2TAF, D Day.

Discussion in 'The War In The Air' started by Trux, Jan 6, 2016.

  1. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    LIGHT and MEDIUM BOMBERS.

    2 Group.

    137 Wing
    88 and 342 Squadrons. Boston IIIA.
    226 Squadron. Mitchell II.
    138 Wing
    107, 305 and 613 Squadrons. Mosquito VI.
    139 Wing
    98, 180 and 320 Squadrons. Mitchell II.
    140 Wing
    21, 464 and 487 Squadrons. Mosquito VI.

    The squadrons of 2 Group were nocturnal creatures, operating mainly in the short summer night. On the night of 5/6 June the aircraft of 2 Group were engaged in patrolling the main roads and railways leading into the battle area and attacking any movement seen. They also bombed pre arranged targets such as road and rail crossings, bridges and junctions to hinder enemy movement.

    Caen was the major transport centre and the following roads leading to it were patrolled by Mosquitos and Mitchells:
    Avranches – Coutance – Lessay.
    Fougeres – Vire – St Lo.
    Domfront – Flers – Caen.
    Argentan – Falaise – Caen.
    Evreux – Liseeux – Caen.

    Any aircraft failing to find targets on the roads were to bomb Coutances, St Lo, Caen or Liseux in order to block roads. 150 sorties were flown, 141 of which were in connection with disrupting road and rail communications.

    Three squadrons of Mitchells set out to bomb road and rail targets, each of them with two Pathfinder Mosquitos. Mosquitos were equipped with navigation devices and dropped target indicator flares. Weather conditions were bad and several aircraft failed to find the indicators. Six aircraft bombed a road and rail target south of Thury Hardcourt, nine aircraft bombed a similar target between Argentan and Falaise but the third squadron failed to find its road/rail target near Mezidon.

    From 2200 hours to 0556 hours the Mosquito squadrons flew offensive patrols up and down the roads listed above and attacked targets of opportunity, road and railway junctions and bridges. A special patrol of four Mosquitos searched the Caen to Carentan road between 2215 hours and 0115 hours and dropped eight 500 lb bombs. Altogether the Mosquitos dropped 360 of the 500 lb bombs.

    On the night of 6/7th 196 sorties were flown by 2 Group. This was to be an all out effort to harass and delay enemy movement to the south of Caen. The Army were concerned that there was a growing concentration of enemy armour in the Caen area. It had been planned that heavy bombers should bomb town centres to crate choke points by blocking roads with debris. However bad weather had disrupted the plans. The small bomb loads of 2 Group aircraft could not hope to block roads in the way the heavy bombers could but they could slow down any movement.

    36 heavy bombers from 8 USAAF had bombed the centre of Caen at 0900 hours on D day and a further 180 bombers had repeated the attack at midday. However the bad weather made bombing accuracy uncertain. Most had been done using H2S radar. Similarly reconnaissance aircraft had been unable to verify with certainty that the city centre was indeed blocked. A further raid planned for 1800 hours was cancelled. This was to have been carried out by the heavy bombers of 8 USAAF which specialised in high altitude precision daylight bombing. The low cloud cover over the target area made this unreliable.

    It was decided that during the night of 6/7 June all of 2 Groups efforts would be concentrated on delaying any enemy movement into the area from the south of Caen. Reconnaissance indicated that the enemy was concentrating forces in the area and the heavy bombers had not been able to create the choke points that had been planned.

    The six Mosquito squadrons flew a total of 129 anti movement patrols covering in particular the routes:
    Bayeux – Carentan – Granville – Avrranche – Bayeaux. One squadron.
    Caen – Lisieux – Brienne – Evreaux – Dreax – Alencon – Caen. Two squadrons.
    Caen – Argentan – Domfront – Fougeres – Pontorson – Bayeux – Caen. Three squadrons.

    122 of the Mosquitos attacked moving traffic or prearranged targets, dropping 486 500lb bombs. One very large convoy was seen and attacked between Fougeres and Mortain.

    Sixty Mitchells flew four missions and dropped 196 1,000lb bombs on the town centres of Falaise and Villers Bocage, the bridge at Dives sur Mer and a narrow defile at Thury Harcourt. The commander of Panzer Lehr Division later said that the attacks caused much delay and he lost 10% of his armoured vehicles, although only five tanks.

    Mitchells.
    Mitchell 3.jpg Mitchell.jpg

    Mosquitos.
    Mosquito FB 2.jpg Mosquito FB.jpg


    Smoke Bostons.

