These two Tiger wrecks have the turret bin 'flattened' and that is a sign that the demo charge in the engine bay has been detonated. Nothing else can cause this type of damage. In the above view you can see the ejected fuel tanks (the triangular shape) on the road behind the Tiger This is the same as the damage on the Fontenay Tiger
I have been re-checking the accounts and it still does not add up. The account in Stuart Hill's book says the Tiger encounter with Semken took place as he left Fontenay: Meanwhile A Squadron had begun moving up from Fontenay, the plan being that they would come through us and thrust towards Rauray. John Semken was Squadron Leader and he had already heard from C Squadron that there were tanks about, so his gun loader put an AP shell up the spout, just in case. As they cleared Fontenay, they were suddenly confronted by an enormous tank coming round the bend in front The Liason letter (the only period document we have) says Lt. Fearn engaged a PANTHER side on with his 75mm and APC It was moving about 12mph at 80 yds range and he brewed it up with one hit through the vertical plate above the back bogie Then it states: He (Lt Fearn)saw his Squadron Commander engage a Tiger ( previously examined by us) on the road. At 120 yds the Tiger was head on. The 75mm put 3 shots on it and the crew bailed out without firing. He put in 3 more. The tank brewed up. Four shots had scooped on front plates.One had taken a piece out of the lower edge of the mantlet and gone into the tank through the roof,and one had ricocheted off the track and up into the sponson. If we take this as a list of engagements starting with the earliest then it follows the Panther is hit first and then, 40 yds later, the Tiger is hit. Here is a Panther that matches exactly Lt Fearns claim with a Tiger in place behind it. Here a screen grab of the Tiger with the Panther visible at left middle. Might it be 40 yards away? Direction of both Fontenay and Rauray marked. This is the front view of this Tiger This a front view of the self-destroyed Tiger It would be very easy to conflate those two Tigers if you were using just a written/verbal description of the hits. I know because I did just that!
The Liaison Letter list the events in sequence from Fontenay to Rauray and from the view of Lt Fearn (items 4) and then Dring (item 5) so It would be fair to assume they were the people interviewed, Appendix 'E' to 21stArmy Group RAC Liaison Letter No.2 Extract from a Report to HQ Second Army from Col.A.G.Cole, DD of A (No. 20 WTSFF) The extract is of tank actions near RUARAY between 27 Jun. and 1 Jul. SHERMAN - 75 MM GUNS. 4. Lt. Fearn engaged a PANTHER side on with his 75mm and APC It was moving about 12mph at 80 yds range and he brewed it up with one hit through the vertical plate above the back bogie He saw his Squadron Commander engage a Tiger ( previously examined by us) on the road. At 120 yds the Tiger was head on. The 75mm put 3 shots on it and the crew bailed out without firing. He put in 3 more. The tank brewed up. Four shots had scooped on front plates.One had taken a piece out of the lower edge of the mantlet and gone into the tank through the roof,and one had ricocheted off the track and up into the sponson. At another Panther he fired 5 shots with HE. The enemy made off without retaliation. 5. Sgt Dring started out south from FONTENOY LE PESNIL with his 75mm and fell in with a MK IV which he shot through the drivors visor. It brewed up and the crew baled out. Next he fell in with a Tiger at 1000 yds. The Tiger fired whilst Dring was traversing but missed. Dring then pumped 5 shots in without further retaliation. The last one hit the drivers periscope and the crew baled out. (this tank is believed to have been recovered for shipment to the UK.) Next he came on a Panther at the cross roads, This he got with one shot with APC in front of sprocket and the crew baled out. Hit at normal and at about 500yds range. It brewed up Next he took on a Tiger at 1400 yds just outside Rauray. He fired 6 shots of which 4 hit and the last one brewed it up. Tp. Cmdr. thought he had missed it and only hit the wall behind. Sjt. Dring's next shot brought the sparks and the remark "You don't see a brick wall spark like that". This tank has been seen and is much shot up. It now has one scoop in front vertical plate, five penetrations in rear, four strikes with no penetrations in rear, plus a scoop and one plate of engine hatch smashed Finally to the east of RAURAY he took on a MK IV at 1200 yds, fired two HE ranging round and then one AP through the tracks, which went in and finished it. It is my contention that some of these accounts are the same events from 2 different viewpoints. The Dring claim of a Panther at the cross roads seems to be the Panther claimed earlier by Lt Fearn (Lt. Fearn engaged a PANTHER side on with his 75mm) and I think Fearn has the better claim but let us concentrate on the Tiger claim. This 1947 air view with the position of the recently identified Tiger wreck in Fontenay (red circle) and the actual position of the Panther (green dot in the yellow circle) 'with one hit through the vertical plate above the back bogie' and they are over a mile apart. The filmed knocked out Tiger is just south of the Panther and they are nowhere near 'Fontenay'. If the Liaison Letter is chronological then the yellow circle is the first engagement (the Panther) and all the others take place south of it. Note that the person who wrote the Liaison Letter inserts all the description of damage to the Tiger in Item 4. It is not Lt Fearn listing the hits but the report compiler who states that he has 'previously seen' the wreck. That part is the compiler assuming it is the same tank.
