1st Alamein - Panzerarmee SitRep translations

I found it curious that General Norrie, C.O. 30 Corps, is not mentioned for the First Battle of El Alamein. Goitt, C.O. 13 Corps gets mentioned twice.

3/7 13 Corps attack the Italian armoured division Ariete, when it lost all is artillery and was down to five usable tanks (pg.215). See: 132nd Armored Division "Ariete" - Wikipedia
9/7 9th Australian Division attack the Italian Sabratha (infantry) Division and routed it (pg.220). See: 60th Infantry Division "Sabratha" - Wikipedia
14/7 Counter-attack @ Ruweisat Ridge held by two Italian infantry divisions, Brescia & Pavia, 'the Italians broke' and 21 Panzer's attack called off moved to shore up the Italians (pg.220). See: 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" - Wikipedia and 17th Infantry Division "Pavia" - Wikipedia
17/7 Destruction of two Italian infantry divisions, Trieste and Trentino (pg.220). See: 101st Motorized Division "Trieste" - Wikipedia

Chink's diary recorded on 14/7 the attack had not achieved the hoped for success, four Italian divisions were now out of action

21/7 24hrs before 1st Australian Div. was due to attack, in Operation Splendour, their C.O. insisted on referring to his government before he attacked. A compromise was reached, with a British infantry brigade being moved up, so a 48hr delay. Another row over armour-infantry working together between Auchinleck and McCreery (Armour adviser to Auchinleck) led to the later being sacked. On 23/7 the Germans counter-attacked. On 26/7 Op Splendour was launched.

See a long description: Splendour | Operations & Codenames of WWII and: 1st Armoured Division (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia

There is no mention of the sacking in: Richard McCreery - Wikipedia

Every so often, particularly on 27/7, Churchill's pressure on Auchinleck to launch attacks is referred to.

 

In April 2025 I attended a lecture on a 1918 WW1 battle by Dr Martin Horton-Edison and he made three particular points (which I have tried to cover in my research):

1. The phases of the battle and the intentions of both sides. These are more important than current historiography recognises.
2. Aerial photos
3. Historical daytime temperature averages for location / region. So:

From: Mersa Matrouh Weather - Matruh, EG

Then I found an article in a RUSI Journal (No. 169 2024) ‘The Falklands War and the Sir Galahad Controversy’ (copy retained) and the points IMHO apply to El Alamein just as well:

See (££): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2024.2444114

 

I think the key here is 'what did they think they would achieve' with these attacks, and for that we can look into the op orders as objective reality and an accurate statement of their intent.

When you read them it is clear that the aim wasn't 'smash up some Italian units' or 'spoil the German attack'. The aim throughout all the attacks in the centre was to break the Axis line so it could be rolled up (exception 3/7 which I think was an opportunistic attack by the New Zealanders as Ariete was out on a limb). To wit:
- The intent on 14/15 July was for the armour to pass through Deir el Shein towards Miteyria Ridge which would have cut off everyone in the Axis positions north of Ruweisat.
- The expectation on 21 July was for a 3-phase attack, with two armoured divisions exploiting in Phase 3 towards Fuka.
- The expectation on 27 July was for 50 RTR to exploit, not for it to be shot to pieces on the initial objective.

They failed every single time at enormous cost in men and tanks. The reason was presumably that Dorman-Smith was too clever to take 'No' for an answer.

There was a reason that Morshead (9th, not 1st Austr.) insisted on checking back with his government. He knew that Dorman-Smith, while very clever, didn't give a toss about his men, and presumably understood that Dorman-Smith's insight, no matter how clever, was not based on objective reality.

There's a lot of apologia for the command performance of the British army in the desert (and, judging by the points in the Sir Galahad article, also in the Falklands War). It needs to be recognised as such.

I have a lot of time for Auchinleck, but it is clear to me that he had to be sacked not when he was, but preferably a few weeks before. The idea that Dorman-Smith could run Eighth Army is just further proof of his non-existent capacity to correctly judge his subordinates. The same goes for whoever thought Gott would have been a good GOC Eighth Army. Where do you even start with that one...

Sorry for being cranky, but this kind of stuff really gets my goat.

