3 Panzer- Grenadier Division- 3 Infanterie Division( mot.)

These are a list of 10 Royal Berks personnel posted missing on 9th February - although the names have been crossed out as part of a tracing exercise you can see the disastrous effect this action had on the battalion.

 

Here are the pages from the short history of the fighting tenth by David R. C. West.Page 59 & 60 says it all. Gary, thanks for posting the missing personnel file it (had not crossed my mind to show it!) Nice one. A reprint of this book is knocking about on the internet.









The Italians did detailed maps.

Regards,
Stu.Edit; here is a map from Frank de Planta's pack.. Garigliano & Anzio Battlefield Study 13-16 June 2019.
With kind permission of Frank. Thanks for giving me the OK to quote & use your pack when needed.

 

Here is the relevant section from the Cabinet Office Historical Section's Enemy Document Section file for Feb 44 (CAB146/50):





Regards

Tom

 

A Cab file that is on my list. How many pages are in it? Not seen it before!

Regards,
Stu.

 

Stu,

135 pages.

Regards

Tom

 

Chaps, slightly going off the thread for a minute.

Can any of you provide me with a link to how may Cab files are held at Kew? I do have a few of which (some are more legible than others)! The one on the 1 Loyals cheesed me off.

Tom,

thanks for sending the above.

Regards,
Stu.

 

And the view from 168 Bde: this is their Int Log for 9 Feb 44 (WO171/628):



Anyone know which tank unit was in support that day?

Stu,

No worries, it is a pleasure. If anyone else is interested in that EDS section file, please feel free to ask.

regards

Tom

 

Hi Tom,

It was probably 46 RTR, in all likelihood A Squadron.



Regards,
Gary.

 

Die 3.Panzer Grenadier Division

 

This is a continuation of post: 3 Panzer- Grenadier Division- 3 Infanterie Division( mot.)

Translated text pp. 297 - 307:

d) Advance to road 82

After Aprilia is taken, preparations are under way for the 2nd and 3rd phases of the attack to throw the enemy back into the sea. For this purpose, the 14. Armee has assembled eight divisions, four Stug-Brigades, and Tiger- and Panthertanks units. In addition, the Armee has 400 guns at her disposal, so that, apart from the ship artillery and air force, it can for the first time fight the enemy on equal terms.

An attack by the two flanking divisions is ruled out, as enemy ship artillery is liable to crush every move, and in the north the ground is intersected by many canals and in the south is extremely swampy. The attack therefore can only be carried out from the Buonriposo - Carroceto - Aprilia - Spacasassi-Citerna area. Contrary to the wishes of the army to launch a flanking attack from the Cisterna area, high command orders a drive along the Anziata toward Anzio, since the area here seems more suitable for tanks. Thus the main effort lays with our division again; which will be supported by flanking attacks of the 65.I.D. from the zone west of Carroceto toward Buonriposo, from the 715.I.D. from the Aprilia area toward the southeast and from the 114.Jg.Div. from the area sector west of Spacasassi toward the south.

The first target is road 82, which, just south of the Carroceto Brook, four kilometers south of Carroceto, intersects the Anziata at right angles at the Campo di Carne stop; the second goal is the northern edge of the Bosco di Padiglione. As soon as this target has been taken by our division, an armoured K.Gr. consisting of the 26. Pz.Div. and the 29. Pz.Gr.Div. will be launched and exploit in to the depth toward Anzio.

Many details are fixed by the Führerheadquarters: on the one hand, the narrow zone of attack to ensure the overwhelming effect of the artillery. On the other the choice for the Inf.Lehr-Rgt. to conduct the main effort, a training unit that has not yet been tested, which lacks field kitchens and supply units and accordingly neither the ammunition nor the food supplies are well organized; it is also not familiar with the ground; because it is hurriedly moved up by trucks of our division and immediately thrown into action. The unfavorable late time of the day for the attack is also set at the Führerheadquarters: 6:30 am; since the Inf.Lehr-Rgt. is not familiar with the terrain, it can only attack in daylight. But this plan entails great risks: it enables the enemy to concentrate his batteries, of which the sound measurement battery of the "H.G." has determined 98, as well as his air force on a very limited zone and grasp our narrow penetration from the flanks.