    The two Boston Squadrons, 88 and 342, of 2 Group were both employed on smoke laying duties on the flanks of the invasion area.

    On the eastern flank 66 Squadron laid a smoke screen to shield the Eastern Task Force from the heavy coastal batteries at Le Havre. Bostons started to take off at 0415 hours in order to start laying smoke at dawn. Further aircraft took off at ten minute intervals so as to maintain the smoke screen. Nineteen aircraft were despatched of which fifteen successfully completed the task. Heavy flak was encountered from enemy destroyers and E Boats off the French coast. Bostons operated singly.

    On the western flank 342 Squadron laid a smoke screen to shield the Western Task Force from the batteries of the St. Veast area on Cap Barfleur. Twelve aircraft operated in pairs at ten minute intervals from 0600.

    The last Boston returned to land at 0843 hours. Two Bostons, one from each squadron was lost at sea, cause unknown.

    Bostons carried smoke dispensers in the bomb bay.
    boston smoke.jpg


    GINGER.
    'C' Flight, 226 Squadron.

    SHAEF established a network of agents in France to provide information on German movements. Getting the information to the UK in time for it to be acted on meant wireless transmissions but the Germans had become very active and efficient. Mobile direction finding vans could rapidly locate any message other than very short ones. Transmissions from France were necessarily lengthy since they had much information to send and it had to be in Morse since voice radio lacked the range. Special equipment was developed which used voice transmissions on a very narrow beam which was directed vertically upwards. This was virtually undetectable at ground level. At 20,000 feet the beam spread out to cover a circle some fifty miles in diameter. An aircraft flying in a pre arranged area could receive the messages for the length of time it took to cross the circle, about fifteen minutes. This allowed long messages to be transmitted from the ground and received by the aircraft. If more time was needed the aircraft could turn and recross the area.

    ‘C’ Flight, 226 Squadron was formed to fly Mitchell medium bombers for the task of receiving the Ginger messages. The flight was administered by 226 Squadron but came directly under the operational control of SHAEF and was very secret. To disguise its actions it officially, and actually, dropped propaganda leaflets. The aircraft carried French wireless operators to communicate with the ground and receive the messages.

    Flights started on June 1 and from then on two aircraft went out each night and each aircraft contacted two agents. On return the information was sent direct to SHAEF by despatch rider. The information on German trains and road convoys carrying supplies and reinforcements was used to brief and despatch fighter bombers, including rocket firing Typhoons, next morning. This system was very successful and continued until October when the areas where the agents operated had been liberated by ground forces.

    Only one Mitchell from ‘C’ Flight was intercepted and that was by an RAF Mosquito night fighter. Having successfully evaded four attacks the pilot ordered the crew to open fire when the Mosquito made a fifth pass. It was shot down, the pilots baling out safely.

    Mike
     
    Ian Jones likes this.
  2. Arty

    Arty Member

    Mike,

    If all the above is what you post on a dark, damp and dismal day - then what to do you come up with when the sun's out???

    Once again, hugely impressed by your work!!!


    Regards
    Arty
     
  3. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    When the sun is out so am I.

    Thanks Arty. Some of the information is of course yours.

    Mike
     
  4. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Fighter Direction Tenders.
    Overall control remained in the UK but fighter direction was provided by Fighter Direction Tenders. These controlled fighters over the shipping of the assault force and over the beaches. There were three such tenders, all identical. FDT 217 controlled the skies over the British Sector, FDT 216 controlled the skies over the US Sector and FDT 13 controlled the skies over the convoys. In the British sector co ordination of high and low cover was handed over to the Group Control Centre ashore on D+9.

    Fighter Direction Tenders were Landing Tank Ship Mk2 converted by the Royal Navy. The bow doors were welded shut and armour plate or pig iron ballast was added for protection. The central part of the Fighter Direction Tender was the Operations Flat on the tank deck. This consisted of Filter Room, Communications Office, Air Control Room and Radar Receiving Room. There were also a VHF radio transmitting room, a VHF receiving room, a radio direction finder receiving room, two fighter direction offices, a Ground Control Interception office, a beacon office, a plotting office, a storeroom and a generator space with four generators. Radars were Type 15 and Type 11.

