What if or What did?

Funny you should ask that. Todays Sunday Times has a review of a new book, with not so much "what ifs" but examinations of decisions made in 1941, and how they could have turned out differently (a bit expensive at the moment but will probably be in paperback in few months):

FATEFUL CHOICES: Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940-41 by Ian Kershaw
Allen Lane £30 pp656
The shape of the second world war was determined in 1940-41: by Britain’s decision to fight on, Roosevelt’s commitment to support British resistance, Hitler’s invasion of Russia, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The latest book by Ian Kershaw, superb biographer of Hitler, analyses 10 watershed dilemmas of that period, and considers whether their outcomes were inevitable.

Many academics are sceptical about “counterfactuals”, arguing that the proper job of historians is to describe and assess what did happen, rather than play with “what ifs”. Yet it is almost impossible to resist the temptation, especially in the context of the second world war. So many projects undertaken by the Axis powers were demented, indeed, suicidal. Had the dictators behaved even marginally more rationally, events might have turned out differently.

If Hitler had addressed himself single-mindedly to finishing off Britain in 1941, rather than invading Russia, he might have succeeded. If the Japanese had not attemptedthe fantastic task of conquering most of China, then insisted upon persevering even when it was plain they were failing, they might have avoided war with America. If Mussolini had resisted the temptation to join Hitler’s war, it is unlikely that the Nazis would have invaded his country. “Musso” might have enjoyed as profitable a neutral’s status as did General Franco, Spain’s fascist monster. If Hitler had not declared war on the USA after Pearl Harbor, he could have hugely complicated the political task of Franklin Roosevelt. Many Americans, especially Republicans, had not the slightest desire to fight the Nazis, and would have been content merely to settle accounts with Japan.

It would be unjust to Kershaw to suggest that he is engaged in mere counterfactuals. At key moments, real choices existed. But his essential thesis is that most of the outcomes which took place were inevitable, given the personalities involved and the circumstances in which they found themselves. He makes it clear that it is fanciful to say,for instance, that Hitler might have held back from his 1941 decision to massacre Europe’s Jews. In his universe, the Jews represented the principal enemy, the cause of the war. He even professed to suppose them the prime movers in Stalin’s Russia. Likewise, Hirohito’s Japan could not respond to America’s 1941 overtures, proposing a resumption of normal relations if the Japanese withdrew from China, because the creation of an Asian empire was fundamental to the vision of Japan’s ruling militarists.

Kershaw is especially good on American attitudes to Britain in 1940-41. Roosevelt was always committed to keeping the British afloat, because he knew that if they were defeated, America would sooner or later face the Herculean task of taking on the Nazis alone. But the US president knew how strongly his people resisted the notion of joining the war. For two years, he doggedly resisted Churchill’s urgings for American belligerency, because he reckoned that Congress would not stomach it – and he was surely right. Instead, he provided all possible aid to Britain’s survival (though most of it had to be paid for in cash). He relied upon events, driven by the madness of the Axis powers, to provide the last push into war, and so indeed they did. Kershaw pinpoints December 1940 as the critical date in the development of Roosevelt’s policy, when the United States committed itself to waging economic war against the Axis. The immediate material benefits of American aid to Britain in 1940-41 were small – the great tide of munitions across the Atlantic began to flow only in 1942. Those famous 50 American destroyers, first fruits of Lend-Lease, were broken-down rust buckets. Only nine were made serviceable for the Royal Navy by the end of 1940, and just 30 by May 1941.

The symbolic importance of the US commitment was enormous, and recognised as such in Berlin as well as London. But so much emotional rhetoric from Churchill and Roosevelt was lavished upon the Anglo-American relationship that it is sometimes forgotten how ruthlessly hardheaded was Washington policy-making. “I believe you will agree,” Churchill wrote to FDR in December 1940, “that it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect if .. . Britain were to be divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all contingencies, we should stand stripped to the bone.” Roosevelt did not agree. In August 1945, “stripped to the bone” was exactly what America did allow Britain to be.

