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Dieppe Raid, 19th August, 1942


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#1 17thDYRCH

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Posted 16 August 2010 - 02:34 PM

Three days to the anniversary of the Dieppe Raid.

If this topic has already been covered at length, perhaps the Mods can direct me to the thread.

I visited Dieppe several years ago. The natural defences ensured that the attack would be doomed from the outset. Canadian and British losses were staggering.

Question to the forum.
Did Operation Jubilee contribute in any way to the success of Operation Overlord? Was the sacrifice of 3645 soldiers ( figure does not include airman or sailors ) either killed, wounded or captured worh it?

Dieppe Raid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Edited by 17thDYRCH, 16 August 2010 - 03:13 PM.
needed to complete the question

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#2 Tom Canning

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Posted 16 August 2010 - 04:02 PM

Randy -
if anything it taught that Tanks should not be landed on pebble beaches - the whole thing had been cancelled by Monty as being unsecure- then the egotistical Mountbatten took over - and we all know the results - we then left a bunch of Churchill Tanks lying around for further study by the enemy - Monty still got the blame somehow but he had already taken over the 8th Army (12th August) by that time - miles away in the desert !

Cheers
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#3 dbf

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Posted 16 August 2010 - 04:48 PM

If this topic has already been covered at length, perhaps the Mods can direct me to the thread.


Here are a few
http://www.ww2talk.c...nniversary.html
http://www.ww2talk.c...us-rangers.html
http://www.ww2talk.c...aid-dieppe.html
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#4 17thDYRCH

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Posted 16 August 2010 - 06:23 PM

dbf,
thanks for posting the previous threads.

Randy
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#5 Gerry Chester

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 01:16 AM

Hello Randy - welcome to the Forum.

The effect of Dieppe's chert (not pebble) beach on the Churchil tanks is frequently overstated as, of the twenty-seven that made it ashore, fifteen successfully climbed onto the promenade, only four failing to do so directly due to a build up of chert. It is a matter for conjecture what may have been the outcome had the road blocks at the town entrances been destroyed as planned.

You asked "Did Operation Jubilee contribute in any way to the success of Operation Overlord?" Thankfully Winston Churchill realised that it did.
Dwelling on the lessons to be learned he wrote: ‘It was a costly but not unfruitful reconnaissance in force. Tactically it was a mine of experience. It taught us to build in good time various new types of craft and appliances for later use. Team work was the secret for success. This could only be provided by trained and organized amphibious fomations. All thes lessons were taken to heart.."

The Prime Minister, recalling an article written by Liddell Hart entitled 'We have wasted brains', went into action. It took all of Churchill's persuasive power to get a Lance Corporal in the Chipping Campden Home Guard to agree to return to the regular army. He was successful - Major General Percy Hobart returned to active duity to again take command of 79 Armoured Divisiion!

Cheers, Gerry
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#6 Drew5233

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 07:08 AM

Just a quick plug:

After the Battle do an excellent little ish book on Dieppe with lots of most excellent pictures that are easy to find via a map provided to do 'Then and Nows'.
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#7 17thDYRCH

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 11:30 AM

Gerry,
Thanks for the update. Maybe, the lighter Shermans would have been more successful handing the beach area?
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#8 Drew5233

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 11:48 AM

Here's a link to the book I mentioned Randy:

After the Battle - Online Store

I'm pretty sure they have published some magazines to that go into more detail. I believe the company have a Canadian distribution so you don't need to order from the UK.

Have a good look around their website-They are quality books, as I found out to my cost.
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#9 Harry Ree

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 12:44 PM

All failures can be pronounced as having a dimension of success in them by those involved and responsible for the plan and operation but it is hard to extoll the successes for us at Dieppe except that it proved beyond doubt that the Allies could not take a port successfully and use it as a bridgehead for an invasion of Europe.Cherbourg proved this to be right for the port was severely wrecked by the German garrison.It took nearly 3 months to get Cherbourg port repaired to receive Allied shipping and supplies.

From this lesson,the plans were immediately laid down to develop and transport a mobile port facility to the intended bridgeheads.Hence the Mulberry harbour projects.

It was also further thought that the decision not to bomb the town was an error.The reason for this was that it was thought that damaged buildings and rubble would impede the progress of tanks into the town while as it was, the town,undamaged was an advantage to the defenders.

