2nd Bn Royal Warwickshire Regiment June 6th-7th 1944

Discussion in 'British Army Units - Others' started by Will T, Aug 9, 2016.

  1. Will T

    Will T Member

    Afternoon all, as mentioned in my previous post I am currently in the process of researching 2nd Btln Warwicks and their involvment with the D-Day landings, culminating with the action at Lebisey Wood, just north of Caen on the 7th.

    So far I've gathered a large amount of information and literature. This includes a incredible thread I found on here regarding a Naval FO who was spotting for HMS Warspite who was sadly killed in action during an ambush of part of the 2nd Battalions anti tank platoon, the precision of information that was found by members of this site was very impressive.

    I wanted to ask if anyone has any information on these certain areas:

    1.According to the Warwicks regimental diary, on D-Day, after leaving D Coy to relieve the British Airborne at Pegasus, the 3 remaining Coys pushed south alongside the river with tank support, two of which were subsequently knocked our by enemy anti tank guns (one having its turret removed by the explosion). I believe they are part of 13th/18th Royal Hussars, part of 27th Independent Armour Brigade, but I have been unable to confirm this, does anyone have anything that would coroborate this information?

    2.In the above action it is listed that one of the tanks destroyed was that of a Forward Observer, again, is their any information to confirm this and to find which branch (Army/Navy) he was part of and what fire he would have been co-ordinating fire for?

    3. During the battle at Lebisey wood on the 7th of June, the Warwicks 4 Infantry Coys are committed to the attack, S Coy is mistakenly sent into Lebisey, with the anti tank platoon being destroyed. Having done some research, S Coy would have consisted of some 35 Bren Carriers, with an anti tank, mortar and carrier Infantry platoon. I know there is an accident involving a motorcycle outrider that splits the column but cannot track where the three Platoons were, as I have conflicting information to say that 2nd Battalions mortars were, or were not in action. Where were these platoons?

    4. The 1st Battalion KSLI diary states that during the battle, roughly about the same time (2nd?) Norfolks went in to support, that the KSLI was put on fire support, however I have KSLI veteran testimony saying that apart from hearing the battle, they were not involved?

    5. Those of the anti tank platoon that got through Lebisey and were then captured recall speaking with their 21st Panzer captors, whilst they did, 16" shells from HMS Warspite starting hitting the area, but no British testimony speaks about any support from land or sea based artillery. All that is mentioned is the Germans hitting the area the Norfolks and Warwicks had been in but had since withdrawn from. Can anyone shed light on this?

    Some very specific questions I know, but any sources, information or anything else would be HUGELY appreciated.

    Will
     
    Leeds Andy likes this.
  2. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Re: 3: the group of knocked-out universal carriers on the road behind Lebisey appear to be from the Mortar Pl, which suggests they weren't providing fire support for the initial attack. (I make the distinction as 6pr antitank guns were usually towed by Loyd carriers.)

    It's possible that the mortar sections could have been split up but it seems unlikely given the other firepower that was available. I tend to think that they were kept in hand with the A/Tk guns to consolidate the village after capture.

    I'm sure I've seen a picture of vehicles moving through Lebisey later on with a 6pr barrel visible on the edge of the shot, so at least some of the A/Tk Pl were KO'd inside the village. It seems reasonable that the Mortar Pl's Universals would be more likely to break through the ambush than the more heavily encumbered Loyds.

    Not sure about the Carrier Pl proper.
     
  3. Will T

    Will T Member

    Hi Idler,

    Yes I have seen the picture you mean and there is indeed a 6 pounder on that road, there are pictures that members of this forum posted on another thread which shows 3 carriers destroyed on the road out the other side of the wood. From what I can tell only 3-5 carriers were ambushed in the wood.
    I have a soldiers written witness testimony to say that the convoy was broken up by an accident prior to reaching the wood. I've also got one book that states that Warwick mortars were in action but got no supporting evidence, and even then, it still does not answer the question of the presence of the carrier infantry platoon and where it was.

    Thanks
     
  4. Will T

    Will T Member

    Sorry just re read your message with a bit more time to spare. The literature I have gives me the impression that at least one 6 pounder gets through as it states it knocks out a panzer IV with the 'action rear' command, firing about 8 rounds before the carrier is hit and the crew are 'blown sideways' into the corn fields.