Opposite us, west of the Anziata, is located the 56th British Inf.Div. and astride the road the 45th U.S. Inf. Div. The enemy now is twice as strong as before. The enemy MDL runs 1.5 to 2 kilometers in front of ours and drops off slightly. In between, the enemy has set up strong combat outposts, that allow time for countermeasures. In the Bosco di Padoglione three battalions are positioned and in the southern part of the forest astride the Anziata there are three more regiments and parts of the 1st US Armored Division in reserve.
The start date for our attack is set at February 16. The divisional command post moves into a cellar of a farmhouse north of Aprilia, three kilometers behind the MDL. In addition to other staff units, the main first aid station is also located here. The assigned amount of ammunition of the artillery is two Ausstattungen, for which another 500 tons still have to be brought forward on February 14th. For the attack, one-third of the Ausstattung for l.FH., 1.5 for s.F.H. and two Ausstattungen for the 10 cm cannons are available. Our Flak-Abt. moves into position at Pasquiali (north of Aprilia), from where it can act in an anti-aircraft as well as artillery role.
Instead of K.Gr. Gräser, our division now operates again as an independent entity, as does the 715.I.D. For this, the Inf.Lehr-Rgt (Oberst Kruska) will be under command of the division and with short interruptions will remain so until the Arno. On our right the I. FJ.Korps, passing through the zone of the 65.I.D., attacks south towards road 82.

Our division's zone is moved to the west, so that it now lies on both sides of the Anziata, 500 meters west and 750 meters east of the road, on the right contact is established with the 65. and to left with the 715. I.D.
For the attack the division is organized: a) in K.Gr. Kruska (Inf.Lehr-Rgt., Pz.Pi.Kp 813 (Goliath) and 3./Pi.Btl. (Mot) 3, who is distributed to the battalions, a platoon each, for assault tasks); b) K.Gr. G.R.(mot) 29 (commanded because of sickness of Oberst Schönfeld until 19.2 by Oberstlt.i.G. Jaster, then Major Wegener (Pi.Btl.3), with assigned Kp. of the Pi.Btl. (Mot) 3 and a platoon Pz.Zerst.Zug 3; c) Pz.Abt. 103; d) 2./Pz.Abt. 301 (FKL); e) A.R. (mot) 3, without 4. and 5. Bttr., with Pz.Art.Rgt. 93 (26.Pz.Div.) and s.Art.(mot) 998 (2 Bttr. of 22 cm Mortars); f) Pi.Btl.(mot) 3 with subordinate Brücken-Kol. (mot) 840.

And so it became 16.2, a sunny and clear day. At 6:00 a.m. our artillery opened up for half an hour and for the first time in Italy had sufficient ammunition. To the west of the main road, K.Gr. G.R.29 made some slight penetrations; local strongpoints, such as Buonriposo, which hold out despite being surrounded keep hindering. On the other hand, the Inf.Lehr- Rgt. east of the road managed to break into the enemy line. The enemy is forced to withdraw his light artillery and to compensate for the drop in firepower, he increases the use of ships artillery and his air force. Since tanks can only move on the roads, the bulk of the fighting is carried by the infantry. Soon the Inf.Lehr-Rgt. is subjected to a hurricane of fire of unprecedented proportions. In the smallest space, the enemy uses artillery concentrations of up to 144 guns and directs it not only on the attacking infantry, but also on all access routes, especially the Anziata.
We immediately suffer heavy losses. Because digging in is problematic, as already after 35 cm groundwater is encountered. The supply troops also suffer severely, all six trucks that were supposed to transport ammunition to the Inf.Lehr-Rgt. were hit and destroyed. Not even a secure evacuation of the wounded is possible, as the division does not have armored vehicles, because the Pz.Aufkl.Abt.103 is deployed elsewhere and despite our requests is not released. In two days, the division's aid stations receive 1,000 admissions.

Under intense fire, the remnants of the Inf.Lehr-Rgt., in the afternoon, pull back about one kilometer. The division was able to advance its MDL between the Anziata and the north-south road one kilometer to the east, by 600 meters, but fell short of its first objectives and the enemy did not have to use his reserves in the battle. Four kilometers to the west, the 65.I.D. manages to push a little deeper into the enemy lines, but is halted after 1 kilometer. Also, to the left of us, where the 715. I.D. attacks from Aprilia along the Carroceto and Ficoccia gorges toward the southeast, only slight gains are made. The division, on this first day, only brought in eight captured soldiers from the 45th U.S. Inf.Div.