Additionally the task given to the Canadians to get their armour over the bridge at Pourville,throught the tank obstacles at the bottom of the hill,then up the hill into Dieppe would have been impossible on the day.Then the Canadians had the difficult task to force themselves up the narrow ravine at Puys which was well defended at its mouth.
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#10 canuck

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 01:45 PM

All failures can be pronounced as having a dimension of success in them by those involved and responsible for the plan and operation but it is hard to extoll the successes for us at Dieppe except that it proved beyond doubt that the Allies could not take a port successfully and use it as a bridgehead for an invasion of Europe.Cherbourg proved this to be right for the port was severely wrecked by the German garrison.It took nearly 3 months to get Cherbourg port repaired to receive Allied shipping and supplies.

From this lesson,the plans were immediately laid down to develop and transport a mobile port facility to the intended bridgeheads.Hence the Mulberry harbour projects.

It was also further thought that the decision not to bomb the town was an error.The reason for this was that it was thought that damaged buildings and rubble would impede the progress of tanks into the town while as it was, the town,undamaged was an advantage to the defenders.

Additionally the task given to the Canadians to get their armour over the bridge at Pourville,throught the tank obstacles at the bottom of the hill,then up the hill into Dieppe would have been impossible on the day.Then the Canadians had the difficult task to force themselves up the narrow ravine at Puys which was well defended at its mouth.


Well said Harry

While there is no question that some important lessons were learned at Dieppe, Canadian veterans will tell you that much of the so called 'success' claimed for the raid was simply to offer some justification for the debacle. Many of those apparent lessons are so self evident that it stretches credibility to believe that the result could not have been predicted.
Having stood on the beach at Puys it borders on being an act of insanity to have ordered that hopeless assault.
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#11 martin14

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 03:09 PM

Well said Harry

Having stood on the beach at Puys it borders on being an act of insanity to have ordered that hopeless assault.


I'll agree with that statement, the list of errors that even laymen can spot borders on the comic.. but ends in the tragic.

Shall we consider the list of major errors ?

1. Parachute drop, arranged then canceled.
2. No preliminary bombardment.
3. Straight on frontal assault, the WW1 guys would have been proud :mad:
I guess no one thought the majority of German troops would be organized there
4. Poor intelligence of the area.
5. No campaign of disinformation to distract the enemy.
6. No control of the air.
7. Badly deployed smoke screens.
8. Bad communications.
9. Bad timing for arrivals, no surprise and no dark.


I don't think I need to continue.


Lessons learned ? Who was the band of idiots so stupid that they
needed this to learn from ?

Any way, we can at least remember the brave men from the different
units who sacrificed themselves at Dieppe:


2nd Infantry Division

Royal Regiment of Canada
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
Essex Scottish Regiment
Fusiliers Mont-Royal
Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada
South Saskatchewan Regiment
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada
Calgary Highlanders
Toronto Scottish Regiment (Machine Gun)
14th Armoured Regiment (Calgary Regiment)
Detachment of 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Detachment of 4th Field Regiment
Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps


And of course, the RAF, RN, 3 and 4 Commando including the Rangers.
Apologies if I forgot anyone.
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#12 17thDYRCH

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Posted 17 August 2010 - 03:50 PM

Harry, Martin14, Canuck,

Thanks for adding to this post.
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#13 jonheyworth

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Posted 18 August 2010 - 08:11 AM

quite,

stand at Puys and even my totally non interested, 100% non military minded wife said " What **** decided to attack THIS place " !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!?????????????????????
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#14 17thDYRCH

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Posted 18 August 2010 - 11:01 AM

I had the same reaction when I was there several years ago
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#15 canuck

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Posted 19 August 2010 - 02:34 PM

Jon,

Puys is one of those places where you 'have to see it to believe it'. No amount of reading can prepare you for the visual impact of looking up from that beach and the 'fishbowl' effect created from the surrounding heights.

I had the privilege of being there with a Royal Regiment veteran who was no less bitter about the event after 65 years. He remains angry over the useless waste of good men. He fired a Bren from that beach until both wounds and no ammunition incapacitated him. He is adamant that they had no chance whatsoever of getting off that beach. The pillbox in the the attached photo was one of many which could enfilade the entire beach.