    Honestly hadn't twigged the difference between bren and lloyd until you pointed it out.
     
  5. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Here is what I think happened on D Day:-

    The party were Royal Artillerymen from 9th (Irish) battery of 7th Field Regiment Royal Artillery responsible for calling in artillery fire from field artillery.

    and on D+1

    The source of this are the notes left by the late Lt Col Will Townend. The three gunner officers who took part in the attack on foot were BC 9 Battery and the two FOOs - Captain Talbot was borrowed from 16 Bty because captain Gregory's party had been put out of action when their tank was hit - see first quote.

    Will certainly thought that Burgess fired Warspite in the opening fireplan on D+1, but that seems to contradict the comments in the preceding paragrah that the naval gunfire support was an unnamed cruiser. Burgess was the Reserve FOB and took over as the FOB with 9 Infantry Brigade after Lee had been lost. Here is am photo fo captain Burgess briefing his crew
    https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe..._in_a_Normandy_village,_June_1944._A24347.jpg

    The timngs also contradict the WD for 7 Fd Regt which has no mention of the the regiment in action before 1730 hrs. However the 16 Bty WD says that 16 Bty were engaging targets all day
     
    Last edited: Aug 9, 2016
  6. Will T

    Will T Member

    7th field regiment sounds right, I have a note in 2nd Bat KSLI regimental diary which says a troop of Priest SP guns were in support of the Warwicks at least part of the day (not mentioned at all in the RWR diary).

    Would I be right in thinking then that the 2 shermans knocked out on 6th at the end of the day were either both from, or at least one from, B troop 7th FR rather than 27th armoured brigade.

    As regards the ship I've seen both noted in various sources as Warspite or 'Cruiser' (which is quite a difference and Warspite was a battlewagon). Is it possible to have been multiple ships on fire support? (finding info from the Navy so far has got me nowhere).

    The four 'blind concentrations' fit the time plan so thank you for that. Would you happen to have a digital copy of Lt Col Will Townends notes? I would be very keen to have a look if you do. Information from the artillery side of things has been very difficult to find. A big thank you for the picture as well!
     
  7. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    The classified history CAB 44 245 1 Corps on D day doesn't mention any other armour with 2 Warwicks other than the OP Tanks. Nor does it say that more than one tank was hit. 13/18th Hussars were not tasked with supporting the moved of 2 Warwicks. Why do you think their tanks were there? The route of advance was selected because the infantry did not have armour with them.

    7 Field Regiment is right. They were in direct support of 185 Brigade which means they provided the element of the artillery deployed forwards with the infantry and armour. The battery war diary of 9 battery mentions the incident and lists the names of the casualties.

    Here are some extracts from 16 Bty War Diary. RAHT204.jpg RAHT205.jpg
    CAB44/247 also says that none of ther timings given in the war diaries are reliable. Those in individual unit diaries are inconsistent and were recalled by the survivors of a chaotic attack.

    Although it is not mentioned in any of the gunner War diaries The Cabinet historian says that the attack was supposed to be supported by an artillery fire plan but because of the delays getting the infantry in position the attack was postponed. This message was passed to the gunners, but did not reach some of the infantry companies which attacked without any fire support.

    You already have the main element of Will's notes on this topic. Neither he nor I have established which ship fired in support CAB 44/247 Operations D+2-D+7, which is based on war diaries, says that the naval unit was a cruiser and lists the targets it was to fire on. Warspite is a lot bigger than a cruiser, but I don't know whether this battleship was provided instead of a cruiser and whether the NGS was stopped when the fireplan was postponed.
     
  8. Will T

    Will T Member

    As regards to the tanks, I have several sources (RW regimental diary and other literature, haven't got access to anything in front of me until I get home later this evening), but all state that, during the advance south after leaving D Coy to relieve the Airborne troops at Pegasus, the Battalion took accurate machine gun and anti tank gun fire, with 2 shermans being knocked out, one described as exploding, taking the turret off with it landing in the middle of the road. However there is no mention in any of them as to what unit they belong but the literature supports (at least) 2 tanks story. I need to check my literature again but I'm sure I found something relating the Hussars being involved (again will look when I get home) but have yet to get my hands on a copy of their regimental history.