Situation on 17 feb 44 (Map courtesy "American forces in Action: Anzio Bridgehead")

In the night to February 17th, the assault forces are reshuffled. Now attack: G.R.741, 145 and 725, supported by 60 tanks and air support. One thrust has to go along the Anziata, a second along the north-south road two kilometers east of Aprilia. The 65th I.D. shifts its attack closer to our division. The division resumes the attack at 01:00 in the morning. This assault, too, made no headway against strong enemy defensive fire. Then the Inf.Lehr-Rgt., skillfully supported by forward observation officers of the A.R.3 and by Stugs, succeeds in crossing the Carrocetello stream and reaches the "dead end road" (3 km south of Aprilia) east of the Anziata. The I.R. 725, three kilometers eastwards, reaches the north-south road as well. This means that the enemy's advanced positions are pushed back and by noon a break-in has been accomplished of four kilometers wide and two kilometers deep, as far as the "dead end road". Hptm. D'Heureuse (3./A.R.(mot) 3) receives the certificate of recognition from the Ob.d.Heeres.

Again the resistance is tremendous. The enemy fires 15,000 shells in a short time. Artillery planes hover in the air directing the artillery, temporarily joined by the guns of three warships. The enemy air force is out on a large scale, and from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. targets tank assembly areas, and our supply and rear installations, mainly in the area of Aprilia, Campoleone and along the Anziata with 942 tons of bombs. The command posts of the Inf.Lehr-Rgt. and the G.R. (mot) 29 have to endure twelve fighter bomber attacks. Our attempt in the afternoon to expand the break-in with fresh troops makes no headway, but the line we have won was held against two counterattacks during the night. By now our attack runs out of steam; on the second day our losses were 535 men. We capture 79 prisoners. The enemy's losses are so severe that he shifts units from the Cisterna front and also throws fresh replacements into battle.

February 18th will be a day of crisis for the enemy. Because the German command now commited the two reserve divisions, which were supposed to exploit the initial succes, to force a breakthrough; the 26.Pz.Division hard to the left of us, so that it took over our left sector, and the 29.Pz.Gren.Div. further east, which pushed forward to the southeast between the Fso.della Ficoccia and the road running from point 71 to the southeast.

In addition to the Inf.Lehr.-Rgt. and G.R. 29 are attached the regiments 735 (715. I.D.), 721 and 741 (114.Jg.Div.). In the early morning of February 18, it was possible to extend the salient gained the previous day and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. The leading elements of the Inf.Lehr-Rgt. reached road 82 at 04:00, then had to fall back 400 meters because of strong flanking fire. To the left of it the Pz.Gren.Rgt.67 (26.Pz.Div.) approaches to within 500 meters of the road; a further advance is prevented by the fact that the tanks are bound to the roads. Further eastward, the G.R. 15 (29. Pz.Gr.Div.) pushes forward north to the road Tre.di Padiglione, but then finds itself in an untenable position, as it was not possible to bring up anti-tank guns and eliminate flanking fire. The Rgt. loses two battalions on the following day (19 February). In the afternoon (of the 18th) tanks of the 26.Pz.Div. move forward on the oblique road to the southeast. Only the blown bridge over the Carroceto Brook prevents an breakthrough. In the meantime the enemy's resistance is stiffening with counter-attacks supported by air; he also is able to concentrate the fire-power of 224 guns anywhere.

On the third day, our salient into the enemy line was extended to a width of nine kilometers and a depth of four. To our division the enemy loses 65 tanks and 5 planes. But the first objective, road 82, has only been partially gained, the second, the Bosco di Padiglione, has not been reached at all, despite the commitment of our reserve divisions. However, the situation is also desperate for the enemy: many FOO's have fallen out, contact between regiments and battalions is largely lost, and in the area of the Campo di Carne only one British battalion can withdraw in good order to the forward defensive line.


