The Desert War Then And Now - anyone have it?

Hey all,

I was wondering if anyone here has a copy of "The Desert War Then And Now" published by After The Battle. It's a more expensive book than I usually buy, but it IS a big hardcover...

Does it spend many pages recounting (yet again) the events of the war in Africa? Or is it concentrating more on locations (if that's possible)?

 

Yes, it does recount the events of the war in North Africa, it has some exposition on the terrain and strategy, as do the other Then and Now volumes. It has quite excellent campaign maps which, in some cases, details terrain as well as movement.

I believe it is worth the money spent.

Mark

 

I have it, although I've only dipped into it as it was a Christmas present. The primary appeal, of course, are the photographs, but as BFBSM says the maps are good, too.

As I've said elsewhere, however, the fact that it covers so much in terms of time and geography means that it isn't as detailed as other titles in the series that cover less ground (I have the Cassino title in mind) or are larger (I'm thinking of the implausibly large Battle of Britain book).

I was hoping to read more about the Ruweisat Ridge fighting in 1942 ('First Alamein'), but the description was lighter than I'd envisaged and mostly discussed formations rather than units.

Similarly, the post-Alamein fighting is given far less treatment than that which comes before, but this is often the case.

All in all, an excellent book, but know what you are ordering.

 

I also have a copy and in agreance with Charley & BFBSM it is more of a coffee table book giving an overview of the places that are familar with the desert war.
The photographs are excellent even when using ariel instead of on the ground..

A useful addition to your collection

 

Thanks guys!

From my point of view the less time spent on the campaign and more on the photos the better. I have Barry Pitt's books, Fletcher's "Tanks In Camera: The Western Desert", etc...

Charley, have you read "Pendulum of War"?

 

I got sent an e-book version a few months ago and have childishly read only the part that pertains to the Ruweisat fighting; I'll return to read it properly later (scout's honour!)

 

Well, if that's what you're interested in, no harm in that!

 

Have now gone back and read the section from the Fall of Tobruk (I'll finish this book one day by successively reading the various sections out of order!)

I must say, I was especially satisfied with the section explaining why--logistically--the successive retreats back to Alamein/Ruweisat had been so deleterious. The fact that millions of man-hours of labour had been expended transporting supplies east to west over weeks and months and then the whole lot was supposed to come back in the opposite direction via one road and one railway line in a matter of days was always going to be an insurmountable hurdle despite the heroic efforts of the RASC & RAOC. And the fact that the loss of Tobruk and Matruh meant that not only materiel and (epic quantities of) ammunition had been lost, but the workshops with their staff of experts relied on to get all the armour back on their tracks and up to the front lines were abandoned, destroyed or undermanned. Matruh had for years been imagined as the site of the 'last stand' in the worst of all possible scenarios, but once it had been abandoned the whole 'operation of war' behind the troops had to retreat to facilities that had never been intended, designed or equipped to carry out the work now required of them--suddenly the whole vital apparatus behind the lines is on the wrong foot and operating with fewer resources in the worst situation.

The author's 'pendulum thesis' demands that as supply lines became stretched on one side, the other tended to gain the advantage and territorial gains were reversed, but this time the bounty Rommel had won (and the 8th Army had lost) allowed him to threaten the 8th Army's vital ability to soak up losses, 'spring back' and re-seize the initiative.

I've never before read an explanation of this which has effectively brought home to me the key reasons why the retreat to Egypt was so perilous--this one did. I imagined previously that the 'bad leadership' was down to the subversions of the chain of command that Auchinleck and Chink Dorman brought about as well as the failures of Ritchie in the field; I now see, however, that just a greater failing was that in which it was envisaged that successive retreats in contact with the enemy would bring exclusively military problems. In truth, the situation was as much about the threat to the ability to keep the men fighting, not the will and morale of the men to do so.

 

Hi Charley,

Interesting remarks, thanks. I've got Pendulum of War and must give it another go - I'll try to read it in order though.

Regard
Tom

 

Hi Charley,

Great post!

By "subversions of the chain of command", do you mean Auchinleck trying to "help" Ritchie?

Chris

 

Yes, but also the fact that Chink took over many duties from Jock Whitely without officially replacing him as the BGS, that Richardson as GSO 1 'Planning' also had his work partially poached by Dorman-Smith and that Auchinleck had Tom Corbet wearing two hats: Auchinleck's Chief of Staff and deputising for him during him during his absence from GHQ in Cairo (did that effectively make him temporarily his own chief of staff?!?).

I have both Hugh Mainwaring's and Richardson's autobiographies on my shelf. I must look into what they had to say on the matter.