them are the same as criticisms made by 50th Division's own officers. You don't have to dig very deep in 50th Div war diaries to find that the division faced serious tactical problems in June and July. A number of actions were 'bitched up' (Sully, Essex Wood, Cristot, second Hottot), and morale and discipline in some units declined (69th Bde, 1st Hampshire). Hargest admitted that 50th Div infantry usually fought well, though, and if he had stayed with 50th Div longer he would have seen a significant tactical improvement. Graham was a solid commander, and he had able brigadiers in Stanier, Gordon, Thompson (CRA), and Prior-Palmer (8th Armd Bde). Melvin, the ADMS, was outstanding, and so were COs like John Mogg and R.B. James. Thanks to a lot of hard work and fast learning, the 50th recovered from its problems and made an excellent attack in BLUECOAT. Unfortunately, neither d'Este nor James Hart took note of this. If you read most secondary works on the Normandy campaign, you might suppose that 2nd Army never learned a thing, never improved, and kept on making the same mistakes over and over. Nothing could be further from the truth. Like Montgomery, 50th Div adapted to circumstances in Normandy and won in the end. It wasn't easy, but they did it
     
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  15. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    The historiography - or the story of how the story of 50th TT Division has been told is the story of how historians have changed their view of the Normandy campaign since the war.

    Immediately after WW2 the story was as per victor comic and Commando magazine, the vignettes in The War Illustrated and the official history.

    Essame's Normandy was the book which acknowledged that the British troops sometimes ran away and the cracks in the official interpretation were fair game. Carlo d'Este's dissection of allied decision making sits here. D'Este's work is flawed as a military history. . It is a one sided analysis of allied failings,with limited discussion of the German decision making and they played ion the result.

    John Ellis and Max "Hitler" Hastings's (as Private Eye named him) painted a picture of allied success through brute force, tinged in Hastings' case with admiration for the fighting qaulities of the wehrmacht and the stronger fighting ethos of the totalitarian states. Hergest is a key witness for their case along with the CO of the 6 DWR

    More recently the trend has been to revise this view. Willams' paper is a corrective as are the works of John Buckley, Terry Copp and the Sandhurst crowd. .
     
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  16. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    Hello TTH,

    I do not believe all of Hargest's criticisms to be invalid either, 50 Div certainly had lessons to learn about fighting in the Bocage. They were far from alone in this respect. The 50 Div fought in many different topographical areas, against a canny enemy which adapted its tactics in defence well and 50 Div had to adapt to them all - 'on the job'. No amount of training could prepare any fighting formation for all that it would face and pre D-Day, 50 Div training was dovetailed solely for the assault on Gold Beach; not for the fighting thereafter. So there were difficulties to be faced, but...

    The principal point I was trying to get across is that the level of criticism levelled at the 51st and 7th Armoured Divisions by the British High Command during the Normandy campaign was not levelled by them at 50 Div as a Division. There has then been a change whereby certain 'authors' have banded 50 Div's performance with those of the 51st and 7th Armoured Divisions; why? If the British High Command thought it right not to so band them, it is because they did not have cause to do so. Any such subsequent linkage by others cannot be assumed to have credibility and precedence, and it is right for me (and others) to question those that say it does.

    NB. I acknowledge that the specific 50 Div works by yourself and Williams question this linkage and conclude differently.

    Best,

    Steve.
     
  17. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    I am not familiar enough with the stories of 7th Armd and 51st Divs to say how similar their stories were to that of 50th Div. I do recall that John Buckley described 7th Armd's Normandy performance as 'moderate.' I have also read that 51st Div's performance improved after Rennie took over from Bullen-Smith. It may be that all three had to go through a rough 'shake-down' period in June, suffering some painful lessons before they could adapt to Normandy conditions. As to the attitude of higher headquarters, Montgomery did say that his newer divisions generally performed better than his older ones, but he also told 50th Div that he was happy with its D-Day performance. Graham and the 50th remained in good odor with Monty until October, when Lyne took over.

    As to authors bracketing one division with the others...that is the kind of thing that happens when people don't take time to research things thoroughly. I pointed out that even in the 50th performance varied between the different brigades, and between the battalions as well. No doubt you'd find the same thing if you looked at the 7th Armd and the 51st in detail.
     
  18. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

    Whichever side of the argument - what 'authors' have to say is of little consequence - what was said and written by those in command and those in the admin and logistics - by the QMG and adjutant general in despatches and to the staff colleges which can be cross referenced. The words of Horrocks, Roberts and many others both for and agin have more often than not been 'cherry picked' to back up or deny an argument. Book choices? 'Which book should I read to get the truth' ask ten folk and pick from the books they choose?
     
  19. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    It may be that some of Brigadier Hergest's criticisms were biased and selective. The cause of this might have been some form of Antipodean snobbery, the difference between the quality of NZ v British raw material., the curmudgeonly views of a has been, or the critical reflex of an experienced DS making the kind of comments the critics always make about the relatively inexperienced. (Whatever experience 50 Div had from the Western Desert and Sicily, the rifle companies had suffered high casualties and are likely to have had a substantial number of inexperienced troops and junior officers.) We will never know more because this gallant officer and infantry veteran of two world wars was killed in action in 1944.

    However, his comments about the tactical naivety, poor use of the ground and lack of initiative are coroborated by the Germans and others. These may reflect weaknesses in the infantry doctrine developed durign WW2. Lionel Wigram's critique of the flaws in the battle drills he helped to develop are well known. The problems may reflect failings in the British Army organisational culture and its emphasis on discipline over initiative.

    It may also be that the British Army was over reliant on artillery to suppress an enemy , with the result that infantry manoeuvre was dumbed down to "follow the barrage and then dig in to repell the inevitable counter attack." The German academic staff at RMAS put the case that this was a thoroughly effective tactic.




     
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  20. Steve Mac

    Steve Mac Very Senior Member

    *
    The German comments I have read about were on the way the British fought, not the way 50 Div itself fought; and Williams dismisses the German view believing they had an ulterior motive in belittling British fighting ability, namely, maintaining the morale of its own troops. The 50 Div had three Panzer Divisions on its front, either in whole or in part. It tied them in place and oversaw (with Allied Air and RA support) their destruction. I am not sure why the comments of an enemy that was in the process of being systematically destroyed, on the fighting abilities of the enemy facing them, are relevant anyway. An analogy would be Boxer A winning 10 rounds of a 13 round fight on points and finally knocking out Boxer B in round 11, only for Boxer B and his management to say 'Yeah, he won, but he didn't use the whole of the ring or his feet very well, his jab was weak and his straight right of limited effect.' Just sounds like 'sour grapes' to me.

    I still believe that general criticisms of the British Army and others specific to other veteran British Divisions, have also been conveniently 'dumped' on 50 Div. Williams in his thesis looked at this very issue and concluded:

    “Through an investigation of its adherence to doctrine, combined arms integration, and an understanding of the constraints placed on the division by higher headquarters, this thesis will support that the 50th Division performed well in the Normandy Campaign. While the 50th Division was not perfect in its execution of the battle and did have setbacks, this thesis argues that the criticism directed towards its performance is a by-product of the disapproval of Montgomery’s operational technique and, to a lesser extent, the highly publicized failures of fellow North Africa veterans 7th Armored and 51st (Highland) Divisions.”

    It is my intention to exhaustively research the reason for 50 Div being reduced to a Training Cadre and as Wills suggests, I will go for Official sources; one day, when I have the time... assuming I have the time.

    Best,

    Steve.
     
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