Situation 18 Feb 1944 "Anzio the Crisis" (Map courtesy "American forces in Action: Anzio Bridgehead")

On the night of February 19, the opponent reorganized his lines and gave up the projecting arch between the oblique road (south of Tre. Di Carroceto-Brucke) to Cas.di Carano. For the 19th he is planning two counterattacks: one along the Anziata to the "dead end road" and one along the oblique road. The first one, carried out with a tremendous effort by his airforce and artillery, penetrates 2 kilometers. But the latter does not come to fruition, since the forces cannot be assembled.
The Inf.Lehr.-Rgt. attacks again on this day, but makes no headway as a result of the amount of artillery and fighter bombers engaged by the enemy. On the other hand, to the west of the Anziata the III./29 advancing to the south-west, succeeds in crossing the Caronte Gorge and in the course of the afternoon pushes forward to the Fso. della Bottaccia, where it becomes stuck in front of hill 82 and digs in. However, contact to the right neighbor, the attached K.Gr. Dorst (I./G.R.145, I./G.R.147 of the 65. I.D.), is not not yet established. The enemy loses six tanks and two aircraft to our Flak. The 20.2 sees another attack by our division along the Anziata; however, this is halted on division command, as the defensive fire becomes too strong and both flanks are in the air.

Overall, the front was pushed forward by 500 meters on February 19th and 20th. It was not realized that, at the moment that our attack is halted, the enemy has engaged his last reserves and even considers to evacuate his bridgehead. In the evening the order arrives to consolidate and to deploy in depth. The frontline runs from the eastern edge of the Campo di Carne gorge over the southern edge of the Fso. di Caronto and further eastward 500 meters north of road 82, eleven kilometers north of Anzio.


Situation on 19 - 20 Feb 1944 The Battle is won (Map courtesy "American forces in Action: Anzio Bridgehead")

As the plan is to widen our salient toward the east by an attack of the 26.Pz.Div. along the north-south road from Tre.Spacasassi to Tre.du Padiglione, the 26.Pz.Div. is relieved in the night of February 22nd by the Rgt.29 after this and the division handed over the sector west of the Anziata to the 65th I.D. However, this attack is not carried out. Instead, our 14. Armee orders a second attack on the bridgehead for February 29th, shifting the main effort to Cisterna. The attack on Nettuno is carried out on a broad front with four divisions, after a thaw and a torrential rain on the preceding day had turned the ground and road into a bog. As tanks cannot be used and the enemy has recognized the preparations, the attack fails. So the 14. Armee finally goes over to the defense, although the army orders, until the beginning of March, provide for an shift of the frontline toward road 82.

THE END

 

Is there still interest in further translations of the war diary? Next week I would have time for it again

 

Hi, yes please. There's more in the war diary as well if you find yourself with some spare time.

Regards

Tom

 

Not half... Please jog-on.. I'm working on a shed-load of war diaries of 5 Grenadiers. I thought you had done one off the forum?

The Grenadiers make some interesting reading & thats only between the 22-28 Jan.

Thanks,
Stu... Edit.. you have made my day!

 

I apologise for the significant delay, but life is what happens while making other plans.
Anyway, here is the promised continuation:

8.2.
In the morning II/G.R. 29 collected in the gorge east of Aprilia. The infantry had many casualties, but a very large part was scattered. The platoon Schubert and the platoon Steinborn are all together except for the wounded and missing. They are waiting for further orders. - In the meantime Lieutenant Ewers arrives and takes over the leadership of the company for the wounded Lieutenant von Eberstein.
In the afternoon, the entire II Battalion marches with the Engineer Company to the regimental command post. In the coming night, another attack is to be made in order to finally gain the ordered space. The company is placed under the command of III/G.R. 29 (Major Grün) for this purpose. The platoon Schubert is to take the Guardapassi road bridge and immediately lay out quick barriers to the east. The 3rd platoon, in cooperation with the 9th/G.R. 29 (Lt. Tuschy), is to take possession of the Aprilia barracks and immediately set up quick barriers here as well. The engineer platoon Engel is placed under the 10th Company in order to take the cemetery area with it. The 2nd Platoon remains a reserve and supply platoon.

 

9.2.
pouring rain and cold wind prevailed throughout the night. At 0.00 a.m. the attack was launched. Schubert's platoon worked its way up to within 500 metres of the bridge, while our own artillery fire lay in the area of the bridge. 5 enemy machine guns lay on the bridge for protection. Oberfeldwebel Schubert deploys his platoon like pincers. As the friendly artillery fire shifts further to the east and south, his group works its way to within 20m of the bridge under the cover of the machine guns. After throwing hand grenades and satchel charges, the platoon forced onto the bridge. The enemy leaves 4 dead and 5 damaged MG's. On the road, rapid barriage are immediately laid out to the east and southwest and tank destruction squads are deployed. At 1.30 a.m. the bridge is firmly in the hands of the platoon. The enemy had secured the bridge with 5 K-rolls and intended to prepare the bridge for demolition. The scaffolding was torn down. At dawn, 3 enemy armoured scout cars approached from the east. However, recognising the rapid barrage, they immediately turned east before the tank destruction squad could be deployed. A hostile counter-attack at dawn was beaten off. The platoon had only 2 lightly wounded soldiers during the whole operation.