The author examines Stalin’s decision, first to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact that precipitated the war in September 1939, then to go to such fantastic lengths to avoid provoking Hitler that his armies were surprised, and almost vanquished, by the German invasion of June 1941. Stalin knew that war with Hitler must come. He simply believed that he was clever enough to delay a showdown until at least 1942, when his forces should be ready to fight. This was a colossal miscalculation, which almost gave victory to Hitler. But Kershaw acknowledges that it is hard to define the moment at which Stalin should have chosen differently, given the lamentable state of the Soviet armies after his purges. In keeping with the author’s own doctrine of accepting that the decisions reflected the personalities making them, I would suggest that Stalin acted as he did because he was Stalin. If he had chosen to construct a rational universe in the Soviet Union, his country would have been something utterly different from what it was in 1941.

Kershaw suggests that the outcome of the war was a much closer call than some historians recognise. I would agree – up to December 1941. But once the United States and Russia were engaged, it seems hard to doubt the inevitability of allied victory. Japan, far from being an asset to the Axis, was painfully weak economically and industrially. Hitler grossly overrated the contribution that Hirohito’s nation could make to his cause. The fundamental fact was that neither Germany nor Japan could hope to conquer America, nor even directly to attack it.

Berlin and Tokyo never co-ordinated their efforts, and were too remote to accomplish much jointly, even had they done so. If we are testing counterfactuals, it is interesting to speculate about what might have happened had the Japanese attacked Russia in its rear, in the east, during the summer of 1941 while the Germans were launching Barbarossa in the west. It is possible such an assault would have tipped the balance to Soviet defeat.
Among all the moments of choice defined by Kershaw, that of Britain in June 1940 seems the most critical. If Churchill had not been there, it is entirely plausible that the British government would have sought terms from Hitler. As it was, Churchill was able to convince his colleagues that it was better to face Britain’s likely destruction than to accept such a deal as the Nazis would have offered.

Kershaw’s book does not tell a surprising story, but it represents a splendidly lucid and impeccably argued exposition of the greatest political decisions of the second world war.

Final solutions
Ian Kershaw reckons some of the 10 “fateful choices” of 1940-41 are more fateful than others. Those with “the most far-reaching consequences” were Hitler’s: to attack the Soviet Union, to declare war on America and to kill the Jews. Japan’s bad calls – to expand into southeast Asia and to attack Pearl Harbor – come next. But what of the choice that shaped the postwar world most fundamentally: the nuking of Japan? Regretfully Kershaw admits it’s beyond his book’s time frame. Roll on volume two . . .

 

I get into too much trouble on "what ifs"!!!

 

Elton's 'The study of History' mate, (might be 'practice of history', can't remember now) annoying (to me) & almost completely objective philosophy that many are forced to read in first year history courses.

Edit: responded to a query of Kyts while he was still editing so apologies for mentioning this dull book

Sorry VP, I posted thinking you meant etonesque rather than eltonesque, and as soon as I hit post message I remembered who Elton was. And it's "The Practice of History", though I prefer Carr's "What is History".

 

Several years ago I got into reading "what ifs" and after a while I lost interest because they were predicated on the premise that the stars all had to line up correctly and every leader whose cause the author was 'studying' had to make absolutely correct decisions, based on the author's understanding of how things should be. (Now that was a long-winded sentence.) To me, it would be difficult to carry what if scenerios out very far because when you get down to it, authors really have no real way of predicting the outcomes of later events following the altered timelines. An example of this would be to look at the Demyansk pocket. If it had folded, would Hitler have been more inclined to demand that troops hold at all cost, resulting in Stalingrad or less, allowing for breakout? How could we ever know what went on the mind of that mad man, when making military desicions?
Another what if: If the scout plane from the IJN Tone been more clear in his first spotting messages, would it have changed Nagumo's course of action and to what degree? Would he have still been caught flat footed with unstored munitions? We can only guess, but we have no way of knowing for sure.