    As regards to the artillery support, again the literature stated that there was a planned bombardment, however, pre jump off the CO of A Coy took small arms fire whilst recceing their jump off point, he recommended a delay of an hour to secure their start linme which was approved by Btln CO, and all firesupport was cancelled, due to be rescheduled for the later attack. However, due to an issue with communication (the radios and their ability to receive I believe), only A Coy received the message. B and C Coys both began their attacks with A Coy being forced to commit. I don't believe, other than the nearby Priest battery, that there was any subsequent artillery support called for until after the Warwicks and Norfolks had withdrawn that evening. This new information though is massivley helpful thank you! It didn't seem to make any sense that there was no artillery support used with the large amounts available

    As regards the ship in question, I think my best bet is trying to get in touch with the Navy as the evidence seems very conflicting.

    Thank you for the notes and diary on the artillery, that was one piece I was really struggling to find.
     
    Last edited: Aug 10, 2016
  9. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    It is worth checking the originals - but the war diaries sometimes conflict because they were written up on the battlefield with accounts and reports by tired men with incomplete information.

    The 16 Battery Diary extracts in post 7 says something more definite than the underlined sentence . Here is a page I overlooked.
    RAHT206.jpg

    and the war diary of 7 Field Regiment for 6-7 June 1944
    RAHT191.jpg

    Firstly, there was no "nearby priest battery" The artillery fire was all indirect fire with the guns of 7th Field Regiment just NW of Coleville-Sur-Mer and moving forward to just North of Bieville during the afternoon of 7 June, ready hy 1600. The 16 Battery diary entry at 1400 on 7th explains that the battery steps forward keeping one troop in action and clears the road to minimise delay.

    In the 16 battery diary entry captain talbot's report timed at 11.00 7 June Talbot says that his was the onlyn radio in contact with Brigade possibly via the battery net. He also says that 16 Battery engaged targets at the back end of Vermouth - Lebisey Wood throughout the day - which is consistent with the battery moving while in action. This fire is probab ly only by a battery of guns because the first Mike Target (using all the guns in the Regiment) is called at 21.30

    Capt Handforth is reported to have supported the attack by 1 Norfolks, probably with the fire of the whole regiment as the Regimental WD says they were in action in support of 2 Warwicks.

    I think this battle is a case study about how not to fight a battle. It raises several big questions.

    #1. The capture of Caen was the main task of the 3rd Division. It had not achieved this on D Day being stopped around Lebisey wood by elements of a panzer division. The thrust on 7th June was important and urgent. Yet it was made by a single battalion without any tank support except from Bieville and artillery support from two out of the nine batteries landed with 3rd Division and one out of dozens of warships. What did they think they were going to achieve?

    #2 The decision to go in without the fire plan made this situation far worse.

    #3 Bringing forwards the vehicles into an ambush shows a level of tactical naivety that calls into question the years of training.

    #4 Who made the decision not to send in tanks earlier? They were allowed forward in support of the Norfolks.

    #4 It seems to have taken most of the day to realise that something had gone very badly wrong. In later battles when a battalion became exposed it was not unknown for a curtain of fire to be put around them. Here the Warwicks struggled on with only 8 guns for most of the day.
     
    Last edited: Aug 10, 2016
  10. Will T

    Will T Member

    Finally managed to get some spare time to get the info from my resources.

    Firstly wanted to clarify the information regarding the armour mentioned as supporting the Warwicks in the evening of June 6th
    13989717_10208794815420886_1136763536_n (1).jpg 13957468_10208794816100903_2068324822_n.jpg

    Is it likely to be the two OP tanks you mentioned? I am unfamiliar with how OP shermans would be used so any information on that would be massively helpful..

    As regards to the immediate artillery support I went through my literature and found the info


    13883707_10208794816020901_67271569_n.jpg 13989584_10208794817100928_23965455_n.jpg 14010090_10208794815340884_1586955540_n (1).jpg

    Do you happen to have anything about the battery in question mentioned that would support these accounts? I think I may have been mistaken in thinking they were priests so apologies for the confusion.

    As far as the naval support, what I've found supports everything you've said regarding referencing both 'a cruiser' and at some point HMS Warspite.

    Following up on the reading I did tonight I've managed to answer my own question as to the where the mortar platoon was as they are listed as part of the convoy headed to Lebisey and the mortar platoon officer is listed as one of those killed wounded or missing after the ambush. Now I just need to pin down where the carrier infantry platoon was.