Meanwhile, at 2.30 a.m., the platoon Steinborn with the 9th Coy approached from the north-east. Under fire from one squad, the other squads of the platoon rushed the barracks camp after throwing hand grenades and satchel charges. The enemy opened fire again from 100 - 150m. Everyone dug in immediately as heavy enemy grenade launcher fire also occupied the area. To the northwest and south, quick barriers are immediately laid out and tank destruction squads are deployed. At dawn, 5 enemy tanks approached, but stopped some distance in front of our barriers. After a few salvos, however, they turned back towards Aprilia. The enemy then tried to recapture the lost ground with two companies.
However, the attack was repulsed. At 12.00 noon the situation in the section was clarified, so that platoon Steinborn could be withdrawn at 13.00. The platoon lost 1 non-commissioned officer and 4 wounded men.

The 1st platoon is also pulled out at 13:00. The bridge remains occupied only by a group of the 2nd platoon, which is to operate the quick barriers in the event of counterattacks. The platoon Engel, which occupied the cemetery at dawn with the 10th/GR 29 without a fight, is also withdrawn in the evening. The engineer platoons, which are released, assemble at the battalion's command post. The bad weather continues. The men are completely soaked. Some of them were up to their stomachs in water in the holes and trenches.
At 9 p.m. the platoons, with the exception of the 2nd platoon, are ordered to move into the shelter. An enemy fire attack, in which the 1st platoon is caught on the return march, seriously wounds Sergeant Major Schubert, Sergeant Danne and 1 man. Sergeant Danne succumbed to his injuries shortly afterwards.

The 2nd platoon remains at the Guardapassi bridge until the following morning for security purposes and keeps the bridge manned.

 

double post

 

No problem at my end! You should never rush a tradesman i say.
You have been quicker than me! I'm nearly ready to go with what I've done.
Thanks
Stu.p.s. you have only got till the 20th feb to translate.

 

10.2.
The weather has cleared up completely. With it, enemy air activity becomes more active again. Strong bomber units fly over the area and bomb the roads. The company is immediately deployed to repair the roads.

11.2.
The platoon is again deployed during the day to the bombed sites to restore the roads to two-track traffic.
Deployment strength (mot.) 2/30/151, combat strength 2/11/109, trench strength 1/8/75, platoon Nagel 1/10.

12.2.
Still in the night the 2nd platoon is ordered to Colle della Mandria to fill a bomb funnel 300m west of it. With the dawn, however, the work has to be interrupted, since at this point there is enemy visibility. The other platoons are working on the damaged road sections in Cecchina.

 

I always find it very interesting to look at such events from the perspective of the so-called ordinary soldier - because at that time ours would probably not have been much higher in the hierarchy either. And beyond all reports and statistics, it were ordinary HUMANS who fought, hoped and suffered - regardless of origin and nationality. We should never forget that

This entry was written by Werner Mork (*1921) from Kronach, June 2006:

After my home leave, I reported to the front control center in Bologna in January 1944 to learn that I now had to report to the control center in the train station in Rome. Since it was evening, I, like all others who arrived in the evening, was assigned night quarters with the express requirement not to enter the city after 10 p.m.. The reason for this was that the commander of the fascist militia in Bologna had imposed a state of emergency on the city, which meant that no one was allowed to be on the streets after 10 pm. That this measure was justified, I could then experience and see for myself.