    Communications for aircraft flying Low Cover was provided by VHF sets in the aircraft. These were tuned to four frequencies. Channel A was the Wing Operations frequency. Channel B was for Low Cover Guard 1. Channel C was for Low Cover Guard 2. Channel D was the Air Sea Rescue Fixer Frequency. Fighter Direction Tenders maintained a permanent watch on both Low Cover Guard frequencies. Each Low Cover squadron was to call up the appropriate Fighter Direction Tender when within 5 minutes flying time of its allotted patrol area. It was also to report when it was in position and when it was leaving. Arrangements for High Cover squadrons were similar.

    FDT.jpg
    Fighter Direction Tender.

    Mike
     
  5. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    In case there are those who question the value of attacking headquarters I include this. Based loosely on an article in Shores excellent four volume work on 2TAF. Taking out locomotives was probably much more fun but taking out staff officers could cripple any operation.

    Chateau de la Caine.

    On D+4, June 9th, Rommel ordered Headquarters Panzer Group West to plan a counter attack against the Allies. The greatly increased wireless traffic generated attracted the attention of Bletchley Park. The messages were decoded by ULTRA and the location of the headquarters was located using High Frequency Direction Finding receivers. The headquarters were at Chateau de la Caine, twelve miles south west of Caen. The information was passed to SHAEF which ordered Headquarters 2 TAF to carry out a strike. Plans were made that day. Some delay was caused by the weather but the strike was eventually given the go ahead for the evening of D+5, June 10th.

    The main attack was to be carried out by four squadrons of RAF Mitchell medium bombers. These were 98, 180, 226 and 320 Squadrons and each would provide eighteen aircraft to bomb at medium altitude. One aircraft in each squadron was equipped with GEE for navigation in case of poor visibility and aircraft would bomb in tight boxes of six aircraft. Four squadrons of Typhoons, 181, 182, 245 and 247 Squadrons, were to attack at low level before and after the bombers. Each squadron provided ten aircraft, eight armed with rocket projectiles and two without rockets to act as close escort. Four squadrons of Spitfires provided escorts and high cover. One squadron of Spitfire MkV were for close escort and three squadrons of Spitfire IX were for high cover.

    As the attack began the German HQ staff were having dinner in the chateau and the general was just arriving. As the air raid warning was sounded the staff went out to watch and realised too late that the attack was aimed at them. Seventeen Typhoons fired 136 rockets from 2000 feet and immediately after wards the Mitchells started bombing. The chateau was reduced to rubble and the staff wiped out. The area surrounding the chateau and the vehicles parked there was also heavily bombed. Four escort Typhoons attacked the nearby village with cannon fire and caused severe casualties to the NCOs and men billeted there. Finally a second wave of rocket firing Typhoons arrived and destroyed anything that remained.

    With the entire planning staff destroyed there was no possibility of organising the hoped for counter attack.

    Mike.

    That is all for the time being. If anyone has anything to add please do so. There are still many gaps in the above narrative.

    Thanks to all who have contributed so far. Every little helps build up a picture.

    I am now painting a set of 1:285 scale GHQ model aircraft as used by 2 TAF. You need good eyesight. Painting invasion stripes is a real pain. The Spitfire in PR Blue is very cute.
     
    canuck and Ian Jones like this.
  6. Ian Jones

    Ian Jones New Member

    Hi Trux,

    My name is Ian Jones. My father was Thomas Chamney Jones he flew with the 2TAF, 139 wing, 180 Sqn. I have restarted researching dads war service and thought i'd start with his flying log book on D day. Was really excited when i read you article about Chateau de la Caine raid.

    Written in his log book:
    June 6 Mitchell 158, self, crew, Railroad junction S.E of Falaise "D" Day.
    June 7 Mitchell 158, self, crew, Panzer Division derailing at Vire 2,700ft
    June 10 Mitchell 158, self, crew, HQ of 21st Panzer Division S.W. of Caen

    June 12 Mitchell 928, self, crew, Support unit of 21st Panzer Division S.W.of Caen ACC intense Heavy Flack.

    I received some more info on who his crew was. F/S T C Jones, Pilot. F.S RJB Serieys, Nav.B. F/S P.C. Frost, W.O.A.G. Sgt N.H. Spagnoletti. A.G
    Flight time was 01.15 down 03.55 There was no detail of the sortie or flight.

    His log book makes great reading and helpful in researching his involvement in the war effort
    [​IMG]
     
    Juha, Trux and canuck like this.
  7. canuck

    canuck Closed Account

    Richard Rohmer RCAF
    Born: January 24, 1924 (age 94)

    "I was a member of 430 Squadron Royal Canadian Air Force. Our tasks were to perform photo reconnaissance and to direct artillery fire onto targets. We flew Mustang Mark 1 aircraft fitted with a large camera mounted behind the pilot in the fuselage in addition to its normal armament. We also made direct ground target observations.

