Hi Interestingly I can find no mention of the fact that Sword was closed to unloading, due to the German artillery from Le Havre.... I am not sure if it was closed permanently, as we got few chances to go back to the beach area. But it certainly was closed for unloading and under shell fire.... Sapper
Hello! Apologies if this is not in the correct place, I've come here from google after looking for info on sword beach and found many references to the DUKW. My Grandfather was in charge of a DUKW in the 101st Coy Amphibious R.A.S.C and he left a short set of notes on his D-day (also his 21st birthday). Hopefully it's useful or interesting so I'll post it. -Vehicle log of amphibious lorry A17 of the 101st Coy Amphibious RASC which took part in the D-Day landings on June 6th 1944. The initial load carried was 75mm Howitzer shells for S.P. guns of the R.A. (not sure on what this means?) The Landing beach was Sword beach between Hermanville and Ouisterham. After initial landing it was engaged taking lightly wounded out the L.S.T. On the afternoon of D.Day I was ordered to captured gun bunkers which were being used by R.A.M.C as beach dressing stations. There I loaded with unstable ammunition and explosives and ordered out to sea, there to dump overboard, keeping clear of beach maintenance area, and incoming landing craft. (He'd told me this was gun cotton). This vehicle finally sank off omaha beach from numerous small leaks. Pump unable to keep clear on the 15th August 1944. Driver L.E. O'Brien. 10680159- I also have the log book (army book 412) for the DUKW, slides from his D-day map which was scanned and restored, soldiers release book, soldiers service book and a few photos he had (mostly from Palestine). I could scan these if they might be useful or interesting. My Dad once told me he'd said that after his DUKW sank, he went back to the Americans and asked for another and they simply gave him another one.
Markay, hi and welcome to the forum. I am sure members would love to see your Grandfather's documents - huge interest here on all aspects of D-Day and Normandy. For your info S.P. means 'self-propelled' guns and R.A. is Royal Artillery. Some members will be able to advise the RA units that landed on Sword beach or were supported from it. LST is a Landing Ship Tank, often used to carry casualties back to UK on return journeys. It seems likely that, since he refers to it as the LST rather than a LST it might have been the vessel that carried his DUKW to Normandy. The unstable gun cotton subject is interesting, do you have anything else about it?
I think the wording needs to be check Thanks for this. Can you check exactly what is written. The RA SP artillery landed on D Day on Sword beach used 105mm ammunition. The 53 Air Landing Regiment RA used 75mm Pack Howitzers which would have needed 75mm ammunition and were supported from Sword Beach. Sorry if this appears a bit pedantic.
Mark, Welcome to the forum. It is always interesting to hear about individuals who were there. 101 GT Company were early arrivals on Sword. A small reconnaissance party landed at about H+150 minutes to prepare for the arrival of the first DUKWs. 633 Platoon seems to match the details that you gave. It was a platoon trained for medical evacuation. Ten of its DUKWs were first to arrive having being carried on the davits of the LSTs and launched immediately on arrival. A further twelve of its DUKWs followed shortly afterwards having being launched from the LSTs tank decks. All of these carried ammunition, mostly 105mm howitzer ammunition as Sheldrake says. Having delivered the ammunition to beach dumps the DUKWs collected casualties and took them out to two LSTs which were specially equipped for he purpose. Captured German gun bunkers were used as Dressing Stations since they offered good protection from enemy fire and air raids. I have not heard before about these DUKWs dumping enemy ammunition at sea but it was not unusual. Three regiments of 105mm self propelled howitzers supported the landing on Sword. They fired on the way in to the beaches and then landed to give more support on land. Providing sufficient ammunition was a problem. They carried the maximum possible on the tanks and towed more in Porpoises, watertight sledges. More arrived on the DUKWs and on LCTs. Mike Sword Beach closed at the end of June and the DUKWs moved to other beaches. They were worked hard and despite regular maintenance and repair many had to be replaced. A stock of replacements was kept and quickly issued. There would have been some paperwork involved but that was probably left to an officer.
He has written 75mm but these notes were made many years later. At the moment I'd assume the self propelled part of what he's written is more accurate so he probably does mean 105mm. Though is it possible he could have carried both? Thank you. Thanks for the information, hopefully I can find out more about his LST. I'll see if I can scan the documents. About the gun cotton, I remember him telling me it had to be cleared out as it was potentially unsafe for the men working (and being treated?) where it was found. Thank you Mike, this is some really great information. Its great to find out what these shells were for and also know more about the bigger picture and my Grandfather's role in it.
Hello Markay, Thank you for joining the forum and welcome! We would definitely love to have the scans of your grandfather's documents. They may bring new information to light and hopefully we can contribute in explaining them if need be. Regarding your grandfather's LST, I would believe that it was LST 361, which was allocated the Landing (or Loading) Table Index Number 381, simply because DUKW A1 was photographed embarking into it, and DUKW A18 is also seen debarking from what should be this same LST. I woud assume that DUKW Platoons were kept together as far as possible. For the photos see my previous post in this thread here: http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/38764-sword-beach/page-2#entry474204 The Landing Table First Tide for SWORD shows that the DUKWs of 101 Gen Tpt Coy RASC were carried in the Tank Deck of exclusively LST as follows: LST (LTIN 381) 20 amphibian 2½ ton 6x6 DUKW and 80 Vehicle Parties [personnel] LST (LTIN 382) 19 amphibian 2½ ton 6x6 DUKW and 77 Vehicle Parties LST (LTIN 383) 19 amphibian 2½ ton 6x6 DUKW and 78 Vehicle Parties LST (LTIN 384) 2 amphibian 2½ ton 6x6 DUKW and 10 Vehicle Parties LST (LTIN 385) 4 amphibian 2½ ton 6x6 DUKW and 30 Vehicle Parties, plus 2 DUKWs stowed on the Rhino Ferry towed by this LST A Note in the Landing Table further indicates that "DUKWS swim ashore to beach at approx H + 5½ - 6 hrs", H Hour being 0725. Each of the two Assault Squadrons Royal Engineers which landed around H Hour was assigned one DUKW with 3 tons of petroleum. From the Operational Notes for 77 Aslt Sqn RE: "One DUKW for Sqn will land at H + 7. Guide will meet at DUKW control pt. 377212. If not met half POL will be put into each drowned vehicle park (DVP)." These two DUKWs must have belonged to either 101 or 633 Gen Tpt Coy RASC, as only these two Coys were planned for arrival within this period of time. Given their most dangerous cargo I would tend to think that they were from 633 Coy, whose DUKWs were carried on davits, i.e. on the outside, rather than inside the LST as almost all 101 Coy DUKWs were. Or maybe they were the two 101 Coy DUKWs stowed on the Rhino Ferry towed by LST (385). But then ammunition was not a very pleasant load to carry either, so perhaps this reasoning is faulty. Michel
This is fantastic thank you. It's especially great to see some of the other DUKWs from the same LST. I've been trying to find more info online and am enjoying the hunt. I managed to find this bit of info that would back up your fair assumption, in which another driver of a 536 A5 says A6 and A7 were lined up behind him (18 minutes behind the first troops on Sword *I think*). http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/79/a3987679.shtml I'm now also certain my Grandfather was with 101, as it's backed up with other info on the 101 such as training Belgian drivers and going to Palestine later on.
