have you seen this pic of the White with speakers on top? Allied WWII AFV Discussion Group: White Scout Car "Sonics" or Amplifier vans This shows a White Scout Modified with low fidelity speakers for use for conventional broadcasting by an Amplifier Unit. The sonic vehicles used for sonic deception purposes had two large, cube shaped stereo speakers mounted on an hydraulic arm in the rear compartment of a White Scout Car. It is these that were used by the deception units in 21 Army Group such as 3 Light Scout Car Company (a cover name for a sonic deception sub-unit within R Force).
reviving this thread to let folks know about a TV program which was on the Yesterday channel [UK] a couple of days ago. It covered a US Army unit providing Sonic, Radio and Visual deception in NW Europe with plenty of information on recording, mixing and replaying the sounds and quite a number of photos of the vehicles used. It is available to view online for another 4 days here http://video.uktv.co.uk/yesterday/ghost-army/feature I will stress that the documentary only concerns this US unit and makes no reference to UK sonic deception but is well worth watching. Noel
At the Plymouth Armed Forces weekend, just ended, I met a National Service veteran called Bill Brown who between 1950 and 1952 served with 60th Special Engineer Squadron, Visual and Sonic Troop in Germany. Bill advised me that their troop had 4 x WSC fitted with the Sonic kit and 1 x WSC used as a command vehicle. The Sonic kit comprised a 32mm Cinema Projection system which ran the sound tape only, this linked to a bank of amplifiers and then onwards to the speakers. The speakers were mounted in a rectangular box, the box raised on a hydraulic arm, which lifted it above the WSC, once in position, the box could be rotated. The system had an audible range of approx. 4 miles. The vehicle also had an Onan generator mounted in the rear to power the system. The rest of the troop were engaged deploying rubber tanks, trucks, jeeps and aircraft Photo of his WSC attached - the object low rear of the vehicle is the exhaust for the Onan generator Tim
The White scout car in the British Pathe still above is 14 Amplifier Unit. It had a very different role - convincing enemy troops to surrender and broadcasting instructions to the civilian population - to the deception role of the Sonics. Cheers David
That's the first time I've seen a White scout car or half track 'in theater' that still had its canvas cover. Lots of pictures of them on in factory lots, on trains and ships and at depots but never in the field.
Whoops... Try again.. The Camouflage Development and Training Centre (B) was set up in May 1942 to develop a new and very 'hush-hush' sonic warfare capability. (The establishment was re-named the Light Scout Car Training Centre - LSCTC - a few months later.) The LSCTC had its base in Laggan House well away from prying eyes (and ears) in a remote part of Ayrshire. American Poplin The “powers-that-be” decided to source kit for sonic deception from the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) rather than wait for UK equipment to be designed and manufactured. The medium was to be commercial 35mm sound film and the RCA apparatus was known as POPLIN in British use. This comprised the sound head, exciter lamp supply unit, pre-amplifier, three power amplifiers, two cube speakers and an Onan generator. The LSCTC fitted POPLIN kits into US White scout cars, which were small, highly mobile and self-supporting. Great care was taken to try and retain the profile of the original vehicles – now known as sonic cars – as the intent was to make them blend in with conventional units. The cube speakers were mounted on a hydraulic frame, so they could be lowered and covered for travel but extended and rotated when needed. Lightweight kit was also later developed for the airborne forces (essentially a jeep and trailer combination), for canoeists and for man pack use in the jungle. Once up and running, the LSCTC trained and equipped LSC Field Companies and LSC Field Parks for their specialist roles. The Field Companies delivered the tactical sonic effects – simulating the movement and harbouring of infantry and armour; movement of soft skin vehicles (SSVs); movement of landing craft; bridging, bulldozing and other engineer activities - whilst the Field Parks stored the effects library, prepared the necessary sound tracks and provided 1st line support for the sonic cars. Each Field Company had the following ORBAT: Coy HQ -- x 2 Offrs, x 16 ORs -- x 2 White Command Cars, x 3 3-tonners, x 1 m/c Ops Tp -- x 1 Offr, x 10 ORs -- x 1 White Command Car, x 4 White Operational (Sonic) Cars, x 1 m/c Ops Tp -- x 1 Offr, x 10 ORs -- x 1 White Command Car, x 4 White Operational (Sonic) Cars, x 1 m/c After the volunteers and kit were brought together, No.1 LSC FP and x2 LSC Fd Coys were allotted to South-East Asia, No. 2 LSC FP and x2 LSC Fd Coys to the Mediterranean and No.3 LSC FP and x3 LSC Fd Coys to North West Europe. The Royal Navy also got in on the act by stealing the eighth formed LSC Fd Coy to establish its own Combined Arms Scout Units (COSUs), who performed sonic warfare operations from landing craft and MGBs/MTBs.