    On the night of June 5, 1944 we were briefed that the Invasion was on. This did not come as surprise as our aircraft had been painted with broad black and white stripes on the wings and rear of the fuselage a couple of days earlier. These were to serve as markers so ships and troops on the ground would recognize us as friendly.

    Six pilots of my Squadron were tasked to perform photo reconnaissance missions in the area of Caen behind the Canadian and British Invasions beaches early in the morning of June 6. We were to look for enemy movement and positions. I was to fly as wingman to another aircraft forming a two plane flight.

    We were woken at 3 a.m., dressed, ate quickly and were briefed.

    We took off at 6 a.m. just before sun up and headed south to cross the Channel to France. As the darkness faded and it became light the sun was obliterated by a solid blanket of high gray cloud. A strong westerly wind was blowing that played havoc with the men below crossing the Channel in small ships.

    As we flew over the Channel the sight below us was awesome. The sea was covered in ships in a vast mile-wide column reaching south to the horizon. It was rough and they were plowing through white capped waves. At the southern end of the column naval and other craft were already bombarding pre-determined targets in the final minutes before H-Hour, the designated landing times for our troops.

    We crossed the still vacant invasion beaches at over 400 miles per hour at 150 metres due to a dark ominous cloud ceiling, which was barely over our heads. Our two plane flight was constantly shot at by light anti-aircraft guns. The tracers came up towards and all around us which forced us to take constant evasive action to avoid being shot down. We flew south to Caen and completed our mission. We then returned to the coast and turned west to follow the beach line about a kilometre inland and at 150 metres. I became mesmerized by the unfolding invasion below us and flew circuits back and forth along the beaches.

    It was near H-Hour. The terrain under us was crater-pocked from bombs and shells. We could see continuous explosions from the falling shell fire landing below us and working its way inland. From my cockpit I looked out to sea at the horizon filled with thick cordite smoke from the constant firing of hundreds of naval guns. There were gun flashes all along the horizon pin pricking the smoke. The fact that all this shell fire was coming directly at us never crossed my mind.

    Back and forth my flight leader and I ranged over this incredible, lethal theatre of death and destruction. A major turning point in World War II was taking place as we watched from above. We were witnesses to one of the monumental military events in the history of mankind - its largest seaborne invasion.

    During a pass over Juno Beach we saw seven assault landing craft carrying the Queen's Own Regiment of Canada about to touch down on the beach at Bernieres-sur-Mer. The Regiment suffered heavy casualties here during the landings and the clearing of the town. They liberated the first house in France to be taken by seaborne troops just at the top of the sea wall. This house still stands and is commemorated as the Queen's Own House along with other memorials on Juno Beach. A German seawall bunker and machine gun pit are still present in the immediate area.

    I was so enthralled by the enormity of the unfolding scene that I had failed to monitor my instrument panel regularly. When I finally did I was shocked to see my fuel gauge read empty. And, we were at least a hundred miles from the coast of England. I had been using a lot more fuel than the lead aircraft or we would already have turned for home long before.

    We turned north immediately and climbed up and out over the thundering naval ships leveling off at 350 meters. I adjusted my engine to minimize fuel consumption. My wingman stayed with me weaving above to protect against any possible enemy fighter attack.

    Would I have to bail out? The last thing to do in a Mustang was to ditch in the sea. Experience had shown that it would not skim along the surface. Once it touched down it would nose straight into the water due to the large, air intake under the fuselage taking the pilot straight to the bottom. No, if the engine quit I would have to bail out over the Channel. The only good thing about that was that the sea was covered with ships of every kind plowing their way to Normandy. I made preparations to bail out quickly checking the harnesses of my Mae West (life jacket), parachute and dingy pack.

    I headed directly for the nearest emergency landing strip on the coast of England. The needle on the gas gauge was well below the empty mark and I was still about 15 kilometers from the coast. However, the engine was still running. I was given clearance for a straight in emergency landing, thankfully touching down. I just turned onto the first taxi way off the runway and the engine coughed a few times and quit. I was very lucky.

    Within three and a half hours I was back in the air leading a section for a tactical reconnaissance of the Bayeux area of Normandy of the Canadian and British beaches."

    richard-rohmer-e1454293074982.jpg
     
    Trux, Tricky Dicky and Chris C like this.

Share This Page