Stuart Hill, By Tank Into Normandy. page 108/109 Meanwhile A Squadron had begun moving up from Fontenay, the plan being that they would come through us and thrust towards Rauray. John Semken was Squadron Leader and he had already heard from C Squadron that there were tanks about, so his gun loader put an AP shell up the spout, just in case. As they cleared Fontenay, they were suddenly confronted by an enormous tank coming round the bend in front. It was hard to kNow who was more surprised, but John shrieked, 'Fire, it's a Hun', and they loosed off about ten rounds into the smoke. As this cleared away, it was observed that the crew were baling out as small flames came from inside the tank. It was a Tiger of 12th SS Panzer, the first Tiger to be captured in Normandy, and made an impressive sight at close quarters as both its size and the thickness of its armour became apparent. Although the range had been only sixty yards, not one Sher- man shell had penetrated that armour. The fire in the Tiger, we discov- ered, had instead been caused by a shot hitting the side of the driver's observation visor and showering white-hot splinters into the tank. The driver had screamed that he had been hit and the commander had oblig- ingly ordered his crew out. There are problems with this account but Stuart had details that were not confirmed until quite recently, This sentence means he actually saw the Tiger: The fire in the Tiger, we discov- ered, had instead been caused by a shot hitting the side of the driver's observation visor and showering white-hot splinters into the tank This is a close up of the recently located Tiger. The drivers visor shows no damage or sign of a hit and other hits are arrowed so whoever inspected it did not see a hit on the visor. This a detail shot of Tiger 114. This is the Tiger just behind the Panther: The top half of the drivers visor is missing and shows a strike mark. Something hit it and blew the top of it away. You can see it in the film of it moving and the arrow points to a ( HE?) hit on the mantlet. Given the information in Stuart Hill's book pre-dates anyone noticing the drivers visor had been hit and damaged this is confirmation Stuart is talking about Tiger 114 when he is describing the Tiger that Semken engaged. The most detailed account we have is clearly linking Tiger 114 with Semken's kill. It can not be the recently located Tiger because it has no damage to the drivers visor. Stuart Hill's book has positively linked Semken to Tiger 114 and Stuart Hill had details about Tiger 114 that were not known when his book was published. There is no doubt Stuart Hill saw Tiger 114 and that he believed it to be the Tiger Semken knocked out.
Hi Michael, Regarding Render's and Hills' accounts, 114 can't be the one engage by Semken as 114 wasn't involved in the 26th June fighting. Mobius' Tiger "114" is blocked on June 27th on the Rauray road by 'B' Squadron SRY. Tiger in Fontenay was stopped by Semken before heading towards Rauray. The scheme in Render's book is quite obvious. SRY HQ was in La Ferme de l'évêché next to the 7th Bn. DWR. The Tiger in Fontenay KO'd two 'C' Squadron SRY Sherman heading towards Fontenay then KO'd a 7th Bn. DWR Bren Gun Carrier on Saint-Martin crossroad and THEN was stopped by Semken in rue Massieu.