Your wife clearly saw that place in the same way everyone else has......except the planners!

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#16 jonheyworth

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Posted 19 August 2010 - 03:07 PM

and when I pointed out to here the enveloping cliffs had retreated considerably since 1942 so in fact it was less of a fairground duck range today than in 1942 !
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#17 17thDYRCH

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Posted 19 August 2010 - 03:12 PM

Canuck,

Many thanks for posting the pics.

Randy
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#18 Harry Ree

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Posted 19 August 2010 - 04:37 PM

The photographs show the three tiers of bunkers which the defender were able to inflict murderous fire on those landing at the mouth of the ravine..Postwar,the ravine has been developed with modern housing and I would think that it would more accurate to describe it in 1942 as a gully.It may have been similar to the gully at Bruneval which has not seen the same type of development to the present day.

The very house at the top apparently used to be owned by the Brition at one time.
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#19 canuck

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Posted 20 August 2010 - 03:13 AM

Of the 554 Royals who landed at Puys (26 Officers & 528 ORs) only 64 (12%) returned to England and 37 of those were wounded, two of them fatally.
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#20 Gerry Chester

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Posted 20 August 2010 - 01:26 PM

Randy having posted this question to the forum. Did Operation Jubilee contribute in any way to the success of Operation Overlord? Was the sacrifice of 3645 soldiers (figure does not include airman or sailors) either killed, wounded or captured worth it?, it called for a civilised discussion rather than castigating the decision makers and/or those who planned the operation who only had the experience of Gallipoli upon which to build. There were no text-books available, and no old hands to initiate them into experiences of the last war. A new technique had to be evolved and lessons had to be learned in the hard school of practice. It is also necessary to remember that the Allies were under intense pressure from Stalin at the time.

Quoting Samuel Johnson: You may abuse a tragedy though you cannot write. You may scold a carpenter who has made you a table, though you cannot make a table. It is not your trade to make tables."

It is always easy for one to criticize or pass judgement from a position of hindsight - Monday morning quarterbacks as they are called in the US - especially when some of the problems encountered at Dieppe are so obvious to the layman many years later. Fortunately the Prime Minister wasted no time getting together with experts, especially Lieutenant Colonel J. Holland, Major (later Major General Sir) Millis Jefferiis, and Stuart MacCrae,to examine in detail every aspect of the raid and what could be done to ensure any future landings did not have the same disastrous outcome. Several groups to accomplish this end were created, Churchill making it abundantly clear their remit was, having examined in detail what and why happened, to come up with answers to what was necessary to minimise any future repetition.

With the lesson learned not to attempt a landing against a port, one group’s task was to find a way how to land a large number of men and vehicles over beaches and to ensure a continuous flow of supplies thereafter. Hence came Mulberry, the floating road, and the underwater pipe line.

Another group’s task was first to analyze why the number of casualties, especially suffered by the Canadian infantry, had been so terribly high, and then determine what were the steps necessary to be taken to lessen them in future operations. Hence came Hobart’s ‘Funnies’.

The following from Canada’s prestigious Juno Beach Centre is relevant:

“Dieppe was a pathetic failure. Sixty years later, it seems obvious that Jubilee was a bizarre operation with no chance of success whatsoever and likely to result in a huge number of casualties. In August 1942, British and Allied officers did not have yet the knowledge and combat experience to make a proper assessment of the risks of such an operation. This catastrophe was useful precisely in providing that knowledge which was later to make victory possible.

The Dieppe fiasco demonstrated that it was imperative to improve communications at all levels: on the battlefield, between the HQs of each unit, between air, naval and ground forces. The idea of capturing a well-defended seaport to use as a bridgehead was dropped after August 19th,1942. In addition, the raid on Dieppe showed how important it was to use prior air bombings to destroy enemy defences as much as possible, to support assault troops with artillery fire from ships and landing crafts, to improve techniques and equipment to remove obstacles to men and tanks.

The true meaning of the sacrifices made at Dieppe was made obvious two years after this ill-fated date, when on D-Day the Allies gained a foothold in Europe to free the continent from Nazi aggression.”

There is no doubt in the minds of Canadians who returned to Dieppe on D-Day, but for the sacrifice of nine-hundred and seven fellow Canadians who gave their lives two years earlier, they too may well have suffered much greater casualties as did the US Forces who spurned the use of Hobart’s ‘Funnies].