During the night there had been quite a shooting in the city, which we had been able to hear clearly in our quarters, partly at close range, the consequences of this shooting could then be seen the next morning. In the center of Bologna there were the bodies of young fascist Blackshirts to "visit", who had been murdered by partisans during the night, but also the bodies of partisans who had been killed by the fascists during the night. Bologna was a stronghold of the communist partisans, and night after night there were gruesome exesses, carried out by both groups. The local militia then organized a display of this mutual killing every morning. Popular for this was the large piazza in front of Bologna Cathedral. Here I was confronted for the first time with the presence in the back of the front. I had not been aware of this until now, even more so in the middle of an area that was supposedly dominated by the fascists, in Mussolini's new "Fascist Republic". For me it was a picture of horror that presented itself to me that morning, shocking and hardly imaginable if I had not seen it myself. It was also inconceivable to me that people of the same nation were not only killing each other, but doing so in a directly bestial manner. Those who were lying there were not "simply" shot, they were for the most part downright massacred people, and that on and from both sides.

At the train station in Bologna there was a train connection to Rome, and with the Italian state railroad I got well to Rome. I arrived at a station that could only be admired, I had never seen anything like it, a structure that could hardly be considered a train station. This was really a "Grande Statione", where I then reported to the front control station. To see more of Rome was out of the question, Rome was considered an open city that German soldiers were not allowed to enter unless soldiers had to be "smuggled through", but this had to be done by the shortest and quickest route. I now also had the pleasure of having come to Rome, but apart from "Bahnhof" there was nothing of Rome to see. But then another small opportunity arose when I, or rather when we, were put on the march again. "We" here means that on the trip from Bologna to Rome I had met on the train a comrade of my company, who also wanted to, rather had to, rejoin the old bunch again from his vacation, as I did. We had joined forces and together we were going to try to get to where our unit was supposed to be.

At the front control center we had received the new marching orders for the marching rations, and these were issued to the front control center in Frosinone, a town south of Rome, about 35 km away from Monte Cassino. To get out of Rome, we were instructed to take the "streetcar" from the "Grande Statione" station to the southern end of the city to the terminus of this line, and then hitchhike to Frosinone. Quite simple, we thought, we sat down in the streetcar and then took the opportunity to make a kind of sightseeing trip through some parts of Rome. We reached the terminus, got off, but then said that we shouldn't be in too much of a hurry, we would get there soon enough, where we were reluctant to go. A possible onward journey would only be possible in the evening anyway, during the day there were hardly any vehicles on the road, the Allied fighter-bombers had air supremacy. Since there was a barber shop where we got off the train, I decided to have my hair cut until we could continue our journey, which would probably be our last opportunity for the time being. Completely unsuspecting, I put myself in the hands of the master, who looked at me a little strangely, but then went about his business. The fact that this treatment could have become very dangerous did not yet occur to me during the execution of his activity, that was to dawn on me only a little later.

But on that January 22, 1944, the front was to move closer to Rome, very close in fact. So I had my hair cut, trying to get into a conversation with the master with the help of my fair knowledge of the language, but he was not willing to talk to me. This surprised me, because usually Italians were always ready to talk, especially when they noticed that you made an effort to talk to them in their language. Something could not be right here, and thoughts of Bologna came to my mind, but here it was still broad daylight, and the partisans were "only" fighting against the fascists, the German soldiers were not (yet) a target, but this was to change soon, also in and around Rome. And then we realized that something was really wrong. Suddenly we heard noises that were not coming from airplanes, what we heard sounded like cannon thunder, like artillery of the heaviest caliber. Our first thought was that there were probably some enemy warships cruising on the nearby sea, "harassing" the coast with their guns. That would surely be over soon, we thought, but that was not the case.

We left the "salon" and now found ourselves in a very large crowd, more than before. This crowd of Italians, mostly men, was standing on the hill where we were, and they were looking at the sea, which was not far away. It was like being on a panoramic terrace with an unobstructed view of the "Mare nostro", across the former Pontine marshes that had been drained and settled under Mussolini's era. There they were, and so were we, on this terrace of Albano, witnessing as amazed onlookers the landing of the Allies in the area of Anzio and Nettuno. We were able to watch the spectacle that had begun in the morning and continued to develop. It was already a very uncomfortable feeling that came over us, but we were even more uncomfortable in this crowd that was not at all well-disposed towards us, the only two German soldiers on the hill, which we noticed and was also somewhat understood by me. There was a palpable tension in this environment, but without verbal or physical attacks on the part of the Italians. But it was already uncanny to us, this nevertheless very strange situation. There we stood and watched the war happening "down there" at the landing strip, a somehow completely unreal "spectacle" in which we were now "spectators". We could not believe that this was possible at all. It had happened on the morning of that day, and no one in Rome had known anything about it when we were sent off by streetcar. Two German soldiers stood on the hill of the village of Albano and experienced war as if in a theater or cinema. As if it were a terrace where the spectators could watch the spectacle without being directly affected by it themselves. A lively aviation activity had developed with exclusively American machines, predominantly the dreaded double fuselage airplanes of the type "Lightning". These also raced over the area where we were still, but there were no attacks, they concentrated on the landing area, leaving the outskirts of Rome, which included Albano, unscathed.