I have been involved in another thread involving the Pershing tank and what if it had been developed earlier. It is intersting to talk about, but it really is difficult to speculate what outcome its presence in larger numbers and in place of some the Shermans would have had in the conduct of the war.

 

Been thinking about this too.
I reckon in any historical study there's always a place for 'what if' otherwise how could you assess the actual decisions made or significance of a historical events outcome?

The trouble starts when 'what if' builds upon 'what if' until you've turned Greenland into a rocket-propelled aircraft carrier.


The most interesting "What if" I have been involved in on this forum was when I asked the question on Operation Sealion.

http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/war-europe/5788-operation-sealion.html?highlight=sealion

Many questions were answered for me that I previously did not know. (The initial reason for the thread)

Many myths were put to bed with factual data.

The initial question was misread by some, weapons etc were included that had not been invented or seen service etc etc etc.

Interesting read if you have 15 minutes to spare.

 

It depends on the question I suppose. I have seen a thread on another forum where the question was asked (I kid you not) "What if Patton was in charge at Arnhem". for a start we can see from the title that the author has an agenda, i.e. Patton was (in the author's eyes, a better commander than Monty and wanted to prove that it could have succeeded). If the topic has an agenda then it will not succeed as it just descends into a "Yes it would have", "No it wouldnt" style of pantomime argument. A better way would be to look at the consequences of a particular type of action and the alternatives open at that time.

 

Most what-ifs I read or was unwise to take part in are or become of the Nazi apology type. I never saw a what-if on Soviets fielding the T-34 in 1941 (Heck! They did!!!) or what-if the Force de Frappe dropped a French atom bomb on Berlin in 1940. As for the Germans boming New York with V-2s from Iceland , ah, that's run-of-the-mill. For such silliness there's always the alternate history forum, "Where Pigs Fly and Germany Wins at WW2 TM".

 

The trouble starts when 'what if' builds upon 'what if' until you've turned Greenland into a rocket-propelled aircraft carrier.


But what if the Allies or Axis had turned Greenland into a rocket-propelled aircraft carrier?? How would things have changed. This is a very valid topic for debate.

I shall start a new topic right away! (i kid)


Seriously though, there's nothing wrong with a good 'what if'. To a point. It can cause good afterthought, interesting discussion and epic slanging matches (the latter only found on t'internet btw). Of course it only works in small doses. A simple what if, a theory or two supported by a couple of facts and leave the rest to the imagination of the reader.

The trouble is, every what if opens up dozens or more other whats ifs, and another dozen for each of those. It gets to a point where interesting side thoughts on a given subject become complete fiction based on the opinion of the author, rather than facts complemented with something to keep you thinking.

If you understood that, then you get a gold star. The reason I couldn't be an author is because what's in my head never translates to paper

 

I find fact to be much more interesting that fiction. Thinking of the Greenland carrier my twisted brain associated that to the Pikrete ship. Now who in his right mind would have written a science-fiction story about an ice and swadust ship striking terror into the Reich?

Not qute a what-if but an almost-was

 

What if Hitler had been killed in WW1?

3
2
1
GO!


/bonk

 

Possible list of topics for discussion

What if:

Patton was in Charge at Dunkirk?
Hess had flown to Ireland?
Patton had been in charge of the Germans at El Alamein?
Hitler had not married Eva Braun?
Patton had been in charge of the Dambusters?

 

What if Patton had been leader of the Nazi party?

 

What if Patton had been leader of the Nazi party?
ok, well the Nazi party would have been schooled in the art of armored warfare and we would have had the situation of the Communists losing the street battles in Berlin in the late 20's due to them being run over by Christie tanks bought by the Nazis from the US.

 

What if Patton was the Secretary General of the CPSU at the Kremlin? Would the Russians have fought for Pattongrad on the Volga?

Or Chuck Norris.