Semken, John Douglas (Oral history) SEMKEN, JOHN DOUGLAS (ORAL HISTORY) Although not currently available online - there is an object description... "Object description British officer served with Sherwood Rangers in Middle East, GB and North West Europe, 1940-1944 Content description REEL 1 Background in GB, 1921-1939: family; education at St Alban's; membership of OTC. Period of training with Inns of Court Regt in GB, 1939-1940: joining unit; officer training on mobilisation with Royal Scots Greys in Edinburgh; posting to Army School of Equitation at Weedon, 12/1939; background to posting to Palestine, 9/1940; commissioning into Sherwood Rangers, 4/1940; reasons for joining cavalry and Sherwood Rangers. Aspects of period as officer with Sherwood Rangers in Middle East, 1940-1942: voyage from GB to Middle East, 9/1940; arrival in Port Tewfik; change of role from artillery to armour; arrival of Stuart 'Honey' Tanks and US instructors; move to Western Desert; training with Grant Tanks; courses attended; desert navigation skills; lack of tactical training; use of hull down position; handing over vehicles to County of London Yeomanry; withdrawal to El Alamein line. Recollections of operations as assistant adjutant with Sherwood Rangers with 8th Armoured Bde in North Africa, 1942-1943: initial experience of action, 8/1942. REEL 2 Continues: first unit casualty; counter attacking Germans at Battle of Alam Halfa; character of first action; limits of command and control measures; change in signals practice; problems with tanks closed down in action; changes in operational practices after battle; tank evacuation procedures; question of lessons learnt and tactics; contrast in British and German armour; effectiveness of Grant Tank's firepower; risk of fire in US tanks; lack of combined arms tactics; training prior to El Alamein battle; leave in Cairo; question of premonitions of death; tactical preparations for El Alamein; penetration of minefields during Battle of El Alamein; degree of knowledge of battle; German Air Force attack on B Echelon vehicles; weather conditions during Operation Supercharge, 11/1942; move on transport from Mersa Matruh to Benghazi; loss of tank at Battle of Wadi Zem Zem; method of clearing main armament. REEL 3 Continues: capture of Tripoli; question of personal morale; course and leave in Cairo and Palestine; return to unit, 5/1943; increase in unit sickness levels; appointment to role as technical adjutant. Aspects of period as officer with Sherwood Rangers, 8th Armoured Bde in GB, 1943-1944: return to GB and improvement in unit health; move to Newmarket, 12/1943; special training with Duplex Drive tanks; unit opinion of Duplex Drive tanks; logistical problems encountered; role as technical adjutant; opinion of new commanding officer; embarkation and reaction of regimental wives to impending invasion. Recollections of operations as officer with Sherwood Rangers in Normandy, 6/1944-8/1944: question of role after beach landing; performance of Duplex Drive tanks, 6/6/1944 including losses; landing on Gold Beach, 6/6/1944; arrival in Bayeux nightfall, 6/6/1944; problems of operating in Normandy; losses to battalion headquarters from German shelling; taking command of A Sqdn during action against Panzer Lehr Div; withdrawal into reserve; character of Panzer Lehr Div's attack; opinion of German troops; treatment of German POWs; role as squadron commander; problems of working with infantry. REEL 4 Continues: squadron deployment; encounter with Tiger tank at Fontenay le Pesnel; advancing against German positions at Fontenay le Pesnel; destruction of German tanks and capture of POWs; examination of Tiger Tank in captured German workshop; opinion of Sherman Firefly; effectiveness of Sherman Tank's main armament; fire control methods against German tanks; British tank losses in Normandy; problems of finding new tank commanders; comments on unit morale and campaigning; questions of nature of courage and tank fighting; daily routine; role of subalterns; importance of regimental system and gradual loss of Nottinghamshire identity. REEL 5 Continues: development of working relationships in squadron; absence of regimental mess; weather conditions; role of Padre; night time battle procedure; role of humour; opinion of commanding officer; contrast between infantry and cavalry O groups; difficulties of infantry/tank co-operation; co-operation with Royal Artillery; close air support from Hawker Typhoon. Recollections of operations commanding A Sqdn, Sherwood Rangers in North West Europe, 1944: operating with US paratroopers at Grave, 9/1944; operating with US troops at Geilenkirchen; opinion US operating procedures and command structure; story of General Horrock's visit to US Division; experiences with US Brigade Headquarters during German counter attack; action at Rauray and move to Caumont, 8/1944; role of Forward Observation Officers; degree of map/air photographs of battle area. REEL 6 Continues: importance of map reading; deployment of tank squadron; question of infantry/tank co-operation including role of infantry; effectiveness of German Panzer Grenadier system; lack of contact with civilians; advance from Normandy; opinion of General Ivo Thomas of 43rd Div; actions in Belgium and Netherlands, 9/1944-10/1944; character of operations after River Seine; role on return to GB as result of illness, 12/1944. Award of Military Cross for destroyer Tiger Tank in Normandy. Question of decorations and policy of recommendation. Memories of receiving of Military Cross from Montgomery. Attitude to having served with Sherwood Rangers."