Markay, It's always great to see new members posting a question and established members (almost anticipating future questions) adding a huge amount of detailed information. Then more discoveries from your own research add a great deal to the emerging story. It is one of the things that make this forum so brilliant. It would be great to see the scanned copies of your Grandfather's documents, they could add infromation that could be vital to other member's research.
A snippet just found. This unit has eluded me for a long time. Naval Radar landing on Sword on D+1. The Allied Expeditionary Force Naval Plan says ‘ A Type 277T Radar will be set up in Position 065772 (this is on high ground a couple of hundred yards SW of Colleville). Plots will be passed by Naval Radar Shore Broadcast to - Flag Officer Eastern Task Force. - Force ‘S’ Headquarters Ship. - Frigate of Captain, Patrols. - Naval Officer in Charge, Sword.' Later an Operations Room would be set up ashore at the Headquarters Flag Officer British Assault Area near Courseulles. This document suggests that the primary role of this radar was to plot naval surface activity on the eastern flank. It also warns that since Coastal Forces will not have IFF great care should be taken by coastal craft not to stray out of position without reporting the fact. More snippets, and longer pieces, will follow now the weather has turned. Mike.
AA Defence of Sword. I hope I have made sense of the information from the War Diaries, orders and reports. Since it is almost impossible to understand without a map I have done my best to draw one. I always got good marks for colouring my maps at school but that was a very long time ago. ‘N’ Assault Group, 80 AA Brigade. 80 AA Brigade would eventually be responsible for the AA Defence of Sword and Juno and its units were divided between the two areas. Initially each of the two beaches formed an AA Assault Group, that for Sword being ‘N’. This came under the command of 3 Division for the assault phase. Eventually the AA units were responsible for the AA defence of the beaches, exits, roads, bridges, shipping and the dumps and other facilities of the Beach Maintenance Area. Units landed on Queen Beach unless otherwise stated. Some landed on Nan. Map references given are those listed in the unit orders and shown on the maps issued before D day. For security reasons these references were false and had to be adjusted. They do not match the references given in War Diaries etc. Tide 1. The first priority was to land LAA guns to protect the beaches and exits. 73 LAA Regiment. 218 LAA Battery. 218 Battery Headquarters Reconnaissance Group set up an AA Report Centre alongside 5 Beach Group Command Post at Ref: 387205. This was in the centre of the beach near the boundary between White and Red beaches. Two troops, each with three Crusader SP 40mm LAA guns towing three trailer mounted 40mm LAA guns, landed by H+120 minutes. These took up positions in the dunes along the beaches. ‘A’ Troop landed to cover the beaches and exits on Queen White. ‘C’ Troop landed to cover the beaches and exits on Queen Red. 93 LAA Regiment. 322 Battery. ‘G’ Troop landed six Crusader SP triple 20mm LAA guns towing three trailer mounted triple 20mm LAA guns. These were distributed along White and Red Beaches to give protection against low flying aircraft. So far the essential LAA protection for the beaches had landed fairly well on time and were ashore to give day time cover over the area. The remaining LAA units due to land on D Day were seriously delayed in unloading from LSTs by the lack of Rhino Ferries. (It should be noted that the times given for landing from LSTs was actually the time when the LST should be offshore and ready to unload. It would take some time to land all the vehicles even in ideal conditions.) The following landed on time at H+45 minutes. 218 LAA Battery Reconnaissance Group. ‘A’ Troop (less two guns) 218 LAA Battery. ‘C’ Troop (less two guns) 218 LAA Battery. 322 LAA Battery Reconnaissance Group. The remaining two guns of ‘C’ Troop 218 Battery should have landed at H+120 but were delayed until H+180. The remaining two guns of ‘A’ Troop 218 Battery should have landed at H+240 but were delayed until H+300. 220 LAA Battery Reconnaissance Group should have landed at H+330 but was delayed until H+9½ hours. ‘C’ Troop 322 LAA Battery and ‘A’ Group 218 LAA Battery should have landed at H+360 but were delayed until H+7½ hours. Tide 2. It was planned that HAA units would land on the second tide and be in position by nightfall. The units were delayed by several factors. Some were to be landed from LST and this unloading was delayed by the weather, beach congestion and the poor performance of Rhino ferries. Some units were to land on Juno and move across to Sword. This was not possible since the area between the two beaches was not yet clear of the enemy. Units took up positions on arrival and by D+2 all were in place. 103 HAA Regiment. Regimental Headquarters. This was established at Ref:328216 which was just inside 102 Beach Sub Area (Juno). It was not possible to use this position immediately as the area was still in enemy hands. It was positioned near Headquarters 73 LAA Regiment at Hermanville until the area was clear. Tactical Headquarters was established at the Anti Aircraft Operations Room in 102 Beach Sub Area. The HAA batteries were sited to protect the beaches and shipping. The initial three troops were positioned one in the centre of the beach and one at each end. 324 HAA Battery. Battery Headquarters. Headquarters for ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ Troops. This landed on Nan and was established south of ‘F’ Troop. ‘E’ Troop with four 3.7” HAA guns was established on the west at Ref:362218, just to the west of Lion sur Mer. ‘F’ Troop with four 3.7” HAA guns landed on Nan. When it managed to reach Sword it was established at Ref:351223. 322 HAA Battery. Battery Headquarters would be Headquarters for ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Troops when ashore. It was positioned in the copse just west of ‘A’ Troop. ‘B’ Troop with four 3.7” guns was established on the east at Ref:419196, on the sea front at Riva Bella. This troop was to be available for the Coast Artillery role. ‘A’ Troop with four 3.7” guns was established in the centre at Ref:385193, La Breche. 93 LAA Regiment. 322 LAA Battery. Two troops were landed to extend the cover of the beaches as they expanded east and west. ‘H’ Troop landed six Crusader SP triple 20mm LAA guns towing three trailer mounted triple 20mm LAA guns. These were distributed to cover the beaches in square 4020. This was to the east of Queen Red towards Riva Bella. ‘I’ Troop landed six Crusader SP triple 20mm LAA guns towing three trailer mounted triple 20mm LAA guns. These were distributed to cover the beaches in square 3721. This was to the west of Queen White towards Lion sur Mer. 73 LAA Regimental Headquarters. When it landed on the second tide Regimental Headquarters 73 LAA would be positioned alongside Headquarters 101 Beach Sub Area at Ref:377202. This was just north of Hermanville. 218 Battery ‘B’ Troop landed on Nan. Established in squares Ref: 4020/4119 for flank defence to the eastern end of the beaches and the estuary. 