All the best

Andreas

 

Andreas,

Thank you. I am relatively new to the North African campaign, having looked at one battle and an incident in Algeria. Forty plus years ago I read a series of books on WW2 Allied Commanders, plus the Gun Buster books and when I returned to military history a number of front line accounts.

The book about Chink was interesting, as it gave a window into one officer's thinking, knowledge and relationships - notably with Auchinleck.

Sadly, once the Afrika Korps and Rommel arrived in North Africa, the British-led army was simply outclassed. Equipment (except field artillery) was under-gunned, the 2-pounder tank and anti-tank gun are most commonly cited. Many senior officers were conservative in their approach, not only to fighting, but preparing to fight and work together - as if the final '100 days Offensives' in 1918 had never happened.

 

I feel your pain!!

Wasn't Major General Tom Corbett Chief of Staff at GHQ, ME? 'Chink' being Deputy to him?

In December 1940? Do they give a reference for that?

My interpretation is that Rommel's attack on 1 Jul 42 failed because it blundered into the Alamein and Deir el Shein boxes. From what we know of Eighth Army instructions from 28 - 30 June 1942, it appears that the forces in these boxes were being stripped down and converted into those mini-brigade columns which most commentators have regarded as one of the causes of the Commonwealth defeats during 1942. Fortunately for the British at Alamein, Rommel attacked before the re-organisation into columns was complete. Hardly a ringing endorsement of British generalship though.

I have seen elsewhere that 'Chink' claimed that it was down to him that Rommel's forces ran into concentrated artillery fire at Alamein. I have looked in vain, so far, for any evidence to support that contention. I have not given up hope though!

A detailed analysis of the comparative strengths of the armies opposing each other during First Alamein would also be informative.

Regards

Tom

 

I seem to recall (and will go away and check!) that Freyberg was away during this period (wounded at Matruh) and Inglis was GOC NZ Div. Freyberg was not impressed that the NZ Div had been misemployed whilst he was recovering.

Regards

Tom

 

Notes as I read the book again to answer Tom's points and questions.

Tom's first question:

Wiki first which has a partial story:

From: Thomas Corbett (Indian Army officer) - Wikipedia

Chink was recalled to duty by Auchinleck 8/5/1942, as Deputy CGS in Cairo (War Office approved 16/6/1942) and started work immediately. Corbett was them Chief of Staff. On 23/7/1942 Auchinleck decided Corbett would return to India, with a formal handover 27/7/1942. Brooke GGS refers to Corbett was to go on 8/8/1942 (amongst other command changes) and Corbett was still there10-15/8/1942. He left Cairo for India after 23/8/1942.

Tom's second question:

Chink visited the Western Defence Force, led by O'Connor, whilst posted as Commandant to the new Haifa-based Staff College, between 9-24/10/1941. Three years before he had designed the Mersa Matruh defences. He arrived at O'Connor's HQ @ Maarten Baggush on 25/11/1941, he appears not to have been Chief of Staff - odd to me - and he names the BGS as John Harding. He was doing the planning and reporting to Wavell in person and flew to Ritchie's HQ 29/5/1942. .

He returned to Cairo to replace Galloway BGS British Troops Egypt (BTE), after O'Connor's capture (6/4/1941) and the next day Tobruk was attacked by Rommel (10/4/1941).

He was then indoctrinated for Ultra and he relished every glimpse of enemy intentions ( I have my doubts about that). The next date in the book is 13/4/1941.

 

WO 216/85 - Notes on Operations.

The file contains a report produced by Norrie for Auchinleck and submitted on 12th July, 1942. He caveated the report with the remarks that it had been dictated in a hurry, should be considered as a draft but did serve "as a record of my views at this time".

"B.T.E. was ordered to organise the EL ALAMEIN line, but 30 Corps took this over as it was obviously too far to control it from CAIRO. This so-called line again consisted of three half-finished Boxes, a good deal better than any others I have seen, but with a gap of 16 miles between each locality. The general layout had been thought out on the assumption we would have plenty of armour to place between boxes, an incorrect assumption."

The report was distributed, but on relatively close hold, at end of Aug - beginning of Sep 42 to certain Home Forces commanders, the War Office scientific advisor and the Commandant of the Staff College.

It's quite interesting reading for Gazala but doesn't really cover Alamein.