Field Companies Royal Engineers had D7 bulldozers at least even if I know a Tiger couldn't be towed or dragged around by one or two D7. Maybe another veh could have dragged it out from the street. The thing which is sure is the Tiger was stopped by Semken in this street after it has crossed the crossroad to engage more British vehs and tanks. British units needed this street cleared out so they put it out of the way.
Stuart Hill has it on June 26th (though he writes 'June 25' in his book from the context he clearly is talking about the 26th because he says the 25th was a Sunday)) so what evidence is there for 114 being stopped on June 27th? Hill also mentions 2 burning Shermans in his account and says they had just been hit and were 'Ian Greenways troop' and that Greenway was wounded, Sgt Rennie killed & and Sgt Stock badly burned. That should be able to be dated by anyone with Unit documents. The IWM series of pics (B6045-50) of the Panther and Tiger shot by Christie are dated the 27th but this does not mean the Tiger had been stopped that day.
-Tiger "114" is not destroyed and it's still functioning. SRY hasn't have any infantry support on June 26th. German would have tried to take it back into their line. SRY wasn't sure at all if it was KO or not, no one checked. It means, from the British side, the Tiger could have remained a threat. No KO Tiger is mentioned in 11th DLI documents (WD nor appendices) not even in the detailed account of Lieutenant-Colonel Hanmer, 11th DLI CO. If he had a threatening Tiger in his perimeter during the night of 26/27, he might have mentioned it. -8th Armoured Brigade WD mentioned two Tiger destroyed on June 26th not four. -Why Tiger "114" is violently blocked against the Rauray road hedge? -The Sherman which spurred the Tiger (OPEATION EPSOM - CAPTURE OF RAURAY SPUR (Part 1)) belongs to 'B' Squadron SRY. Why British would have staged such an odd configuration, right in the middle of the only road leading to Rauray. It annoyed any vehicle trying to reach Rauray and it's a real waist of time, and for what purpose? -Plus Möbius personal account which clearly places the scene on June 27th.
There is nothing 'clear' in the story by Mobius. This from Agte: I (Hauptsturmfuhrer Mobius) myself stopped an advance by the English I then attacked an armored column with another tank (Ustuf. Amselgruber) and knocked out three tanks; my gun jammed and I was shot up by ten tanks. I bailed out; Amselgruber had already done so through a defile by (after?) destroying six tanks.." That says Mobius and Amselgruber : SS-Untersturmfuhrer Amselgruber of the 3rd Company. The following is taken from a combat report: "28 June 1944. Amselgruber remained in his old location during the night and the entire day, repelled probing English infantry, and was attacked by a superior number of English tanks. Amselgruber was able to knock out two Shermans before his tank was disabled by several hits. Amselgruber's left leg was badly injured as he abandoned the tank; however this failed to prevent him from pulling his gunner, who had been seriously wounded in the belly by shell fragments, from the tank and taking him with him. Under very heavy machine-gun and cannon fire, Amselgruber headed back with the gunner in the direction of our lines, which he came upon after dark. This determined stand by Amselgruber undoubtedly helped give our infantry sufficient time to settle into a new, although only makeshift,position. Amselgruber returned to the battalion, said nothing about his injured leg, and returned to action the following day." Amselgruber had been attacked from Colleville by tanks of the 9th Camerons; he knocked out two of three tanks and thus stopped the attack. After his tank had been knocked out and Amselgruber was forced to leave his position, the enemy, with strong artillery support, succeeded in taking the town of Grainville-sur-Odon. 28 June 1944 was the last day of Operation "Epsom."
How both Möbius (114) and Amselgruber (334) could have destroyed so many Sherman and loose their own Tigers on the same day in Rauray knowing : -No 'A' Sqn SRY Sherman was destroyed on June 26th. -On June 27th, 'B' Sqn SRY Sherman lost 13 Sherman. So these accounts clearly state it was June 27th.