To answer your question Randy recourse to two War Cabinet records, available at the National Archives, is suggested.

Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers: CAB 65/31/18

Cabinet Memorandum: S.O.E. assistance to "Overlord". CAB 66/56/20

Gerry

Edited by Gerry Chester, 20 August 2010 - 03:55 PM.

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#21 Stormbird

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Posted 22 August 2010 - 07:27 AM

[FONT="]Here is the story of the raid from the viewpoint of 332(N) sqd:[/FONT][FONT="]
[/FONT]
[FONT="]In the evening of the 18th August the pilots were briefed on Operation Jubilee: Canadian Special Forces and British commandos were to be landed on the coast and attack Dieppe at first light the next day. The fighter pilots were tasked to protect the landing operation against German air raids. The outcome of the operation was depending on maintaining air superiority. The whole picture would give an idea of the strength of powers after three years of war.[/FONT]
[FONT="]The pilots went to bed early, but few got a good night’s sleep. The ground crews worked hard all through the night to get all the planes combat ready.[/FONT]
[FONT="]At 0620 hrs the squadron took off and half an hour later they were involved in intense dog - fights over Dieppe. Four hectic missions were flown before the ground fights diminished in the evening.[/FONT]
[FONT="]It was a hard and negative experience for the Allies, with more than 4000 dead and injured. The German defence works were far too strong and Allied cooperation suffered from fatal weaknesses.[/FONT]
[FONT="]It had also been a major air battle where the Luftwaffe showed they were not weakened at all.[/FONT]
[FONT="]The Norwegian 132 Air Wing was however very pleased with itself. The two Norwegian squadrons (331 and 332) had achieved the best results of all the Allies: 15 German a/c were confirmed shot down, 3 probable and 14 damaged. Six Norwegian Spitfires were lost, but all the pilots were saved.[/FONT]

[FONT="]This news article appeared in a Canadian newspaper:[/FONT]
[FONT="]Down 14 Nazis At Dieppe[/FONT]
[FONT="]Probably destroyed four more and damaged 10[/FONT]
[FONT="]- 15 P.C. of Enemy’s Losses[/FONT]
[FONT="]Two Norwegian fighter squadrons manned by young Norsemen, who[/FONT]
[FONT="]received their training at Toronto’s Little Norway, are officially[/FONT]
[FONT="]credited the destruction of fourteen German planes during the air[/FONT]
[FONT="]battles over Dieppe on August 19.[/FONT]
[FONT="]The announcement was made officially yesterday by Royal Norwegian[/FONT]
[FONT="]Air Force Headquarters in London, England, and transmitted to Little[/FONT]
[FONT="]Norway today.[/FONT]
[FONT="]In addition to definite credits, four enemy planes probably[/FONT]
[FONT="]destroyed and ten more damaged make the independent Norwegian[/FONT]
[FONT="]squadrons responsible for 15 per cent of the total losses inflicted[/FONT]
[FONT="]on Axis planes during the day-long encounter.[/FONT]

Source: 332 sqd 60th Anniversary booklet issued in 2002 (translated into English)
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#22 17thDYRCH

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Posted 22 August 2010 - 11:47 AM

Gerry, thanks for adding a British perspective. I will check out the War Cabinet records.

Randy
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#23 17thDYRCH

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Posted 22 August 2010 - 11:49 AM

Stormbird,
thanks for adding to the post.

Randy
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#24 canuck

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Posted 25 August 2010 - 03:18 AM

Dieppe was a pathetic failure. Sixty years later, it seems obvious that Jubilee was a bizarre operation with no chance of success whatsoever and likely to result in a huge number of casualties. In August 1942, British and Allied officers did not have yet the knowledge and combat experience to make a proper assessment of the risks of such an operation. This catastrophe was useful precisely in providing that knowledge which was later to make victory possible.


I maintain that the 'lessons learned' justification was the cover story designed to shield Combined Ops from criticism. It has been repeated, overused and simply doesn't stand up to close examination.