220 Battery. Battery Headquarters landed on Nan and moved to Ref: 368214 near HQ 6 Beach Group west of Hermanville. ‘D’ Troop landed on Nan and moved to squares Ref: 3721/3820 to cover the beaches and exits centred on La Breche de Hermanville. 296 Battery. Battery Headquarters landed on Nan and moved to Ref:384187 at Colleville. ‘I’ Troop landed on nan and moved to Ref: 3919/4018 to provide defence in depth to beaches and exits at the eastern end. 73 LAA Workshop REME. ‘A’ (Advanced) Group landed on nan and moved to Ref:373201 near HQ 73 LAA at Hermanville. 112 Pioneer Smoke Platoon. This landed and was spread along the first lateral road. 474 Searchlight Battery. ‘C’ Troop landed 8 searchlight projectors on Nan. On arrival in Sword area they were distributed along the coast and at prominent points inland as follows. Refs: 1. 418195, 2. 413196, 3. 398201, 4. 387207, 5. 363195, 6. 382193. 7. 399188, 8. 389179. All sites, especially 1 and 2 (at Riva Bella), might be required to cooperate in the Coastal Artillery role. All of 73 LAA Regiment except some administrative vehicles and personnel were due to land in the first 24 hours. In the event the landings suffered increasing delays and some units due to land on D Day did not actually land until the morning of D+2. ‘H’ and ‘I’ Troops 322 Battery should have landed at H+16½ hours but actually landed at 1800 hours on D+1. The remainder did not land until the morning of D+2. ‘B’ Troop 218 LAA Battery. ‘D’ Troop 220 LAA Battery. ‘A’ Group 220 LAA Battery. ‘A’ Group 73 LAA Regiment. ‘A’ Group 218 LAA Battery. ‘R’ Groups ‘H’ and ‘I’ Troops 322 LAA Battery. ‘E’ and ‘F’ Troops 220 LAA Battery. Tide 3. 73 LAA Regiment. 220 LAA Battery. ‘E’ and ‘F’ Troops were distributed across the Beach Maintenance Area to the west of Hermanville to cover the beaches, roads and dumps. ‘E’ Troop was deployed in squares Refs 3621/3620. ‘F’ Troop was deployed in squares Refs 3422/3420. 103 HAA Regiment. 323 Battery. ‘C’ Troop was established at Ref. 382172, north of Colleville. It was to protect the beach, roads, Beach Maintenance Area and shipping. ‘D’ Troop was established at Ref. 341229, at the western end of Queen. It was to protect the beach, roads, Beach Maintenance Area and shipping. 474 Searchlight Battery. ‘B’ Troop landed with 8 searchlight projectors. Three were for Nan while the remainder were distributed along the line of HAA gun sites at Refs: 1. 368208, 2. 363222, 3. 352229, 4.384209, 8. 353210. The guns were now all in place. There remained two special units to act in a Coastal Artillery role. These were both located at Ref. 419196, Riva Bella. They were to work with ‘B’ Troop 322 Battery, 103 HAA Regiment. Tide 5. 16 Fire Control Post. To control ‘B’ Troop, 322/103 in Coastal Artillery role in co operation with Naval Officer In Charge. 103 Coast Observer Detachment. Early Warning radar to give warning of enemy seaborne attacks in co operation with ‘A’ Troop 322/103 HAA battery and 16 Fire Control Post in CA role. June 14. 20 LAA Regiment 405 and 409 LAA Batteries of 20 LAA Regiment placed in support of 80 AA Brigade and ordered to deploy as follows: - VP 80. Lock gates and bridge at Ouistreham 7767. One troop. - VP 81. Bridge at Ecarde 112766. One troop. - VP 82. Bridge at Benouville 105745. One troop. These had ben the responsibility of 3 Division. 103 HAA Regiment. It is not always clear exactly when the various components of 103 HAA Regiment landed or when they were established in their positions and ready for action. During the afternoon the gun sites were reconnoitred and the plans coordinated. There was still a good deal of sniping and mortar fire. The ‘A’ groups arrived offshore at 1800 but were unable to land because of a shortage of Rhino Ferries. Some guns had managed to land during the night and one gun of ‘A’ Troop had landed at 2330 and managed to fire ten rounds during the night. By 0900 322 Battery ‘A’ groups had landed and established sites for ‘A’ and ‘B’ troops. ‘B’ troop was not yet able to occupy its planned position on the sea front at Riva Bella. By the evening of D+2 all guns were reported to be ashore and established as planned. ‘B’ Troop engaged an enemy light Coastal Artillery gun and put it out of action. The next day ‘B’ Troop was fired on by the enemy. The predictor was put out of action and one gun damaged. On D+4 Regimental Headquarters was able to take up its planned position at La Deliverand. On D+7 the regiment fired 2300 rounds against ground targets with 4 AGRA. This was to become a common activity and the number of rounds fired against ground targets far exceeded those fired against aircraft. Anti aircraft fire was called for most nights but in general there was so little enemy air activity that the regiment was on a low level of alert and was ordered to have only one in six of its radars switched on.
Mike, More superb work from you. I’m intrigued about the reference to 103 HAA Regiment….“‘B’ Troop engaged an enemy light Coastal Artillery gun and put it out of action.” Whereabouts was this gun? Does the War Diary/Report perchance mention whether it was a direct fire engagement? Arty
Thank you Mike and Arty. Verbatim from 103 HAA War Diary. 8 June. 1700. B Troop moved to new position for Coast Defence role overlooking the canal at Ouistreham. 1730. B Troop engaged and put out of action a light CA gun. About size of 6pdr. My assumption is that the enemy gun was on the far side of the estuary and had been firing, but at whom? Mike
Mike, The bogus grid reference provided for B Troops location correlates to the actual grid reference 119796 - which puts them right on the waterfront in Riva Bella. In 1944 it was the eastern end of WN08 (the current location being the Gare Maritime). This position meant B troop were going to be exchanging fire with WN05 across the estuary at Franceville West (WN05 was armed with at least three 4.7s and a 7.5cm). That is, direct fire by a Brit 3.7 AA gun on a ground target. Just like an “88”…. The initial plan had always been to clear up the German positions on the east of the estuary however it’s failure meant that Gerry had ample opportunity to observe at close quarters, and indeed fire at, everything in the Sword area. A veritable shooting gallery for the other side. Here’s a snippet which helps explain why Sword became unusable by the end of June. It comes from the post war report by Generalleutnant Staudinger, 1 SS Panzer Corps Artillery, who’s observers were almost certainly ensconced in WN05...“During the first days of the invasion [probably after 10June], I fired on the enemy ships assembling off the coast with my two 17cm-gun batteries, which had taken positions south of Caen. Their observation posts were on the coast east of the Orne River estuary….” Arty
Arty, All fascinating as you say. There remain many by ways, and back waters to be examined. I have a list of 'mysteries' which I will probably post one day. Such as: How did the coaster Dunvegan Head come to be beached in an area which had already been closed to coasters? She was of course carrying ammunition and was hit by enemy gunfire. 80 AA Brigade were asked to provide cover for an ammunition coaster docking at Ouistreham. Did it actually dock there? 80 AA Brigade also instructed its sub units to check the stability of 3.7" mountings. Apparently after prolonged firing at ground targets with the guns at low, for AA guns, elevation the platforms shifted making the fire inaccurate. Lots more to look at then. I should live so long. Mike.