Hills book more fully: Stuart Hill, By Tank Into Normandy. Cassell 2002 ISBN 0304362166 pg 106 At 0400 hours the next morning, June 25, (error from the previous text it is clear he means Monday 26th) we awoke, downed a mug of tea and a bacon sandwich and then moved off again. C Squadron was lined up along the road to Caen under the cover of a belt of trees. Our objective was St Nicholas farm, south-east of Fontenay towards Rauray. It was another murky day with light rain falling and visibility of about a hundred yards. First the infantry tried to capture the farm on their own, but were bloodily repulsed by automatic fire. I consulted my map to try to work out where the main fire was coming from and deduced that it must be from the farm's apple orchard and hedgerows. Peter Selerie, C Squadron Leader decided to take the armour in on their own. Half of the squadron was on the left of the Rauray road, the other half on the right. Our Sherman was in the middle of the left-hand group. Suddenly the attack halted as two tanks on our right burst into flames. The whole of Ian Greenaway's troop was knocked out. Ian himself was badly wounded but won the MC for this action. Sergeant Rennie was killed, and Sergeant Stock, who was now leading 3rd Troop, was knocked out and very badly burnt. Almost immediately, I nearly suffered heart failure as our tank engine stalled halfway across an open field. Then the recoil of the gun, which had been just fired, broke the connection under the wireless set, so this also gave up and we were left with no internal or external communications. I frantically seized a screwdriver and, using every swear word I knew, mended the wire while shouting at the operator to start the auxiliary motor to charge the bat- teries. For what seemed like an eternity we were a sitting duck, expecting the fatal shot at any moment and only too aware of what had just happened to Ian and his troop. Suddenly the engine roared into life and we were off again with the others. We paused a moment to try to work out where the fire was coming from, then swung left to come round the farm from behind page 107 We were now in front and burst through the hedgerow into the orchard, firing as we went. The grass was long and the foliage on the apple trees very dense: the enemy could have been hidden anywhere. We and the other Shermans hosed down the hedgerows and the farmhouse with- out having to worry about hitting our own infantry. It seemed to work, though, as we thrust out of the orchard and across the Rauray road into a paddock~ We paused a few minutes, wiped the sweat from our faces and checked the machine-gun belts. As we moved on through the paddock, Geoff Storey had to avoid about twenty dead cattle. We moved to the far hedgerow and were just able to see Rauray in the distance. A wooded area jutted out to our left, and suddenly Arthur (reddish, lap gunner)spotted a Panzer Mark IV. 'Enemy hornet,' I heard through the intercom. Remembering my training at Lulworth, I ordered: 'Eleven o'clock. Two thousand five hundred yards. Gunner, traverse left, steady, on. Enemy tank. Armour piercing (AP). Fire when ready.' The first shot bounced once before hit- ting the Panzer. There was a plume of blue smoke from its exhaust as it lurched into reverse and stalled. It started to move again and a second shot hit it as it disappeared into the wood. The shots would not have penetrated but they might have damaged a track. This was my first tank-to-tank engagement and it had not been as conclusive as I might have wished. Meanwhile A Squadron had begun moving up from Fontenay, the plan being that they would come through us and thrust towards Rauray. John Semken was Squadron Leader and he had already heard from C Squadron that there were tanks about, so his gun loader put an AP shell up the spout, just in case. As they cleared Fontenay, they were suddenly confronted by an enormous tank coming round the bend in front. It was hard to know who was more surprised, but John shrieked, 'Fire, it's a Hun', and they loosed off about ten rounds into the smoke. As this cleared away, it was observed that the crew were baling out as small flames came from inside the tank. It was a Tiger of 12th SS Panzer, the first Tiger to be captured in Normandy, and made an impressive sight at close quarters as both its size and the thickness of its armour became apparent. Although the range had been only sixty yards, not one Sher- man shell had penetrated that armour. The fire in the Tiger, we discov- ered, had instead been caused by a shot hitting the side of the driver's observation visor and showering white-hot splinters into the tank. The driver had screamed that he had been hit and the commander had oblig- ingly ordered his crew out. A Squadron squeezed past the Tiger and into a field on the right where they deployed. During the next two hours they systematically shot up every hedgerow as they advanced. Some of John Semken's tanks were Sherman Fireflies, and they started knocking out one German tank after another. Sergeant Dring claimed no less than four himself, and a Panther was shot up by the whole squadron as it drove across our front, its crew baling out as it was still moving. The German infantry started to