    Thanks

    Will
     
  11. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Re Gunner I have already posted the summary report by Captain Talbot as detailed in the battery war diary.

    The Warwicks regimental history looks as if it has drawn from the same source material. The regimental history does not contradict the gunner side of the story, but it does reveal that the author wasn't a gunner and may have misunderstood a couple of matters.

    The sentence "the only support came from two SP guns attached to the 2nd battalion which fired HE and smoke onto the objective" does not make sense, and is contradicted by other reports. CAB 44/247 which quoted Lt Col Nigel Tapp the CO 7th Field Regiment who planned the fire-plan to support the attack as planning a fire plan using the divisional artillery, and the attack accompanied by the BC and a troop commander from two BATTERIES of guns - i.e. 2 x 8 = 16 guns. The M7 105mm (Priest) SP Guns were usually used in indirect fire , as an area weapon using a minimum of four guns (a troop) as a fire unit. Here is a photos of a 7 Regiment Priest taken on their gun position north of Coleville sur mer, taken on the evening of D Day with gliders in the sky. The village is just over the himm in the centre of the picture. This is where 9 and 16 battery were until they moved forward 1400-1600 on D+1. B 5046 7 Fd Regt evening D Day.jpg

    It isn't clear from this sentence when this support took place, or whether this was the planned or actual fire support. The accounts say that the fireplan was postponed , so it could not have been fired during the infantry advance, and the war diaries seem to indicate that most of the calls for fire were on 16 Battery, who were in comms to their OP via the tank manned by his tank crew. It is not clear whether fire orders were relayed to 9 Battery during the day. I have the feeling that the loss of comms meant that no one outside 16 battery was aware of how desperate the situation was for many hours.

    The two Troop commanders for the Priest SP batteries of 7th Field Regiment were mounted in Sherman OP tanks. The troop commanders either acted as forward observers where they could see and control artillery fire or or as liaison officers to infantry or armoured units. The RA policy was to use experienced officers at the sharp end and trust them to read the battle and order fire where it was needed.

    The 2nd Warwicks would have been accompanied by three Royal Artillery tanks - but these were to give indirect fire support from the guns they could call. Indeed usually they were fitted with dummy guns.

    The Op Tanks were usually modified to remove the 75mm gun breach and using the space to mount a map board. They would also have a second vehicle, either an "Armoured OP" bren carrier or a jeep. The radios mounted in the Sherman OP vehicle were more powerful than the man pack radios of the time. For this battle Captain Talbot, and three soldiers wwent forward with the infantry carrying a No 18 set.

    Talbot did not usually work with the 2nd Warwicks. 16 battery were affiliated to and usually worked with the 1st battalion the Royal Norfolks. The Warwicks were usually supported by 9th (Irish) Battery, but they had lost Captain Gregory's party on D Day. I have no idea what the second vehicle hit was. However one of 16th battery's tanks travelling with the Norfolks was hit by a 47mm shot which did not cause any damage. Two RA Tanks travelling with 185 Brigade were hit by antitank guns on the afternoon of D Day, one of them was knocked out spectacularly.

    Talbot was lent to 9 (Irish) Battery whose battery Commander Major Lister and Captain Appleby Troop Commander of "A" Troop were also there. The gunner story of this battle is told by Talbot, who survived the campaign and took a lively interest in the history of the Normandy campaign.

    Talbot seems to have been the only person to have maintained radio contact from the 2nd Warwicks. The infantry lost their vehicles with their rear link radios in the ambush. Talbot, who had come from the Norfolks near Blainville had left his tank in no mans land, where his tank crew had passed messages from him to the battery, who then passed it to brigade HQ. The gunners took pride in their communications. Without communications to the guns the artillery can do nothing. Talbot's party were"through" (to the recipients)
     
    Last edited: Aug 15, 2016
    Will T and CL1 like this.
  12. Will T

    Will T Member


    Ok got you, honestly not familiar with the artillery side of things with my research so far so thank you for taking the time to clarifying the details with me.

    I'm at an event for the weekend from tomorrow but plan to come back to this then, I'll print off the pictures and reports you've sent me (which are a big, largely untold piece of the story) and add those to the time line I've got so far.
     