NAVAL FORCE 'S'. I suppose that this ought to be posted under War at Sea but it is such an integral part of the story of Sword Beach that I have decided to post it here. Anyway it is not intended for experts in naval matters but for those interested in D Day as a whole. It was a combined operation. FORCE ‘S’. The objectives of Force ‘S’ were given succinctly as: ‘The safe and timely arrival of the assault forces on the beaches, the cover of their landings and the support and maintenance and the rapid build of forces on shore’. To achieve these objectives it had the following ships and craft. ORDER OF BATTLE. This is the initial Order of Battle. More vessels would be added later but most of the LSTs, LCTs and LCIs would be assigned to the cross Channel Shuttle Service rather than Force ‘S’. For the initial crossing there were four groups: Assault Group S1. Assault Group S2. Assault Group S3. ‘S’ Build Up Group. Plus Bombardment Group ‘D’ which came under command of Force ‘S’ on arrival off the Normandy Coast. Headquarters. HMS. Largs. Landing Ship Headquarters. Flag Rear Admiral Naval Force S. HMS. Saint Adrian. Requisitioned yacht. Headquarters Senior Officer Ferry Control. Assault Group S1. HMS Locust. Landing Ship Headquarters (Small). Headquarters Senior Officer Assault Group S1. (SOAG S1.) LST Squadron. 1 LST Flotilla. LSTs No 9, 302, 303, 304, 320, 324, 361 and 363. 5 X LCP(L). 3 X LCP(R). 3 LST Flotilla. LSTs No 322, 367, 408, 419, 420, 423, 427 and 428. 2 X LCP(L). 6 X LCP(R). 5 LST Flotilla. LSTs No 162, 163, 164, 364, 365, 415, 430. 3 X LCP(L). 5 X LCP(R). ‘T’ Landing Craft Squadron. 265 LCI(L) Flotilla. 8 X LCI(L). 266 LCI(L) Flotilla. 5 X LCI(L). 39 LCT Flotilla. 14 X LCT4. 47 LCT Flotilla. 12 X LCT4. Assault Group S2. HMS Dacres. Landing Ship Headquarters (Small). Headquarters Senior Officer Assault Group S2. (SOAG S2.) ‘I’ Landing Craft Squadron. 251 LCI(L) Flotilla. 9 X LCI(L). 263 LCI(L) Flotilla. 12 X LCI(L). US LCT Group IV. 11 X LCT. 40 LCT Flotilla. 12 X LCT. 42 LCT Flotilla. 10 X LCT. 48 LCT Flotilla. 12 X LCT. Assault Group S3. HMS Goathland. Landing Ship Headquarters (Small). Headquarters Senior Officer Assault Group S3. (SOAG S3.) HMS Glenearn. LSI(L). 435 Assault Flotilla. 12 X LCA. 543 Assault Flotilla. 12 X LCA. SS Empire Battleaxe. LSI(L). 537 Assault Flotilla. 18 X LCA. SS Empire Broadsword. LSI(L). 538 Assault Flotilla. 18 X LCA. SS Empire Cutlass. LSI(L). 536 Assault Flotilla. 18 X LCA. ‘E’ Landing Craft Squadron. 261 LCI(L) Flotilla. 5 X LCI(L). 14 LCT Flotilla. 9 X LCT3. 41 LCT Flotilla. 14 X LCT4. 43 LCT Flotilla. 10 X LCT4. 45 LCT Flotilla. 10 X LCT4. Support Squadron. 330 Support Flotilla. 4 X LCF(4) 3 X LCG(L). 1 X LCT(A)CB. 32 LCT Flotilla. 14 X LCT4. 38 LCT Flotilla. 9 X LCT4. 321 LCT(R) Flotilla. 5 X LCT(R). 592 Assault Flotilla. 9 X LCA(HR). 704 Assault Flotilla. 4 X LCP(L). 2 X LCP(Sy). 707 Assault Flotilla. 12 X LCP(L). S Build Up Group. ‘C’ Build Up Squadron. Royal Marines. 803 Build up Flotilla . 16 X LCV(P). 810 Build up Flotilla . 16 X LCV(P). 811 Build up Flotilla . 16 X LCV(P). 812 Build up Flotilla . 16 X LCV(P). 813 Build up Flotilla . 16 X LCV(P). 814 Build up Flotilla . 16 X LCV(P). ‘D’ Build Up Squadron. Royal Marines. 602 Build Up Flotilla. 16 X LCM Mk1. 603 Build Up Flotilla. 16 X LCM Mk1. 653 Build Up Flotilla. 16 X LCM Mk3. Landing Barge Squadron. 5 LBV Flotilla. 12 X LBV(2). 6 LBV Flotilla. 12 X LBV(2). 16 LBV Flotilla. 12 X LBV(2). 35 LBV(S&R) Flotilla. 1 X LCE. 6 X LBE. 1 X LBK. 10 X LBO. 2 X LBW. Tugs Damito, Empytia and Vindelicia. Part 30 LBV(S&R) Flotilla. 3 X LBE. 1 X LBK. 6 X LBO. 2 X LBW. Tugs Tokio II and Sanson. Mike
NAVAL FORCE 'S'. Embarkation. Embarkation was timed to start on D-7. On that day the signal ‘Neptune Tinker’ was to be sent. If embarkation was to be delayed then the signal ‘Neptune Tailor’ was to be sent. This meant that the signal to start embarkation would not be sent for 24 hours. This could be repeated on subsequent days. All eventualities were planned for and signal ‘Neptune Soldier’ could be sent to suspend loading and/or Neptune Sailor’ to cease loading. ‘Neptune Serial ?’ was the signal to proceed with the operation. ‘?’ indicated D Day. In the event of course signal ‘Neptune Trident was sent. This meant operation postponed all ships and craft return to port. Embarkation started on schedule. In the last week of May units moved to their concentration areas. Those for Force ‘S’ were in wooded areas inland of Portsmouth. Troops and vehicles were accommodated in camps, mostly built for the occasion. These were hutted as far as possible and contained all the usual amenities of a military camp. Once in the concentration area all communication with the outside world was severely restricted. Personnel were not to leave except on vital military business. Phone calls could be made in only the most exceptional circumstances. Outward mail was held up. Inward mail had for some time been addressed to the anonymous APO England and continued to be delivered. Final preparations were made in the concentration areas and serials of men and vehicles were called forward for loading in accordance with the loading plan. Roads from the concentration area to the embarkation area were strictly controlled. Some were designated as being for operational traffic only and not even other military traffic was allowed on them. Most were closed to civilian traffic, at least during the periods when loading was taking place. Vehicle parking was provided along wide roads, roads with wide verges and on the few double carriageways which existed. All equipment being landed in Normandy was to be waterproofed, even if it was likely that it would land dry shod. 21 Army Group laid down that all vehicles had to be waterproofed to allow ‘B’ vehicles to land in four foot of water and ‘A’ vehicles to land in six foot of water. In each case there should also be an allowance for waves up to eighteen inches high and vehicles should be able to operate immersed for up to six minutes. Tanks and similar heavy armoured vehicles needed to have the hull sealed to prevent water entering the engine, fighting and driving compartments. This made it unnecessary to waterproof individual internal items. The gap between turret and hull had to be sealed. Trunking for the engine air intakes and exhausts had to be fitted to the hull. All exposed assemblies had to be protected and preserved. All of this had to be done in such a way that the fighting efficiency of the vehicle could be restored immediately on landing. In the Concentration Area heavy ‘A’ vehicles were first inspected and routine maintenance and servicing carried out. The hull and turret were sealed and the mountings for trunking etc. fitted. The vehicle was then tested in a fresh water tank. This work required 190 hours of work, mainly by the crew. The vehicle should then not exceed a mileage of 100. At the Marshalling Area the trunking was erected and stays adjusted, fixtures were sealed and any adjustments required