surrender, leaping out of the ground under the noses of the tanks, while our own infantry came up to finish things off. It had been a great day. Thirteen Panzer Mark IVs had been knocked out, along with a Tiger and a Panther. The enemy tank force defending Rauray had been eliminated and their infantry overrun. Aggressive tactics had paid off, and at relatively small cost to ourselves. C Squadron had lost two tanks, with two dead and two wounded. I felt encouraged by the way each squadron had performed and this was reflected in the gen- eral morale of my troop, in spite of the casualties. We had won a tank battle against significant opposition, and this gave our confidence an important boost. The next day, June 27, it was B Squadron's turn to take the lead. They sent out two troops to investigate the situation in Rauray but ran into several Panthers which must have been brought up during the night. Three Shermans were destroyed, and Troop Leader Ray Scott and the experienced Sergeants Biddell and Green were killed. By midday Rauray had been cleared and in it were found about eight German tanks, all damaged to some extent, and one Tiger, which seemed to be in perfect working order. We tried to incorporate it into our ranks, but unfortunately High Command wanted it to be taken back to England. Later that afternoon B Squadron ran into more trouble around Rauray, and by the end of the day only had seven tanks still serviceable out of their usual sixteen. John Hanson-Lawson, Squadron Leader, was badly burnt when his tank was hit, and Sergeant Crookes, his signal sergeant, later died of his wounds. He had been with the Regiment since before the war. With the information on the casualties mentioned by Hill SRY casualties June 1944 it is confirmed that this is indeed an account of Monday June 26th Here is the map in Hill and the 2 Shermans with the casualties are at bottom right. Everything in Hill is confirmed and there is no doubt that Tiger '114' was knocked out on June 26th and not June 27th. It is also 100% certain that Hill is describing Tiger '114' when he describes the Tiger knocked out by Semken. This is what the German demo charges look like (actually for demolition of artillery pieces but the one at far right is the same as those for tanks with the container upright at rear) and the recently located Tiger has obviously been destroyed by its own crew.
If you base all your argumentation on the Stuart Hills' account, it can't be admissible at all. And what about all my other arguments...? -No KO Tiger is mentioned in 11th DLI documents (WD nor appendices) not even in the detailed account of Lieutenant-Colonel Hanmer, 11th DLI CO. If he had a threatening Tiger in his perimeter during the night of 26/27, he might have mentioned it. ??? -8th Armoured Brigade WD mentioned two Tiger destroyed on June 26th not four. ??? -Why Tiger "114" is violently blocked against the Rauray road hedge? The Sherman which spurred the Tiger (OPEATION EPSOM - CAPTURE OF RAURAY SPUR (Part 1)) belongs to 'B' Squadron SRY. Why British would have staged such an odd configuration, right in the middle of the only road leading to Rauray. It annoyed any vehicle trying to reach Rauray and it's a real waist of time, and for what purpose? -Who has destroyed the TDM10 on June 27 next to the crossroad? -Ramilies posted the oral account of Major John Semken : REEL 4 Continues: squadron deployment; encounter with Tiger tank at Fontenay le Pesnel. -Render's account and scheme are far more detailed than the Hills' one. Have you seen it?
Hill was there and his book is based on his diary. The details he gives for the casualties from the 2 Shermans you mention is June 26 and have been checked and confirmed. The encounter took place on June 26th and not the 27th. The film was shot on the 27th but is is a mistake to think it was shot the same day as the Tiger and Panther were stopped. For example the burnt-out Panther has men all over it and you can not do that on a hot tank.
If it was not for this photo (one of a pair)we would have no information on this Tiger. No one knows exactly where it was. 3 photographers were working in Rauray on June 27 and they filmed/ photographed the same scenes. People in the film appear in still photos. Handford wandered off and he (and he alone) found this 2kp Tiger. No account mentions it. It appears not to have existed and yet there it is. There is no significance in the non-mention of something No account makes any mention of it and the exact location is unknown. There were 3 photographers at work in Rauray on the 27th and only
Because of the language difference that does not quite make sense in English. Its not a criticism but I need to fully understand what you are saying.
This account raises more issues This is Fontenay. The 'main street' is clearly the one marked in red. It is in fact the main road to Caen. The green line is where it is claimed the Tiger was knocked out. The 'hit on the turret ring' is also a new condition. Whatever the claims about this Tiger it is an undeniable fact that it was destroyed by the use of its own internal demolition charges. It is quite possible it was rendered immobile by combat damage and then blown up but the fact is it was blown up.