Regards

Tom

 

That date sounds much more likely. I've been reading around the Sigint delivered during Jan - Mar 41 to HQ Troops in the Sudan hence my scepticism about his possibly being indoctrinated in late 1940.

Regards

Tom

 

I noted this remark in Connell's biography of Auchinleck - p.614, when he describes Auchinleck's motives for changing the plans for defending Matruh:

"Auchinleck's motive for this decision was his desire to gain time - time to bring more tanks up from the workshops, time for the R.A.F. to settle down and work from new airfields, time to bring the 9th Australian Division from Syria, time to concentrate all the remaining field and medium artillery under centralized command."

Just following up on that last point again. What evidence is there that "all the remaining field and medium artillery" were concentrated "under centralized command"?

On p.623, Connell suggests that Auchinleck's "orders" flowing from the appreciation he produced on 28 June 1942 were "widely misinterpreted" and provides as evidence Kippenberger's account of his [he was temporarily commanding NZ Div in both Freyberg's and Inglis' absences] briefing from Gott on the 29th.

More to follow.

Regard

Tom

 

Do you have the full text of the appreciation? This isn't mentioned in the summary quoted in the Auchinleck Papers.

In any case, when CCRA 13 Corps visited 5 Ind Div on 2 o3 July it 2x8-gun regiments left, each of which was operating in a separate column. See also the SA report I quote above. So...

Having said that, for SPLENDOUR the CCRA put on a Corps fire plan with tasks given to all subordinated divisions.

so within those three weeks they seem to have sorted concentration.

All the best

Andreas

 

I don’t think so, but Barr references it as well so it should be available.

I’m away for a week now but will return to this when I get back.

Thanks. I’ve got some artillery files for July - more on my next trip to Kew!

Regards

Tom

 

Tom refers in Post 29 to Chin's indoctrination into Ultra and his own research:

Stewart in 'The First Victory' refers (pg.140-141) to Italian high grade ciphers being broken in November 1940, which enabled all signals intercepted between Abyssinia and Italian command being read. With attendant distribution.

My own point would be that 'Chink' did not need indoctrination into Ultra when in North Africa in 1940, as there were only Italians to fight and Ultra refers to German radio traffic interception. I have never seen any mention of a small German liaison staff / presence with the the Italians in North Africa i.e. before the Afrika Korps arrival.

 

You wouldn't expect to see corroboration in a letter, but for what it's worth, this period (April 1941 onward) is covered by the Google Preview of the second book:

https://www.google.co.kr/books/edition/Military_Maverick/hSM6EQAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1

Alternatively, the full .epub version is reduced to £1.99:
Military Maverick

 

Charley,

Thank you, but here the preview ended in October 1923. Not the period sought. Ah well, back to chores.

 

Odd, I'm seeing a preview that ends at 2 July 1941.

Perhaps regional variation--will investigate.

 

Charley,

Three points to make: 1) 20/5/1941 After the fall of Crete he refers to 'doped' German parachutists being 'braver and dangerous'; 2) 1/6/1941 Interesting post-Crete reflections; and 3) 2/7/1942 no mention of the day's battle.

I will add a cross-reference to Post 37 on the main thread for 'Chink'.

 

RE: Italian dates for the battles.

From Seconda controffensiva italo-tedesca in Africa settentrionale da El Agheila a El Alamein (1951)

1–3 July Primo tentative della forze italo-tedesche per superare la resistenza della linea di El Alamein-El Qattara (First attempt by the Italian-German forces to overcome the resistance of the El Alamein-El Qattara line).
10–27 July La battaglia difensive di El Alamein. (The Defensive Battle of El Alamein)

30 Aug – 5 Sep Secondo tentative della forze italo-tedesche per avvolgere le forze britanniche ad El Alamein (Second attempt by the Italo-German forces to envelop the British forces at El Alamein).

The terms 1st Alamein and Battle of Alam el Halfa are not used in this early official.

Montanari’s Le operazioni in Africa settentrionale vol. III El Alamein (1989) uses La prima battaglia di El Alamein (1-27 July) and La seconda battaglia di El Alamein (30 Aug–5 Sep). The section of the book that actually covers the fighting during the 2nd Battle is titled La battaglia di Alam el Haifa. The newer Italian official history does title the second battle as Alam el Haifa.

Pista! Jeff

 

Now complete.

All the best

Andreas