  13. Arty

    Arty Member

    Interesting thread chaps,

    Here's some feedback on the feedback...

    On questions 1 & 2

    The battle for Benouville went on for all of 6th June. At least three Shermans were knocked out just to the South of the village - two belonged to B Sqn, 13th/18th Hussars, while the third was the AOP Sherman of B Troop, 9 Bty, 7 Fd Regt.

    From the War Diary of 13th/18th Hussars 06Jun44:
    "1130 - Lieut Coker, with 5 tanks 'B' Sqn began to support 1 SS Bde over onto the Bridges at BENOUVILLE over the Canal-de-Caen and the River Orne, which were taken over intact from 6 airborne Div. Two 'B' Sqn tanks knocked out by 88mm south of BENOUVILLE."

    The war Diary of 71 Field Company Royal Engineers gives us a better idea as to exactly when the B Squadron Shermans were knocked ou (71 Fd Coy had arrived at Benouville around 1300hrs):
    "1530 Enemy reported in strength 400 yds SOUTH of BENOUVILLE. OC 3 Pl and patrol 9 Sec despatched to bring him under observation. Patrol was accompanied by two DD tanks of 13/18 Hussars. This party was fired on debouching from the SOUTH edge of the village. The second tank was hit by an 88mm shell and knocked out. The leading tank was likewise knocked out trying to manoeuvre on the 88mm gun."

    71 Fd Coy's diary states later: "1900 attack by 2 R WARWICKS proceeds."

    There is, however, no mention of th AOP Sherman's demise in the Engineers diary.

    As was usually the case, the gun that did the damage was incorrectly identified as an "88'. The actual culprit was almost certainly a self propelled 75mm anti tank gun (German designation in this case: 7.5cm PaK 40 L/46 auf m SPW S307(f)). The German gun belonged to the anti tank platoon of 8th (Heavy) Company, II Battalion, 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 21 Panzer Division (platoon commander: Leutnant Hans Holler).

    It was later when 9 Bty's AOP Sherman was knocked out - probably by the same German Platoon (which eventually withdrew, intact, due to the Warwick's attack).

    Capt Hendrie William Bruce, of 9 Bty, later reported: "2230 hours: Message received that "B" Troop OP tank LANDRECY has been knocked out by enemy anti-tank gun on the road to BLAINVILLE. Casualties are as follows:- One Signaller killed; Troop Commander and OP assistant seriously wounded."

    As per usual there's conflicting information to deal with!
    *7 Field Regiment's War Diary doesn't mention Capt RB Gregory being wounded until 1900hrs 07June, whilst it says that Capt RN de Courcy Thompson was wounded on 06June.
    *Capt Bruce says that the "OP tank" was named "LANDRECY", whilst Lt Col Townend apparently says that it was named "Rocroy".

    Meanwhile I'm still pondering the identity of the second "tank" that was reportedly knocked out near Benouville late in the evening...

    On question 3

    A minor technical point...it's likely that most, if not all, of the carriers in action with the Warwicks on 6th and 7th June were Universal Carriers - including the Anti Tank Platoon. Landing tables show that the first "Carrier, loyd" of the Warwicks weren't due to arrive until the morning of 7th June, and hence they probably hadn't caught up with the battalion before the debacle unfolded in Lebisey Wood.

    Regards
    Arty


    Edit! My mistake! The Warwicks were apparently due another 6 Universal Carriers not "Carriers Loyd" some time after H+25½ hours (ie. AM 07June). Which implies their Loyd carriers arrived even later...
     
    Last edited: Aug 27, 2016
  14. Will T

    Will T Member

    Arty thanks for your information, again that fills in some of the gaps, I'm sure I've found a note somewhere about the Hussars being involved but with no joy on getting their regimental diary I've had no luck verifying that information. Would you be able to post a couple of pictures (if you have them) of their regimental information so I have a hard copy for resource? The same would go for the engineers if possible. I have found tracking any regimental information beyond the infantry battalions and Staff Yeomanry very challenging, the info you guys are providing is fantastic so again thank you.

    Again with your note on question 3, what document were you able to get that information? And again if possible, would you be so good to send me a photo/ scan?
     
  15. Arty

    Arty Member

    But wait there’s more!

    The sentence "the only support came from two SP guns attached to the 2nd battalion which fired HE and smoke onto the objective" may indeed make sense!