The question obviously is: Did these units playing hi-fi sound effects ever have an effect on German activities? From the above units' war diaries it should be possible to to pinpoint the dates and locations where they employed their FX, then determine which German units were within 'sonic weaponry audible range'. Since there are a lot of German war diaries online free, including 'Ic' (intelligence) reports, maybe something might turn up, i.e. 15.Armee has ordered redeployment of anti-tank units due to repots of enemy armored vehicle activity at...(such-and-such place).
Horizon Crawler's poser: is a good question and underlines the problematic requirement of how to measure effect/effectiveness. In many cases, prisoner of war questioning would probably have been a primary indicator. But therein lies a rub: would the average field interrogator have known about the Deception measures to ask high granularity questions? Anon. The tasks of the sonic units are likely to have been focussed at quite a low, near term tactical level .... perhaps paralleling that suggested within the 14 Amplifier Unit piece provided by PsyWar.Org at #16: 14 Amplifier Unit & 19 Leaflet Unit War Diary ".... On 3 April ’45, at the request of 1 Commando Brigade, a broadcast talk was delivered from the amplifier car in the outskirts of OSNABRUECK, to warn snipers to surrender ......" A key factor would have been equipment range. I note at #23 a claim of 4 miles (6.5 Km), but am mindful that the British ALS 10 system of the late '50s had a qualified planning distance of only 800-1000 metres, subject to wind and the type of terrain over which it was used. It might have been possible to remote the transmission - the ALS 10 could be operated 200-300 metres from the speakers, but the additional 14 Amplifier Unit report of "the fierce enemy resistance outside WINSEN, however rendered the use of broadcast propaganda impracticable ...." suggests not, chiming with Clues of sonic measure effectiveness are limited, but a continued provision of resources and people suggests 'enough', although 'with room for improvement.' In 'Deception in WW2', Cruickshank writes: "Another example of .... poor liaison (between US and UK deception agencies) was the development of sonic equipment - instruments which simulated the sounds of battle. The two countries had worked independently, the Americans producing a very sturdy article with powerful but not very convincing sound, the British a more fragile model with more faithful sound. The JSC thought that if there had been collaboration from the beginning the resulting device would have incorporated the best features of each design. These sonic devices were wire recorders reproducing the sound of gunfire, motor-transport, the much greater noise of tanks, the clatter of troops disembarking from landing-craft, and the like. From the invasion of Sicily on, they became a useful element in tactical deception during the later stages of the War; for example on Overlord D-Day, when they were dropped with dummy parachutists to simulate airborne landings. If the dummies had been dropped silently into the Normandy landscape the deception would have had little effect, but when accompanied by machine-gun fire and other noises of battle it was very convincing. Dummy paratroops had been used with great success in the Middle East, and their manufacture - half-size - began in Britain in 1943. The Middle East model set fire to itself when it landed, to convey the impression that the parachutist had escaped into hiding after burning his parachute, but this refinement was not needed during the Normandy landings, where it was simply a question of adding to the enemy's confusion in the twenty-four hours after D-Day. There were four separate simulated paratroop attacks for this purpose, code-named Titanic I-IV. British and American airborne forces were due to drop inland on D-Day and it was considered that their security immediately after they landed would depend on spreading confusion among the opposing ground forces. This was achieved by dropping dummy paratroops, accompanied by a few Special Air Service (SAS) men, battle noise simulators, and special effects bombs. Titanic I used 200 dummies to simulate the landing of an airborne detachment at Yvetot, 30 miles south-west of Dieppe, about five hours before the first Allied troops were due on the beaches. Two parties of SAS men had already been dropped in this area and as the dummies touched down the SAS men attacked despatch-riders and lone vehicles. They were briefed to allow enough of the enemy troops to escape to spread the news that there had been a paratroop landing. The object of this diversion was to retain enemy forces north of the Seine and with luck, to draw reserves from south of the Seine. The second of the Titanic operations used 50 dummies, which were dropped east of the River Dives. It was intended to prevent German reserves from moving out of that area to join the troops defending the beaches in the west. Titanic III also used 50 dummies. They were dropped south-west of Caen, to divert attention from the 6th United States Airborne Division, and to draw local counter-attack troops away from Caen. Titanic IV was dropped at Marigny in the base of the Cherbourg peninsula, to entice German forces westward from St Lô. It used 200 dummies, and it too relied on the SAS to give life to the simulated attack. Titanic IV supported the genuine drop of the 101st United States Airborne Division. These four diversionary operations were carried out from RAF Stations Tempsford and Methwold by forty Stirlings, Halifaxes and Hudsons from 90, 138, 149, and 161 Squadrons. Most of the aircraft - of which two were lost - succeeded in dropping the inanimate paratroops on target."