were made. This work should take 25 man hours and then the vehicle was limited to 20 miles travel. Finally at the Embarkation Hard or on the actual craft five hours was allocated to final sealing and lubrication of the tracks. Immediately on landing the canvas sealing all operationally vital openings could be removed using explosive charges detonated by a single switch. Great care had to be taken not to accidentally activate the circuit during the crossing and landing. As soon as possible the trunking was removed. This was normally done in the Assembly Area. ‘B’ Vehicles were more difficult to waterproof since the entire chassis would be totally immersed during wading and all mechanical and electrical parts would be exposed to sea water and sand. All electrical systems had to be fully insulated and water prevented from entering fuel pumps. Electrical leads were covered in rubber tubing. Plugs, distributor and carburettor completely sealed. Even dashboard instruments, switches and the horn were waterproofed. Air intake pipes had to be fitted. It was also important that drivers be trained since the combined effects of a fully loaded vehicle, a steep ramp, soft sand, cold water and waves could easily lead to a stalled engine. It was also essential that the vehicle should be in perfect mechanical condition. As with armoured vehicles the work of waterproofing was carried out in stages. At the Concentration Area inspection and maintenance was carried out, followed by the sealing of as many fixtures as possible. Fittings for air intakes and exhausts were fitted and the chassis and other exposed metal was given an anti corrosion treatment. This took fifty man hours and the vehicle could then travel up to two hundred miles. At the marshalling area air intake pipes were fitted and all sealing completed except for breathers. At the Embarkation Hard or on the craft the breather was sealed, a canvas sheet fitted to protect the radiator and a tow rope fitted. Light armoured vehicles varied according to their construction but followed the pattern of those above. Carriers had their height extended so that the hull could be sealed. Armoured cars and scout cars had to have chassis protected but could have the body sealed so that the electrics and engine did not require separate treatment. Towed guns presented problems since they had a great many exposed components. Instruments were removed and carried separately. Trail and carriage drain holes were blocked and grease applied to all exposed parts. To prevent damage due to salt water it was planned that equipment would be washed in fresh water and given a complete service as soon as possible. 3.7” HAA guns needed so much equipment removing and storing in waterproof bags that it took ninety minutes to re assemble them. Closed trailers of all types presented special problems. They could be completely sealed, in which case there was a danger that they would float and be at the mercy of waves, or they could be allowed to fill with water in which case the contents must be protected. Some vehicles cannot be waterproofed. In general such vehicles were not taken overseas. If they were taken then they must be landed dry shod. Vehicles which cannot be waterproofed include: - Any vehicle manufactured before 1940. - Vehicles which have open clutch housings or are too low including Albion B7 6X4, Austin 8, Austin 10, Commer 15cwt 4X2, ERF 6ton 4X2, Ford WOA1, Ford WOA2, Guy FBAX, Maudsley Militant, Morris 30cwt van, AEC Marshall, Leyland Lynx, Thorneycroft 6X4, Carrier S&C, early Leyland Retriever. - Rollers. These cannot be waded. - Cranes and excavators. These must be landed on trailers. - Humber 4X2 Utility which will float in 3foot of water. Vehicles were to land with full tanks plus a reserve of 13½ gallons for vehicles of 15cwt and under, and 22½ gallons for carriers and vehicles over 15cwt. Sufficient POL was to be landed on D Day to replace all D Day consumption. MT Spares. Units were to proceed to concentration areas with complete first aid MT outfits. In no circumstances were these to be used in concentration areas. Unit spares had to be kept for use on the Continent since it could be some time before the RAOC supply system was fully operational. 1098 Equipment. Full scales of WE and G1098 equipment and stores were to be taken to concentration areas. G1098 which could not be carried in vehicles was packed in wooden cases not exceeding a gross weight of 100lbs. Units were to ensure that all G1098 stores were packed and waterproofed properly. The surplus G1098 stores and equipment were sent as unaccompanied stores and held in ordnance depots awaiting delivery or collection. Stationary. Units were to ensure that all forms, books, manuals, regulations, stationary and office equipment were complete before embarkation. There was in fact a serious shortage of forms in Normandy. Without the correct forms the army cannot function. (Not joking). Baggage. Officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above were allowed 75lb of baggage including blankets. Officers below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel were allowed 60lb of baggage including blankets. Warrant Officers were allowed a large pack. Reinforcements. First reinforcements of units were withdrawn to selected Reinforcement Holding Units. First reinforcements of RAC units were withdrawn to squadrons of Armoured Replacement Groups. Ground to Air Recognition. Yellow celanese triangles were to be carried. Feeding Arrangements. All units will be fed a hot meal in the Marshalling Area Camps before leaving. All personnel will be issued with 6oz of biscuits and 4oz of chocolate for the period between leaving the camp and arriving on board ships and craft. A mug of hot tea will be provided in the embarkation area. Sea Passage Rations will be provided for the crossing. These will consist of Compo Ration Type ‘F’, one tin of self heating soup per man per day plus one tin of self heating cocoa per man for assault troops only. Voyage Rations (Ship reserve) will be placed on board ships and craft but only used in case of emergency. All personnel will be issued in the Marshalling Area Camp with two 24 hour rations, a tin of 20 cigarettes, one emergency ration, one water sterilising kit, one Tommy cooker with six hexomine tablets plus six refill tablets. Assault troops will have one 24 hour ration and one 24 hour ration (assault) which has the same contents but fits into the smaller half of the mess tin. All personnel will provide themselves with the means to light Tommy cookers. Unit transport would carry one days composite ration. 