    41 Bty of 20th Anti tank Regiment had landed in support of 185 Bde on 06June. A Self Propelled M10 troop from 41 Anti Tank battery were with 2 KSLI as they advanced towards Lebisey on the evening of 06June. As we know by 2000hrs 2 KSLI had withdrawn to Bieville. On 07June 41 AT Bty – presumably it’s Bty HQ, with it’s troops deployed - was in Le Homme (less than 1km north of Bieville). It’s entirely feasible that a couple of M10’s were indeed providing “the only supporting fire” as the Warwicks advanced on the morning of 07June.

    D-Day may have been a success, but the 7th was a bit of a balls up!

    Regards
    Arty

    ps. Will - Re info from War Diaries/Landing Tables I'll send you a PM.
     
  16. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    While in theory the SP support might refer to M10s. However the reports don't sound as if the SP Anti tank Guns

    #1 M10s are not assault guns, though were occasionally used as such. The role of their 3" guns was to kill tanks as part of the divisional anti tank plan. They can fire HE, but rarely drop HE into the target area and they definitely don't drop smoke onto the objective! It would be absurd for two of these guns to be used instead of the regiment of armour in the same area.

    #2 CAB 44/247 analysis draws attention to the Staffordshire Yeomanry being brought forwards late in the day and an earlier restriction on movement beyond the anti tank ditch. It makes no mention of M10s.

    #3 The 20th Anti tank Regt WD entry for 7th June has a description of 3 Divs activities. This includes an attack by 9th Brigade on Cresserons and Plumetot, which mentions two SP anti tank troops and a 6 pdr troop of 20th Atk Regt. The reference made to 41 ATk Bty is that after the two infantry battalions withdrew 41 Bty's position were intact and firm.

    #4 Major Rae the BC 17/43 Battery with the KSLI reported that that the KSLI formed a "firm base" and cleared snipers.
     
  17. Arty

    Arty Member

    Sheldrake,

    I suggested above that the “two S.P. guns” may have been M10’s. I’m not impressed by your attempt to dismiss the suggestion – so lets argue some more, shall we….

    #1 “M10s are not assault guns…” Yes, the by the book doctrine works perfectly well - right up to the time you get on the battlefield. The M10’s of B Troop, 41 Battery 20 AT Regt were involved in some very close range direct fire in support of 2 KSLI just the previous evening – just like assault guns. The reality was the tactical situation. At least one British M10 Troop Commander bemoaned the fact that his guns were misused like tanks, because they looked tanks. Whilst anecdotal evidence from US sources suggests that M10’s fired more HE than AP.

    “They can fire HE, but rarely drop HE into the target area…” Semantics? It’s not a big deal that the word “dropped” was used to describe rounds being fired at a target.

    “They definitely don't drop smoke onto the objective…” The M10 could fire a range of ammo including AP, HE and smoke – the last being the “M88 HC B1” (base emission). The M88 was a particularly blunt nosed projectile – fired at any appreciable distant it’s trajectory would not be particularly flat….

    “It would be absurd for two of these guns to be used instead of the regiment of armour in the same area…” Really? Do you think that comment has any substance, given that the whole affair was a fiasco?

    #”2 CAB 44/247… makes no mention of M10s”…As is the case with War Diaries, Reports et al there’s often not any mention of the actions of sub units (ie. at Troop or Platoon level). A document such as CAB 44/247 was never going to have any detail at all about, what might have been, a section of two M10’s.

    WO 171/913 - 20th AT Regt’s War Diary makes no specific mention of B Trp 41 Bty’s activities on 06June, in fact no mention at all - it doesn’t mean they weren’t in action. The War Diary does mention casualties but it doesn’t mention that B Trp 41 Bty had it’s No. I gun knocked out by a Panzer IV of 21 Panzer Division.

    WO 171/1325 – 2 KSLI’s War Diary doesn’t mention M10’s at all on the 6th, despite the fact at least one KSLI officer specifically mentions them in his memoirs.

    None of the above means that 41 Bty’s M10’s missed the boat!

    #3 “The 20th Anti tank Regt WD entry for 7th June…” Same as above applies - there’s no specific mention of the location or activities of any of the towed or self propelled gun troops. The reference (at 1600hrs) simply confirms that 41 Battery, as a whole, hadn’t moved from the area.

