I notice that Correlli Barnett died on 10 July and here is the link to his obituary in The Times: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/?shareToken=e4f203a68cf2527c95074dda82eb7bb1 Although controversial he was renowned for his myth-busting books, such as The Desert Generals.
Although I would suggest that The Desert Generals just replaced one set of myths by another. Any historian who writes about “second hand coats of glory” needs to go for a long walk to calm down!! Regards Tom
I haven't read The Desert Generals but I was just thinking that the whole premise that Auchinleck was responsible for the victory at Second El Alamein, or Montgomery, suggests that nothing else changed in Eighth Army in the intervening months. I think Niall Barr's book talks about the more.... Institutional changes in the intervening months.
I understand the motivation for Barnett's thrust. Monty decided that tactically it would play well (with the men and correspondingly for his own status) to be seen as an entirely new model of broom, hence it would be to his advantage to imply that all previous tools has been faulty—or perhaps psychologically incapable of the task at hand. Auchinleck was honourable to a fault and made no public fuss at such shoddy treatment, or at such party tricks as Monty issuing orders before having formally taken command, and this perceived denigration of the Auk's reputation rankled greatly with his friends, as well as those who had lost blood and sweat before their white-kneed replacements turned up to loudly point out their mistakes. I don't have the figures to hand, but Alex and Monty were given enough in the way of fresh men and materiel—plus the increased supplies to maintain it all—to change the nature of the problem and enable new approaches to its solution, but in matters of war the bottom line is defeat or victory, regardless of how well a general played his hand. Barnett, Cornell and others appeared to want to redress the balance and give the Auk his efforts, but they overstated the case and underplayed his chronically bad decisions at picking men: Cunningham, Ritchie, Shearer his DMI, and arguably Dorman-Smith, his Chief of Staff. My grandfather's battalion was there at 'First Alamein' under Auchinleck, and from all I've read, there was little answering the description of an army under command until the crucial period of the first few days of July had already passed. What stopped Rommell passing into the Delta and seizing Cairo was the surprising tenacity of a small number of British and Imperial units and hastily assembled columns (formal 'formations' were a shambles and regularly out of communication with the units they commanded, often for very short periods of time) coupled with a merciful exhaustion of Axis tanks, fuel and men at the end of a very long pursuit. That there were positions to fall back to at Alamein is, of course, to Auchinleck's credit, but at the same time he'd be damned with negligence if there hadn't been.
I'm never quite sure whether the instructions to prepare the El Alamein position came from Wavell or Auchinleck but I presume the former. 2 S.A. Division worked on them through 1941. Auchinleck had a great military mind but was absolutely abysmal at selecting subordinates and then controlling them. While he outgeneralled Rommel by a clear margin, Rommel did the HR work required to keep an army on a tight leash much better. All the best Andreas
Recommend Colvin's book for this, which I was kindly invited to review for The Wavell Room. Book Review: Eighth Army against Rommel All the best Andreas
Auchinleck's papers are now available for this period: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sou...UQFnoECCAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2LcFasarY7rSiHgV7bqhPa
I am partial to the book as I did proofreading/line-editing for it but would still definitely recommend Barr's book as I think the focus is different. (That's Pendulum of War by Niall Barr)
That seems a fair assessment. In the historiography there have been some swings back and forth, and in hindsight we can now I think achieve a better synthesis.
Side note in relation to Charley's point - August 13 was the day on which Monty gave his "no retreat" order.
I've always considered Corelli Barnett to be one of those 20th Century oddballs, like Gore Vidal or Carroll Quigley, where you have to buy into the entire worldview in order to make sense of the books.
They always have been, if you went to the Deansgate Library of the University of Manchester. I got access to them in the early 80s as a student there when my group were doing work on the Gazala campaign, but anyone could write in and request access. I'm not going to wade into the argument Auk bad/Monty good/Auk good/Monty over-rated again, but a considerable black mark for Monty agitating that the "8th Army" clasp to the Africa Star only be granted to those serving on or after his assumption of command which did some brave men a disservice.
It was a wartime decision. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commo...cca521-77b1-4f0c-860d-171b426301ee/AfricaStar I think any idea that Montgomery, at the time GOC 8th Army, wasn't involved in it is not credible. Given that Brooke supported the idea, I can think of three men who would have been able to counteract this - Churchill, Alexander, and Montgomery. The matter continued during and after the war. Maybe someone can go and dig out these letters? GB AUC/1051 Letter 9 Mar 1944 Extent of unit of description: 1 leaf. Letter from Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to Auchinleck, concerning the extension of the emblem '8' to the ribbons of those who served in the 8th Army before the battle of El Alamein (AUC/1048 above), stating that he wrote to the Prime Minister supporting Auchinleck's request; that the submission was then forwarded to the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and Medals in Time of War; that the application was rejected on the grounds that, if Auchinleck's submission was accepted, other claims of various kinds to similar privileges would make the whole problem insoluble; and that, therefore, it was necessary to stand firm on the original, if arbitrary, distinction and to resist extensions. Typescript, signed, with a holograph note. GB AUC/1329 Letter 7 Feb 1962 Extent of unit of description: 2 leaves. Letter from John Profumo, Secetary of State for War, to Auchinleck, explaining his reasons for rejecting Auchinleck's plea to extend the clasp '8' to all who served in the Eighth Army and were awarded the Africa Star medal, instead of restricting it to those who served from 23 October 1942 only. The reasons are the same as those advanced in 1944 when a similar request was rejected [see AUC/1051 above]. Typescript, signed. https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/files/rylands/gb133auc.xml All the best Andreas
I wonder if Correlli Barnett did himself a bit of a disservice by writing The Desert Generals. Sure it shifted lots of copies but by its provocativeness marked him out as an enfant terrible of historians and maybe led to later, worthier, works being ignored. The first of his I read was "The Collapse of British Power", polemical and depressing but still worth reading. Then The Desert Generals, which felt a bit duff at the time and as I have learnt more gets worse. Haven't read anything else of his since, maybe missing out.
Might add it to the pile, thanks. I hope it won't be polemical and depressing (the latter would be hard) or provocative and error strewn. Get enough of that on the internet!