2nd line transport landing on D Day would carry a further one day composite ration. All further 2nd line transport would carry a reserve of composite rations. One packet of chewing gum will be issued to each man landing on D Day and D+1 to alleviate sea sickness. All water trucks and trailers will be filled before leaving he Concentration Area and maintained full. Each man carried a full water bottle. Unit transport carries 1½ gallons per man. Units were to land with full first line scales of ammunition plus as much extra as possible. Second line ammunition lands on D Day. I Corps Embarkation Orders suggest that formation signs were to be worn by all personnel for security reasons. Only essential operation and administrative orders were to be taken ashore. No documents which might reveal future plans were be taken ashore. Marching personnel of assault brigades were not to carry respirators. All anti gas equipment will be carried on unit transport. All vehicles carried vehicle anti gas equipment and local alarms (rattles). Beach Groups landed with a full scale of unit equipment, vehicle equipment, first line reserves and decontamination reserves. All ranks were to wear AV Battledress (impregnated with anti gas chemicals). Loading. Force ‘S’ Loading Table. The large number of ships and craft loading around the Solent needed careful planning and coordination. It would not be possible to load all vehicles in the last couple of days but LCTs in particular had very limited accommodation for personnel and these must be embarked as late as possible. Timetables also needed to take account of tides at the loading hards. Field Regiments RA. The vehicles of the Self Propelled Field Regiments RA started loading onto LCTs of Group 4 at GF Hard, Gosport. The craft then moored until D-2. At 1830 on D-2 two LCT from each of Groups 4, 4A and 4B berthed at Harbour Station Jetty and embarked and distributed personnel to these groups. GF Hard, Gosport D - 5. Group 4. 76 Field Regiment embarked. 0600. Serials 272 and 273. 1100. Serials 274 and 275. 1430. Serials 276 and 277. D - 4. Group 4A. 33 Field Regiment embarked. 0630. Serials 278 and 279. 1200. Serials 280 and 281. 1530. Serials 282 and 283. D - 3. Group 4B. 7 Field Regiment embarked. 0700. Serials 331 and 332. 1300. Serials 333 and 334. 1630. Serials 335 and 336. D-2. On D-2 the Stokes Bay Hards embarked vehicles for the assault groups. Stokes Bay Hard G1 - embarked ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons (DD) 13/18 Hussars and Royal Marine Armoured Support Group. Group 1. ‘A’ and ‘B’ (DD) Squadrons 13/18 Hussars. 1500. Serials 101 and 102. 1600. Serials 103 and 104. 1700. Serials 105 and 106. 1800. Serials 107 and 108. Group 2. RMASG. 1900. Serials 532 and 533. 2000. Serials 534 and 535. 2100. Serials 544 and 545. Stokes Bay Hard G2. - embarked AVREs and Vehicles for the Reserve Brigade Group 2. AVRE. 1500. Serials 109 and 110. 1600. Serials 110A and 111. 1700. Serials 112 and 113. 1800. Serials 114 and 114A. 1900. Serials 115 and 116. Group 19. Reserve Brigade Vehicles. 2000. Serials 399 and 400. 2100. Serials 401 and 402. Stokes Bay Hard G3. - Embarked vehicles for the Assault Brigade and the remainder of the Reserve Brigade. Group 10. Assault Brigade Vehicles. 1500. Serials 296 and 297. 1600. Serials 298 and 299. 1700. Serials 300 and 301. 1800. Serials 302 and 303. 1900. Serials 304 and 305. 2000. Serial 306. Group 2. LCT(CB) 2000. Serial 548. Group 19. Reserve Brigade Vehicles. 2100. Serials 403 and 404. Stokes Bay Hard G4. - Embarked the remainder of the vehicles for the Reserve Brigade and Armoured Regiment. Group 18. Reserve Brigade vehicles and Armoured Regiment. 1230. Serials 365 and 367. 1330. Serials 366 and 369. 1430. Serials 368 and 372. 1530. Serials 370 and 374. 1630. Serials 373 and 376. 1730. Serials 375 and 406. Group 19. Reserve Brigade vehicles. 1830. Serials 405 and 408. 1930. Serials 407 and 410. 2030. Serials 409 and 547. 2130. Serials 546 and 371. Note. Serials 546 and 547 are LCT(A) of Group 2. Gosport Hard GF. - Embarked priority vehicles for the Assault Brigade. Group 7. Assault Brigade Priority Vehicles. 0630. Serials 210 and 211. 0730. Serials 212 and 213. 0830. Serials 214 and 215. 0930. Serials 216 and 217. 1400. Serials 218 and 219. 1500. Serials 220 and 221. Landing Ships Innfantry. Also on D-2 the LSIs embarked personnel. The ships remained at anchor in the Solent, at Berths 1, 2, 3 and 4, Area 25. Personnel were ferried to them by two Isle of Wight ferries, SS Shanklin and SS Merstone. Glenearn Serial 579. S70. 0730. Trip 1A. SS Shanklin. 0900. Trip 1B. SS Merstone. Empire Cutlass Serial 583. S71. 1030. Trip 2A. SS Shanklin. 1200. Trip 2B. SS Merstone. Empire Battleaxe Serial 584. S72. 1330. Trip 3A. SS Shanklin. 1500. Trip 3B. SS Merstone. Empire Broadsword Serial 580. S73. 1630. Trip 4A. SS Shanklin. 1800. Trip 4B. SS Merstone. D-1. The LCIs loaded. These had limited space. All personnel were provided with sleeping accommodation but catering was limited, especially on the LCI(S) At Warsash. LCI(S) carrying Commandos loaded at Warsash under the orders of Captain G.J.4. Loading was to be completed in time to ensure that the flotillas arrived at their assembly berths in Area 24 Western Part by 1800 on D-1. Group 9. Serials 256 to 260. 41 Commando. Serials 263 to 267. 6 Commando. Group 9A. Serials 190 and 191. 10 Commando. Serials 284 to 288. 45 Commando. Serials 261 and 262. HQ 1 SS Brigade. Serials 289 to 293. 3 Commando. South Parade Pier, Southsea. The LCI(L) loaded at South Parade Pier, Southsea. Group 8. 0600. Serials 228 to 230. Group 16. 0700. Serials 388 to 390. KOSB. 0800. Serials 391 to 393. 2 RUR. 0900. Serials 394 to 396. 2 Lincolns. Second Tide. 1000. Serials 600 to 602. 6 Beach Group. 1100. Serials 603 to 605. 6 Beach Group 1200. Serials 606 and 607. Port Operating Group. 0830. Landing Craft Headquarters 501 and 531. East Arm, Royal Pier, Southampton. Loaded: 1000. LCI(L) Serial 1559. Docks Operating personnel. To join Convoy L1. D Day East Arm, Royal Pier, Southampton. Loaded. 1000. LCI(L) Serial 3131. Docks Operating Personnel. To join Convoy L5. LSTs Gosport Hard GH. Loading at Gosport Hard GH. LSTs had better accommodation for troops than did LCTs. They could sleep and feed troops for long periods if necessary. D-4. 0600. Serials 381 and 382. Group 17. Loading 357 and 329 personnel respectively. 1000. Serials 383 and 384. Group 17. Loading 401 and 365 personnel respectively. 1400. Serial 385. Group 17. Loading 362 personnel. Serial 611. 2nd Tide. Loading 362 personnel. 1800. Serials 612 and 613. 2nd Tide. Loading 320 and 355 personnel respectively. 2200. Serials 614 and 615. 2nd Tide. Loading 363 and 370 personnel respectively. D-3. 0200. Serials 616 and 617. 2nd Tide. Loading 369 and 349 personnel respectively. 0600. Serials 618 and 619. 2nd Tide. Loading 322 and 312 personnel respectively. 1000. Serials 625 and 626. 2nd Tide. Loading 335 and 331 personnel respectively. 1400. Serial 627. 2nd Tide. Loading 295 personnel. Serial 3109. 3rd Tide. Loading 313 personnel. 1800. Serials 3110 and 3111. 3rd Tide. Loading 345 and 348 personnel respectively. 2200. Serials 3112 and 3113. 3rd Tide. Loading 334 and 288 personnel respectively. Rhino Ferries. These carried the serial of the towing LST with a R suffix. 381R, 382R, 383R, 384R, 385R, 613R, 614R, 615R and 616R. D-5. 