    #4 “Major Rae the BC 17/43 Battery with the KSLI reported that the KSLI formed a "firm base"…” A couple of M10’s located somewhere near Bieville (ie. as part of the anti tank screen) wouldn’t have needed to move one inch to put fire onto the northern edge of Lebisey Wood. At a range of about 2000 yards they may indeed have provided “the only support” that morning – albeit with a limited number of rounds.


    It is of course possible that reference to the “two SP guns” may just be a case of the Warwick’s Regimental Historian getting confused. As I said previously, the sentence "the only support came from two SP guns attached to the 2nd battalion which fired HE and smoke onto the objective" may indeed make sense. Your attempt to dismiss my suggestion has not proved otherwise. Having said that, I’ve identified the likely M10 Troop Commander – now all I have to do is establish what he was up to on the morning of 07Jun44 – I’m guessing he wasn’t down the pub!


    Arty
     
    Last edited: Aug 13, 2016
  18. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Sorry but this starts to look like a conspiricy theory based on a determination to prove that the unsourced quote that mentioned two guns is right and all other contemporary sources wrong.

    We know that two batteries of SP guns were supposed to support the fire plan which was postponed at the last minute. We know that at least one of them fired all day in support of the Warwicks and other SP batteries supported the attack by the Norfolks.

    OK so possibly two M10s of 41 Battery could have fired in support of the Warwicks from Bieville.

    • Who gave this unit, under 185 brigade command, but part of the Divisional anti tank plan orders to take part in this operation, disclosing their location?
    • Why would they fire smoke and HE on the same targets as 7th Field Regiments fireplan but without the CO 7th Field Regiment, then plan's author being aware of it.
    • How did they communicate with the Warwicks as the attack progressed and how were they supposed to know when were they supposed to stop firing?
    • How did the author of the unsourced quote know that the fire was from two M10 SPs and not from the 105mm SP battery assigned to support the battalion?
    • If some junior officer or NCO in 41 Battery showed initiative and did the right thing on a difficult day why didn't anyone comment on their actions or put forward for some form of gong?
    I'd be happier to accept your interpretation if I knew the sources for the quote about only two guns in support.
     
    Last edited: Aug 13, 2016
  19. Whatever its unit may have been, Sherman V OP 'LANDRÉCY' had definitely been KO'd by 1 Aug 44, because 'LANDRECY II' is shown as a (total) wreck in B8409 (click on the image to go to the IWM page, then on the image again to get the zoomable version):
    [​IMG]
    THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORMANDY 1944. © IWM (B 8409)
    IWM Non Commercial Licence

    Or maybe the 'LANDRÉCY' Capt Bruce refers to was already 'LANDRECY II'.

    In the same series of photos shot at a scrap yard on 1 Aug 44 by Sgt Wilkes, on B8394 we can see a Carrier of 2 WARWICK, also in a rather sorry state (the one to the right, perhaps one of those destroyed at Lebisey?). Apart from the obvious AoS 67, we can see, or rather half-guess, the loading markings '1213/338/L...', '1213' being the Unit Mob Serial Number for 2 WARWICK (photo also zoomable on the IWM page):
    [​IMG]
    THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORMANDY 1944. © IWM (B 8394)
    IWM Non Commercial Licence

    LCT(4) LTIN 338 was to land at H+240 on QUEEN WHITE, among others, 31 men of 2 WARWICK in the following vehicles:

    2 carriers univ towing 2 guns 6 pr A tk of the A tk pl
    2 carriers mortar
    2 carriers univ (coy comds)

    plus 2 M10 (3" A tk) & 1 carrier univ with 20 men of 41 A Tk Bty.

    I leave it to the Carrier experts to find out what kind of carrier the one on B8394 is (the 'standard' type, the Mortar one or the A tk towing one, which I understand was a variant of the Mortar one).

    LTIN 339 had a similar load (4 carriers univ, 2 guns 6 pr, 3 carriers mortar of 2 WARWICK plus 2 M10 & 1 carrier univ of 41 A tk Bty).

    The loading plan certainly suggests that the SP troop of 41 Bty was to support 2 WARWICK, the other two troops (towed 6 pr) in 41 Bty, loaded one in LTIN 343 and the other in 345, respectively supporting 2 KSLI and 1 NORFOLK.

