22 September: 4 Wiltshire versus mysterious factory in Arnhem-Zuid

1530 hours 22 September, whilst 4 Wiltshire was struggling to get passed the anti-tank screen at Ressen, 24 Typhoons attacked a factory on the south bank of the Rhine River.

Does anybody knows why this factory [see circle containing the digit 1] was so important (afterwards, 43 Division and Airborne Corps asked to bomb it again)

 

Man oh man, that looks to me like Arnhem Bridge
http://www.airrecce.co.uk/WW2/imagery/Arnhem/Arnhem.html
http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Forum/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=26&t=196



Someone had fun trying to model the Arnhem area: http://www.kerynne.com/games/ArnhemBridge.html
He noted a large Kestral Factory to the East of the bridge. No idea what it was though.

Ressen is NE of Nijmegen, SE of Arnhem, but a fair ways away from any river.
- It could be that bridges were very similar in the area...

Question.
Are you sure you have your dates right?

Edited. Factory was East, not NE of the Bridge.

 

Really, on 22 September, 4 Wiltshire did attack the heavily defended anti-tank screen at Ressen, unsuccesfully. They did so without air support (flying wheater was excellent, 24 Typhoons attacked a factory from which nothing is known).

 

Wrong dates in the original war diary of 4 Wiltshire.

So why was there no air support for 4 Wiltshire, or - more interesting - what was so special about this factory?

 

Nijemegen

Where do you get your information? I have to agree with Owen re what appears in the war diary for the 22nd. At 0815 on the morning of the 23rd 4 Wilts attacked Elst where they encountered heavy opposition.

John

 

I wonder whether there is any link between the Airborne Division's request for air support and the message at 1830 hrs. This might provide some explanation for the prioritisation.

John

 

I do not think so.

 

A few questions:

Horsapassenger - could you tell me where those air support requests by 1 AB Div are from?

Nijmegen - are you sure that is the factory that they attacked that day? I had always assumed that they meant the one to the west of Arnhem bridge from which the AA guns fired against 1 and 3 Para Bns on 19 Sep.

As for why planned air strikes were made rather than Close Air Support directed from the ground - their seem to be two historical schools - one blames the Army for not asking and the other blames the RAF for not providing CAS and doing armed recce instead.

It is intriguing to read of armed recce missions around Arnhem which reported back "no movement seen"!

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

Horsapassenger's attachments are both from the 30 Corps Log files, dated 22 September. That day, there were air "tentacles" with 129 (4 Wiltshire at Ressen) and 214 Brigade (7 Somerset LI at Oosterhout, also without air support).

I find it difficult to get a clear picture of why air support was not "100%", apart from the weather.

RGP

 

Nijmegen,

I'm doing some research into 21 Army Group air support and will post here anything relevant.

One immediate question though is whether I am right in regarding an "air tentacle" as different from a VCP (Visual Control Post?)? The way I understand it is that the former is a comms link to pass on requests for pre-arranged air support (i.e. please attack wood at MR ..... as soon as possible, thanks) while a VCP is like the one with the Irish Guards on 17 Sep 44 and contains an Army/RAF team of visual spotters who can speak directly to the planes pre-allocated as close air support.

I think that is how it worked (or didn't work more often!). I'd welcome any further information though.

Regards

Tom

 

Tom,

Your understanding is correct, I think. As I understand (now), there were two kinds of air support. Pre-arranged (i.e. 24 Typhoons attacking a factory in Arnhem-Zuid) and impromptu (i.e. the Irish Guards Group attack on 21 September, where an attached "air tentacle" failed to contact the CABRANK formation).

RGP

 

RGP,

Well for 21st September, Sebastian Ritchie (Arnhem: Myth and Reality) has argued that:

"By contrast, on the 21st, there is no evidence that 83 Group received any prior warning of the Guards' requirments. Indeed, when the call for support first came through, such aircraft as might theoretically have been provided were already airborne and committed to armed reconnaissance missions. Nowhere do the group, wing or squadron records indicate that the Typhoons were expecting to work with the Guards' VCP that day, and this may well partly explain why the VCP was unable to reach them (although, at the time, the Guards blamed faulty radio equipment)."

Incidentally, for the 22nd, Ritchie suggests that "At least one pre-planned attack targeted a 'factory to the south of the Lower Rhine', which was almost certainly the brickworks on the south bank of the Lower Rhine" [from which 1 Parachute Brigade troops were fired on during the 19th]. His source here is AIR26/698 - 83 Group F.540, September 1944.

Other Typhoon missions on 22 Sep apparently included: armed recce in Arnhem area, interdiction of German troop movements outside the MG area and support for troops inside the corridor (especially near Veghel).

Regards

Tom

 

Hi,

As I understand it, British CABRANK was very rare in NW Europe! So, in this respect, the difficulties supplying 30 Corps with effective air support are indicative of an enduring problem for Army - RAF co-operation during WW2.

As for the Irish Guards attacking north sooner - well, the British Army being quite a traditional institution I am sure that to begin with they were waiting for orders! I see that these came at 1100, not sure why the delay until 1330 to attack though - perhaps trying to tie-up supporting arms? Or waiting for Welsh Guards Gp to come up from Grave?

I'm not sure what you mean by "the "unsuitable" surrounding terrain (where the next day they themselves and 13/18 Hussars would operate, without problems" - as far as I can see, neither Irish Guards nor 13/18 Hussars made any progress up the main road on 22 Sep either.

Regards

Tom

 

Hi,

I've seen the 30 Corps Intentions signal before - what time was it sent to Guards Armd Div? It's a bit of a stretch for a Brigade Group to both ensure security of Nijmegen bridges and advance north up to Arnhem! Perhaps the Div Comd decided to wait for 43 Div to take over the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen before pushing anything but recce up the road north and west?

Both Irish Guards and 13/18 Hussars may have got off the road, but they didn't get far if I recall correctly and sadly suffered casualties to no effect? I think there is a little more on this in the Irish History?

The other factor must be the weakness of 3 Irish Guards - they started on 17 Sep with only 3 companies and had suffered further casualties since then I think.

Regards

Tom