0900. Rhinos 381R, 382R and 383R load vehicle for all the Rhinos at Gosport GH Hard. On completion of loading the three Rhinos proceed to Area 23 South where loads and personnel should be transferred to Rhinos and LSTs as shown in the Loading Tables. D-3. The LSTs load at Gosport GH Hard. Rhinos remain at the moorings. D-2. Rhinos secure to their respective LSTs. Headquarters Ships and Craft. These loaded on D-1. 1000. SR Jetty. St Adrian. Embarks 2 men for Inland Water Transport. 0600. PH Jetty. Serial 222 Goathland. Embarks 19 men for HQ 8 Brigade. 0900. PH Jetty. Serial 307 Dacres. Embarks 34 men for HQ 3 Division. 1400. SR Jetty. Serial 308 Largs. Embarks 30 men for HQ 3 Division. 0900. PH Jetty. Serial 364 Locust. Embarks 19 men for HQ 9 Brigade. At 0830 the following small craft load at South Parade Pier, Southsea. Serial 501. LCH. Embarks 27 men for RN Commando etc. Serial 531. LCH. Embarks 12 men for RN Commando etc. Serial 561. ML. Embarks 2 men for 76 Field Regiment. Serial 562. ML. Embarks 2 men for 33 Field Regiment. Serial 571. ML. Embarks 2 men for 7 Field Regiment. Serial 505. LCP(L). Embarks 4 men for 76 Field Regiment. Serial 516. LCP(L). Embarks 4 men for 33 Field Regiment. Serial 517. LCP(L). Embarks 4 men for 7 Field Regiment. Serial 506. LCP(L). Reserve. Follow Up Brigade. Loading at Newhaven. 1 X ML. 9 X LCI(L). 29 X LCT. 1 X Coast Guard Cutter (US). Northern Wave En Avant. 14 X LCI(L). 1 X Coast Guard Cutter (US). These craft would sail from Newhaven and join the stream of shipping at Area Z. The loading was carried out without serious problems, even the bad weather failed to delay the programme. Embarkation started on 31 May. Assault Groups S1 (reserve) and S3 (assault) loaded at Portsmouth and Southampton while Assault Group S2 (follow up) loaded at Shoreham and Newhaven. Delays did occur but these were largely compensated for by the generous time allowed. Most delays were the result of late arrival of army vehicles, by the lack of experience of the military loading personnel and the full and awkward loads planned for many craft. More serious were the many instances of overloading of craft. In particular: - The three LCT4 which were each to carry nine Sherman tanks of ‘C’ Squadron 13/18 Hussars were found to have a forward draft of 4foot 10inches instead of the usual loaded draft of 3foot 9inches. This was explained by the large amount of additional equipment loaded onto the tanks and to the Porpoise ammunition carriers. A reserve LCT was used to carry two Shermans from each of the three original craft. - The LCTs lifting the AVREs were so fully loaded that the watertight doors behind the ramps would not close. This was attributed to the additional weight of assault equipment carried, and again to Porpoises. Little could be done with regard to reducing the loads so extra pumps were provided to deal with any water coming over the bow ramp. - The overloads in some well used LCTs caused strain which in turn caused leaks in the hull which in turn further increased the draft. - In many cases brigade or battalion staffs insisted on squeezing in an additional Jeep or similar. These were often placed in the bows of the craft, something which the MLOs staff avoided since if these small vehicles drowned on exiting they prevented the following vehicles from landing. The only answer was for craft to retract and land elsewhere to avoid the stalled vehicle. (On another beach at least one unit adjutant took great delight in ordering a stalled jeep to be tipped off the ramp. The jeep belonged to another unit.) - Most units overloaded vehicles. Extra kit, fuel, ammunition, food was squeezed in until all space was full regardless of the weight. The cumulative overload could be considerable. One RN Captain, Senior Officer Assault Group S3, felt that the MLO Staff and Movement Control were too inflexible. Given the size and complexity of the loading operation there can have been little room for flexibility. Vehicles and personnel were assembled in craft loads before moving to the embarkation areas. In many cases vehicles and personnel from several different units were to be loaded onto a craft. The tables for movement to the loading areas were timed precisely, giving the time when a craft load should leave its Assembly Area, pass certain points and arrive at a holding area near the loading hards. Most roads were narrow by modern standards, one lane in each direction, with one lane full of waiting vehicles as the loading area was neared. It might have been possible to ‘stop the clock’ but altering the order of groups would have caused chaos. Mike.
Fantastic stuff, Mike. Particularly like hearing the details of vessels being overloaded. Were units given maximum weights for types of vehicles or did they just add as much equipment as they could carry?
FORCE ‘S’ SAILING. Once loaded the ships and craft were moored in the Solent. The entire Solent was covered with moorings for the three British Assault Forces. Only channels to allow groups to move to the gates in the Boom defences remained clear. Careful planning and control was required as Force J was also using the eastern exits from the Solent. As a general rule Force ‘S’ landing craft used the Lumps Fort Entrance to the Solent. This was nearer the shore. Force ‘J’ landing craft and the LSIs of Force ‘S’ used the central Spithead Gate. It was written into the orders for Neptune that the order for the operation to be confirmed or postponed should be sent by H-24 hours. This it was explained was because the weather approaching from the Atlantic was often unreliable and difficult to forecast accurately. It was also emphasised that there could not be repeated postponements since the troops on many craft would have to be disembarked. The problems involved in getting the order to the huge number of vessels and other organisations were recognised. It was agreed that the order to postpone could be sent by telephone to as many senior officers as possible even though this was a security risk. Officers receiving the order would then ensure that the order was passed to all vessels using small despatch craft. There was of course a shortage of such craft as most were already earmarked for the invasion force. The first vessel of Force S to sail was the Midget Submarine X23 with Combined Operations Pilotage Party 9. This sailed at 2130 0n D-4 from Fort Blockhouse. This craft could not of course be recalled when the postponement was ordered and had to remain off the Normandy coast for 24 hours longer than planned. It must have been rather cramped on board. Bombardment Force ‘D’ sailed from the Clyde on the evening of June 2nd. When the postponement was announced they remained at sea. The following give the composition of convoys and where they were berthed. The time at which they should slip their moorings, they were moored at buoys rather than being anchored, was chosen to give time to get formed up, get under way and reach the gates at the planned time. Escorts were generally berthed separately and joined their convoys outside the gate. Destroyers which were part of Bombardment Force ‘D’ acted as escorts as far as the Lowering Position. Convoy S1. Minesweepers. 