    Maybe two of these M10 remained in company with the 2 WARWICK carriers until the evening of D Day?

    Michel
     
    Last edited: Aug 14, 2016
  20. Arty

    Arty Member

    Yes it's all a conspiracy... Langrune sur Mer AM 07Jun44 IWM B5148.jpg

    A two part post follows…

    Part I. A chronological order of events - with some interesting detail…
    Part II. Some ‘comic’ relief…

    Part I.


    06Jun44 - 41 Anti Tank Battery of 20th Anti Tank Regiment RA had been attached to 185 Infantry Brigade. 41 AT Bty’s Self propelled gun Troop was B Troop. B Trp was equipped with 4 M10s (ie. Self Propelled Anti Tank guns – principal role was Anti Tank for which 70% of the ammunition load was Armour Piercing Rounds. Of note AP rounds were also used against a range ‘hard’ targets eg. bunkers, antitank walls, factory chimneys etc). OC B Trp on 06Jun44 was Lt Sydney Perring Thomas. B Trp was to be part of a mobile column (including 2nd Bn KSLI & Staffordshire Yeomanry) which was to attempt to reach Caen on 06Jun44.

    On 06Jun44 the towed 6pdr’s of 41 Bty were deployed as a ‘backstop’ behind the Infantry Battalions of 185 Inf Bde. 41 Anti Tank Bty’s SP Gun Troop was attached to 185 Inf Bde’s forward Infantry Battalion.

    ~1055hrs 41 AT Bty including B Trp with 4 M10s landed on Queen White beach
    ~1330hrs B Trp clear of beach
    ~1430hrs En route south M10 B4 engaged suspected mortar with 5 rds of High Explosive
    ~1530hrs Beuville area - M10 of B Trp reportedly fires at church tower in close support of infantrymen of 2 Bn KSLI (B troop apparently taking a pro-active role)
    ~1630hrs Bieville area - counter attack by 22 Panzer Regt of 21 Panzer Div – B Troop in action – two Panzer IVs hit by M10 B4, Panzer IV hit & damaged M10 B1 (gun damaged, some crew casualties - however M10 withdraws)
    ~2200hrs 2 Bn KSLI having got one Infantry Coy into Lebisey Wood had fallen back to Bieville.
    ~2300hrs B Trp Harboured with Staffordshire Yeomanry. B Trp, 41 AT Bty then had three M10s with operational guns.

    AM 07Jun44 - 41 Anti Tank Battery remained attached to 185 Infantry Brigade. HQ 185 Inf Bde was near Beuville (the War Diary of 20 AT Regt reported at 1600hrs that 41 AT Bty was at Le Homme, which is a hamlet ~250 yds north of Beuville).

    On the morning of 07Jun44 185 Infantry Brigades’s forward Infantry Battalion was the 2nd Battalion Warwickshire Regiment. 2nd Warwicks were to advance on Lebisey Wood - with planned artillery support (ie. from the Field Battery’s of 3 Div & one warship).

    ~0845hrs Attack had been postponed, however communications failure had occurred and leading Infantry Companies of 2 Warwicks moved forward without artillery support.

    Regimental Historian of 2nd Battalion Warwickshire Regiment states: “the only support came from two SP guns attached to the 2nd battalion which fired HE and smoke onto the objective”

    Conclusion?

    Part II.

    The attached photograph is IWM B5148 – taken in Langrune sur Mer AM 07Jun44 (ie. about the same time as the Warwicks were walking into a disaster). An M10 is seen acting just like an assault gun - firing at very close range in support of 48 RM Commando. Of note this M10 was firing at a concrete antitank wall - not using H.E. on this target, as it would have had little effect. It was using A.P. to successfully damage the wall. This M10 crew seems to have known what they were about or maybe they thought there was a Tiger hiding behind the wall?

    On the left of the photo Lt Col Moulton OC 48 RM Commando is perhaps yelling; “That's not according to doctrine!”

    And if you listen really closely you might here the M10’s commander shouting back: ‘No problems Sir, it’ll confuse want-to-be-historians in years to come!”

    Arty

    ps. Thanks Sheldrake you've inadvertently help me select an Avatar!
     
    Last edited: Aug 15, 2016

Share This Page