Canadian historian Jack Gratatstein:

"Assaults from the sea were nothing new in 1942. The U.S. Marine Corps. had a developed doctrine for such attacks, and the British themselves had staged seaborne attacks in the Great War. Who could have believed that tactical surprise was all that was necessary to get 5,000 men ashore on defended beaches? By what planning principles did the staff decide that a relative handful of aircraft could provide air support and that eight destroyers could give sufficient covering fire? This was recognized in the original plan and later withdrawn.
More to the point, what fool decided to attack Dieppe? No one who has stood on the stony beach in front of Dieppe -- as hundreds of thousands of British vacationers had done for a century before 1942 -- could have failed to notice the cliffs that commanded the Canadians' landing areas. Where else would the Germans have placed their weaponry? Dieppe was a failure of intelligence, a "gross lapse in command sense and leadership," historian Bill McAndrew has correctly noted. Yes, there were lessons learned from Dieppe, but most of them would have been obvious to a second lieutenant fresh out of officer cadet classes."


There is also evidence to suggest that it was a vaguely conceived operation, the rationale for which was largely produced after the fact to protect careers. The shear weight of critical errors cannot be excused for such a costly operation.
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#25 17thDYRCH

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Posted 25 August 2010 - 09:55 AM

Canuck,
I am in total agreement. The operation was doomed from the start.
Cheers from Toronto
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#26 Simon_Fielding

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Posted 25 August 2010 - 12:06 PM

Excellent post Gerry.
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#27 Carl Schwamberger

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Posted 27 August 2010 - 01:55 AM

All failures can be pronounced as having a dimension of success in them by those involved and responsible for the plan and operation but it is hard to extoll the successes for us at Dieppe except that it proved beyond doubt that the Allies could not take a port successfully and use it as a bridgehead for an invasion of Europe.Cherbourg proved this to be right for the port was severely wrecked by the German garrison.It took nearly 3 months to get Cherbourg port repaired to receive Allied shipping and supplies.


Cherbourg was entered by the advance party of the 1056th Engineer Port Construction & Reapair Group 27 June. The first cargo was llightered ashore across beaching ramps by DUKW vehicals 16 July. The ‘three months’ of cited refers vaguely to the peak intake rate reached in September. In early September a average daily intake ammounting to 25,000 tons per month was achieved. This was reoughly three times the peacetime capacity of Cherbourg or 8,000 to 10,000 tons permonth. A average daily intal of 8,000 tons permonth was reached by early August. The 25,000 ton intake exceeded the plans for Cherbourg & was reached by use of material & enginer units intended for the Breaton port group, which could not be developed in july & August as planned

I’d recommend Ruppenthal ‘Logistical Support of the Armies’ as a starting place for reading up on the supply of the Allied armies for Overlord.

From this lesson,the plans were immediately laid down to develop and transport a mobile port facility to the intended bridgeheads.Hence the Mulberry harbour projects.


The planning begain much earlier. The problems of supplying expeditionary armies in littoral or coastal warfare had long been understood. Some folks probablly mistook that modern developments abrogated the long proven principles of warfare & Dieppe proved them wrong. The Brits begain studying a return to the continent by early 1941 and development of prefabricated harbors started then, not post Dieppe.
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#28 Carl Schwamberger

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Posted 27 August 2010 - 02:00 AM

I maintain that the 'lessons learned' justification was the cover story designed to shield Combined Ops from criticism. It has been repeated, overused and simply doesn't stand up to close examination.

Canadian historian Jack Gratatstein:
Quote:
"Assaults from the sea were nothing new in 1942. The U.S. Marine Corps. had a developed doctrine for such attacks, and the British themselves had staged seaborne attacks in the Great War. Who could have believed that tactical surprise was all that was necessary to get 5,000 men ashore on defended beaches? By what planning principles did the staff decide that a relative handful of aircraft could provide air support and that eight destroyers could give sufficient covering fire? This was recognized in the original plan and later withdrawn.
More to the point, what fool decided to attack Dieppe? No one who has stood on the stony beach in front of Dieppe -- as hundreds of thousands of British vacationers had done for a century before 1942 -- could have failed to notice the cliffs that commanded the Canadians' landing areas. Where else would the Germans have placed their weaponry? Dieppe was a failure of intelligence, a "gross lapse in command sense and leadership," historian Bill McAndrew has correctly noted. Yes, there were lessons learned from Dieppe, but most of them would have been obvious to a second lieutenant fresh out of officer cadet classes."