1st Minesweeping Flotilla. 4 X Danlayers. 2 X MLMS. HMS Scorpion 1 X HDML from 149 Flotilla. The minesweepers were moored just inside the booms in Area 28 so they were able to slip at H-17 hours, 45 minutes and pass Spithead Gate fifteen minutes later at H-17hours, 30minutes. Convoy S2. Bombarding destroyers. These two groups were to escort Convoy S2 (15 Minesweeping Flotilla) sailing from Dover. HMS Slazak HMS Middleton Berthed in Area 26N. HMS Scourge HMS Serapis Berthed in Area 28. 5 MTB from 55 Flotilla and 1 HDML from 149 Flotilla. These were all to slip at H-15 hour, 35 minutes and pass Spithead Gate at H-15hour, 15minutes. Convoy S3. DD Tanks. 2 X LCP(L) Navigation. 1 X LCH 8 X LCT3. For DD Tanks. 3 X LCG(L) 10 X LCP(L) 3 X LCS(L)(2). 1 X ML These were berthed in Area 27, Line C. They were to slip at H-19 hours, 15minutes and pass Lumps Fort at H-15 hours, 45 minutes. 165 Mine Sweeping Flotilla (BYMS) was berthed in Area 30 and would slip at H-17 hours, 55 minutes. 1 ML and 16 Mine Sweeping Flotilla were to rendezvous with S3 at D Buoy at H-17 hours, 15minutes. Convoy S4. Royal Marine Armoured Support Group. 8 X LCT(A) 1 X LCT(CB) 1 X ML 8 X LCM. These were berthed in Area 27, Line D. They would slip at H-22 hours, 10minutes and pass Lumps Fort at H-21 hours, 40 minutes. Convoy S5. AVREs, SP Artillery and support craft. HMS St. Adrian. A requisitioned yacht to be used as a headquarters ship in Gooseberry 5. She was berthed at PHJ. She would slip at H-18 hours, 5minutes, pass Spithead Gate at H-17hours, 35 minutes and rendezvous with Convoy S5 at D Buoy at H-16hours, 45 minutes. 1 X LCH 10 X LCT. AVRE 4 X LCF 9 X LCA(HR) 5 X LCT(R) 18 X LCT(SP) 2 X ML. These were berthed in Harbour. They would slip at H-19hours and pass Lumps Fort at H-18hours, 15minutes. Convoy S6. HMS Roberts. Being short ranged Roberts sailed from the Solent and not with the other heavy units. Convoy S7. Fast LSI convoy. These were bombarding destroyers which would escort the LSI convoy. HMS Virago HMS Verulam HMS Kelvin HMS Eglinton They were berthed in Area 28. They would slip at H-9 hours, 55 minutes and pass Spithead Gate at H-9 hours, 45 minutes. 5 X MTB (63 Flotilla) 4 X LSI(L) 1 X LSI(S) 1 X LSI(H) 2 X LCI(S) 1 X LCH 1 X High Speed Launch 3 X Coast Guard Cutter (US). These were berthed in Area 25. They would slip at H-10 hours, 5 minutes and pass Spithead Gate at H-9 hours, 45 minutes. Convoy S8. Priority vehicles. 23 X LCT 3 X LCI(L) 1 X ML These were berthed in Area 27, Lines A and B. They would slip at H-17 hours, 45 minutes pass Lumps Fort at H-17 hours, 15 minutes. Convoy S9. Commandos. 22 X LCI(S). 1 X Coast Guard Cutter (US). These were berthed in Area 24, Western Part. They would slip at H-9 hours, 50 minutes and pass Lumps Fort at H-9hours, 20minutes. HMS Stork would pass Spithead Gate at H-9 hours, 5 minutes and rendezvous with S9 at D Buoy at H-8 hours, 35 minutes. Convoy S10. Follow Up Brigade. HMS Dacres. Follow Up Brigade Headquarters Ship. She was berthed at PHJ. She would slip at 0630 D-1, pass Spithead Gate at 0700 D-1 and arrive at Newhaven at 1100. Loading at Newhaven. 1 X ML. 9 X LCI(L). 29 X LCT. 1 X Coast Guard Cutter (US). Northern Wave En Avant. These were berthed at Newhaven. They would slip at H-19 hours, 55 minutes and pass Newhaven C3 Buoy at H-18 hours, 25 minutes. Convoy S11. HMS Torrington was berthed at Area 26N. She would slip at H-13 hours, 35 minutes, pass Spithead Gate at H-13 hours, 15 minutes and rendezvous with convoy S11 at Newhaven C3 Buoy. Loading at Newhaven. 14 X LCI(L). 1 X Coast Guard Cutter (US). These were berthed at Newhaven. They would slip at H-10 hours, 45 minutes and pass Newhaven C3 Buoy at H-10 hours, 15 minutes. Convoy S12. HMS Locust. Reserve Brigade Headquarters Ship with a Coast Guard Cutter (US) were berthed at PHJ. They would slip at H-12 hours, 25 minutes, pass Spithead Gate at H-11 hours, 55 minutes and rendezvous with Convoy S12 at D Buoy at H-11 hours, 15 minutes. HMS Clover was berthed at Area 26N. She would slip at H-12 hours, 20 minutes, pass Spithead Gate at H-12 hours and rendezvous with Convoy S12 at D Buoy at H-11hours, 15minutes. 24 X LCT 9 X LCI(L) 1 X ML. These were berthed at Area 24, Eastern Part. They would slip at H-13 hours, 25 minutes and pass Lumps Fort at H-12 hours, 35 minutes. Convoy S13. FDT 217. Fighter Direction Tender. 2 X High Speed Launch (RAF). Rescue launches. 2 X Drakes (RASC). These were berthed at Area 20. They would slip at H-13 hours, 10 minutes and join S13 outside the gate. 5 X LST towing 5 X Rhino were berthed at Area 26N. They would slip at H-13 hours. 40 minutes was allowed for passing tows and they would pass Spithead Gate at H-12 hours. HMS Campbell was berthed at Area 26N. She would slip at H-12 hours, 20 minutes and sail with the LSTs. Trawlers Northern Gem and Northern Gift were berthed at Area 31 (outside the gate) and would join convoy S13 as it passed. Convoy S14A. 4 X LST towing 4 X Rhino were berthed at Area 26. They would slip at H-7 hours. Time was allowed to pass tows before they passed Spithead Gate at H-6 hours. Trawlers Northern Reward and Hugh Walpole were berthed in Area 31 (outside the gate). They would join Convoy S13 outside the gate. Convoy S14B. 5 X LST. 5 X LCI(L) HMS Lavender. These were berthed at Area 26N. They would slip at H-10minutes and pass Spithead Gate at H+30minutes. Convoy S15. 3 X LST and HMS Pennywort were berthed at Area 23N. They would slip at H+4 hours and pass Spithead Gate at H+4 hours, 30 minutes. Convoy S16. 5 X LST and a LCI(L) were berthed at Area 23N. They would sail in Company with the Portsmouth portion of Convoy L5. Convoy S17. 2 X LCI(L) would sail in Company with the Portsmouth portion of Convoy L1. Notes: Coast Guard Cutters (US) were berthed at Poole but sailed previously so as to be in company with their appropriate convoy before the latter proceeded. They were all 83” cutters to act as rescue craft. The orders state: ‘US Coast Guard Cutters will accompany groups of LSI, LST and LCI(L) to pick up survivors. No other ships will stop but may drop rafts if required. Military survivors will be taken forward and landed after the assault. Facilities exist for re equipment.’ (Being shipwrecked is no excuse for shirking then.) LCT convoys were allowed 20 minutes outside the gate for forming up. Once all the assault group convoys had sailed you might imagine that the Solent would be empty. In fact there were a large number of Motor Transport Ships, Personnel Ships, Motor Transport Coasters, Ammunition Coasters and Ammunition Coasters waiting to cross the Channel and more preloaded coasters arriving from ports and harbours on the Thames and East Coast. Soon the ships and craft of the assault groups would return to embark more vehicles and personnel for the cross Channel Shuttle Service. Mike.