The weather was such that from our terrace position, we could clearly see the enemy warships. These warships were incessantly shelling the coastal strip in front of them over the landing craft that were coming ashore. We could see soldiers going ashore and also saw the fighting activity on this area. But now something had to happen to us, we could no longer stand up there as spectators in the theater of war, but what should, what could we do in this for us very uncomfortable situation?


Slowly it became dusk, and now we became even more aware of the unreal that was taking place here. The evening would begin and in front of us, not far away, the war would take place in all its danger, and behind us the lights of the open city of Rome would come on as on every evening in the war so far, as if the war on our doorstep were an unreal affair. And so it happened, the lights were burning in the houses and on the streets, the streetcars were running as if nothing special had happened. It was a completely unreal reality for us. And the two of us, we were still standing there and didn't know what to do, we had to go to Frosinone, but where were we going to find a vehicle that could have taken us? But then it was so that with increasing darkness, where we were, war began to make itself felt. We waited at the country road that led south to get a ride. We wanted to at least get out of the area where we had been until now. But instead of vehicles in the direction of Frosinone, military columns came rolling in from the direction of Frosinone. These were the first German troops to arrive at the new front, but with them also came units of the German field gendarmerie, who were supposed to regulate the traffic, but also had other tasks that could have become unpleasant for us. While we were still standing around cautiously, we suddenly recognized a "tactical insignia" on the vehicles, which was that of our division, and we also recognized the regiment rolling by, the Panzer Grenadier Regiment 155, to which I had also belonged for a short time in Sardinia, from the other features we were familiar with. This now meant for us that at least this regiment of our division was to come into action in the Anzio/Nettuno area, but this also led to the conclusion that perhaps the whole division would come, thus also our regiment.

Because that was the case, we decided to get out of this place as quickly as possible. We did not want to be taken over here already, especially not by the guerrillas of the field gendarmerie. We thought it would be better to gain some time first. And we two brave "heroes" drove in the protection of the darkness with one of the last streetcars completely simply back to Rome! We felt a lot more queasy than on the morning ride, because the Romans, who were also on the way, were now even more unfriendly. But we reached the service station that had sent us on our way in the morning unscathed and reported there with a stupid excuse like that we could not have found our unit. It didn't sound very credible, but we were still there, we had reported back to the control center. Well, we had managed to do that, but now we were in deep trouble, as we soon found out. As a result of the landing, the control center was now a collection point for dispersed people and for vacationers who could not be forwarded. It was said that in the coming hours a marching company would be assembled from this collected heap, which would then be sent immediately to the invasion front. This was not what the two of us had in mind, we might as well have reported to Regiment 155. What now? Since we were in the mood for something like a fairy tale, starting with a lame excuse, we quickly invented a new fairy tale. We told the story that we had found out where our unit was, and the unbelievable happened, we were believed, we were allowed to sign out with the already appointed leader of the formed marching company and leave Rome again with new, clean papers. Only now we "chose" another way to really get to Frosinone, a way with which we wanted to make a hook in order to try to bypass the nevertheless very dangerous place that led in the direction of the new front.

But I was not to get far. Before Frosinone even came into view, I was once again overcome by a fever. The malaria that I had caught in Sardinia and that plagued me again and again until 1971 came back with a new attack. I dragged myself with shivering to a command center, which then immediately sent me to the next available military hospital. I ended up at the main hospital site H.V.P II / 190, which was located in a small Abruzzo village, in the town of Villa St. Stefano. The H.V.P was housed in the school of this village. The place was more of a village, but good and safe. The staff of the hospital place consisted of some German medics and doctors and otherwise of Italian women who did an exemplary job for the sick and wounded German soldiers. There was no antagonism, no enmity, there was excellent cooperation and truly self-sacrificing care. I have fond memories of my time in Villa St. Stefano and of the lovely, purely civilian nursing staff who had agreed to care for German soldiers. I also have fond memories of the lovely residents of this place, who were not hostile to us either, despite their proximity to the front. The reason for my stay in this place was less beautiful, the malaria did not mean well to me at all.