There is also evidence to suggest that it was a vaguely conceived operation, the rationale for which was largely produced after the fact to protect careers. The shear weight of critical errors cannot be excused for such a costly operation.


The last line in Gratatstein's remarks is classic. The preinciples of amphibious warfare had been understood since Roman times or more likely the Summerian era. The British had conducted dozens of amphibious invasions over several centuries. The only lesson of Dieppe was that the basics still applied.
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#29 Carl Schwamberger

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Posted 27 August 2010 - 02:42 AM

....
[FONT="]It had also been a major air battle where the Luftwaffe showed they were not weakened at all. ...[/FONT]

So the air plan sucked too.
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#30 Ron Goldstein

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Posted 27 August 2010 - 06:49 AM

Following on Gerry's excellent summary of the Dieppe raid I must mention a series of coincidences that have led me to make this posting.

On Sept 6th I shall be attending my old boy's club reunion and, as always, the table talk will get around to former members who are no longer here to join in our talk of WW2. At my particular table, because we have several vets there, Jack Nissenthal's name is invariably brought to mind.

I was recently interviewed, about the club, on spitalfieldslife.com and the interviewer known only by his pseudonym of "The Gentle Author" was intrigued by the story of Jack Nissenthal, a former club boy, who was taken to Dieppe to find out about German radar accompanied by a special troop who had instructions to kill him rather than allow him to be taken prisoner. He also placed a link on his Blog so that others might read the story.

A well known authority on Jack's history is Martin Sugarman and his newly published book "Fighting Back" contains a full chapter on Jack's exploits.

I've also just been to Wikipedia and on the pages relating to Dieppe found this item:
Dieppe Raid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I was amused to find that footnote No.13 took the reader to the BBC WW2 Archives to an article that I had previously posted myself on behalf of Martin Sugarman ! (Note the actual footnote number may alter but watch for the "Goldstein" text)

The Wikipedia excerpt now follows:

Pourville radar station
Posted Image Posted Image
Destroyed Landing craft on fire with Canadian dead on the beach. A concrete gun emplacement on the right covers the whole beach. The steep gradient can clearly be judged


One of the objectives of the Dieppe Raid was to discover the importance and accuracy of a German radar station on the cliff-top to the east of the town of Pourville. To achieve this, RAF Flight Sergeant Jack Nissenthall, a radar specialist, was attached to the South Saskatchewan Regiment. He was to attempt to enter the radar station and learn its secrets, accompanied by a small unit of 11 men of the Saskatchewans as bodyguards. Nissenthall volunteered for the mission fully aware that, due to the highly sensitive nature of his knowledge of Allied radar technology, his Saskatchewan bodyguard unit were under orders to kill him if necessary to prevent him being captured. He also carried a cyanide pill as a last resort. Nissenthall and his bodyguards failed to enter the radar station due to strong defences, but Nissenthall was able to crawl up to the rear of the station under enemy fire and cut all telephone wires leading to it. This forced the crew inside to resort to radio transmissions to talk to their commanders, transmissions which were intercepted by listening posts on the south coast of England. The Allies were able to learn a great deal about the arrays of German radar stations along the channel coast thanks to this one simple act, which helped to convince Allied commanders of the importance of developing radar jamming technology. Of this small unit only Nissenthall and one other returned safely to England.[10][11].

Edited by Ron Goldstein, 23 August 2011 - 04:34 AM.

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:peepwalla:

 

I was "called-up", as a 19 year old, on the 1st of Oct 1942 and was one of 5 serving brothers, one of whom, Jack, was in RAF Bomber Command and was killed on March 16th 1945.

I served as a Driver/Op (Wireless Operator) with the 49th Light Anti Aircraft Rgt. (78 Div) from Apr 1943 to Dec 1944 (North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Egypt). The Regiment was disbanded in Dec 1944 and I was retrained (in Italy) by the Royal Armoured Corps.

 

Finally, I served as Loader/Op with the 4th Queen's Own Hussars (6th Armd.,78th & 56 Div) from Mar 1945 to Dec 1946 (Italy, Austria, Germany) finishing up as Tech Cpl. for "A" Sqdrn.  I was "De-mobbed" in Apr 1947

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