It was on February 8, 1944 when I arrived at the H.V.P. [Hauptverbandsplatz ->Main First-Aid Point]. It had already taken some time from January 22nd to February 8, 1944, but there was also all kinds of confusion until I could be "doctored". By the way, we also knew now that it was exclusively American units that had landed in the area of Anzio and Nettuno, and that on a width of 35 km. Only to Rome they had not come. The German 14th Army succeeded in building up a defensive front with the units to which our division had also had to contribute its share. It was to be several weeks before I could leave the H.V.P. again. Malaria had me in its grip, and I had a total of three attacks there. Hardly was the one over, the next attack came. I was really shaken up, it was a terrible ordeal. The attacks weakened me so much that a longer period of rest and recuperation was necessary, which for the sake of simplicity was spent right on the spot. I actually had to be grateful to the malaria attacks, which had saved me from deployment on the invasion front. Later, I heard that Regiment 155 had been almost completely wiped out in the Anzio-Nettuno area.

Source: https://www.dhm.de/lemo/zeitzeugen/werner-mork-amerikanische-landung-im-raum-anzio-nettuno-1944.html

 

13.2.
During the night, the 2nd platoon filled the bomb craters on the Colle della Mandria road and returned to the shelter despite heavy enemy fire.
The company command post is moving today, as the old accommodation has recently been badly damaged by heavy bombing. Feldwebel Steinborn, Uffz Furkert, Uffz Blachnierek and Gefr. Schagerl are awarded the E.K.I and 12 other company members the E.K. II will be awarded.
Today at noon all work is stopped, as an attack is to take place the next night. The company is to take the farmsteads beyond the causeway south of Aprilia. Right of it are to be attacked by the 2nd Company. The operation is delayed for 24 hours, however, as the infantry that is to relieve the sappers is not yet in place.

14.2.
The company prepares once again for the attack. During the day, the platoon leaders observe the area from Aprilia where the night attack is to start.
For this purpose, as many automatic weapons as possible are assigned to the 3rd platoon, while the bulk of the machine guns are with the 1st platoon. The company's own scouting parties, which had been sent to reconnoitre the area at night, reported that the farmsteads in question were free of hostiles and occupied by German outposts.
The commander nevertheless orders the attack to continue southwards, as point 82 (the railway guard's house) in the right section of the company is still occupied by the enemy. At 3 p.m., however, he receives word that Point 82 is already in German hands. So the 2nd Coy's new mission order is to conduct combat reconnaissance with 2 platoons on the left of the road south of Aprilia to Nettunia. At 17.00 the Coy is driven by vehicles to the fork in the road 1km north of Aprilia. It then reaches the staging area at the motorway overpass near Carracheto on foot.
The coy is structured for the operation as follows: 1st assault group 2/9 (8 SMG, 2 rapid-fire rifles, 4 Panzerfaust, 8 satchel charges, 44 hand grenades, 22 egg hand grenades) 1st platoon as security platoon 1/1/24 (9 MG, 6 rapid-fire rifles)

At 23.20 both platoons move out of the staging area. Following the road, the security platoon proceeds on the left. In the middle of the platoon, the assault group follows at a distance of 50m. The farmstead is approached unnoticed to a distance of about 100m. Now the assault group advances, while the 1st platoon takes up a security position. Two Panzerfaust are fired at the house. The enemy becomes aware. Flares rise, heavy machine gun fire strikes against the advancing sappers. The machine-guns of the safety platoons respond and hold the enemy down to some extent. In the meantime, the assault group has moved closer to the house and fires 2 more Panzerfaust. Satchel charges and hand grenades fly into the farmstead. In the glow of the flares that keep rising, the densely occupied enemy main battle line (HKL) can be seen on the south side of the house. It is now high time to withdraw, as the enemy barrage begins. Under alternating fire and the destruction of an enemy platoon who attempted to attack on the right flank, it is possible to reach the own starting position again without own losses. (Ammunition consumption: 2500 rounds MG, 525 rounds SMG, 165 rounds rifle ammunition, 4 Panzerfaust, 4 satchel charges, 27 hand grenades)